Maritime Security

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  • China's Post-1978 Maritime Relations with South Asia: Towards Greater Cooperation

    The objectives of this article are, firstly, to identify the place occupied by the Indian Ocean and South Asia in China's maritime strategy, and secondly, to identify the appropriate means of dealing with the global and regional maritime security concerns arising from China's maritime strategy as far as the Indian Ocean and South Asia are concerned.

    May 2012

    The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands: Organisational Learning and the Andaman and Nicobar Command

    India took an unprecedented step 10 years ago by setting up a joint theatre operational command for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANC). This article seeks to examine the following questions: why did India decide to establish its first joint operational command? Why has the creation of this and other unified commands been so incremental in the Indian context? What are the arguments for and against jointness, integration and joint operational commands in the Indian context?

    May 2012

    Maritime Developments in the South Western Indian Ocean and the Potential for India's Engagement with the Region

    The Indian Ocean region, being a vast geographical entity, is composed of various regional and sub-regional entities. This article addresses prominent maritime developments in the South Western Indian Ocean (SWIO) region of the Indian Ocean Rim and highlights the multi-dimensional growth of strategic maritime activities in the region.

    May 2012

    India's Maritime Core Interests

    While the maritime doctrine was published by the Indian navy in 2004 and improved upon in 2007, the core interests identified were as seen through the prism of the navy. The national maritime interests of India are distinctly different from the ones identified by the Indian navy and need to be analysed to understand the nuances and the dimensions of such interests so as to promote India's maritime power potential.

    May 2012

    Charting a Maritime Security Cooperation Mechanism in the Indian Ocean: Sharing Responsibilities among Littoral States and User States

    The main objective of this article is to highlight the challenge of maritime security in the region geographically bounded by the Indian Ocean. It studies the current status of maritime security in the region from both the traditional and non-traditional points of view. From the traditional security perspective, it examines the strategic interests of the major Indian Ocean players—the China–India competition and India–US relations in particular—in addition to the existing maritime disputes among the littoral states.

    May 2012

    A Neo-Nixon Doctrine for the Indian Ocean: Helping States Help Themselves

    In recent years the Indian Ocean has received significant attention from the defence-intellectual community in the United States. However, the actual strategic importance of the region to US interests is less clear. In an environment of fiscal austerity, if commitments abroad are not firmly linked to interests, any significant involvement in a region of secondary concern could contribute to ‘imperial overstretch’.

    May 2012

    A European Perspective on Maritime Security Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region

    The Indian Ocean Region (IOR), ranging from the Suez Canal in the west to the Strait of Malacca in the east, is of crucial importance for Europe. However, Europe's interest in the region's maritime space and its security challenges is limited.

    May 2012

    Nishanthi asked- Who is responsible for formulating the maritime policy of India? What institutions/ministries are involved in the process?

    S.S. Parmar replies: Formulation of any policy is part of the overall national strategy. National strategy depends on a variety of tangible and intangible fields. These fields would collectively and at times individually have a bearing on the national interests. Therefore, the responsibility of formulating any national policy lies with the government. As far as maritime policy is concerned, a plethora of ministries and agencies would contribute to the maritime policy. Broadly, a policy could be broken into three parts – economics, security and diplomacy.

    The broad ambit of the maritime domain entails the involvement of a number of agencies, such as the Indian Navy, Coast Guard, mercantile marine, ship building industry, Department of Ocean Development, fisheries department, Oil and National Gas Commission (ONGC), hydrographic department, diplomatic corps, department of surface transport, Antarctic exploration wing - in essence any department which either deals with or has interest in coastal, oceanic or overseas activities. In order to implement steps that would ensure a cogent working of the policy, these departments which are part of the government are responsible for forwarding their cases, depending on the financial implications, to the concerned ministries that take up the cases for approval with the concerned financial body. In India’s case, it would be parliamentary committees.

    Sandya asked: What is the role of Indian Navy in identifying, assessing and controlling non-traditional threats in the Indian Ocean?

    S.S. Parmar replies: The Indian Navy has a prominent role to play in addressing non-traditional threats. This task is done in tandem with other agencies like the Indian Coast Guard, maritime wing of police, governments of states with coastlines and intelligence agencies to name a few. Non-traditional threats can be broadly divided into two areas – those like maritime terrorism and piracy that require to be addressed by kinetic means, and those like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), search and rescue (SAR), pollution control, etc., that require to be addressed by benign means. Although pollution control is under the ambit of the Coast Guard, the Indian Navy provides the required assistance that is sought.

    The Indian Navy has mechanisms in place to assess, indentify and address these issues. These include identifying strong points and strengthening weak points so as to better manage situations both developing and developed. This involves deploying assets that would aid in combating the threats that arise from such non-traditional threats.

    Issues like terrorism and piracy that require application of force are addressed by patrolling areas identified as the most vulnerable with suitable assets in tandem with other agencies. For example, along the coast the Indian Navy has identified suitable places and established detachments that work with other agencies to assess the situation and patrol designated areas. Ships and aircraft also patrol the maritime zones of friendly nations on their request to combat terrorism and piracy. In addition, ships with embarked armed helicopters have been deployed in the Gulf of Aden since 2008 to combat piracy as part of the ongoing international effort.

    The benign role is assumed and assets deployed so that assistance is rendered both internally and externally in a fast and humane manner. The deployment of assets during the 2004 tsunami is a classic case in which relief was provided within 24 hours to the states on the east coast of India and Sri Lanka and within 72 hours to affected nations like Indonesia and Maldives. Unlike the threats emanating from terrorism and piracy that could be assessed based on intelligence inputs, disasters do not come with any warning and therefore the Indian Navy is always ready at short notice to deploy its assets as and when ordered.

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