India should ensure that the deal does not slip away because of GRSE’s perceived financial inability, which may not actually be the case.

Raising a Central Marine Police Force and wasting resources on their training and equipment is neither necessary nor advisable given that the country already has a central organisation to protect the coast – the Indian Coast Guard.

A sound sensor array in the Indian Ocean could prove invaluable for India which has a major anti-submarine warfare handicap and a lack of operational submarines.

India’s future submarine fleet operations are likely to involve SSKs and SSNs operating in the littoral spaces, in a strategic environment sanitized and protected by SSBNs. If New Delhi can ensure compliance with present construction deadlines, it could put its submarine modernization plans back on track.

Maritime security challenges in the Indian Ocean Region continue to be an issue of concern and this effective regional mechanism needs to be strengthened to deal effectively with them.

For Indian observers, it is useful to extrapolate known Chinese position in the Indian Ocean Region and assess Beijing’s likely strategic behaviour. Indian policymakers might well recognise the fact that once China finds itself in a position of maritime advantage, diplomatic engagement has limited utility as a bargaining tactic.

The inability to portray greater strategic ambition for the Indian Navy renders this document an exercise in smart profile-building rather than one of purposeful image-projection.

Africa needs not only maritime administration frameworks and the local capacity to enforce regulations, but also a model for sustainable blue-economy development that does not result in the destruction of its natural maritime habitat. In this, it can use India’s assistance.