For nearly a quarter of the past century a series of notable changes have taken place in the Arctic. All of them, whether political, economical, environmental or climate-related, inevitably had an impact on regional and global governance. This commentary mainly focuses on the role of China in Arctic affairs in the context of global change and global governance.

In the last decade, the dynamics of inter-state relations in the Asia Pacific have changed rapidly, largely due to the rise of China. Competition rather than cooperation has become the order of the day. In the East and South China Seas, freedom of navigation, competitive claims over maritime boundaries and air space security are experiencing an evolution of new brinkmanship between the US, an established super power, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), an emerging super power, unfolding new challenges for the other potential regional players including India.

Maritime security in the Indo-Pacific (or the Indian Ocean–Pacific Ocean continuum) has acquired salience following the shift of the centre of gravity from the Atlantic. It has brought the focus onto the trade, resources and energy lifelines that run across it. The emerging power equations marked by an assertive China, a rising India, a resurgent Japan, together with a rebalancing United States make for a potentially turbulent region.

Within the first year of Xi Jinping’s elevation to the presidency, China has moved further ahead on its path to achieving primacy in the world. In the last week of November 2013, Beijing imposed an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the conflicted Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, much to the consternation of its feuding neighbours such as Japan and South Korea. Their howls of protest found expression in the US attempt to challenge China to promulgate what it has done in deed.

It is a matter of widespread belief that on assumption of supreme power, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s overall ambition was to emerge as an iconic figure in the same league as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. At the very outset, Xi realised this would necessitate the elimination of any political challenge and his first step was therefore to consolidate an unassailable position within the Standing Committee of the Party Politburo (PBSC). To achieve this objective, Xi chose to emulate some of the policies and methods of the late Mao Zedong, albeit with modern underpinnings.