This is a good time for India to review its Afghan strategy taking into account increasing war weariness of the Western forces and President Karzai’s policy of reintegrating the ‘good Taliban’.

If India indeed considers itself to be a rising power, it cannot remain a passive in the face of instability all around it.

Obama’s signal that the United States seeks to exit in 18 months will be viewed with scepticism by fence sitters in Afghanistan who will identify the victor as the one who endures.

Ideally, ISAF and NATO should concentrate on urban population centres along with the ANA, and the ANA should also deploy outside the towns and cities to dominate the hinterland and crack down on Taliban controlled areas.

The United States is facing serious economic problems, and Obama seems to have drawn the lesson that national security is not just about military strength but that it is equally about the economy, partnerships and diplomacy.

Post an American exit, China is likely to increase its investments in Afghanistan, provide employment to hundreds of unskilled Afghan workers, and assume the role of regional stabiliser.

The US may have satiated its desire for vengeance but risks losing sight of its objectives due to liberal atavism, inconstancy, pusillanimity and operational ineptitude.

On the eve of the formation of the new government it is expected that Germany would mainly devote its energy at home as the mandate is for continuity in the time of economic recession. No spectacular point-of-departure in foreign policy can hence be expected from Berlin.

America’s new strategy in Afghanistan needs to be based on the concept of `connect–hold–build’, where the ground troops surely and silently `connect’ with the local population.