Dr Rajiv Nayan is Senior Research Associate at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Click here for detailed profile.
In different international bodies and in statements by various world leaders, universalisation and a possible revision of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are figuring quite frequently. Certainly, in the emerging context for universalisation, the relationship between India and the NPT may be reviewed. Several relevant options are emerging to define the relationship between India and the NPT. This has put the relationship between India and the NPT in the international limelight.
The failure of the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) almost signalled doom for the treaty. The NPT, since it came into force, has always travelled a slippery slope encountering various hurdles on the way. Its problem did not end even after it acquired the ‘near universal’ status. With the exception of India, Pakistan and Israel, all countries have joined the treaty, though North Korea withdrew from it and later conducted a couple of nuclear tests.
After eight years of governance by a Republican Administration, the United States elected a Democrat as its president. The Democrat President, Barack Hussein Obama, assumed presidency and appointed several key officials to implement his agenda. Though some believe that democracy forces political parties to evolve a common agenda and towards consensus on several key issues, there are others who see differences between the Republican agenda and those of Democrats.
On February 6, 2009, the Pakistani judiciary acquitted Abdul Qadeer (AQ) Khan, the symbol of Pakistani involvement in clandestine nuclear commerce. Since 2004, he had been under house arrest after the proliferation network, linking several countries, including Pakistan, was uncovered. Though he has been put under ‘unspecified security measures’, yet the release of AQ Khan – dubbed by the United States State Department spokesman Gordon Duguid as a ‘serious proliferation risk’ – is considered to be a disturbing development for the non-proliferation regime.
The November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks that shook the world again had tangible links to the security and intelligence establishment of Pakistan. The emergent situation is forcing the policy-making community to take appropriate action so that the culprits are brought to justice and the elements sponsoring the terror attacks in India are adequately deterred. Several options were being exercised and explored for the purpose. As the Pakistani Government is undertaking only cosmetic and deceptive steps to ward off international pressure, the world and India appear far from convinced.
In 1984, a report, of a special investigatory commission appointed by the United Nations Secretary General, pointed the finger at western countries for supplying chemical agents used in the Iran-Iraq war as weapons. This frightened and prompted some western countries to set up Australia Group to avoid such an occurrence in the future. It was called the Australia Group because Australia initiated the move to organise the first meeting in Brussels in June 1985. Ever since its formation in 1985, the Australia Group always searched for legitimacy and the rationale for its existence.
Today, it is necessary for India to respond to the current crisis of the NPT and weigh its options vis-a-vis the Treaty. This paper is an attempt to explore answers to the question of what ought to be India's policy in the light of the new nuclear reality. It analyses three policy options that India could pursue and concludes that India must strive to join the NPT as a nuclear weapon country, because joining the non-proliferation regime by evading the NPT is likely to prove costly and is also unlikely to remove destabilizing irritants.
