The Afghan government’s peace and reconciliation overtures to the militants, initially at the unofficial level but later sanctioned officially, have formed a key theme of state security policy from the early days of the post-Taliban administration in Afghanistan. Yet far from producing peace and stability, they seem to have played into the hands of the violent groups intent on overthrowing the country’s internationally supported and legitimate political system in the past decade.

The following commentary argues that the strategic and structural solutions proffered by advocates of ‘hybrid’ governance—encompassing elements from distinctly different ideological backgrounds or schools of thought—ignore or fail to address certain inherent shortcomings in their approach that are counter-productive to the ongoing and long-term statebuilding and peacebuilding projects in Afghanistan. The following study elucidates some of these shortcomings.

This article addresses the question of why regional cooperation among Afghanistan’s neighbours has been so difficult despite these countries’ common concerns. To answer this question, Afghanistan is conceptualised as placed at the core of overlapping regions: South Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia and, through China’s influence, East Asia. Over the past decade, interactions among different regions ‘through’ Afghanistan have increased, and overlap has intensified.

The war on terror, often described as ‘the longest war’ or ‘the wrong war’, is approaching its pinnacle. In this context, 2014 has been the centre of gravity while formulating strategies, framing policies and executing actions to ensure an honourable exit for the international forces led by the United States from Afghanistan.