India-US Relations

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  • Civilian and Strategic Nuclear Facilities of India

    One of the major objectives of the United States in entering into the Indo-US nuclear co-operation agreement is to bring about an early freezing of the Indian weapon-usable nuclear materials stock at the minimum possible level. India, in turn, obviously wants to retain all the accumulated inventory of such materials, as well as the facilities to produce the additional material we consider essential for a minimum deterrence, out of IAEA safeguards. Obviously, each country wants to manoeuvre the separation plan to suit its specific objective.

    January 05, 2006

    Indo-US Nuclear Deal and Non-Proliferation

    Different views have been expressed by the American non-proliferation lobbyists on possible loss or gain from the Indo-US nuclear agreement. Would the agreement complicate global non-proliferation efforts as the critics argue or would it lead to a stronger front to deal with emerging non-proliferation challenges? To answer these questions it is necessary to examine the merits of the arguments put forward by the US non-proliferation lobby carefully.

    October 2005

    Indo-US Nuclear Agreement and IAEA Safeguards

    Nuclear transfers to a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) are conditioned on IAEA safeguards on all current and future peaceful nuclear activities, what are called the full-scope safeguards (FSS) or comprehensive safeguards. Since India is a NNWS according to the NPT definition, the NSG Guidelines as currently implemented would, therefore, invoke FSS if India seeks nuclear technology or nuclear power plants – even on a turnkey basis – or nuclear fuel from any NSG membercountry.

    October 2005

    Partnership in a Balance of Power System

    The popular perception in India is that with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of one of the two Superpowers, the bipolar international system has become unipolar. The United States is now assumed to be an unchallenged sole Superpower. Consequently, it is felt in some quarters that the Indo-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 is a case of US recruiting India as one of its allies for possible future containment of China. Such a perception nurtures suspicion about the US and its motivation about its attempts to befriend India.

    October 2005

    The Indo-US nuclear deal has generated a lot of heat: here’s why

    The July 2005 visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Washington has been eventful as far as nuclear issues are concerned. The joint statement, various speeches, briefings, and interactions have given a new direction to the nuclear policies and postures of both India and the United States (US). Of course, much heat has also been generated in both the countries. It is necessary, therefore, to provide some clarity to the heated debate. Is it a sell out/ surrender to the US or a big victory?

    August 04, 2005

    Good Day for India?

    The joint statement issued at the Manmohan Singh-Bush summit held in Washington (July 18) has generated considerable interest and anxiety in both countries for the manner in which it has addressed the nuclear issue. It merits recall that the nuclear determinant has bedeviled the bi-lateral relationship between the US and India for well over three decades since India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974 – which was further exacerbated after the May 1998 Shakti nuclear tests that gave India a de facto nuclear weapon status.

    July 25, 2005

    Will US Congress Back Bush on India’s N-plan?

    On July 18, India and the United States released a joint statement delineating the multi- dimensional aspects of the bilateral relationship.

    July 20, 2005

    Major Shift in U.S. Policy to South Asia: Democracy in Pakistan More Critical Than F 16s

    The visit of US Secretary of State Ms. Condi Rice to Delhi on March 16 had generated considerable optimism about where India-US ties are headed and this was highlighted in my last column (March 24). However events over the last week have been even more promising and the telephone conversation between US President Mr. Bush and the Indian PM Dr Manmohan Singh on March 25 and the subsequent background briefing by the US State Department indicate that the Bush team has outlined an ambitious policy towards South Asia.

    April 05, 2005

    F-16s: Can we trust Uncle Sam?

    The US offer to sell F16s and F18s to India, announced on March 25, has to be seen in context. True, this initiative is linked to the White House decision to lift the ban on supplying F16s to Pakistan and the more cynical view is that the US manufacturers of these aircraft will now laugh all the way to the bank as the sub-continent gets sucked into an arms race.

    April 05, 2005

    Indo-US Relations: Perception and Reality

    This paper attempts to provide an overview of significant recent developments in US policy towards South Asia and their implications for India. It examines the proposed cooperation between India and the US, focusing on advanced technology issues. It also places this issue in the context of US-Pakistan ties, as this provides a relevant referent for comparison. This paper concludes that while the US and India are formally expanding their strategic cooperation, the results on the ground are still not in step with the rhetoric.

    April 2005

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