Northeast India

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  • Chittagong Tribunal Verdict and its Implications

    The verdict exposes a conspiracy to destabilise India’s restive North Eastern region. According to the charge-sheet, all the arms and ammunition were manufactured by Chinese firm NORINCO and the funds had been procured from Pakistan. Contrary to the BNP policy of promoting cross-border terrorism, the current Awami League (AL) government has demonstrated its zero-tolerance towards militancy through the recent verdict.

    April 03, 2014

    China at your doorstep: Looking east from India’s northeast

    Myanmar and India have followed separate political paths only to find it converging in recent times. Myanmar’s other neighbour China has had a much larger footprint in the country. India has to calibrate its engagement with Myanmar to not just effectively implement its Look East policy but also manage the contiguous border regions of Northeast India given the ground realities.

    March 18, 2014

    Anup Srivastav asked: How can BCIM corridor project boost strategic ties between India and Myanmar when it is believed to be aiding insurgency in India’s northeast?

    Udai Bhanu Singh replies: The cooperative principle behind the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) is based on the “principles of mutual trust and respect, mutual interest, equitable sharing of mutual benefits…..and securing win-win outcomes.” The BCIM-EC Joint Study Group, which held its first meeting in December 2013 in Kunming, China, is aimed at improving physical connectivity, trade in goods, services and investment (including finance), environmentally sustainable development and people-to-people contacts. However, this a double-edged sword because when connectivity is exploited to encourage drug trafficking, small arms trafficking and promoting insurgency, then the principle of “mutual trust” is compromised. Such a breach of trust can not and should not be ignored or underestimated. In order to ensure that connectivity is not misused, stringent rules and implementation mechanisms have to be put in place. This can be made possible through built-in safeguards and improved facilities and infrastructure at the border check-posts.

    Posted on March 13, 2014

    Need for action plan to counter KLO

    The recent violent incidents carried out by the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) in the sensitive eastern and north-eastern parts India have serious security implications. Conscious intervention of the centre in concert with the state governments of West Bengal and Assam and even Sikkim, as well as with cooperation of the Bhutan government is required at the earliest.

    February 28, 2014

    Anudeep asked: Under the sixth schedule of the Indian Constitution, how administration differs from a district to a regional council? Please explain in the context of the recent clash between Rengma Nagas and Karbis?

    Namrata Goswami replies: The Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution that functions under Article 244 (2) offers representative councils to the states of Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya and Tripura. The major difference between a district and a regional council is that while the district council covers a particular district, for instance, the Karbi Anglong District which witnessed the clash between the Karbis and the Rengmas in December 2013, the regional councils can be constituted by the governor of the state to cover regions which may compose of one particular ethnic community. An example is the demand by the Kuki National Army for a Kuki Regional Council. The idea of a regional council is that it transcends state borders to form councils based on the inhabited areas of a particular ethnic community.

    With regard to the clashes between the Rengmas and the Karbis, it started after nine Karbi youths were found murdered near Chumukedima in Nagaland. The dead included one Karbi student leader. In retaliation, some Karbi militant cadres attacked a Rengma village in Karbi Anglong. It must be noted that the Rengma Nagas have lived in Karbi Anglong for many decades now without violence between the two communities; but attacks on Karbi youths in Nagaland can bring about retaliation on a totally unrelated Naga tribe just because it owes allegiance to the larger Naga ethnic identity.

    Posted on February 12, 2014

    Drugs and the Golden Triangle: Renewed Concerns for Northeast India

    India’s security strategy for the economic corridors and connectivity will have to entail water tight anti-drugs control measures and mechanisms to snuff out the possibilities of surges in narcotics trafficking that may result from better connectivity and established networks of peoples across the region.

    February 10, 2014

    Internal Security Trends in 2013 and a Prognosis

    The internal security situation in India reflected a marked improvement in 2012-2013 relative to previous years. This Issue Brief offers an assessment of the major trends in 2013 for Jammu and Kashmir, the land borders of India, Naxalism, the Northeast, terrorism and radicalism in India. It also offers a prognosis for the year ahead.

    January 24, 2014

    Naga Violence: Reminiscent of ‘Wild West’

    The recent violence indicates that armed groups have not disarmed and that state forces are simply unable to keep “extortion” networks in check. While the cease-fire agreement signed in 1997 has been the harbinger of the subsequent peace talks, blatant violations of the agreement by the outfit render the framework of the talks weak and question its effectiveness and legitimacy.

    January 09, 2014

    Border Roads Organisation in the North-East: Need for Priority

    The importance of the road network in the north-east needs no emphasis. India is now raising the 17 Mountain Corps to augment its strategic strike capability vis-à-vis China. The BRO is the key instrument to realise the road network objective and provide the required logistical capability to this Corps.

    December 16, 2013

    Reduction in Expenditure on Internal Security in Nagaland: Is it Feasible?

    The State hardly has any `balance from its current revenues` to take on additional internal security expenditure or fund its own development activities. In this backdrop, the State has perforce to depend on the Centre to maintain a security establishment and sustain it on a long-term basis.

    December 03, 2013