Much has been written about terrorism and counterterrorism as forms of communication, but such analyses are usually jettisoned in the arena of “breaking news alerts” and real-time reporting.
The spate of rioting which plagued Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) from June 2010 is testimony to the mismanagement of developments by both the state and central governments. This is all the more unfortunate as near normalcy had been established in Jammu and Kashmir following the November 2008 elections and the downtrend in insurgency through 2009 and early 2010.
By postulating that the players think ahead not just to their immediate consequences, but also to the others, game theory can provide a framework to think about defending against terrorist attacks.
Countering ideological narratives, effective communication of developmental measures to the people, and adherence to the principle of judicious use of force should form integral elements of India's strategy to counter insurgent and terrorist groups.
The current terrorist threat has reemphasised the importance of Europe, considered to be increasingly irrelevant in global security and strategic calculus.
Bangladesh is making an important effort domestically to weaken the affiliates of al-Qaeda and Taliban ideology, which is no less important than making contributions to ISAF.
Indonesia, which has been taking significant measures to curb terrorism, scored another success with the arrest of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir aka ABB, suspected of having funded and ideologically motivated Al Qaeda Aceh, in early August 2010. The arrest is just one of the steps in a long, consistent and protracted fight to maintain Indonesia’s secular, democratic and republican credentials.
There is a view that India's approach to national security is largely ad hoc and marked by incompetence. Indians as well as foreign commentators on the country's security policies seem to share this perception. However, India does have a security approach that has a discernible pattern and arguably has been a success. This comment focuses on how India has dealt with internal security since independence.
This commentary attempts to answer the question as to why the flow of jihadis is unending despite tough measures being undertaken by Jakarta, on its own or in collaboration with its regional and international partners.
The interim opportunity provided by the Army’s curtailment of insurgent activity needs to be utilised to meet the aspirations of the local population in insurgency affected areas.
No Time for Finger-Pointing: Taking a Long View after the Mumbai Blasts
Much has been written about terrorism and counterterrorism as forms of communication, but such analyses are usually jettisoned in the arena of “breaking news alerts” and real-time reporting.