Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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  • Neha asked : How did Taliban rise in Pakistan? Is Pakistan Government's endeavour to hold peace talks a right step to end the violence?

    Ashok Kumar Behuria replies: I presume the question pertains to the rise of the Pakistani Taliban.

    The Pakistani Taliban's rise is both due to acts of omission and commission on the part of the government in Pakistan. When the US launched its war on terror, Pakistan willingly joined it as a partner and pledged to sever its links with the Afghan Taliban. However, in reality it provided these elements sanctuary in both Quetta (Balochistan) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The Afghan Taliban had sympathisers among the local population, some of whom had even fought along with them during their rise as a political force in Afghanistan. As Pakistan hobnobbed with these forces even after joining the war on terror in Afghanistan against them, the Pakistani sympathisers of the Afghan Taliban in the tribal areas slowly metamorphosed into a coalition of radical Islamist forces calling itself Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, better known in its acronymic form as TTP.

    While the groups consisting of TTP grew in stature and influence, the Pakistani state ignored them. Initially it sought to handle them either through talks or half hearted and episodic military thrusts that lacked both strategy and conviction. Pakistan's policy of treating the Afghan Taliban as a strategic asset forced it to turn a blind eye to the umbilical cord that brought the two groups together. When finally it decided to take on the TTP, the Afghan Taliban chose to remain neutral. However, even then, Pakistani security forces have found it difficult to deal with such an ideological group, which seeks to impose Sharia and reverse the entire process of democratic state formation in Pakistan.

    Talks, that are being attempted now to reconcile the TTP with the state of Pakistan, are a legitimate option which any government worth the name would like to exercise to bring peace to its population. However, in the case of Pakistan and the TTP, such efforts may not succeed. This is mainly because of the irreconcilable positions from which they are approaching the whole issue of reconciliation. Moreover, Pakistan state has had several talks with the TTP since 2004 (the agreements of Shakai, Sararogha, Swat, etc.), which have ended in failure earlier. The talks are not going to work unless one of the parties sheds its ideological orientation and succumbs to the position of the other. Even if the strategy may look right, any desperate attempt to placate the TTP to have a positive outcome from the talks will be disastrous for Pakistan. Remember the old saying: the road to hell is paved with good intentions!!

    Posted on April 4, 2014

    Talks with Taliban: war by other means

    The situation in Pakistan today is very fragile. Despite the progress on the democratic front, there is a sense of helplessness on how to tackle the menace of terrorism. Unlike in the past, Islamabad appears quite weak vis-à-vis Taliban while it keeps chanting its commitment to talks with TTP, despite the provocation and retaliation from the army.

    March 03, 2014

    Pakistan Army vs Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: The latest Round

    For tackling terrorism Pakistan’s civil and military establishments have to relook at their own attitudes towards religion and jihad and reform themselves.

    July 15, 2013

    The TTP Factor in Pakistani Elections

    What we are seeing in Pakistan is the ushering in of an anti-democratic Islamic order through the ballot box. What is more, the Pakistan Army has decided to also indirectly ensure that Islam is never “taken out of Pakistan”.

    May 10, 2013

    The Current Talibani Assault on the Pakistani Nation

    What is worrying is that the Army is clearly abandoning its earlier pretence of readiness to take the Islamic zealots head on and sections of the establishment seem more willing now to be just silent accomplices.

    November 12, 2012

    Pakistan’s Descent into Chaos

    The terrorist strike on Minhas airbase in Kamra on August 16, in which one Pakistani soldier and nine terrorists were killed, is but the latest manifestation of the state’s inability to protect even its vital military installations.

    August 19, 2012

    Beginning of the Countdown to Sectarian End-Game in Pakistan?

    The Pakistani leadership has apparently come to the point where it realises that for the survival of the country and its structures created by Jinnah, it must buy peace for the present with its arch-enemy India.

    April 27, 2012

    Afghan Factor behind moves to revive talks between India and Pakistan

    The resumption of India-Pakistan dialogue is closely linked with US moves in Afghanistan in the context of Obama’s publicly declared intent to begin the process of US military withdrawal from Afghanistan from 2011.

    February 25, 2010

    Taliban and Weapons of Mass Disruption Threat

    The article analyses the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s threat of use of chemical weapons inside Pakistan. It looks at the recent such instance of possible low scale use of chemical agents and argues that the recent threat is more of tactical nature.

    January-March 2010

    Pakistan ISI: The Patron and the Victim

    That the ISI patron is now becoming the victim of jehadi terrorism does not bode well for Pakistan, which now has to recast the agency’s role and organizational ethos to contain the Taliban.

    December 24, 2009

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