Russia’s new nuclear strategy is both a tactical and a strategic document. It leaves the door open for adversaries to recalibrate their strategies while giving Russia the scope to manoeuvre the ongoing turbulence in its ties with the US

In December 2015, the Russian Foreign Ministry revealed that Russia was engaging in intelligence sharing with the Taliban to counter the growing presence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.

The Kerry-Lavrov agreement did not work because those who had to cease fire were not willing to abide by it.

The new contours of a Russia-U.S. engagement appear to be shaping up. There is a growing realization in the U.S. that treating Russia as an adversary can be counter-productive.

Putin seems to have concluded that Russia must draw the line at Ukraine. The EU bid to sign trade agreement with Ukraine in December drew Russia’s ire and now Russia has moved to make Crimea its part thus changing the borders in Europe once again and deepening the distrust between Russia and the West at a time when serious issues like Syria, Iran and Afghanistan are yet to be resolved.

The West will be compelled by their own threats to impose economic sanctions against Russia. But Russia is no Iraq or Iran and may very well retaliate against Western companies, for example, Exxon Mobile is active in Russia and there are 6,000 German companies in Russia.

While President Putin has conveyed the message of tough military action, it is highly unlikely that he will order his troops to invade the majority ethnic Russian region of Crimea. Military brinkmanship can be seen as an attempt to force the West to include Russia as a partner in settlement of the crisis.

The durability of the New START will depend largely on how both sides value it as a means towards disarmament rather than for strategic competition.