Should GRSE and GSL deliver satisfactory services to their export customers, there is considerable potential for India to position itself as a competitive supplier of small and medium warships and patrol crafts.

India’s future submarine fleet operations are likely to involve SSKs and SSNs operating in the littoral spaces, in a strategic environment sanitized and protected by SSBNs. If New Delhi can ensure compliance with present construction deadlines, it could put its submarine modernization plans back on track.

Nothing conveys strategic intent as effectively as the large conventional warship whose mere presence can provide a decisive psychological advantage in strategic scenarios.

By engaging GCC navies through joint exercises, port calls, and training programmes, the Navy has successfully created a durable template of maritime relations in the Western Indian Ocean.

The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) is a small but positive sign towards better communication channels between navies to reduce tension in the seas. But for CUES to become a reality many issues need to be resolved including the time frame for implementation.

The naval exercise at Qingdao does not detract from the fact that the India-China maritime relationship is essentially an uneasy one. Each side is uncomfortable with the other’s presence in its own theatre of nautical influence, but both recognise the other’s dominance in their respective maritime ‘backyards’.

Though the general elections are due this year, the need of the hour is to build a political consensus on the issue without further delay. It will be to the credit of the government if it is able to generate political consensus and appoint a Permanent Chairman CoSC or CDS.

All major democracies have opted for the CDS and India cannot ignore it any further. In the prevailing battlefield milieu of joint operations, combined operations and even coalition operations, modern armed forces cannot be successful without a well-developed and deeply ingrained culture of jointmanship.