Sarabjeet Singh Parmar replies: There is currently no reliable information available in open sources on the Chinese plans to use Coco Islands for intelligence or military purposes. Some older reports, dating back to 1992, do refer to setting up of an electronic intelligence installation with antenna towers, radar sites and other related facilities. It was also reported that the Chinese were developing and expanding the air base on the Island. The issue was apparently taken up with Myanmar in 2009 and it denied the presence of the Chinese on Coco Islands.

For more details, refer to the following:
http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/myanmar-says-no-chinese-base-at-coc...

http://www.dnaindia.com/india/1289045/report-india-takes-up-with-myanmar...

http://www6.cityu.edu.hk/searc/Data/FileUpload/294/WP101_08_ASelth.pdf

Rajeev Agarwal replies: Both Russia and China are supporting the Syrian regime, and have made all attempts to see that efforts of the US-led lobby to force President Bashar al-Assad out of power, politically or militarily, does not succeed. They have not let any UN resolution pass against the Syrian regime till now.

As regards their support for the Syrian Army, Russia has direct military interests in the Syrian Armed Forces. It is one of the biggest suppliers of arms to Syria including the often disputed S300 missiles. It would, therefore, be fair to assume some sort of moral and equipment support from Russia for the Syrian Army. Direct support in terms of getting involved in fighting with or for the Syrian Army, is not yet reported or come out. Also, Russia is not likely to take that choice as it could blow out into a regional military conflict.

As regards China, it has supported the Syrian regime ever since the uprisings broke out. It however does not have any military interest and is unlikely to support the Syrian Army directly. Some kind of technological or intelligence support can't be ruled out. However, China's support for Syria seems to be more based on certain ideological fears and on political grounds, contours of which are quite different from the possibilities of a direct support to the Syrian Army.

Reply: Kindly refer to an earlier reply by Prashant Kumar Singh to a similar query, at http://idsa.in/askanexpert/recogniseTibetasanintegralpartofChina

Also, refer to the following publications:

IDSA Task Force Report, “Tibet and India's Security: Himalayan Region, Refugees and Sino-Indian Relations”, 2012 (ISBN: 81-86019-99-5), at http://idsa.in/book/TibetandIndiasSecurity

Mandip Singh, “Critical Assessment of China's Vulnerabilities in Tibet”, IDSA Occasional Paper No. 30, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/occasionalpapers/CriticalAssessmentofChinasVulnerabilitiesinTibet

Yeshi Choedon, “Transformation of Tibet Issue from Hope to Despair: What Next?”, February 12, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Transformation%20ofTibetIssue_YChoedon_120213

Shailender Arya, “Infrastructure Development and Chinese War Waging Capabilities in Tibet”, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 5, Issue 3, July 2011, at http://www.idsa.in/jds/5_3_2011_InfrastructureDevelopmentandChineseWarWagingCapabilitiesinTibet_ShailenderArya

Dawa Norbu, “Chinese Strategic Thinking on Tibet and the Himalayan Region”, From the Archives, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, Issue 4, July 2008, at http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/ChineseStrategicThinkingonTibetandtheHimalayanRegion_dnorbo_0708