Dr Rajiv Nayan is Senior Research Associate at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Click here for detailed profile.
This paper explores the paradox of US policy on dual-use technology cooperation with China in the face of resistance from a strong section of the security establishment. The paper examines the factors contributing to the current level of dual-use technology business between the two countries. It finds that the US Cold War grand strategy of co-opting China by dividing the socialist bloc has resulted in embedded commercial interests that have been further bolstered by the strategic need for ties with China.
With the not so unexpected North Korean nuclear test on October 9, 2006 the world has entered into yet another nuclear age. Regional tension is the inevitable corollary of the new nuclear situation. Many apprehend East Asia may become a nuclear flashpoint. Quite naturally, the international community is closely watching the emergent situation. The United States (US) as a major and traditional stakeholder both in the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and security management in East Asia is actively involved in diplomacy to deal with the fallout of the North Korean nuclear test.
On July 27, 2006, the US House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the bill HR 5682 for United States and India Nuclear Co-operation Promotion Act of 2006. This bill was submitted to the House by its International Relations Committee, after modifying the bill HR 4974 which was referred to the House by the US Administration. The House in an "up-or-down vote" passed this bill by a wide margin, with 359 members voting for and 58 opposing it. A number of amendments seen as killers were defeated on the floor of the House.
On July 9, 2006, the long awaited Agni-III ballistic missiles test finally took place. This was the first test of this version of Agni designed with a range of 3,000 km. This missile used two-stage solid propellant. It took off successfully but failed to cover its determined course completely. Apparently, the missile developed a snag while entering into its second stage. Admitting the snag the Indian minister of defence said that it was not a major failure. Scientists are quite confident that the error will be rectified, and the missile would be ready for testing in the near future.
The July 2005 visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Washington has been eventful as far as nuclear issues are concerned. The joint statement, various speeches, briefings, and interactions have given a new direction to the nuclear policies and postures of both India and the United States (US). Of course, much heat has also been generated in both the countries. It is necessary, therefore, to provide some clarity to the heated debate. Is it a sell out/ surrender to the US or a big victory?
The paper examines the salient features of the principal statutory authority, the Export Administration Act (EAA), that is, at present, governing dual-use technology control in the US, and the frontiers of dual-use export control after the enactment of the new Act. An analysis of different provisions of the bills for the new Act indicates mixed features. It does not completely liberalise the control of dual-use technology, and continues to have in place a number of curbs.
The Indo-US Civil Nuclear Co-operation Agreement in the House of Representatives
On July 27, 2006, the US House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the bill HR 5682 for United States and India Nuclear Co-operation Promotion Act of 2006. This bill was submitted to the House by its International Relations Committee, after modifying the bill HR 4974 which was referred to the House by the US Administration. The House in an "up-or-down vote" passed this bill by a wide margin, with 359 members voting for and 58 opposing it. A number of amendments seen as killers were defeated on the floor of the House.