While explicit political control cannot be questioned, it is critical to involve the military as equal partners in the overall decision making process so as to leverage their knowledge, operational experience and unmatched organisational capacities for the well being of the state.

An absence of legal statutes in the insurgency affected areas would adversely affect the utility and efficacy of the security capacity of the state.

A military to military engagement between India and Pakistan could help pave the way for greater understanding and opening up in the troubled relationship.

There are no shortcuts to overcoming the grave Naxal threat to our democratic way of life. Broadening the mandate by handing over the problem to the army is neither fair nor efficacious.

Since safeguarding the public space such as mass transportation networks, financial and industrial hubs from sporadic acts of terror is increasingly becoming difficult, socialising citizenry in democratic societies to the needs of counterterrorism assumes salience.

The hard lesson of Chintalnar is that the police are simply not investing enough in their frontline leadership and training to tackle the situation. Even when attempts have been made to bring in competence, the efforts to acquire required counterinsurgency skills have been marginal.

That the ISI patron is now becoming the victim of jehadi terrorism does not bode well for Pakistan, which now has to recast the agency’s role and organizational ethos to contain the Taliban.