Uttam Kumar Sinha replies: A riparian treaty is entered into to allay the following fears/concerns:

1. Water sharing: For a lower riparian country, the share of water that it gets from the upper riparian is of great concern. Water is largely linked to agriculture and hence water security is also food security. Fears and apprehensions always remain. If the lower riparian is economically and militarily weaker than its upper riparian, it will seek a treaty or water sharing arrangement and the involvement of a third party to ensure the treaty's effectiveness, for example the Indus Water Treaty. But, if the lower riparian is relatively powerful in the basin then it can dictate terms, like Egypt in the Nile basin. Some powerful upper riparian countries like China do not have any water treaty with its lower riparian and deliberately chose not to have any sharing arrangement except for some MoUs.

2. Sharing of hydrological data: This is a big concern given the impact of climate change. Lower riparian would like to be informed on the changing profile of the rivers in the upper reaches. Such information helps them to be prepared for eventual flood disaster, etc. Withholding information is a tool of coercion and upper riparian can exploit its hydrological position to harm the lower riparian.

3. The general principles of water sharing as captured by the above two concerns are: principle of limited sovereignty over water resources and the principle of 'no significant harm'.

Ashok Kumar Behuria replies: I. K. Gujral served as India's Minister of External Affairs in the cabinets of V.P. Singh (5 December 1989-10 December 1990) and H. D. Devegowda (1 June 1996-21 April 1997. He went on to become Prime Minister in April 1997 and retained the foreign ministry (21 April 1997-18 March 1998).

During his tenure as foreign minister, he adopted accommodative policy vis-à-vis India’s neighbours. Gujral’s policy of non-reciprocal accommodation led to the signing of a 30 year treaty between India and Bangladesh on December 12, 1996. In fact, the 1977 treaty on water sharing between India and Bangladesh (after extensions in 1982 and 1985) had lapsed in 1988 and negotiations could not succeed because of inflexibility on both sides. He even ensured Bhutanese consent for digging of a canal from a Bhutanese river to augment the flow of water to Ganga and showed his willingness to revise the controversial Mahakali treaty with Nepal which was received well in Nepal.

In his famous Chatham House speech in London in September 1996, Gujral outlined his approach towards the neighbours and stated:

"The United Front Government’s neighbourhood policy now stands on five basic principles: First, with the neighbours like Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity but gives all that it can in good faith and trust. Secondly, no South Asian country will allow its territory to be used against the interest of another country of the region. Thirdly, none will interfere in the internal affairs of another. Fourthly, all South Asian countries must respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. And finally, they will settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations. These five principles, scrupulously observed, will, I am sure, recast South Asia’s regional relationship, including the tormented relationship between India and Pakistan, in a friendly, cooperative mould."

Gujral reiterated these five principles later in another speech at Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS), Colombo in January 1997. Such policy of accommodation was called ‘Gujral doctrine’ by noted Indian journalist Bhabani Sen Gupta in his article, “India in the Twenty First Century”, [International Affairs, Vol. 73, Issue 2, 1997, pp. 308-309].
Interestingly, Pakistan did not feature in the list of countries Gujral identified in his speech for non-reciprocal treatment. A perceptive analyst of south Asian politics, A. G. Noorani, held such measures as ‘cosmetic’ and ‘deceptive’ and argued that Gujral doctrine excluded Pakistan and was thus not a wholehearted effort to generate trust with all the neighbours. Some other analysts held that Gujral was unable to bring about any change primarily because of his inability to “convert the foreign policy bureaucracy” firmly wedded to the principles of security, national interests and major power status at the global level, “to the basic art of friendliness”. It was also alleged that the foreign office was more comfortable with the language of “hegemonic power” than “Gujral’s language of friendship and détente”.

Interestingly, however, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government (1998-2004) led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and and the United Progressive Alliance government (2004 - till date) led by Manmohan Singh have continued with Gujral’s foreign policy which laid emphasis on the need to have “a peaceful, stable and constructive environment in India’s neighbourhood” which is being regarded as “vital for the goals of accelerated development for India and the region”.

Rumel Dahiya replies: There are many definitions of Comprehensive National Power (CNP). As per one of the more acceptable definitions, CNP is "comprehensive capability of a country to pursue its strategic objectives by taking the necessary actions internationally". It can also be defined as "degree of ability to mobilize and utilize strategic resources of a country to realize national objectives." It provides an intrinsic analytical tool for identifying gaps and boundaries of national power and extrinsically balances interests in the international relations loop. Although there are different factors considered by different people to measure CNP, the most commonly accepted factors are: economy; military strength; internal cohesion; governance; human capital; science & technology; knowledge and information; geography and natural resources; foreign policy and diplomacy; and, national will and leadership. All these factors are consequential in denoting the power of a nation state in the present environment.

One of the first studies for measuring Comprehensive Index of Power was attempted by an American named Ray Cline in 1977. Subsequently it was modified by the Chinese think tanks, like China Academy of Social Sciences and Academy of Military Sciences. In India, the NSCS has also been publishing National Security Index from time to time.

The respective positions of various countries in all these studies vary. Therefore, it is not possible to state exactly the position of India in CNP index. However, it is commonly agreed that India is presently behind USA, China, Russia, Japan and Germany but has the potential to improve its position by overtaking the last three in about a decade or so. It will of course depend on taking adequate measures to fill the gaps and make course correction in policy implementation.

Meena Singh Roy replies: India, Iran and Russia signed the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) agreement on September 12, 2000. The agreement provides for the transit of goods through Iran and the Caspian Sea to Russia and Northern Europe. This agreement has been ratified by all the three signatories and has been in force since May 16, 2002.

The INSTC is an important gateway for India to Central Asia. The potential of this corridor is manifold, with India, Myanmar and Thailand also getting linked by road. This will boost trade between Europe and South East Asia as well. As compared to the route through Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea that is currently used, the INSTC is much shorter and cost-effective. It is 40 per cent shorter and 30 per cent cheaper. From India’s point of view, the North-South Corridor not only helps India bypass Pakistan and yet reach out to Central Asia but also enables it to transport goods at a cheaper cost to the European markets. At present there are many missing links in this route. Member countries are working to address the problem areas to make full use of the corridor.

R.N. Das replies: There has been continuity in relations between India and North Korea, irrespective of change in leaderships. Peace and stability in the Korean peninsula has always been a matter of abiding interest to India. It may be recalled that a special session of Indian Parliament was convened on July 31, 1950 to discuss the Korean crisis. Drawing the attention of the House, the then President Dr. Rajendra Prasad had noted that Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru has appealed to the Russian Prime Minister Joseph Stalin and to the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson that the authorities of these two great countries should use their influence to localise the armed struggle in Korea, and break the dead lock in the UN Security Council over the admission of the People’s Republic of China, so that the present international tension might be eased and way is opened up for the resolution of the Korean problem by discussion in the Security Council.

India was appointed as Chairman of the 9-member UN commission to hold elections in Korea in 1954. After the Korean war of 1950-53, India had played an important role as the chairman of the NNRC (Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission). Consular relations with DPRK were set up on March 1, 1962 and full diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on December 10, 1973. Relations between India and the DPRK have been generally characterised by friendship, cooperation and understanding. India has been extending humanitarian assistance to the DPRK, which has suffered from food shortages during the last few years as a result of natural calamities. The DPRK authorities have expressed their gratitude for India’s humanitarian assistance to them from time to time.