Left-Wing Extremism

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  • Rockets in Maoist Arsenal

    Rockets in the Maoist arsenal may seem, presently, to have nuisance value. However, the possibility of the Maoists acquiring greater capability to fire the rockets with accuracy cannot be ruled out. Many strategic and static locations would come under threat with disastrous consequences.

    May 10, 2013

    D. Aravind asked: Why can’t the Tripura model be replicated in other insurgency hit states (especially the states suffering from Left Wing Extremism)?

    Vivek Chadha replies: Every insurgency has its own peculiarities and dynamics, which defines and characterises it. Even two insurgencies in a single state could have a very different character. A look at the Bodo and the ULFA led insurgencies in Assam is an example. Similarly, the dynamics of various insurgencies in Manipur, which includes the Naga insurgency in the hills and Meitei dominated insurgency in the plains, is different, as is the Kuki led insurgency. Therefore, every insurgency should be tackled according to its peculiarities.

    Gaurav Kumar asked: What constitutes the "civic action programme" undertaken by the union government in areas affected by LWE (left wing extremism)? How does it work?

    Vivek Chadha replies: Before answering the question, it is important to understand the circumstances and conditions which characterise any insurgency. Most areas affected by such movements are severely impacted in terms of the ability to render even basic civic amenities to the common people. These include provision of food supplies, medical support, transportation in case of emergencies, schooling and basic recreational facilities. Given the limited ability to govern such areas effectively, the insurgents fill the void and run a parallel government.

    It is under these circumstances that security and administrative agencies reach out to the people in the far flung areas to provide them these very basic amenities to enable sustenance and support. These civic action programmes are funded by the government and are undertaken based on the local requirements and conditions. This implies that these cannot be generic in nature and must address the local needs of an area. Even as basic needs are addressed, these programmes also help re-establish the writ of the state and convince the people of the need to support the government against the insurgents.

    Based on these very guidelines, civic action programmes have been undertaken in LWE affected areas. Initiatives differ from overall capacity building to include roads, medical facilities and schools to specific needs of local areas depending on the needs of the people. This could include a water supply scheme for a particular area and a vocational institute in another.

    PM’s address to police chiefs: A Wake up Call

    The Prime Minister’s address highlighted critical threats to internal security and expected counter-measures with the aim of refocusing the attention of the police forces on these vital issues.

    September 12, 2012

    India’s Maoists: The Party shall be over!

    Although there has been little change in the influence of Naxalites across the country over the past couple of years, patience and concerted effort shall no doubt make the Maoists irrelevant.

    September 07, 2012

    Disrupting Life and Economy: The Maoist way

    Repeated acts of targeting infrastructure speak of Maoist intentions: paralyse normal life, sabotage economic activity, dictate terms and allow life and economic activity only on their “terms and conditions.”

    May 31, 2012

    Maoists’ global web of linkages

    All Indian Missions abroad need to closely monitor international communist groups to counter the propaganda campaign that they unleash from time to time and refute their false claims.

    May 19, 2012

    Growing Maoist Activism in Assam: Sinister and Calculated Moves

    Although law enforcement agencies have been receiving timely reports about growing Maoist activities in Assam, it appears that they do not pay much attention to the issue.

    February 24, 2012

    Maoists understand the limitations of Mine Proof Vehicles

    After a systematic study of the MPV deployed in anti-Maoist operations, the Maoists have come to the conclusion that “There is no such thing as a mine proof vehicle”.

    January 30, 2012

    Maoists in ‘Golden Corridor Area’

    The ‘Golden Corridor Area’ was reportedly formed by the Maoists in February 2008. It is essential to check their presence in this area in order to curtail their finances as well as to avoid industrial sabotage.

    December 19, 2011

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