The proposed blacklisting policy of the Ministry of Defence must be comprehensive enough to ensure that no loose ends are left to be tied at time of implementation.

India should ensure that the deal does not slip away because of GRSE’s perceived financial inability, which may not actually be the case.

As India embarks on a quest to boost its arms exports, the Latin America-Caribbean region offers India both markets and potential partnerships. Though India is not a stranger to the region, it needs to have a more systematic and coordinated approach.

Should GRSE and GSL deliver satisfactory services to their export customers, there is considerable potential for India to position itself as a competitive supplier of small and medium warships and patrol crafts.

It is rare that a foreign company makes a huge investment to produce major platforms in a third country with a view to make that country an export hub.

The United States, once the dominant influence over the armed forces of the region, is now in danger of losing that position to China and has already lost it in countries like Bolivia and Venezuela.

While it may be tempting for the Niti Aayog to make deep inroads into defence planning, it would be wise to focus only on those areas that do not disturb the core function of defence preparedness.

If a product is indigenously designed, developed and manufactured, should the percentage of indigenous content in that product really matter so much?

The Task Force has not extended the principle of Strategic Partnership to the whole gamut of big contracts in which the private sector is supposed to play a major role. And it visualises strategic partners as poor cousins of state-owned entities.