This paper attempts to provide an overview of significant recent developments in US policy towards South Asia and their implications for India. It examines the proposed cooperation between India and the US, focusing on advanced technology issues. It also places this issue in the context of US-Pakistan ties, as this provides a relevant referent for comparison. This paper concludes that while the US and India are formally expanding their strategic cooperation, the results on the ground are still not in step with the rhetoric.

Before and during World War II, India was one of the many territorial commands of the British imperial defence system. When India became independent, the country was totally reliant on Britain for its armaments for the three services. There was some left over equipment of the US armed forces from the World War II period – Dakota aircraft, some Sherman tanks and transport vehicles.

The conceptual discourse, contributed to in the main by Western scholars, on the security and strategic stability of new nuclear weapon states like India and Pakistan seems alarmist. In reality, however, India and Pakistan have been mutually deliberating on various aspects of nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs). This article is an effort to identify the issues of nuclear security concerns in two spheres – academic and policy formulations. The emphasis is more on the nuclear thinking of the two countries and the diplomatic challenges ahead particularly on the nuclear CBMs.

An attempt has been made in this article to assess the arguments in favour of a fundamental shift in Indo-US relations by revisiting the history of their bilateral relations since its formative period and comparing it with the present period. The paper strongly argues that the Indian decision to go nuclear in May 1998 played a catalytic role in bringing the two democracies together. It was Shakti 1998, which changed the entire scenario and augmented for a changed US policy towards South Asia, especially towards India.

In the background of former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s obituary tribute to P.V. Narasimha Rao acknowledging the latter as the true father of Shakti nuclear test of May 11, 1998, let me recall Rao’s role in the development of the Indian nuclear deterrent as narrated by him. This is important in order to understand the correct historical perspective about very important decisions of the past; in this case, Rao’s account of the evolution of the nuclear policy during his term of office.

The post-Cold War period has witnessed significant maritime developments. The intensification of trade-linked development and the entry into force of the Laws of the Seas in 1994 led to state interests being increasingly identified with freedom of navigation and ocean resources, thus making maritime issues a major subset of national security. Events leading to 9/11 saw the addition of an amorphous dimension to existing threats, expanding the ambit of maritime security.

Unlike other aspects of non-traditional security, energy security has been very closely linked with military security. Very often, it is the powerful state-consumers seeking to preserve an uninterrupted supply of energy at an affordable price, who threaten and use military force. At times, it is individuals and groups within the energy-producing countries seeking to resist energy-driven foreign interventions, who disrupt the supplies. The energy-military security nexus is at its peak in the present circumstances - mainly in Iraq, but also in the energy-rich West Asia.

The centre of gravity of global economic growth is rapidly shifting to the Asian continent. The transition is led by China and India which have propelled themselves onto a robust growth trajectory to be fuelled by affordable energy supplies. These developments have been accompanied by a fortuitous but significant growth in the sources of global energy supply, thanks to the re-emergence of Russia as the new petrostate and the discovery of substantial energy deposits in the Caspian and Central Asian Republics.

India’s policy with Southeast Asia, which took a distinctive shape since the early 1990s in the form of the Look East policy, has been a multipronged approach encompassing political, strategic and economic aspects. Apart from establishing institutional linkages with ASEAN and strengthening bilateral relations with its member states, especially in the field of defence, India has been an enthusiastic participant and supporter of multilateralism in Asia-Pacific.