Reply: Please refer to the following IDSA publications on the subject:

A. Vinod Kumar, “15-Years after Pokhran II: Deterrence Churning Continues”, June 10, 2013, at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/15YearsafterPokhranII_avkumar_100613

Ali Ahmed, “India's Limited War Doctrine: The Structural Factor”, IDSA Monograph Series No. 10, December 2012, at http://idsa.in/system/files/Monograph10.pdf

Ali Ahmed, “Reopening the Debate on Limited War”, February 29, 2012, at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/ReopeningtheDebateonLimitedWar_aahmed_290212

Ali Ahmed, “What Does Pakistan Hope to Achieve with Nasr?”, August 17, 2011, at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/WhatDoesPakistanHopetoAchievewithNasr_aahmed_170811

Ali Ahmed, “Pakistan’s ‘First Use’ in Perspective”, May 12, 2011, at http://idsa.in/node/7464/3087#comment-3087

Ali Ahmed, “Towards a Proactive Military Strategy: 'Cold Start and Stop'”, Strategic Analysis, 35 (3), May 2011, at http://idsa.in/strategicanalysis/35_3/ProactiveMilitaryStrategy_aahmed

Ali Ahmed, “Making Sense of ‘Nasr’”, April 24, 2011, at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/MakingSenseofNasr_aahmed_240411

Ali Ahmed, “The advantages of ‘Cold Start Minor’”, December 13, 2010, at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/TheadvantagesofColdStartMinor_aahmed_131210

Sushant Sareen, “Cold Start as Deterrence against Proxy War”, November 22, 2010, at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/ColdStartasDeterrenceagainstProxyWar_ssareen_221110

Ali Ahmed, “Cold Start and ‘The Sehjra Option’”, Journal of Defence Studies, 4 (4), October 2010, at http://idsa.in/jds/4_4_2010_ColdStartandTheSehjraOption_aahmed

Ali Ahmed, “The ‘Cold Start and Stop’ strategy”, September 28, 2010, at
http://idsa.in/idsacomments/TheColdStartandStopstrategy_aahmed_280910

Views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Ashok Kumar Behuria replies: With the rise in radicalism in Pakistan, the minority communities as a whole— both Muslim and non-Muslim minorities— including Shias, Ahmadiyas and Hindus are being attacked by Sunni radical elements. During the last year (2012), media reports about some Sikhs and some Hindus migrating to India did attract wider public attention in India. However, this is unlikely to have any major impact in India-Pakistan relations, beyond reinforcing negative perceptions about Pakistan amongst the people in India. The government of India appears determined to extend a fig leaf to the government in Pakistan and engage it in a constructive dialogue where all these issues can be taken up for discussion, without lowering its guard on the security front. The rise in extremism in Pakistan is an issue of concern for India as a neighbour; however, India has no other option but to put pressure on the Pakistan government— both through bilateral engagement and by working with the international community— to take adequate measures to contain this tide.

Reply: Kindly refer to an earlier reply by P.K. Upadhyay to a similar query, at http://idsa.in/askanexpert/SirCreekbetweenIndiaandPakistan

P.K. Upadhyay replies: Sir Creek issue is defying solution because of the deep rooted syndrome of lack of trust in Pakistan. Unless the element of trust is restored through Pakistani actions, attitudes and utterances, any real and meaningful progress on this, as well as other issues like Siachen, looks somewhat remote. Sir Creek is an area that has not been demarcated between India and Pakistan by a clearly delineated maritime border.

The Indo-Pakistan international border starts from the point where coming from the Arabian Sea Sir Creek joins the land mass. This area had not been demarcated as it had not been properly surveyed due to its being somewhat desolate and inhospitable. Nonetheless, taking advantage of a 1914 Bombay Government Resolution that sought to demarcate Sir Creek between Sindh and Kutch divisions of the Bombay state as an internal administrative measure, Pakistan began to lay claim over the entire Creek. They conveniently ignored the reality of Sindh and Kutch having become parts of two sovereign states, India and Pakistan, and thus their maritime boundary now needed to be settled as per international norms, mainly the Thalweg Doctrine, which follows the meridian principle. In fact, another resolution of the erstwhile Bombay Government adopted in 1925 did install mid-channel pillars in Sir Creek. Pakistan does not agree with India since an acceptance of these provisions would lead to redrawing of the maritime boundary in the area, re-delineation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and other fishing areas in the Arabian Sea. This could be detrimental to Pakistani hopes as it anticipates the presence of hydro-carbon resources in the area.

India is not inclined to take any chances simply on the basis of pious hopes and intentions. If India gives up control of the eastern bank of the Creek, there is no guarantee that Pakistan would not claim any new territory in the sector, particularly if any oil or gas discovery is made in the region. Thus, the trust deficit in Pakistan that bedevils the overall Indo-Pak relations also makes any progress in resolving the Sir Creek issue that much more difficult.