Left-Wing Extremism

You are here

  • Share
  • Tweet
  • Email
  • Whatsapp
  • Linkedin
  • Print
  • The Need for a Strategic Response to Insurgency and Terrorism

    Countering ideological narratives, effective communication of developmental measures to the people, and adherence to the principle of judicious use of force should form integral elements of India's strategy to counter insurgent and terrorist groups.

    November 26, 2010

    Linkages between Indian and Nepalese Maoists

    Though fuzzy, there are linkages between Indian and Nepalese Maoists and these have been either admitted or downplayed by all sides –– the Nepalese Maoists, the Indian Maoists and the Indian government.

    November 09, 2010

    Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) in India

    It has become almost a cliché to say that the LWE situation is the most serious internal threat facing the country. Naxalism has been operating in several parts of the country. It has been there from the late 60s and 70s and different parts of the country have been affected with different levels of naxal violence. It has been tackled in different ways in West Bengal, in Kerala, in Andhra and so on and so forth, Telangana situation was there earlier. A significant change came about with the merger of the Peoples War Group and the MCC to form the CPI (Maoist) in 2004.

    April 2010

    Strategy and Tactics in Countering Left Wing Extremists in India

    Left Wing Extremism (LWE) presents a serious internal security challenge to India that needs careful and coordinated policy response from both the security front and the development front. For the CPI (Maoists) (Communist Party of India), the main outfit propagating LWE, the plan and execution of this style of people's war against the state is like the Churchillian ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’. At one level, the LWE can be described as a ‘Democratic revolution through tactical offensive with tactical speed in the protracted people's war of strategic defensive’.

    July 2010

    Always in the Line of Fire

    There are no shortcuts to overcoming the grave Naxal threat to our democratic way of life. Broadening the mandate by handing over the problem to the army is neither fair nor efficacious.

    June 22, 2010

    Countering the Naxals

    The Grid-Guard-Govern strategy would do away with the sequential application of socio-economic solutions by undertaking security-led governance cum development action.

    June 11, 2010

    The Maoist Menace: Time for Serious Action

    Air presence is a critical factor in counterinsurgency operations as it provides a high level of dominance and control over the situation.

    May 20, 2010

    The Hard Lesson of Chintalnar

    The hard lesson of Chintalnar is that the police are simply not investing enough in their frontline leadership and training to tackle the situation. Even when attempts have been made to bring in competence, the efforts to acquire required counterinsurgency skills have been marginal.

    May 10, 2010

    Anti-Naxal Operations: Employment of Armed Forces

    Whereas employing Armed Forces may appear to be an attractive idea to control the naxal menace, the adverse effects of their long term commitment, particularly of the Army, need to be understood.

    May 04, 2010

    Pages

    Top