Economic globalisation, coupled with geopolitical instability and international terrorism, has made it impossible for any single country to secure its energy supply entirely on its own. The urgent energy security issue has resulted in brisk energy diplomacy with aspirations for cooperation running high among both producing and consuming countries. The concept of energy security needs to be expanded, however, because the real risks are not 'below ground' (a lack of resources) but 'above ground' (political instability). We need a new energy security concept to ensure global energy security.

China's efforts to build 'nodes' of influence in the Indian Ocean Region have been increasingly discernible in recent years. This endeavour, many argue, is driven by Beijing's military-strategic ends. However, such an argument remains a speculation, backed by frail and somewhat disjointed evidence. At least in the public domain, it may be too early to marshal tangible evidence to prove or dismiss the hypothesis.

Today, it is necessary for India to respond to the current crisis of the NPT and weigh its options vis-a-vis the Treaty. This paper is an attempt to explore answers to the question of what ought to be India's policy in the light of the new nuclear reality. It analyses three policy options that India could pursue and concludes that India must strive to join the NPT as a nuclear weapon country, because joining the non-proliferation regime by evading the NPT is likely to prove costly and is also unlikely to remove destabilizing irritants.