Nuclear Proliferation

You are here

  • Share
  • Tweet
  • Email
  • Whatsapp
  • Linkedin
  • Prasad M.V. asked: When both MTCR & Hague Code of Conduct aim to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missile, what is the difference between them?

    A. Vinod Kumar replies: The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an export control grouping, on the lines of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), which issues norms and guidelines on the export (or transfer) of missiles and/or related materials and technologies. The Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC), as the nomenclature indicates, is a code of conduct expected of states in handling their ballistic missile systems or inventories.

    Nuclear Disarmament and Proliferation: Two Sides of the Same Coin

    Disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, has long been a dream of world ever since it witnessed the horrors of the effects of its use in the Second World War. Nuclear disarmament is likely to be the centre of debate at the forthcoming NPT Review Conference.

    March 2010

    A feeble approach

    The report provides useful documentation on nuclear issues but falls short of making recommendations which would speed up nuclear disarmament. This is not surprising considering that many of the Commissioners are from nuclear armed states or from ones which enjoy the comfort of a nuclear umbrella. Actually, the report may have the unintended impact of strengthening the hawks in nuclear and security establishments as it fails to put enough moral pressure on them to undertake drastic measures to achieve nuclear disarmament.

    March 18, 2010

    Nuclear Proliferation Challenges and India's Response

    India is uniquely placed in the international security and political environment as it neither falls within the NPT 'definition' of 'nuclear weapon states' nor is it a country that can be ignored in any international arrangement without taking into account the reality of its being a state with nuclear weapons capability. At a time when proliferation challenges are assuming disturbing levels, this article seeks to examine the policy options available for India to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

    September 2007

    India and the Proliferation Security Initiative: A US Perspective

    The article considers why New Delhi has shied away from full participation in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative despite compelling national interests in improving Indian maritime forces and cooperating with the United States at sea. Some factors examined are polarized domestic politics, Indians' ambivalence about non-proliferation arrangements that formerly targeted them, and New Delhi's desire for regional primacy. Until Indian leaders come to believe that the benefits of PSI participation outweigh its drawbacks, they will continue to hold the initiative at arm's length.

    March 2007

    Counterproliferation: India's New Imperatives and Options

    Despite its excellent record in the field of non-proliferation of technologies, know-how and equipment related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to other states, India has been essentially a passive actor in global non-proliferation initiatives. As a result, it does not as yet have a comprehensive framework or strategy within which it defines its anti-proliferation objectives.

    January 2007

    Closure of the Pakistan-Based A.Q. Khan Network Case: A Hasty Burial?

    North Korea’s and Iran’s showdown with the US and the West on the nuclear proliferation issue are closely related to their dubious proliferation connections with the Pakistan-based A Q Khan network. Yet, Pakistan has announced that the case against Khan and his proliferation cohorts is closed. To comprehensively understand the nonproliferation challenges, it is crucial that the details about the network’s operations as also about Khan’s associates as well as their benefactors are publicly revealed.

    April 2006

    Indo-US Nuclear Deal and Non-Proliferation

    Different views have been expressed by the American non-proliferation lobbyists on possible loss or gain from the Indo-US nuclear agreement. Would the agreement complicate global non-proliferation efforts as the critics argue or would it lead to a stronger front to deal with emerging non-proliferation challenges? To answer these questions it is necessary to examine the merits of the arguments put forward by the US non-proliferation lobby carefully.

    October 2005

    IAEA and Iran

    In a significant turn of events, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on September 24, 2005, adopted a resolution (22-1 with 12 countries abstaining) calling upon Iran to accelerate its cooperation with the Agency in terms of revealing its ‘secret’ nuclear programme failing which the issue will be referred to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).1 Althoug

    July 2005

    India and the Iranian Nuclear Standoff

    India’s September 24 vote in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supporting the resolution moved by Britain, France and Germany (EU-3) on Iran’s nuclear programme has a raised a significant debate within the strategic studies community on the value and wisdom of the policy stance.

    July 2005

    Pages

    Top