


Africa Trends

Volume 6, Issue 2

July-December 2017

ISSN: 2456-7329

A Biannual Magazine on Africa



idsa

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE
STUDIES & ANALYSES

रक्षा अध्ययन एवं विश्लेषण संस्थान

Editor

Ruchita Beri

Associate Editor

Arpita Anant

<i>In This Issue</i>	<i>Page</i>
EDITOR'S NOTE	3
COVER STORY <i>Turkey's Growing Strategic Inroads in Africa</i> <i>Md. Muddassir Quamar</i>	4-7
COMMENTARY <i>India's Economic Diplomacy with Ethiopia</i> <i>Chithra Purushothaman</i>	8-12
COMMENTARY <i>"... if the people in Rwanda ever needed help, now was the time..."</i> <i>Priyal Pandey</i>	13-16
VIEWPOINT <i>Africa and the G20</i> <i>Arpita Anant</i>	17-23
BOOK REVIEW Timothy Doyle and Dennis Rumley (Eds), Africa and the Indian Ocean Region <i>Mathew Sinu Simon</i>	24-26

Disclaimer

This newsletter does not reflect the views of IDSA. News reports have been abridged to provide clarity. IDSA is not responsible for the accuracy and authenticity of the news items.

Editor's Note

Greetings! We bring you the second issue of *Africa Trends* for 2017.

The cover story by Md. Muddassir Quamar brings forth the various ways in which Turkey is trying to regain a foothold in some parts of Africa. A commentary by Chithra Purushothaman points to the strengths and weaknesses of India's economic outreach to Ethiopia. A second commentary by Priyal Pandey revisits the genocide of Rwanda through the documentary *Ghosts of Rwanda* (2004) in the wake of the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front leader, Paul Kagame, in the Presidential elections of August 2017. The view point by Arpita Anant assays the G20's engagement with Africa in view of the announcement of the Compact with Africa at the Hamburg Summit of the G20. A review of the book titled *Africa and the Indian Ocean Region* by Mathew Sinu Simon highlights the strategic significance and untapped potential of the African littoral in the Indian Ocean Region.

We look forward to your feedback.

Covery Story

TURKEY'S GROWING STRATEGIC INROADS IN AFRICA

In many ways Turkey is reviving its historic relations with Africa with an eye to strengthen economic ties and gain strategic depth, but for some this is a reminder of the bitter past and represents neo-Ottomanism.

Md. Muddassir Quamar*

...in 2005...Ankara adopted the "Open to Africa" policy and the year was declared "the year of Africa".

Africa". This shift in policy was part of the larger foreign policy reorientation that had started after the Cold War but gained momentum under the AKP. The AKP-government led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, first as prime minister (2003-2014) and later as president (since 2014) invested in improving relations with the neighborhood and put in systematic efforts toward gaining membership of the European Union (EU). The much emphasised doctrine of "strategic depth" and "zero-problem with neighbors" became the guiding principles for Turkish foreign policy. In the process, Turkey employed its linguistic, cultural and religious affinity with the neighbourhood to gain influence and increase economic ties. This was true for Balkans, Central Asia, Europe as well as West Asia and North Africa. This also

...the Arab Spring protests and subsequent turmoil in the region seriously put Turkish foreign policy to test...

led to the debate on Turkey's effort to revive the Ottoman-era influence in North and Sub Saharan Africa which were once part of the Ottoman Empire.¹ Though the Arab Spring protests and subsequent turmoil in the region seriously put Turkish foreign policy to test and led to worsening relations with countries such as Syria, Iraq and Egypt, it did not deter Ankara from pursuing its geopolitical and economic forays in Africa.

* Dr. Md. Muddassir Quamar is Associate Fellow, West Asia Centre, IDSA.

Diplomatic and economic relations

As part of its plan to improve relations with African countries, Turkey adopted the “Africa Action Plan” in 1998 with an aim to improve diplomatic and economic relations. However, due to internal problems, namely political instability, transition of power and economic downturn, the plan did not take off. Again in 2005, the AKP government initiated the “Open to Africa” policy which was to a large extent a re-packaging of the “Africa Action Plan” and started improving relations with the African countries. A number of Turkish embassies were opened as part of the policy. Thus, from a few embassies in 2005, the number of Turkish missions in Africa increased to 19 in 2009 and grew to 40 as of 2018. Further it significantly enhanced partnership with the African Union, hosted African leaders in Ankara and Turkey’s leaders travelled extensively to North and Sub-Saharan Africa. The first Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit was held in August 2008 and in the same year the African Union declared Turkey as a “Strategic Partner.”

...the number of Turkish missions in Africa increased to 19 in 2009 and grew to 40 as of 2018.

The growing diplomatic relations were accompanied by enhanced commercial activities. Turkey also started undertaking developmental projects and economic aid in African countries. Thus between 2002 and 2012, Turkish developmental projects in Africa increased from US\$9 billion to US\$46 billion. According to Andolou Agency, the official Turkish news agency, as of 2015 Turkey’s development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa was US\$395 million.² The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) started a number of economic aid projects in war-torn and poorer African countries including Somalia and Sudan by building hospitals and schools. As of 2018, the TIKA runs more than 20 economic aid projects in Africa.

Additionally, Turkey-Africa trade increased with growing bilateral relations. The volume of Turkey-Africa trade increased from a meager US\$750 million in 2000 to more than US\$23 billion in 2013. Though due to the global downturn, the volume of trade dropped subsequently to reach US\$20 billion in 2017, it has shown signs of picking up again. Before the 2016 failed coup, the Gülen movement-affiliated Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkiye (TUSKON) was significantly active in Africa in promoting Turkish businesses but after the fallout between AKP and the Gülen movement as a result of the coup attempt, its activities have been curtailed by the state. Nevertheless, it had over the decade from 2006-2016 significantly helped promote Turkish businesses and industries in the continent. As part of its effort to promote trade, Turkey also organized the second Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in Malabo (Equatorial Guinea) in 2014. Further, Erdoğan has been undertaking visits to African countries and in February 2018 toured Algeria, Mauritania, Senegal and Mali with an eye on strengthen bilateral trade.³

...the Gülen movement-affiliated Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkiye (TUSKON) was significantly active in Africa...

Defense and strategic ties

While trade and economy have been a priority, in more recent times, Turkey has shown interest in enhancing strategic and military ties with African countries. This is part of Ankara's larger foreign policy ambitions to gain strategic depth in the neighborhood and beyond. As part of the plan Turkey has over the last decade established overseas military bases in five countries including in Azerbaijan (2016), Iraq (2008), Syria (2016), Qatar (2016) and Somalia (2017) in addition to military presence in Northern Cyprus since 1974. Reflective of the Turkish ambitions, the military forays are not confined to securing border areas such as in Iraq and Syria. In fact, its bases in Qatar and Somalia have been opened with an aim to providing security to the respective regimes. The base in Mogadishu is the largest Turkish overseas military base. Inaugurated in September 2017, it will train 10,000 Somali troops and can train 1,500 troops at a time.⁴

The base in Mogadishu is the largest Turkish overseas military base.

Turkey has been building relationship with Somalia over the last decade and Erdoğan had visited the country in 2011. This led to forging of strong bilateral ties and resulted in Ankara enhancing its economic and developmental aid to Mogadishu. But with the establishment of the army base with 3,000 combat soldiers in addition to a large military paraphernalia, Turkey has gained a foothold in the troubled but strategically important Horn of Africa and an inroad in the Indian Ocean. Further, in December 2017 Turkey and Sudan signed an agreement granting Turkey a long-term lease for restoration of an Ottoman era port city in the Red Sea island of Suakin.⁵ The city has several Ottoman era structures including the port and during Ottoman era served as a stopover for Muslim pilgrims from Africa and Mediterranean going to Mecca. As per the agreement signed during the visit of President Erdoğan, Turkey will not only restore the old structures but also the port, and build a naval dock to maintain civilian and military vessels. This has alarmed neighbouring countries, especially Egypt, that doubts Turkey's strategic ambitions and is concerned about its growing presence in eastern Africa.⁶

Geopolitical significance

Turkey's growing strategic presence in Africa encompassing commercial, cultural, political and military ties is part of Ankara's foreign policy ambitions. Turkey sees itself as emerging global power, leader of the Muslim world and an important actor in its neighborhood. Ankara wishes to play a larger role in the geopolitics in its neighbourhood and beyond including in Africa, and this had led to its growing forays in the continent. While some countries such as Somalia and Sudan have been welcoming of the growing Turkish presence, others such as Egypt and Algeria have been less forthcoming and view it with suspicion. In many ways Turkey is reviving its historic relations with Africa with an eye to strengthen economic ties and gain strategic depth, but for some this is a reminder of the bitter past and represents neo-Ottomanism.

-
- ¹ The Turkish foreign policy push to regain “strategic depth” in the erstwhile Ottoman territories was termed by many as “neo-Ottomanism”. See Alexander Murinson, *Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: Neo-Ottomanism and the Strategic Depth Doctrine*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2012.
 - ² Zuhail Demirci and Fatih Hafiz Mehmet, “Turkey in intense cooperation with Africa”, *Andolou Agency*, February 10, 2018, at <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-in-intense-cooperation-with-africa/1059565> (Accessed February 28, 2018).
 - ³ Zülfikar Doğan, “Turkey looks to Africa”, *Ahval News*, February 27, 2018, at <https://ahvalnews.com/africa/turkey-looks-africa> (Accessed February 28, 2018).
 - ⁴ *Al-Jazeera*, “Turkey sets up largest overseas army base in Somalia”, October 1, 2017, at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/turkey-sets-largest-overseas-army-base-somalia-171001073820818.html> (Accessed November 11, 2017).
 - ⁵ Ali Kucukgocmen, Khalid Abdelaziz, “Turkey to restore Sudanese Red Sea port and build naval dock”, *Reuters*, December 26, 2017, at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-sudan-port/turkey-to-restore-sudanese-red-sea-port-and-build-naval-dock-idUSKBN1EK0ZC> (Accessed January 9, 2018).
 - ⁶ Mohamed Abdul Maguid, “Why Egypt is concerned over Sudan-Turkey’s Suakin deal”, *Egypt Today*, January 6, 2018, at <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/39419/Why-Egypt-is-concerned-over-Sudan-Turkey-s-Suakin-deal> (Accessed January 9, 2018).

Commentary

INDIA'S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY WITH ETHIOPIA

Several international players are competing to finance projects in African countries, and New Delhi will be at a disadvantage if it does not proactively engage in strengthening development partnerships. As an emerging power that is actively pushing South-South Cooperation (SSC), India has to convince its partners the advantage of Indian development assistance, which adheres to principles of horizontal cooperation and mutual benefit.

Chithra Purushothaman*

Indian President Ram Nath Kovind visited Ethiopia from October 4-6, 2017, marking a new era in India-Ethiopia bilateral relations. This visit is important considering India's long historic and cultural ties, as well as the rising economic and commercial linkages with this strategically important country in the Horn of Africa. Interestingly, Ethiopia also qualifies as the largest recipient of India's Lines of Credit (LOC) in Africa, which points to the importance of the country in India's foreign policy calculus.

Growing Development Partnership

India has cemented its relations with Ethiopia as a development partner from the Global South.

Newly independent India initiated its diplomatic ties with Ethiopia in the early 1950s. Over the last seven decades, India has cemented its relations with Ethiopia as a development partner from the Global South. Even though India has a long-standing diplomatic relationship with Ethiopia, the past one decade has seen renewed interest and enhanced efforts on the part of the two countries in strengthening ties through continuous economic

partnerships and diplomacy.


New Delhi has contributed to Ethiopia's development through its EXIM Bank lines of credit (LOC), grants and Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, which are provided in areas ranging from infrastructure development to agriculture, education, capacity-building, and energy generation and supply. In Ethiopia, ITEC programmes started in 1969, and these capacity-building programmes have helped India build immense goodwill among both the civilians and the defence personnel in the country. In the last one decade, there has been a ten-fold increase in the number of ITEC slots offered to Ethiopia,

* Dr. Chithra Purushothaman is Research Assistant, Non-Traditional Security Centre, IDSA.

rising from 25 slots in 2007-08 to 250 slots in 2016-17 (see Figure.1).

Furthermore, after New Delhi committed USD1 billion to Addis Ababa in 2015, it has become the largest recipient of India's LOCs in Africa. The LOCs are provided mainly for the development of energy transmission projects, sugar industry, and railways.¹ Also, the EXIM Bank's branch office for Eastern Africa is located in Addis Ababa, and Government of India's flagship initiative for sharing India's expertise in healthcare and education with African countries, namely the Pan African e-Network Project, first started working in Ethiopia in 2007. This project is focused on providing tele-education and tele-medicine services to African partners and has proved to be a great support for Ethiopia in its efforts for socio-economic development.

Figure.1 Number of ITEC Slots Allocated to Ethiopia



SOURCE: MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (2008-2017)

Compiled by the author

A major platform for New Delhi's efforts in engaging with Africa has been the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS). The Second India-Africa Forum Summit was held in Addis Ababa in 2011, which marked the first visit of an Indian Prime Minister to Ethiopia. During the third IAFS in 2015, Prime Minister Modi announced USD10 billion for Africa for the next five years. Ethiopia would be a key beneficiary of this assistance.

Even though India's development cooperation with Ethiopia has largely been mutually beneficial and much appreciated by the government, it is not without some minor setbacks. The development of Tehndaho integrated sugar project which was supported by India saw severe delays in completion; the dispute between the contractors escalated to the level of Indian companies suing each other, which led to further delays.² The aim was

The development of Tehndaho integrated sugar project... saw severe delays in completion;...

to make Ethiopia self-sufficient in sugar production. However, the country still imports sugar which shows the slow progress in India's development cooperation projects in Ethiopia's sugar industry and raises questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of India's development cooperation.

Another major setback for India was the Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway line, for which New Delhi had announced a credit line of US\$ 300 million, which remained unutilized. Later, it was understood that the government of Ethiopia received funding for the same project from China, which it preferred against Indian funding.³ This has made New Delhi slightly uncomfortable, realising that China has a better grip over its preferred partner in East Africa. However, Ethiopia has recently requested for re-purposing this LoC and utilising it for power transmission lines and infrastructure projects instead.

Ethiopia has been successfully using foreign aid or development cooperation from both the emerging powers and the traditional donors to push its development initiatives.⁴ Even when India is becoming an important actor in Ethiopia's development sector, it has to develop adequate mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating projects that could help fill the information gaps and avoid project delays that are common challenges in Indian funded projects in the country.⁵

Aiming for Greater Trade and Investments

India and Ethiopia are keen on greater cooperation in trade and on the investment front.

Apart from development cooperation, India and Ethiopia are keen on greater cooperation in trade and on the investment front. Even though the two countries had aimed at increasing the bilateral trade to USD1 billion by 2015, it has not yet been achieved. During his visit, President Kovind addressed the India-Africa Business Dialogue and signed a trade pact, which has got ex-post facto Cabinet approval. This trade pact is supposed to boost bilateral trade between the two countries that had declined to USD840.5 million from the previous fiscal year's USD854.6 million.⁶ Even when both the countries are pushing for greater trade relations, the volume of India-Ethiopia trade is much smaller when compared to Ethiopia's trade with its largest trading partner China, which was USD6 billion in 2015.⁷

Ethiopia is also the largest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa, attracting USD3.2 billion which has seen a 46 per cent increase from the previous year.⁸ It is highly appreciable that the country could sustain double-digit economic growth throughout the past decade when the broad-based growth averaged 10.3 per cent a year from 2005-06 to 2015-16.⁹ However, to sustain the economic growth and accelerate poverty reduction, Addis Ababa has to boost its investments in infrastructure, manufacturing sector and focus on socio-economic reforms.

Indian Business Forum has been pushing Indian investments in Ethiopia...

Indian Business Forum has been pushing Indian investments in Ethiopia and striving to boost trade between the two countries. Indian investments in Ethiopia are estimated to be around

\$4 billion with 540 Indian companies present in the country.¹⁰ India is also one of the three largest investors in Ethiopia.¹¹ While Indian public and private sector companies are encouraged to invest in Ethiopia, certain private sector companies are under the radar for striking land deals. While other major countries, including the United States, China, Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia are also investing heavily in Ethiopia's agricultural land, India is among the top ten investors.¹²

These land deals have come in for severe criticism as in most cases, the land so acquired is not used for agricultural purposes which renders it as an instance of land grabbing.

Conclusion

The current high-level visit demonstrates the priority India attaches to Ethiopia. The President has chosen Africa for his maiden visit abroad and has clubbed Djibouti and Ethiopia, pointing to the rising importance of the Horn of Africa in India's foreign policy and economic diplomacy. The current high-level visit is the first visit by an Indian president to Addis Ababa in 45 years since President V.V. Giri's visit in 1972.¹³ During the visit, President Kovind announced New Delhi's decision to provide fresh line of credit of USD 195 million for Ethiopia's power transmission and also provided medicines worth USD2 million.¹⁴

India is also supporting Ethiopia in its energy security, by helping to achieve the desired electrification targets and improve its energy infrastructure. Ethiopia is also one of the first countries to join the International Solar Alliance (ISA), where India is a founding member. India can share their experiences as major player in developing and utilising solar energy and can push for more solar energy projects in Ethiopia under the ISA umbrella.

Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) is another critical platform where India could partner with Ethiopia that can prove to be a win-win partnership for both the countries. The presence of Indian diaspora in Ethiopia also makes India's engagement with Ethiopia significant.

Several international players are competing to finance projects in African countries, and New Delhi will be at a disadvantage if it does not proactively engage in strengthening development partnerships. As an emerging power that is actively pushing South-South Cooperation (SSC), India has to convince its partners the advantage of Indian development assistance, which adheres to principles of horizontal cooperation and mutual benefit. However, the lack of deep pockets and delays in project implementation is making India lag behind in its development cooperation efforts in many regions around the world, including Africa. While it is essential for India to be a reliable partner for Ethiopia, it has to weigh its role carefully so as to be a responsible Southern partner.

President Kovind's visit reiterates the significance of Ethiopia in India's foreign policy. However, India has to proactively pursue its economic diplomacy with Addis Ababa to build lasting ties and keep up the momentum in the bilateral relationship. There is immense scope for cooperation that has to be tapped by both the countries for mutual benefit.

- ¹ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "India-Ethiopia Relations", September 2017, at https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Ethiopia_Sept_2017.pdf (Accessed January 25, 2018).
- ² Asrat Seyoum, "India avails billion dollars' worth line of credit to Ethiopia", *The Reporter*, March 18, 2017, at <https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/content/india-avails-billion-dollars-worth-line-credit-ethiopia> (Accessed January 28, 2018).
- ³ Istvan Tarrosy and Zoltan Voros, "China and Ethiopia, Part 2: The Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway", *The Diplomat*, February 22, 2018, at <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/china-and-ethiopia-part-1-the-light-railway-system/> (Accessed February 25, 2018).
- ⁴ Fantu Cheru, "Emerging Southern powers and new forms of South-South cooperation: Ethiopia's strategic engagement with China and India", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 37, No.4, 2016, pp. 592-610.
- ⁵ Sushil Kumar, *India's development cooperation with Ethiopia in sugar production: An Assessment*, RIS Discussion paper 198, at http://www.ris.org.in/images/RIS_images/pdf/DP%20198%20Mr%20Sushil%20Kumar.pdf (Accessed February 08, 2018).
- ⁶ "India-Ethiopia trade pact gets ex-post facto cabinet approval", *The Economic Times*, November 01, 2017, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-ethiopia-trade-pact-gets-ex-post-facto-cabinet-approval/articleshow/61400766.cms> (Accessed February 06, 2018).
- ⁷ "Private Chinese investments hits 269 mln USD in Ethiopia in 2017", *New China*, December 21, 2017, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/21/c_136843376.htm (Accessed February 06, 2018).
- ⁸ Henok Tibebe, Ethiopia becomes largest recipient of FDI in Africa, *Ethiopia Herald*, November 23, 2017, at <http://www.ethpress.gov.et/herald/index.php/news/national-news/item/10084-ethiopia-becomes-largest-recipient-of-fdi-in-africa> (Accessed January 28, 2018).
- ⁹ "The World Bank in Ethiopia", *The World Bank*, at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview>, (Accessed January 26, 2018).
- ¹⁰ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, n.1.
- ¹¹ "India's trade and investment relationship with Ethiopia is very strong, says President; symbolic of India's commitment to African Continent", October 05, 2017, PIB, at <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=171416> (Accessed February 06, 2018).
- ¹² Mohammad Amir Anwar, "India, the biggest land investor in Ethiopia", *The African Exponent*, January 09, 2016, at <https://www.africanexponent.com/post/india-the-biggest-land-investor-in-ethiopia-1327> (Accessed February 08, 2018).
- ¹³ "India, Ethiopia sign agreements on trade, communication", *The Times of India*, October 05, 2017, at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-ethiopia-sign-agreements-on-trade-communication/articleshow/60958503.cms> (Accessed February 11, 2018).
- ¹⁴ "President Ram Nath Kovind invites Ethiopian and African business to India", *The Economic Times*, October 06, 2017, at <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/president-ram-nath-kovind-invites-ethiopian-and-african-business-to-india/articleshow/60968707.cms> (Accessed January 29, 2018).

Commentary

"...IF THE PEOPLE IN RWANDA EVER NEEDED HELP, NOW WAS THE TIME..."

The media, visual and means of mass communication have often been criticised for presenting a biased and skewed viewpoint on the conflict. However, the power of documentaries like the *Ghosts of Rwanda* which present before the audiences the unpalatable realities of the world, compels the international community to ponder, discuss and accept the need for change in its institutions and their ways of working. The release of the documentary became a moment of unfolding of the pristine rubric of United Nations, especially of its peacekeeping mandates, which were discriminatory and caught in power struggles.

Priyal Pandey*

Introduction

Nearly 23 years after the occurrence of the genocide in Rwanda, Paul Kagame, the leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), who played a crucial role in fighting the extremist Hutus and halting the genocide against the Tutsis, was re-elected for a third presidential term in August 2017. Despite the infamous event occurring 20 years ago, the trials of those involved in committing the crimes and the subsequent rebuilding of the state have remained in the spectrum of international community. The occasion therefore provides an opportunity to revisit a documentary on the genocide in Rwanda (2004) that was released to mark its 10th anniversary and to recount the lessons to be learnt about dealing with violent conflicts that take a huge humanitarian toll. Directed by Greg Barker, the intricate nature, detailed script-writing and nuanced understanding of the country made the film's audience revisit, re-examine and re-evaluate the underpinnings and involvement of key actors in this conflict.

Ghosts of Rwanda (2004)

"Films can never be the primary source in this quest for knowledge about International Relations, it (sic) can, however, be a valuable adjunct".

This quotation by Robert W. Gregg provides another perspective to study, understand and analyse the field of international relations and politics. Movies, visuals and documentaries

* Ms. Priyal Pandey is Masters Candidate at Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva and has been Intern, ALACUN Centre, IDSA.

have become an adjunct and an indispensable element of the realm of international relations. They depict a nuanced version of the on-going politics and situations engulfing and encapsulating different concerns in the world. Hence, the profound impact of cinema on the audience cannot be undermined.

Ghosts of Rwanda (2004) is a widely viewed, detailed documentary and has also been considered as one of the top documentary films. It not only provides a detailed background and political situation of the conflict but also enlists the diverse range of actors who denied

...what had happened in Mogadishu...made the UN very apprehensive of participating or acting in Rwanda.

support (particularly the international organisations like the United Nations), those who wanted to help but couldn't (like many diplomats and members from international community) and those who stayed in Rwanda despite any organisational support (like many workers from humanitarian assistance organizations and NGOs). The title is an apt description that captures the guilt and failure which haunts the prestigious, pristine and lustrous corridors of United Nations (UN). UN, an organisation made to preserve and promote world peace

and harmony witnessed the dismantling of its rubric and simultaneously, its virtues, when it stood as an onlooker of the genocide in Rwanda. The title in a certain way remains symbolic and a reminder of how various states and institutions still bear the cost and burden of inadequacy and absence of help which resulted in many lives and livelihoods being dismantled and destroyed. Hence, the quotation by Kofi Annan, the then Secretary General of United Nations from the film "(W)e acted wrongly and we acted inadequately..." explains how the fear of the past pertaining to what had happened in Mogadishu, Somalia wherein 19 US soldiers died and their bodies was deformed and dragged all across the city, made the UN very apprehensive of participating or acting in Rwanda. In a certain way, *Ghosts of Rwanda* attempts to present the genocide of Rwanda emphasising on the role and interplay of local identity, mass violence and international community. The documentary remains a stand-alone and is widely appreciated due to its investigative nature, its documentation of first-hand account of witnesses and culprits and for presenting an unbiased perspective.

The documentary begins with the imagery of corpse of men, women and children fluttered and lying in a completely chaotic manner like carcasses. This imagery showcasing and highlighting the ridiculed nature and existence of human lives who are caught in conflict was immediately contrasted with the posh room and grandeur of United Nations where the conference room of General Assembly presenting another a completely different face life; the existing and increasing divides of wealth, power and politics. The documentary in a conscious manner tries to incorporate diverse opinions by capturing and highlighting distinct identities as that of the affected, the killers, the perspective of those nations who turned away during the zenith of violence as well as of those assistance provides, NGOs and civil society who remained on the group with or without any support and hope of future relief or assistance. Hence, it provides an amalgamated yet nuanced description of what went wrong and continued despite international actors and institutions being informed and updated. It is interesting to notice and observe the disappointment and frustration amongst those providing humanitarian assistance at their organisational politics and simultaneously, the agi-

tation and regret felt by those who had to evacuate themselves during the moment of crisis due to inadequate support and backing. Hence, despite being differently involved and absorbed in relief and rescue operation, these people narrated how they were still haunted by the *Ghosts of Rwanda*.

...people narrated how they were still haunted by the Ghosts of Rwanda.

The conflict in Rwanda emerged from the rising differences between the two communities of Hutus and Tutsis. The Tutsi constituted to be the minority community and were still living a repressed livelihood and had the status of being the refugees. The heightened subjugation and suppression by the majoritarian community of Hutus resulted or ignited the rebellious revolt. The rebellion started with targeted killing and extended up to a deliberate aim and intent of committing genocide. The UN initially had sent the peacekeepers on the mission to Rwanda to mitigate conflict and initiate peace processes. But the peacekeeping troops substantially lacked organisational support as they were sent empty handed with limited information of the nature of the conflict, parties involved and despite repeated request were not adequately provided with intelligence capabilities. To a certain extent, they were sent to the field ill equipped. Simultaneously, UN was repeatedly provided with regular information from the field on the heightened crisis entailing rampant killing of Tutsis as well as of the Belgian soldiers who were a part of the delegation. However, the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan was advised by his own staff, consultants and researchers to primarily observe the situation and was advised to share information with the government involved, which had close links with the Hutu extremist. These actions were largely motivated with the fear of the past which purloined the present necessity to strive.

...the peacekeeping troops substantially lacked organisational support...

Before the Rwanda conflict broke out, a tragic incident took place in Mogadishu, Somalia, wherein 18 Black Hawks were shot down resulting in death of 18 American soldiers on field during the mission. This incident forced the administration of United States of America to change perspective on peacekeeping and conflict transformation in Africa. Hence, the fear of what happened in Mogadishu made the USA and UN very apprehensive from participating in any situation of violence in Africa. However, the situation continued to worsen in Rwanda and reached a peak with the killing of the then acting Prime Minister Madame Agathe and with the taking of 10 Belgian peacekeepers as hostage. Despite such developments, there were no official statements released by the UN and the instructions to the peacekeepers remained and prevailed as that of tightening the rule of engagements, non-intervention and avoiding armed confrontation or conflict in every situation.

Another startling factor which was explained in detail in the movie was the lack of adequate response, protection, assurance and safety provided to the peacekeepers involved in the situation on the ground. For instance, despite the hostage situation of Belgian peacekeepers which culminated in their killing, no action or statement or change in policy was under-

...for the white diplomats and expatriates the exit from the sites of struggle was very swift and rapid...

taken by the office of United Nations. However, in personal capacities, many aid workers and peacekeepers tried to mitigate the situation with much enthusiasm, hope, optimism and belief of making a difference by contributing and attempting to save even one life. Just like the Vietnamese war, the situation in Rwanda was well documented by several journalists who had come along with the Belgian and French paratroopers to record and archive the ongoing suffering of the masses as well as the conflict. It was startling to note how these journalists were being approached and begged for rescue and security by the affected people. The Rwandan genocide also revitalised the orientalist debate of cultural politics as for the white diplomats and expatriates the exit from the sites of struggle was very swift and rapid as the countries they were representing had ensured them security and protection by sending military forces to safely bring them back home. However, no rescue operations were organized for any Tutsis who were being killed and massacred brutally. Hence, such a situation depicted the white man's supremacy as well as a white man's burden.

Conclusion

Hence, the documentary highlights and emphasises on different aspects and factors which marked the building of the conflict and contributed in its heightening. The media, visual and means of mass communication have often been criticised for presenting a biased and skewed viewpoint on the conflict. However, the power of documentaries like the *Ghosts of Rwanda* which present before the audiences the unpalatable realities of the world compels the international community to ponder, discuss and accept the need for change in its institutions and their ways of working. The release of the documentary became a moment of unfolding of the pristine rubric of United Nations, especially of its peacekeeping mandates, which were discriminatory and caught in power struggles.

¹ PBS, *Ghosts of Rwanda*, *Frontline*, 2004.

Viewpoint

AFRICA AND THE G20

An increased level of engagement of the G20 with Africa could be significant as it could activate the existing G20 initiatives. It is also significant because it proposes to venture into new and critical areas such as skill development of women and rural youth, as well as a focus on renewable energy which are fundamental to capitalise on increased private investment.

Arpita Anant*

Bilateral and multilateral interest in Africa's development is plentiful, but has been seen as not very effective. So the launch of yet another new initiative, this time by the G20 in July 2017, beckons some reflection. The G20s focus on Africa is not new, though somewhat unique. Over the period of the last decade, other informal multilateral groups have also sought to address Africa's issues. The BRICS have for long focused on Africa; their relationship is symbiotic.¹ Their association with Africa had been through trade, FDI and development assistance to wring "mutual benefit and solidarity rather than on gift giving or pure commerce".² The G8 too has been in a mode of "partnership" with Africa especially for a decade since the year 2000.³ The UK⁴ and Germany have been instrumental in putting Africa on the G8 agenda.⁵ The Africa Action Plan of the G8 (2002) was launched to augment the NEPAD. However, not many targets set were met; and these initiatives remained philanthropic in nature, with little focus on trade, investment and governance issues.⁶ What then is the nature and significance of the latest G20 effort?

The G20s focus on Africa is not new, though somewhat unique.

G20's Compact with Africa (CwA)

At the Hamburg Summit of the G20, July 7-8, 2017, G20 Africa Partnership was launched.⁷ The partnership, called Compact with Africa (CwA) is aimed at promoting private investment and non-commercial infrastructure in Africa. It consists of related initiatives such as #eSkills4Girls, Rural Youth Employment, African Renewable Energy and facilitates investment compacts. The partnership was made supplementary to the African Union's (AU) Agenda

Compact with Africa (CwA) is aimed at promoting private investment and non-commercial infrastructure in Africa.

* Dr. Arpita Anant is Associate Fellow, ALACUN Centre, IDSA.

A permanent Africa Advisory Group was set up within the G20.

2063 and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), with an implementing and monitoring role for the AU and the NEPAD.⁸ The partnership was devised jointly by the African Development Bank (AfDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for the G20 Finance Deputies for inclusion in the G20 finance track.⁹ The partnership was able to attract ten African countries in 2017- Côte d'Ivoire, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, and Tunisia joined in March 2017; Ethiopia and Ghana joined in June 2017; and Benin, Egypt and Guinea joined in October 2017. A permanent Africa Advisory Group was set up within the G20. By October 2017, the G20 had mapped all available avenues-government, firm and investors, both bilateral and multilateral, for specific countries, as well as common platforms available to facilitate the Compact.¹⁰ It is the first time that representatives of the AU (Guinea) and the NEPAD (Senegal) were invited as guests for the Summit.¹¹

G20 Focus on Africa: A History¹²

The first reference to Africa in the G20 came in the Toronto Summit of the G20 in 2010 which made a commitment to ensure that concessional lending facilities to the African Development Bank (AfDB) would continue despite the financial crisis of 2008.¹³ The Annex to the declaration refers to a 200 per cent increase in the capitalisation of the AfDB which would increase its funds from \$1.8 billion to \$6 billion and a corresponding increase in the annual lending to it. This was done since Africa was lagging behind in the achievement of millennium development goals.¹⁴ It also mentioned the particular concerns of food security and agriculture modernisation as pertinent immediate concerns that the G20 must look into as priority.¹⁵

At the Seoul Summit, the importance of regional economic integration in Africa was recognised...

At the Seoul Summit held later in 2010, the importance of regional economic integration in Africa was recognised and the G20 countries committed to help with that through trade facilitation and building regional infrastructure.¹⁶ It was also decided that two of Africa's countries would be among the five non-member invitees to G20 summits.¹⁷ The Multi-year Action Plan on Development pledged to support existing initiatives and facilities in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), African Water Facility (AWF) and the Investment Climate Facility for Africa, in addition to requesting the AfDB to identify barriers to regional trade integration in Africa.¹⁸ It also pointed to the need for the African Tax Administration Forum to improve tax collection to aid domestic mobilization of resources. Among the specific policy commitments by G20 countries, Japan pledged to double its ODA to Africa over the 2007 level by 2012, Canada doubled its G8 Gleneagles commitment on its aid to Africa and its G8 L'Aquila commitment to double its food security aid to Africa and France announced the formulation of national policy for supporting sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa among four other regions.¹⁹

The G20 Cannes Summit Leaders' Communique' of 2011 made a reference to its "Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture" and its support for food security initiatives

of the ECOWAS, NEPAD's agricultural risk assessment initiative and the need for the G20 High Level Panel to support NEPAD's infrastructure projects in Africa.²⁰ Under the French presidency, financing of infrastructure projects in Sub-Saharan Africa was a priority and 5 of 11 such projects were identified in the region.²¹ On food security, with G20 support, the ECOWAS pilot project of creating a food reserve was initiated.²² The G20 Remittances Toolkit was launched to reduce the cost of remittances to mainly African countries.²³

...with G20 support, the ECOWAS pilot project of creating a food reserve was initiated.

The Los Cabos Summit Declaration of 2012 made no additional commitment specific to Africa but took note of the food security initiatives in the Horn of Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa.²⁴ Under the Mexican Presidency however, the African Development Bank teamed up with the World Bank, OECD and United Nations to produce a toolkit for Inclusive Economic Growth.²⁵ The Los Cabos Summit launched the *AgResults* initiative to assess progress on the food security front.²⁶ By December 2012, the ECOWAS pilot project was made a part of the Global Initiative for Resilience in Sahel and Western Africa (AGIR).²⁷ The Tropical Agricultural Platform (TAP) was launched at the same time to assess particular requirements of agriculture in tropical countries. The Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) were prepared in October 2012.²⁸

The St. Petersburg Leaders' Declaration of 2013, announced its support for "Transparency in Trade", a collaborative initiative of the AfDB, International Trade Centre, the UNCTAD and the World Bank to promote use of trade policy data and analysis for exploring opportunities for trade and facilitating them.²⁹ It also announced the completion of the assessment of Project Preparation Facilities (PPFs) for Infrastructure in Africa.³⁰ During the St. Petersburg Summit, the Development Working Group "welcomed the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) Assessment of Project Preparation Facilities (PPFs) for Infrastructure in Africa and the ICA held a workshop to launch a project preparation network."³¹ Once this was completed in November 2012, based on the High Level Panel on Infrastructure and ICA report, the AfDB launched the Africa 50 Fund in November 2013 to channel \$US 100 billion from public and private sources for infrastructure development in Africa.³²

In 2013, the *AgResults* intermediary fund was set up within the World Bank to receive contributions for food security.³³ To assess particular requirements of agriculture in tropical countries, the Tropical Agricultural Platform (TAP) was launched in December 2012, which started getting inputs from the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA).³⁴ Africa was one among the two areas for the field testing of the PRAI put together by the Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG, i.e. the FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD and the World Bank) in 2013.³⁵ Moreover the G20 contributed to the integration of agriculture risk management in agricultural policies in the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) through its association with NEPAD in the IFAD supported Platform Agricultural Risk Management (PARM).³⁶ In line with the Seoul MYAP and the directions of the Development Working Group, the AfDB established the Trade

Africa was one among the two areas for the field testing of the PRAI...

Finance Plan in 2013 to enable the US\$ 1 billion to be channel for trade facilitation in Africa.³⁷ Duty Free and Quota Free trade and Aid for Trade are other policies from which Africa benefitted. The Australian presidency of the G20 in 2014 saw the IFC funded Global Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Finance Facility focus worldwide on very small SMEs in high impact, targeting several African SMEs.³⁸

The Leaders Communiqué of the G20 Summit in Turkey in 2015 made specific reference to the first ever meeting of the Energy Ministers of the G20 and the adoption of the *G20 Energy Access Action Plan: Voluntary Collaboration on Energy Access*. The first phase of this programme

52 countries of Africa, ...received attention of the Climate Finance Study Group of the G20...

was envisaged to focus on Sub-Saharan Africa since it faces the most acute energy crisis.³⁹ 52 countries of Africa, among other regions, also received attention of the Climate Finance Study Group of the G20 which designed a toolkit for better access to climate finance aimed at adaptation to climate change.⁴⁰ A Practitioner's Dialogue on Climate Investment (PDCI) was initiated by Germany in 2015, and its 2016 edition was held in Africa in 2016.⁴¹ The G20 Summit in China in 2016 launched an initiative for industrialisation of the

LDCs and countries in Africa in the wake of the "new industrial revolution".⁴² The G20 action plan on Agenda 2030 which was adopted after the Summit brought forth several countries' commitments to help with the achievement of specific SDGs in Africa.⁴³

Significance of the Compact

The G20's focus on Africa, thus, is not new. So far the main areas of focus have been agriculture and food security; areas of limited focus have been climate and energy, infrastructure, trade and SMEs. Yet, the Compact is significant for several reasons.

In the context of the G20, first, for the first time in the history of G20 summits since 2009, there is a dedicated policy document on Africa.⁴⁴ This may indeed be regarded as a high-point in the dyadic relationship; for in the earlier summits, priority was accorded to various issues of development the world over and particular focus on Africa came only as a corollary of that. Also, with the setting up of the Africa Advisory Group, Africa's interests are somewhat institutionalised within the G20. Second, the compact attempts to bring together all existing projects and actors so as to synergise them and fill in the voids of private investment and infrastructure development in the Compact countries. Third, it seeks to channelise private investment in new and critical areas such as skill development of women and rural youth, as well as a focus on renewable energy.

In the larger context of bilateral and multilateral engagements with Africa, the Compact is not very unique. It recognises the agency of smaller individual African countries, beyond South Africa and Nigeria, a trend that has been on the ascendant for nearly a decade.⁴⁵ Like many other initiatives, it also goes beyond the limited vision of providing 'aid' to enable its development to provisioning investments.⁴⁶ And finally, the Compact is avowedly demand driven and focuses on human resource development, thus making it conceptually akin to South-South partnerships.

It also has several inherent limitations. Though G20 is more representative than the G8 and was effective in dealing with the financial crisis since 2008, it has been dogged by a crisis of legitimacy as a club of big nations, allegations of lack effectiveness on matters of global economic governance, and shifting priorities based on the rotating Chairmanship of the group.⁴⁷ Moreover, it is an informal grouping of unequals with differing interests and visions. So, though proverbially well begun is half done, in this instance it may not be so.

Conclusion

An increased level of engagement of the G20 with Africa could be significant as it could activate the existing G20 initiatives. It is also significant because it proposes to venture into new and critical areas such as skill development of women and rural youth, as well as a focus on renewable energy which are fundamental to capitalise on increased private investment. Such fundamentals, if strengthened, would have a salutary impact on development in Africa. Discernible progress may also encourage other African countries to join the Compact.

-
- ¹ Brendan Vickers, "Africa and the Rising Powers: Bargaining for the Marginalized Many", *International Affairs*, Vol. 89, No.3, 2013, pp. 673-693.
 - ² UNECA, *Africa-BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa*, 2013, p.30, at https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/africa-brics_cooperation_eng.pdf, (Accessed July 13, 2017). AfDB, *BRICS and Africa: A Win-Win Partnership*, July 10, 2013, <https://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/africa-and-the-brics-a-win-win-partnership-12098/> (Accessed August 02, 2017).
 - ³ David Black, "The G8 and Africa: A Partial Reckoning", *Global Governance*, Vol. 18, No.4, 2012, pp.441-447.
 - ⁴ Ian Taylor, "Spinderella on the Safari: British Policies toward Africa under New Labour", *Global Governance*, Vol. 18, No.4, 2012, pp. 449-460.
 - ⁵ Ulf Engel, "The G8 and Germany's Africa Policy: A Case of Hegemonic Mainstreaming", *Global Governance*, Vol.18, No.4, pp. 471-476.
 - ⁶ Ibid. The G8 have also supported capacity building in the realm of peace and security in Africa. See Alex Ransbotham, Alhaji M.S. Bah and Fanny Caldor, "Enhancing African Peace and Security Capacity: A Role for the UK and G8?" *International Affairs*, Vol.8, No. 2, 2005, pp.325-339.
 - ⁷ G20 Germany 2017, *Annex to G20 Leaders Declaration G20 Africa Partnership*, Hamburg, July 8, 2017, at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/2017-g20-annex-partnership-africa.html> (Accessed July 14, 2017).
 - ⁸ G20 Germany 2017, *G20 Leaders' Declaration: Shaping an Interconnected World*, Hamburg, July 8, 2017, (Accessed July 14, 2017).
 - ⁹ G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governor's Meeting, *The G20 Compact with Africa*, A Joint AfDB, IMF and WBG Report, Baden-Baden Germany, March 17-18, 2017, at <https://www.compactwithafrica.org/content/dam/Compact%20with%20Africa/2017-03-30-g20-compact-with-africa-report.pdf> (Accessed July 14, 2017).
 - ¹⁰ G20 Compact with Africa, *Toolbox: Instruments Available to Support Private Investment with Africa (sic) Countries*, https://www.compactwithafrica.org/content/dam/Compact%20with%20Africa/inventoryofinstruments/cwa_inventory_2017.pdf (Accessed January 10, 2018).

- ¹¹ Earlier, African countries were invited in their individual capacity as non-member invitees. In the G20 Hangzhou Summit in 2016, three African countries Chad, Egypt and Senegal were invited as special guests in their individual capacity. G20 China 2016, *G20 Summit Participants*, September 6, 2016, <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/160905-participants.html> (Accessed July 14, 2017).
- ¹² See Zaria Shaw and Sarah Jane Vassallo, "G20 Leaders' Conclusions on Africa 2008-2010", *G20 Research Group*, August 8, 2011, at www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/conclusions/africa-l.pdf (Accessed July 13, 2017). For a critical analysis on Africa and the G20 see Courtney Hallink, "The G20's Governance of Africa Related Issues, 2008-2016", *G20 Research Group*, June 1, 2017, at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/g20-africa-2008-2016v2.pdf> (Accessed July 14, 2017). For a focus on climate change see Courtney Hallink, *G20 Africa and Climate Governance: Past Performance and Prospects for Hamburg*, Paper prepared for the conference on "The G20 and the Global Environment, Climate and Energy Agenda," Bavarian School of Public Policy, Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany, June 26, 2017, at www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/170626-hallink-g20-africa-climate.pdf (Accessed July 14, 2017).
- ¹³ G20 Canada 2010, G20 Toronto Summit Declaration, June 27, 2010, paragraph 26, at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/to-communicue.html> (Accessed July 13, 2017). A similar decision was made regarding the International Development Association.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid*, Annex III: *Enhancing the Legitimacy, Credibility and Effectiveness of the IFIs and Further Supporting the Needs of the Most Vulnerable*, paragraphs 5, 6 and 8.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid*, paragraph 24.
- ¹⁶ G20 2010 South Korea, *G20 Seoul Summit Document*, November 12, 2010, paragraph 45, at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul-doc.html> (Accessed July 13, 2017).
- ¹⁷ *Ibid*, paragraph 74.
- ¹⁸ G20 Seoul Summit 2010, *Annex II, Multi-Year Action Plan on Development*, November 12, 2010, at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul-development.html> (Accessed July 13, 2017).
- ¹⁹ G20 Seoul Summit 2010, *Table: Policy Commitments by G20 members*, at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul-commitments.pdf> (Accessed July 13, 2017).
- ²⁰ G20-G8 France 2011, *Cannes Summit Final Declaration – Building Our Common Future: Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All*, paragraphs 72, 74 and 75, Cannes, November 4, 2011, at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-communicue-111104-en.html> (Accessed July 13, 2017).
- ²¹ G20 2013 Russia, *St Petersburg Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments*, 2013, p.10, p. 18, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/Saint_Petersburg_Accountability_Report_on_G20_Development_Commitments.pdf (Accessed July 13, 2017). The projects were the West Africa Power Pool (WAPP), Ethiopia and Kenya Power Systems Interconnection, Inga Hydropower, North-South Corridor (NSC) and the Isaka-Kigali Railway. In addition, 2 projects were for the Middle East and North Africa region: a Jordan Railway project and scaling Up Solar Energy in MENA for export to European Markets.
- ²² *Ibid*, p.25.
- ²³ *Ibid*, p. 58.
- ²⁴ G20 Mexico, *G20 Leaders Declaration*, Los Cabos, Mexico, June 19, 2012, paragraphs 55 and 59, at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-0619-loscabos.html> (Accessed July 13, 2017).
- ²⁵ G20 2013 Russia, *St Petersburg Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments*, 2013, p.12, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/Saint_Petersburg_Accountability_Report_on_G20_Development_Commitments.pdf (Accessed July 13, 2017).
- ²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 26.
- ²⁷ *Ibid*, p.25.
- ²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 26.

- ²⁹ G20 2013 Russia, *G20 Leaders' Declaration*, September 6, 2013, St Petersburg, at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0906-declaration.html> (Accessed July 13, 2017).
- ³⁰ *Ibid*, paragraph 81.
- ³¹ G20 2013 Russia, *St Petersburg Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments*, 2013, p.12, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/Saint_Petersburg_Accountability_Report_on_G20_Development_Commitments.pdf (Accessed July 13, 2017).
- ³² *Ibid*, p.17.
- ³³ *Ibid*, p. 26.
- ³⁴ *Ibid*, p.27.
- ³⁵ *Ibid*, 30.
- ³⁶ *Ibid*, p.31.
- ³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 50.
- ³⁸ Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion, *2014 Financial Inclusion Action Plan*, September 2, 2014, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014_g20_financial_inclusion_action_plan.pdf (Accessed July 14, 2017).
- ³⁹ G20 2015 Turkey, *Leaders' Communique*, Antalya, November 16, 2015, at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/151116-communique.html> (Accessed July 14, 2017).
- ⁴⁰ Extrapolated from Annex I, pp. 36-39, OECD, *Toolkit To Enhance Access To Adaptation Finance For Developing Countries That Are Vulnerable To Adverse Effects Of Climate Change, Including LIDCs, SIDS And African States*, August 2015, at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/Toolkit-to-Enhance-Access-to-Adaptation-Finance-for-Developing-Countries-that-are-Vulnerable-to-the-Adverse-Effects-of-Climate-Change.pdf> (Accessed July 14, 2017).
- ⁴¹ G20 Climate Finance Study Group, *Report to the Finance Ministers*, September 2015, p.31, at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/G20-Climate-Finance-Study-Group-Annual-Report-2015.pdf> (Accessed July 14, 2017).
- ⁴² G20 China 2016, *G20 Leaders' Communique: Hangzhou Summit*, paragraph 13 and 35, Hangzhou, September 5, 2016, at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/160905-communique.html> (Accessed July 14, 2017).
- ⁴³ G20 2016 China, *G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, September 8, 2016, at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/g20-action-plan-on-2030-agenda.pdf> (Accessed July 14, 2017).
- ⁴⁴ Zaria Shaw and Sarah Jane Vassallo, n. 12. The authors make this point for the period 2008-2010, but this has remained so until the Hamburg Summit, 2017.
- ⁴⁵ William Brown, "A Question of Agency: Africa in International Politics", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No.10, 2012, pp. 1889-1908.
- ⁴⁶ Ian Taylor, "'Advice is judged by results, not by intentions': Why Gordon Brown is Wrong about Africa", *International Affairs*, Vol. 81, No.2, 2005, pp.299-310.
- ⁴⁷ Robert Wade, "Emerging World Order: From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank and the IMF", *Politics & Society*, Vol. 39, No.3, 2011, pp.347-378, at pp.354-359. For a more nuanced critique see Courtney Hallink, June 1, 2017, n.12.

Book Review

Timothy Doyle and Dennis Rumley (Eds), *Africa and the Indian Ocean Region*, Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2017, pp.111, \$ 156.35

ISBN: 978-1-138-20534-5

Mathew S. Simon*

The African littoral is strategically significant for the Indian Ocean region. However, the African role in the governance of the Indian Ocean in terms of trade, security, geopolitics and culture has not been adequately recognised. Africa, inherently rich with natural resources, imbued with diverse and vibrant cultures, possessing strong maritime and economic linkages with the Indian Ocean can indeed play a pivotal role in the future of the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean region. It is in this backdrop, the edited book, *Africa and the Indian Ocean Region*, examines reasons for Africa's lack of participation in the Indian Ocean Rim- Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) and suggests strategies to bring maritime Africa back into the Indian Ocean regional community.

The African littoral of the Indian Ocean is perceived as a region on the move which is experiencing tremendous social and economic changes and it could emerge as one of the most dynamic areas in the twenty-first century. In this regard, a collaborative chapter by Christian Bouchard and William Crumplin is helpful to consider the rising significance of the African littoral in the Indian Ocean region. The African littoral and hinterland as per human development index [2012] indicates that it is a region of low socio-economic development facing many challenges. Improved demographic processes, growth in urbanization and a stable, stronger economic performance would be the key factors in enabling the African littoral to be a vital actor in Indian Ocean Region. Herein, the authors outline how Africa's potential for growth, economic development and more efficient maritime activities brings high expectations for its role while also increasing its geopolitical and geostrategic significance in the region.

Consecutively, Barry Ryan's chapter examines the special strategies and power relations along the African coast of the Indian Ocean in terms of space and time (zones and routes). He focuses primarily on America's proposition to improve the maritime security of the coastal states of Africa, and its implications. As technology and oceanographic knowledge

* Dr. Mathew S. Simon is Research Assistant, Internal Security Centre, IDSA.

has progressed, and as the new economic opportunities arise, the taxonomic impulse to bring order to freedom of sea space has increased. In this regard, the US acts as a facilitator of securing speed and freedom in African littoral while also installing police surveillance. However, it faces the risk of creating land-sea architecture on a path of the ocean that is more at risk of being understudied than it is from pirates, terrorists and illegal immigrants.

On the other hand, the role of external players in Africa and the Indian Ocean Region holds strategic significance as it brings vital foreign direct investments and develops key infrastructural facilities along the coastal states. Africa needs to tap potentialities of foreign players to its advantage in terms of linking East and Central African region to international trade. Under this pretext, Ross Anthony's chapter on the growing presence of China in the Indian Ocean discusses its proposed development of ports and infrastructure on the east coast of Africa, and the geostrategic interests involved. The chapter compares Chinese commercial infrastructure as well as resource development in Africa with the earlier 19th century German and British colonial rule in Africa. He argues that Chinese presence today is significantly owing to the developments being supplemented by other actors, including host states, multinational corporations and regional development funds. G.V.C Naidu's chapter examines India's new policy of engagement with Africa. This new policy of engagement is expansive and multi-faceted, encompassing political, economic and strategic dimensions. He also analyses India's ambitions to build a formidable navy and maritime strategy and emerge as a pre-eminent power within the Indian Ocean as its economy grows.

Another collaborative chapter by A.C. Bourque, I.L. Nelson, Matthew Pritchard, J.D Stanfield and J.D. Unruh examines the primary issues, actors and impacts of large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) of forest-related lands as described by the authors in the broader Indian Ocean world, while assessing the opportunities for national populations of target countries as well as investors and the key social and environment concerns requiring policy attention.

Finally, Lindy Stiebel explores the link between the late exiled South African writer Lewis Nkosi and the city of Durban. According to Nkosi, Durban, was both at one point of escape and later in his life a locus for arrival. His chapter evaluates the role of Durban and the Indian Ocean in the life and work of Nkosi, drawing from his novel *Mating Birds* and an article published in a Swiss newspaper.¹ For Stiebel, the writings of Nkosi provide a point of commonality between the usual binaries of African/black Atlantic and Indian/Indian Ocean. For Nkosi, a study of the Indian Ocean, as both loci of escape and of arrival would be one way of trying to bring 'African' and 'Indian' groupings together, both historically and intellectually.

The book indeed brings out the untapped potentialities of Africa in the Indian Ocean region. However, the chapters could have been arranged differently to bring out the point the editors wish to make better. They could have started with explaining the importance of the African littoral in the Indian Ocean, then emphasised the role of external players. The chapter on LSLAs should not have been included in the book since it does not gel with the theme of the book. The book reiterates the line of thought that Africa is indeed a force to reckon with in the western Indian Ocean Region, provided the nations of Africa show pro-active

ownership. Formal regional cooperation in maritime affairs through international and regional organisations, bilateral and multilateral cooperation on maritime affairs between African coastal states and other Indian Ocean Rim States, commercial relations and shipping networks, multinational marine research programmes and navy and coast guard cooperation can contribute and testify to the significance of Africa in the Indian Ocean Region.

Call for Contributions

IDSIA invites articles, commentaries and book reviews for publication in *Africa Trends*, a biannual magazine on Africa. Submissions can focus on security, political and economic issues relating to African countries. Articles may focus on analysing bilateral, regional and multilateral developments of strategic significance to India's engagement with African countries.

Articles could be of approximately 2000 words. Commentaries can range between 1,000-1,500 words (excluding footnotes) and book reviews between 600-1,000 words. Guidelines for contributors may be found at: <http://www.idsa.in/africatrends>. Submissions may be emailed to the Editor at idsa.africatrends@gmail.com.

About Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN Centre IDSA

The Centre's research focus includes understanding developments in the African region and analysing various hotspots like Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and the Indian Ocean Region. It also focuses on bilateral, regional as well as multilateral engagements between India and the countries of Africa. The Centre also endeavours to analyse India's engagement with Latin American countries, particularly in forums such as the IBSA and BRICS.

In addition, the Centre carries out research on the broader theme of India and the United Nations. It deals with important topics that come up in the Security Council and those that have relevance and significance for India's foreign policy.

Cover page courtesy: Dr Saurabh Mishra & Ms Geeta



Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg,

Delhi Cantt., New Delhi - 110 010

Tel.: (91-11) 2671-7983 Fax: (91-11) 2615 4191

Website: <http://www.idsa.in>

E-mail: contactus@idsa.in