Rajiv Nayan is Senior Research Associate at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Click here for detailed profile.
Both the government as well and the strategic community are convinced that India must not join the Australia Group without a road map for the MTCR and the NSG.
The treaty needs to be capable of addressing existing and perceived threat of the world; at the same time, it should be flexible enough to meet emerging security challenges.
Since the idea of export controls may be new for a large number of countries, and most of the proposed provisions are borrowed from existing systems in developed countries, the treaty should be flexible enough to remove redundant provisions and adopt new provisions suitable for changed circumstances.
Indexing will provide a further opportunity for countries to make allegations that the NGOs working on nuclear security are basically pushing the agenda of the US non-proliferation community as well as of the US government.
While the project that produced the Report engaged some credible scholars from western universities and elsewhere, but the control and leadership exercised on the project by known non-proliferation activists may have sent a wrong signal to the non-western world.
everal measures are being initiated by the international community to secure sensitive materials. Al Qaeda's open interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and the rise of terrorist activity in nuclear-armed Pakistan have triggered a global interest in the need to secure nuclear weapons and materials. In April 2010 President Obama invited some key countries and international organisations in Washington to frame a new regime for nuclear security. The emerging regime includes some older initiatives as well as some new mechanisms, and it must address a number of issues.
Though India has supported and adopted the international legal framework for nuclear security, it has adopted a somewhat unique approach reflecting its policy of cautious activism.
Non-proliferation is now an accepted norm in international security and international relations. Most countries perceive global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as being inseparable in principle, although there is disagreement among countries on the ultimate objective of non-proliferation. Most countries generally want non-proliferation to be a transitional arrangement before total nuclear disarmament, which at present is a desirable though distant goal. The classical bargain for balancing the two has tilted in favour of non-proliferation.
Even the otherwise vague 2011 NSG public statement which inserted the NPT angle into the guidelines underlined that the NSG would implement the India-specific exemptions fully.
Update on India’s Membership of Multilateral Export Controls Regimes
Both the government as well and the strategic community are convinced that India must not join the Australia Group without a road map for the MTCR and the NSG.