Rajneesh Singh replies: Reform to the Higher Defence Organisation of India has been a long standing demand of the Services and of the strategic community. In the wake of the Kargil war, the Government of India had constituted the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) to look into the episode of Pakistan’s aggression in the Kargil Sector. The Committee comprised of four members, namely Mr. K. Subrahmanyam (Chairman), Lieutenant General (retd.) K. K. Hazari, Mr. B.G. Verghese and Mr. Satish Chandra, Secretary, National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and also Member Secretary.

A Group of Ministers (GOM) was also constituted by the Prime Minister on April 17, 2000 to review the national security system in its entirety and in particular to consider the recommendations of the KRC and formulate specific proposals for implementation. The GOM after initial deliberations decided to address the recommendations of the KRC through four Task Forces, one each in the areas of Intelligence Apparatus, Internal Security, Border Management and Management of Defence. The Task Forces considered not only the recommendations of the KRC falling within their respective competencies, but also other aspects impinging upon national security which were not touched upon by the KRC. Consequent to deliberations and recommendations of the KRC and the GOM, some changes were made to the Higher Defence Organisation, viz. integration of the Service Headquarters with the Ministry of Defence (MoD), establishment of HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and so on. However, one of the major recommendations of the KRC and the GOM was to have an appointment of the CDS. For variety of reasons, the government did not consider it prudent to establish this appointment.

In 2011, the government convened Naresh Chandra Committee to deliberate on issues concerning national security. The report of the deliberations of the committee has been submitted to the government and presentation on the key recommendations has been made to the National Security Council (NSC). Both the print and electronic media have carried news items regarding its key recommendations. If the media reports are to be believed, the committee has recommended the appointment of the permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). The exact details regarding the appointment will only be known once the report is declassified. In all likelihood, the appointment of the CDS may not come through in the near future.
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For more on the subject, refer to the following IDSA publications:

All essays published in the first issue (vol. 1, Issue 1, 2007) of the Journal of Defence Studies, available at http://www.idsa.in/jds/1_1_2007

Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee: A Midway Solution
By Rajneesh Singh, August 7, 2012
http://idsa.in/idsacomments/ChairmanChiefsofStaffCommitteeAMidwaySolutio...

A Call for Change: Higher Defence Management in India, IDSA Monograph Series No. 6, 2012, at http://idsa.in/monograph/ACallforChangeHigherDefenceManagementinIndia

Jointness in Armed Forces and Institution of Post of Chief of Defence Staff are Mutually Exclusive
By Vinod Patney, Journal of Defence Studies, 2 (1), Summer 2008, at http://www.idsa.in/jds/2_1_2008_JointnessinArmedForcesandInstitutionofPo...

Reply: Refer to the following publications on the subject by IDSA faculty:

• India’s Defence Industry Base by Rajiv Nayan in Defence & Security Alert, at http://www.idsa.in/system/files/DIB_Nayan.pdf
• A Critique of MoD’s Joint Venture Guidelines by Laxman K. Behera, at
  http://idsa.in/idsacomments/ACritiqueofMoDsJointVentureGuidelines_lkbehe...
• Private Sector Participation in Defence Production: Industrial Licensing and FDI Issues by Laxman K. Behera, at
  http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/PrivateSectorParticipationinDefenceProdu...
• Public Private Partnership In Procurement Practices by Venu Gopal, at
  http://idsa.in/idsacomments/PrivatePartnershipinProcurementPractices_vgo...
• Will Indian Defence Private Sector Deliver with Recent Policy Changes? by Narinder Gupta, at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/WillIndianDefencePrivateSectorDeliverwithRec...

Ali Ahmed replies: Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) pose a threat of two kinds: first is from terrorism targeting population, and second is IEDs aimed at causing casualties among soldiers. The two forms of IED employment by terrorists/insurgents require distinct and overlapping measures. India’s policy to tackle the threat posed by IEDs aims, firstly, at prevention. This at the political level involves mitigation of persisting conflict situations. This has both internal political and diplomatic dimensions. At the strategic level, it implies intelligence and public information. Next, since IEDs are employed in proxy war, increase in their use would imply escalation in the level of confrontation. This can be deterred through diplomatic and conventional means. At the tactical level, it means taking due precaution such as surveillance through electronic means and keeping tabs on explosive material from falling into wrong hands.

The second element of policy is defensive. These include proper sanitisation of areas under threat through, for instance, road opening drills in counter insurgency areas, and appropriate reaction by quick reaction teams. An example at this level is the periodic IED information bulletin document in Northern Command for speedy dissemination of ‘lessons learnt.’ Third are mitigation measures to reduce casualties by timely evacuation, collecting evidence for follow up and prosecution, etc. Lastly, offensive actions to trace and destroy IED making factories, busting terror cells, etc., may be employed. These could be both military and intelligence operations.

As far as the strategy against IEDs goes, it is situation specific and guided by the overall policy and counter terror/insurgency doctrine. Since conflict theatres in which IEDs are employed have their unique context and intricacies, strategy is dynamically individuated. There is cross learning from experiences elsewhere, including from abroad. The manner the latter is done is through appropriate doctrine, sensitisation and training.