Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use, dreadfully experienced in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has had little policy impact on concluding a genuine nuclear disarmament convention.

The parties involved in the Ukraine–Russia conflict should privilege nuclear risk avoidance measures rather than indulge in nuclear sabre-rattling.

Showing readiness to sign the SEANWFZ treaty seems to be a low-cost, high-return proposition for Beijing. It could be a calculated symbolic gesture having no bearing on the region’s precarious security situation.

The Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has not succeeded in adding any additional universal stigma to nuclear weapons. It lacks the support base needed for replacing the Cold War vintage “Mutual Assured Destruction” with “Mutual Assured Abstinence”. The nuclear weapon countries’ faith in the deterrence logic remains intact.

The standoffs in Doklam and North Korea offer insights on how crisis stability remains subject to the complexities of deterrence, especially in theatres with multiple nuclear-armed states, and what this entails for disarmament.