Investigations into Mumbai's 26/11 attack made startling revelations about the militant training camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The Mumbai perpetrators started from Baitul-Mujahideen in Muzaffarabad, the capital of the so-called ‘Azad Kashmir’, and headed for Mumbai via Karachi. They underwent specialized training in PoK for an extended period before the attack.

Choking the flow of funds to terrorists is one of the vital aspects of combating terrorism. While its importance has been realized post 9/11 by the international community, counter measures for terrorist financing remain largely ineffective. In India, more resources and effort need to be devoted to launch a financial war against terrorists. In this context, the article attempts to establish the significance of emerging challenges in denying funds to terrorists globally and recommends a focused national response by outlining an integrated strategy.

A series of bomb blasts in Delhi on October 29, 2005, that left 66 dead and 220 injured has, once again, underlined the acute vulnerability of major Indian cities to international terrorism. The blasts in Sarojini Nagar, Paharganj and a Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) bus in Govindpuri were well-orchestrated, nearly simultaneous, and targeted crowed markets and city centres.

India and Pakistan have fought four wars over Kashmir and have held several rounds of talks to resolve the 57-year-old issue, but without any tangible success. The only progress thus far has been that India has agreed to discuss the issue as part of the composite dialogue process and Pakistan has shown willingness to explore options other than the UN resolutions on Kashmir. Although both India and Pakistan appear trying to breakaway from the past and think afresh on Kashmir, yet both fail to bring about any significant policy shifts.

Terrorism in the state of Jammu and Kashmir has completed almost 15 years. It marked its arrival with blasts in Srinagar city in 1988 and subsequently expanded to other parts in a well-planned and organised manner. It has the ingredients of a professionally run movement. Initially, majority of the terrorists were locals who had crossed over to Pakistan in large groups in 1987 and returned after obtaining training, but gradually the foreigners, mostly Pakistanis, replaced them. Locals or foreigners, terrorists depend fully on the public support—obtained voluntarily or through coercion.