The rise of Asian maritime power is a sequel to Rising Powers in Asia. Maritime power in the age of globalisation has been a critical instrument for the emergence of the latent powers and capabilities of the once pre-eminent ‘civilisational states’ in the contemporary international order. It is important to note here that the rise and fall of maritime power determined the rise and fall of ancient civilisations.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s recent accomplishments are impressive but have not gone beyond ‘pocket excellence’, as its overall structure and equipment are still out of date. However, the PLAN now has ships and powerful weapons that enable it to extend its combat range and engage its foes in a relatively large-scale maritime campaign beyond the Yellow Sea—its traditional battlefield. Depending on the nature of operations, it may already be able to carry out blue water missions around the first island chain in the West Pacific.

The objectives of this article are, firstly, to identify the place occupied by the Indian Ocean and South Asia in China's maritime strategy, and secondly, to identify the appropriate means of dealing with the global and regional maritime security concerns arising from China's maritime strategy as far as the Indian Ocean and South Asia are concerned.

India took an unprecedented step 10 years ago by setting up a joint theatre operational command for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANC). This article seeks to examine the following questions: why did India decide to establish its first joint operational command? Why has the creation of this and other unified commands been so incremental in the Indian context? What are the arguments for and against jointness, integration and joint operational commands in the Indian context?

The Indian Ocean region, being a vast geographical entity, is composed of various regional and sub-regional entities. This article addresses prominent maritime developments in the South Western Indian Ocean (SWIO) region of the Indian Ocean Rim and highlights the multi-dimensional growth of strategic maritime activities in the region.

While the maritime doctrine was published by the Indian navy in 2004 and improved upon in 2007, the core interests identified were as seen through the prism of the navy. The national maritime interests of India are distinctly different from the ones identified by the Indian navy and need to be analysed to understand the nuances and the dimensions of such interests so as to promote India's maritime power potential.

The main objective of this article is to highlight the challenge of maritime security in the region geographically bounded by the Indian Ocean. It studies the current status of maritime security in the region from both the traditional and non-traditional points of view. From the traditional security perspective, it examines the strategic interests of the major Indian Ocean players—the China–India competition and India–US relations in particular—in addition to the existing maritime disputes among the littoral states.

In recent years the Indian Ocean has received significant attention from the defence-intellectual community in the United States. However, the actual strategic importance of the region to US interests is less clear. In an environment of fiscal austerity, if commitments abroad are not firmly linked to interests, any significant involvement in a region of secondary concern could contribute to ‘imperial overstretch’.

Introduction

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR), ranging from the Suez Canal in the west to the Strait of Malacca in the east, is of crucial importance for Europe. However, Europe's interest in the region's maritime space and its security challenges is limited.