Amit Kumar replies: The acts of terrorism in Chechnya and elsewhere in Russia involving Chechens are indicative of the revival of terrorism as an instrument for promoting the cause of Chechen separatism. These acts of terrorism have also underscored the threat posed by Islamists, for whom Chechnya has become the rallying point to propagate the idea of Caucasus Emirate and which has started to find resonance in other predominantly Muslim republics of North Caucasus, like Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. Though the Islamist phenomenon is a late addition, the quest for Chechen independence is not new.

Broadly, there are three choices before Russia: recognise the independence of Chechnya, suppress the secessionist forces, or work towards better federal relations within the ambit of the Russian Constitution to durably resolve the Chechen separatist problem. As far as the first choice is concerned, it can be said that Russia cannot afford to allow Chechnya to secede as the same could be replicated in other adjoining Muslim republics, undermining Russia’s territorial integrity. The second choice involves coercion and is fraught with the danger of inviting retaliation from the Chechens who are not alone in their fight against the Russian central authority. The third choice entails skilful use of democratic politics and appears to be the most desirable one.

President Putin’s logic that democracy can be delayed in a crisis-ridden state, does not appear to be convincing in the present scenario where Russia seems to have emerged stronger than ever before since 1991. Russia should, therefore, explore the possibility of strengthening the democratic process in Chechnya and elsewhere in the country without much delay. Delaying democracy can be counter productive. In the short-term, though democracy may not appear to be effective against disgruntled elements who might still engage in anti-state protests and even insurgency, but then suppression too may not prove to be a viable conflict resolution method either.

In the longer run, broad based and consensual democracies are often better at problem solving than autocracies. It is democracy which often leads to a stable polity and has better chances of resolving secessionist conflicts. A case in point is J&K, where the restoration of the democratic processes has led to a more peaceful and stable polity. It is noteworthy that President Putin, of late, has emphasised the importance of democratic polity and has outlined plans to modernise the mechanisms of Russian democracy in order to develop a more effective, accountable and transparent governance.

Also, please refer to my following IDSA publication:

Amit Kumar, “The Chechen Imbroglio: An Update”, IDSA Issue Brief, October 05, 2011.

Posted on January 16, 2014

Rajorshi Roy replies: Before we get to the strategic implications of President Putin's visit to South Korea and Vietnam, it is important to analyse the reasons for Russia strengthening its ties with the Asia Pacific countries.

Till a few years ago, Europe was Russia’s biggest energy market which gave it a tremendous geopolitical leverage over the European countries. However, the shale gas revolution and EU’s desire to diversify energy sources has reduced the importance of a strategic partnership with Russia. With hydrocarbon revenues accounting for more than half of Russia’s state budget, it has become imperative for Moscow to look for new partners.

The growing economy of the Asia Pacific countries and their quest for more sources of energy fit in with Russia’s own diversification programme. There also remain inherent tensions in Russia’s relations with the West which has made Russia look for more partners. All this should be seen within the broader context of Russia’s attempt to play a more meaningful role in the economic integration process of the Asia-Pacific region, as part of President Putin’s vision of strengthening Russia’s strategic independence. Moreover, close to 70 per cent of Russia’s territory lies in Asia. Russia’s renewed focus towards the ‘East’ can also be seen as an attempt to tap into the growing potential (technological and productive) of the region in order to develop its Far East. Its hosting of the APEC summit in 2012 was interpreted as an attempt to project Russia as a reliable Asian power, which can also be called upon to meet the defence requirements of countries in the region. These developments have coincided with renewed US interest in the region and growing Chinese assertiveness, especially in the South China Sea.

Despite China being Russia’s closest partner in the region, there remain underlying tensions in their bilateral relationship. These include apprehensions with China’s rise and assertiveness, IPR infringements, growing Sino-Central Asian engagement and fear of mass migration in its Far East. Russia’s ‘East’ policy can also be seen as an attempt to subtly balance China.

Russia shares strong military and energy ties with Vietnam. It has significantly upgraded the Vietnamese navy and has reached an agreement on co-production of weapons systems. Interestingly, Vietnam has a long running dispute over sovereignty in South China Sea with Russia’s strategic partner, China. So do many other countries of South East Asia. More energy markets in the region will give Russia an alternative to the Chinese market which is poised to replace Europe as the main destination of its hydrocarbons.

Similarly, there exists huge potential for a strong Russia-South Korea relationship. South Korea is one of the world’s leading consumers of energy and the second largest importer of LNG. Russia had agreed to export LNG to South Korea way back in 2005 and one of the agreements signed during President Putin’s visit includes Korea’s support for modernising LNG fleet and investing in the development of Russia’s Far East. Russia also sees the potential, eventually, to push railway and pipeline connections through North Korea. For South Korea, which has strained ties with both Japan and China, a growing engagement with Russia seems to be a good option.

The Asia Pacific countries in general seem to be amenable to Russia’s potential to meet their energy and defence requirements. Therefore, Russia’s role in the region is something to watch out for. To sum up, need for new markets, development of its Far East, desire to play a more meaningful role in Asia Pacific and subtly balance China are the main drivers of Russia’s ‘East’ policy.

For more information on Russia’s renewed focus on Asia Pacific, please refer to the following IDSA publication:

Rajorshi Roy, “Russia’s Military Modernisation” in S.D. Muni and Vivek Chadha (eds.), Asian Strategic Review, IDSA, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2013.

S. Samuel C. Rajiv replies: The US, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom (P5) and Germany (the P5+1) are currently giving push to the 'engagement' track with the latest round of talks which began on October 15, 2013 at Geneva. While existing unilateral and multi-lateral (UNSC and EU) sanctions are in place, no additional sanctions are as yet being contemplated as a part of the 'sanctions' track.

The 'dual-track' policy of sanctions and engagement has till date not shown much progress in modulating Iranian behaviour. It is pertinent to note that in the past, as the nature and volume of sanctions increased, Iranian intransigence correspondingly increased. Iran for instance suspended its voluntary implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) after its referral to the UNSC in February 2006.

However, various reports as well as Iranian officials have acknowledged the vulnerable state of the Iranian economy and its currency as a result of trade and oil-related sanctions. President Hassan Rouhani's overwhelming victory defeating candidates like Saeed Jalili (who was the chief nuclear negotiator) has given rise to the strong perception that the Iranian public have rejected the confrontationist approach of the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Government. Supreme Leader Khamenei has also supported the path of dialogue, crucially in a speech to the IRGC commanders in September 2013. With the Obama Administration showing its commitment to the dialogue process, the hopes for progress at the current round of negotiations are huge.

Possible outcomes could range from Iran signing the IAEA AP, temporarily suspending its enrichment activities, the shipping out of excess quantities of enriched uranium (a possibility alluded to by the Iranian Parliament Speaker) in exchange for graduated sanctions relief, provision of spare parts for its civilian aircrafts, among others in a 'grand bargain'.

These elements are in the realm of the 'possible' given the unique circumstances surrounding the current negotiations, including Rouhani 'the pragmatist' being in power, Khamenei's support for negotiations, weak state of the Iranian economy, and the positive vibes generated by the renewed interactions between the US and Iran topped by the first telephonic conversation between presidents of the two countries in more than three decades.

Rajeev Agarwal replies: Both Russia and China are supporting the Syrian regime, and have made all attempts to see that efforts of the US-led lobby to force President Bashar al-Assad out of power, politically or militarily, does not succeed. They have not let any UN resolution pass against the Syrian regime till now.

As regards their support for the Syrian Army, Russia has direct military interests in the Syrian Armed Forces. It is one of the biggest suppliers of arms to Syria including the often disputed S300 missiles. It would, therefore, be fair to assume some sort of moral and equipment support from Russia for the Syrian Army. Direct support in terms of getting involved in fighting with or for the Syrian Army, is not yet reported or come out. Also, Russia is not likely to take that choice as it could blow out into a regional military conflict.

As regards China, it has supported the Syrian regime ever since the uprisings broke out. It however does not have any military interest and is unlikely to support the Syrian Army directly. Some kind of technological or intelligence support can't be ruled out. However, China's support for Syria seems to be more based on certain ideological fears and on political grounds, contours of which are quite different from the possibilities of a direct support to the Syrian Army.