China and to a lesser extent Pakistan have helped North Korea with its nuclear and missile development programmes.

The First Committee vote is a culmination of a long-drawn campaign and marks a dramatic shift in the affairs of the non-proliferation regime.

The key to calling Pakistan’s nuclear bluff lies in ensuring that the Indian armed forces are prepared to meet the threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons.

In the aftermath of recent North Korean actions and threats, there has been in recent times some open debates and discussions about the prospects of South Korea “going nuclear” i.e. developing its own nuclear weapons. This brief argues that short of abrogating all its bilateral and multilateral treaties and obligations with heavy costs, the prospects of it doing so in the short/medium term are not that easy and may not be cost effective.

Nuclear force development is at present an attractive means for Pakistan to attract international political and financial assistance, while salving the paranoias of its security establishment. Improvement in the state-society relationship could reduce the domestic appeal of endless nuclear expansion as other, more sustainable, resources become available to the state for building economic growth and security.