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  • F-35 is not an Ideal Choice for India

    F-35 is not an ideal choice because of the delay in its developmental schedule, a tight production line, prohibitive cost, India’s own efforts to jointly develop and produce a fifth generation fighter with Russia, and little technological or industrial benefits that would accrue.

    November 23, 2011

    What Does Pakistan Hope to Achieve with Nasr?

    The commentary addresses the pros and cons of Pakistan’s development of Nasr and concludes that it can be neutralised by India through innovative measures.

    August 17, 2011

    The US-India Strategic Partnership after the MMRCA Deal

    Common sense suggests that India as the weaker partner has much more to gain from the relationship with the U.S., but common sense has always been somewhat scarce in Indian strategic thought.

    May 06, 2011

    Making Sense of ‘Nasr’

    In rethinking Cold Start as a default option and working towards proactive ‘contingency’ options, India is a step ahead in doctrinal shadow boxing.

    April 24, 2011

    China's Aircraft Carrier: Some Observations

    China’s aircraft carrier programme will not only affect the balance of power in the Asia Pacific region but also add impetus to the Chinese maritime intent.

    April 21, 2011

    Taking the Arms Control Debate Forward: The Hague Code of Conduct and India

    This article evaluates the opportunities associated with The Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) for India. HCoC is a stand-alone agreement against ballistic missile proliferation. Since the 1974 Pokharan nuclear tests it has been tricky for India to get into the non-proliferation mainstream. The success of the 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal is a first step towards global acceptability of India's non-proliferation and disarmament policies. Now, it is important for India to start supporting the international norms which do not affect their strategic programmes.

    March 2011

    China Air Show-Zhuhai 16 November 2010

    Thousands of aviation enthusiasts and professionals are bound to throng to Zhuhai on 16 November, but one wonders if Indian aviation companies and other SMEs would send their delegations or sell their wares at the show.

    November 11, 2010

    Jiaolong - An Underwater Dragon

    Once the Chinese achieve the capability of producing UUVs with deep depth capability, they could surround India by placing these submersibles at strategic places.

    September 16, 2010

    Weaponisation of Space and India’s Options

    During Cold War era, space became an essential adjunct for war-fighting on the ground, without becoming another theatre of combat. While militarization of space proceeded rapidly, the weaponisation of space was avoided. Because the weaponisation of space was avoided during the Cold War, it does not necessarily follow that weaponisation will continue to be avoided in a new era of asymmetric warfare. We can improve protection of satellites against some threats, but satellites will remain easy targets for space weapons designed to kill on impact. Space has been free from warfare.

    July 2010

    Jens Heinrich asked: Why is nuclear (and conventional) arms control a "non-issue" in the current (and past) talks between India and Pakistan?

    A. Vinod Kumar replies: Nuclear or conventional arms control could figure as a key element in a dialogue only when it amounts to be the most potent point of contention between the two states or when it makes a drastic transformation in the equation. In the case of India and Pakistan where the core political issues are terrorism and Kashmir, quasi-political matters like water-sharing, arms control or nuclear confidence-building measures could only follow a larger political understanding. It could be noted that this point has not been achieved in the Indo-Pak talks. Another factor is the element of stability that is perceivably existent in the nuclear equation of these two countries.

    Though Pakistan had fought a limited war in Kargil and has undertaken a prolonged low-intensity conflict, both under nuclear conditions, and notwithstanding the Western notion of South Asia as a nuclear flashpoint, there were very few opportunities when both countries went the extra mile on nuclear Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) – the two instances being the agreement to abstain from attacking nuclear facilities and giving prior notice of missile tests. While the potential for nuclear or conventional CBMs to dramatically impact this relationship is minimal when the core political issues remain unresolved, such measures could be significant when there is threat of conflict escalation, leading to nuclear brinkmanship. Besides, there are conditions like an Indian push for ballistic missile defences, which could prompt Pakistan to seek countermeasures or push for arms reductions in the region.