Kargil War

You are here

  • Share
  • Tweet
  • Email
  • Whatsapp
  • Linkedin
  • Print
  • KARGIL: Past Perfect, Future Uncertain?

    • Publisher: KW Publishers
    The Kargil conflict was fought 20 years ago. However, it continues to remain relevant for strategic analysts, military historians, academics, armed forces personnel and diplomats. This book, delves into the structures, planning processes and procedures adopted while pursuing diplomacy, higher direction of war and strategic communications, on both sides of the Line of Control during the Kargil conflict. In doing so, existing arguments are challenged and alternative conclusions drawn. This includes the debate around the decision not to cross the LoC during operations, the decision making process involved with the employment of air power and limitations of existing strategic communication structures of the armed forces, as observed during the conflict.

    The second part of the book employs Kargil and the succeeding 20 years, as the basis for analysing the changing character of war. This includes a study of its implications on the notion of victory and shifts needed while pursuing diplomacy, higher direction of war and strategic communications. It also introduces the concept of finite and infinite game theory to conflicts in the sub-continental context, in an attempt to contextualise it through a fresh perspective.

    • ISBN: 978-93-89137-13-2,
    • Price: ₹.880/-
    • E-copy available

    Restraining Kargil: Nuclear Caution in the Shadow of Kashmir

    The debate surrounding the stability of nuclear weapons has been a critical issue for the last half century. On the one hand, realists like Kenneth Waltz argue that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will foster greater stability due to the intrinsic deterrent logic associated with these weapons. The nuclear pessimists, on the other hand, argue that the accidental use of nuclear weapons and unstable regime types are a greater concern for the outbreak of nuclear war.

    July 2013

    Managing the 3Ms of Military Readiness

    Money, manpower and material (3Ms) determine a state's capacity to leverage its hard power for fulfilling its national security objectives.

    January 28, 2011

    Political Dimensions of Limited War

    While limitation in aims set is acknowledged as the primary way of conflict limitation, the point lost sight of usually on the politico-military facet is war termination.

    March 29, 2010

    The Army’s decade in review

    Over the short term, events in Pakistan dictate higher order readiness. In the middle term, equations have to be managed with China so as to gain time to get the second strike capability and infrastructure organised.

    November 30, 2009

    Conventional War in the Presence of Nuclear Weapons

    Nuclear weapons cannot obviate wars, but can change its complexion and influence the manner of its conduct. In order to keep nuclear weapons from entering into real warfare, it is important to intelligently judge an adversary's nuclear thresholds and to calibrate one's own conventional strikes. For India, the exploration of this space is particularly important in order to deny Pakistan a free hand to indulge in sub-conventional conflict even as it holds the threat of an all-out nuclear war against an Indian conventional response.

    May 2009

    India's Nuclear Doctrine: A Critical Analysis

    Although the broad contours of India's nuclear doctrine were announced within the days of May 1998 nuclear tests, the formal doctrine was made public only five years later. This article will critically examine the evolution of India's nuclear doctrine in terms of the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001-2002 military confrontation with Pakistan. This article concludes that the one-page nuclear doctrine of 2003 remains sketchy and subject to varied interpretations.

    May 2009

    Reflections on the Kargil War

    The Kargil conflict can be categorized as a 'limited war'. It was initiated by Pakistan to achieve mixed military and political objectives, but made important misjudgments that doomed the enterprise to failure. The questions discussed in this article are: why was India surprised; why did both countries observe such great restraint; did the Kargil conflict have a nuclear dimension; and is 'limited war' a viable concept with nuclear deterrence obtaining in South Asia. It also argues that the Kargil conflict was an exception, in some dimensions, to the 'stability-instability paradox'

    May 2009

    Kargil War: Reflections on the Tenth Anniversary

    Ten years later, the Kargil War still arouses deep emotions turning around Pakistan's gross perfidy, an intelligence failure, great heroism, military improvisation and innovation, a national upsurge, a most open inquiry leading to a comprehensive review of vital issues long closed to scrutiny and reform. Its report, prepared in record time, was uniquely presented to the nation as a commercial publication. (From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report, Sage, New Delhi, December 1999.)

    May 2009

    Kargil War: Reflections on the Tenth Anniversary

    In May 1998, India and Pakistan surprised the world by carrying out nuclear weapon tests. The tests were followed by two developments. The positive development was Lahore Summit in February 1999. In a simultaneous negative development, Pakistan initiated the Kargil war. Due to difficult terrain, inadequate intelligence and poor surveillance, it took time to clear the initial fog of war. Later, despite a self-imposed strategy, Indian forces responded with a resolve and daring that few believed was possible.

    May 2009