


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Editor

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Editorial Team

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Nachiket Khadkiwala

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Editor's Note

Greetings for 2016! We are happy to bring to you the first issue of this year.

This issue includes an interesting array of articles. In the cover story, Sanjay Badri-Maharaj, details the dynamics of the trade in narcotics, mainly cocaine, between Latin America and West Africa. He explains how this trade imperils the fragile governance structures in West African nations and points to the urgent need for accountability in governance on both sides of the Atlantic. This is followed by a commentary in which Nachiket Khadkiwala traces the rise of Niger Delta Avengers in the politics of Nigeria's oil-based economy and contends that they will not be as strong a force as the yesteryears' Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta. In the viewpoint, Susanne Kamerling posits that in the port town of Djibouti, China's stimulated security engagement with Africa is manifest in both its unilateral and multilateral dimensions. She portends that this may also be China's blueprint for engagement with the Middle East. Finally, Saurabh Mishra reviews the work of Morten Bøås and Kevin Dunn titled *Politics of Origin in Africa - Autochthony, Citizenship and Conflict*. He contends that the book makes a strong case for attributing the protracted nature of conflicts in Africa to the prevalence of autochthonous narratives that play on the resource scarcities and other vulnerabilities of groups.

The first quarter of 2016 has witnessed several militarily significant developments. China's security presence in Africa went a notch higher with the agreement with Djibouti on the setting up a military post. US on the other hand decided to close down its drone-base in Ethiopia that had been used to target Al-Shabaab militants. France delivered the first three interceptors to Mozambique. On the economic front, the downturn in the Chinese economy is likely to push Chinese investment in Kenyan infrastructure projects. The Bank of China has obtained the permission to work in Mauritius. A Chinese company and the Sultanate of Oman are to begin construction of the Bagamoyo port in Tanzania. The South African economy is going through a low and tending towards recession. Gas production in Mozambique and Tanzania is likely to boost both these economies. Several projects took off in the economic and military spheres in a sign of increasing collaboration between India and Mauritius and Seychelles.

As we enter the fifth year of publication of Africa Trends, we welcome your contributions and feedback.

Cover Story

COCAINE TRAFFICKING BETWEEN LATIN AMERICA AND WEST AFRICA

The link between narcotics' traffickers in Latin America and their allies in West Africa has opened another front in the "war on drugs" and has unfortunately led to West Africa becoming home to what has been described as the "world's first narco state" namely, Guinea-Bissau. The availability of aircraft, pilots and an expanse of airspace without radar coverage, aided and abetted by poorly or corruptly policed borders has led to a thriving trade between the two continents for the enrichment of some and the detriment of many others.

Sanjay Badri-Maharaj*

Separated by the Atlantic Ocean, it would appear that West Africa and Latin America would make for an unlikely nexus in the cocaine trade. Yet, as cocaine consumption in the United States has remained relatively constant, demand for the drug in Europe has started to grow considerably. West Africa has thus become an integral part of the drug cartels' network supplying the European market. The link between narcotics' traffickers in Latin America and their allies in West Africa has opened another front in the "war on drugs" and has unfortunately led to West Africa becoming home to what has been described as the "world's first narco state" namely, Guinea-Bissau.¹ The availability of aircraft, pilots and an expanse of airspace without radar coverage, aided and abetted by poorly or corruptly policed borders has led to a thriving trade between the two continents for the enrichment of some and the detriment of many others. Cocaine consumption in Europe

...the drug cartels of Latin America have forged alliances with organized crime outfits in West Africa to facilitate the smuggling of drugs into Europe.

more than doubled between the years 1998 and 2009, with particularly sharp rises being recorded in the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy which comprise a staggering 60 per cent of all cocaine users in Europe.² Indeed, the volume and value of cocaine trafficked to Western and Central Europe now rivals that sent to the United States.³ To satisfy this demand, the drug cartels of Latin America have forged alliances with organized crime outfits in West Africa to facilitate the smuggling of drugs into Europe. There has also been a constant revision of tactics by the

narco-traffickers, switching from large-scale marine transport to the use of second-hand commercial aircraft to get cocaine from Latin America to West Africa.⁴ There has been a further shift in tactics in getting the drugs from West Africa into Europe with a move towards using the traditional cannabis resin smuggling routes from North Africa to Europe with cocaine being transported in convoys across the Sahara desert. This marks a change from the previously most common route of using "mules" on commercial flights between West Africa and Europe.⁵

* Dr. Sanjay Badri-Mharaj is a Trinidad-based Barrister and Attorney at Law, and Visiting Fellow, IDSA.

The source of the trade

While shipment of cocaine into Europe from Latin America has been happening since the trade in the drug began, the increasing efficacy of interdiction efforts on the part of the United States made the drug cartels look to Europe for a less risky market. Indeed, the Mexican narcotics cartel the *Zetas*, having been severely impacted by enhanced US border security, has obtained control of a lucrative smuggling route from West Africa to Europe.⁶ Colombian cartels, traditionally the largest suppliers to Europe, while still powerful, are losing ground to the Mexicans.⁷

Colombia has long dominated the cocaine trade and is still the main source of supply to Europe, transshipped through Venezuela or Brazil. However, Colombian cartels suffered a severe blow when the dominant figure in their supply channels to Europe - Daniel Barrera (aka *El Loco*) - was arrested in Venezuela on September 18, 2012 after a prolonged joint effort between the security forces and intelligence agencies of Colombia, Venezuela, the UK and the UK.⁸ He was subsequently deported to and convicted in the United States.

Off late, Venezuela and Brazil, are beginning to emerge as the major places of embarkation for narcotics bound for the West Africa-Europe route. The surge began in 2004 with seizures of 46 metric tonnes of cocaine being reported between 2005 and 2008.⁹ This coincides with a decision of the Venezuelan government in 2005 to suspend cooperation with the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).¹⁰ This has led to an upsurge in cocaine trafficking out of Venezuela where corrupt law enforcement and military personnel, porous borders with Colombia and apparent government indifference have contributed to this trend. In Brazil, the combination of porous borders with three major cocaine producing countries (Bolivia, Colombia and Peru) and a poorly patrolled coastline are combined with a thriving legitimate trade with West Africa thus facilitating the smuggling of cocaine by subterfuge, corruption or coercion of legal traders.¹¹ South Africa has emerged as one of several preferred transshipment points for cocaine emanating from Brazil, taking its place alongside such nations as Angola, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.¹² It should be noted that South Africa has also become a preferred route for Afghan heroin.¹³

Methods of shipment

Transport of cocaine between Latin America and Africa was traditionally via sea in container ships or in private yachts. The potential to ship large quantities of cocaine through this method made the maritime route the preferred method of transit.¹⁴ However, as interdiction efforts at sea have become more effective, the cocaine smugglers have switched tactics to using second-hand cargo aircraft to deliver cocaine to their West-African confederates.¹⁵

A wide range of used aircraft, available for as little as US\$275,000 for a four-engined DC-8 jet can be obtained and there is no shortage of pilots willing to undertake these flights.¹⁶ As the airspace between Latin America and West-Africa is almost completely bereft of radar cover and national radar networks in most of West Africa are patchy at best, it is relatively simple for narco-flights to evade detection. In one publicised incident, for example, a Boeing 727 was set alight after it failed to take-off and was abandoned following a delivery, at a makeshift airfield, of cocaine from Venezuela to Gao in Mali.¹⁷

Colombian cartels, traditionally the largest suppliers to Europe... are losing ground to the Mexicans.

South Africa has emerged as one of several preferred transshipment points for cocaine emanating from Brazil...

After arriving in West Africa, the traffickers have an elaborate network of convoys which collect the cocaine from the delivery points and thereafter move them overland to be smuggled into Europe.¹⁸ The connivance of local officials and senior law enforcement and military personnel is suspected, and in one high profile example, the former commanding officer of the Guinea-Bissau navy, Rear Admiral José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto was arrested in a sting operation that revolved around the smuggling of cocaine into Guinea-Bissau and arms to insurgents in Colombia.¹⁹ Using old smuggling routes, paths from places such as Ghana, Mali and Niger, are used to cross the Sahara into North Africa from where, by air and sea, the cocaine finds its way into Southern Europe.²⁰

The connivance of local officials and senior law enforcement and military personnel is suspected...

The Impact

Besides the inevitable social consequences that flow from the use and abuse of cocaine, and the criminalisation that comes with the enterprise of smuggling narcotics, the cocaine trade has been used to fund terrorism both in Africa and Latin America. *El Loco*, for example, was reputed to have links to two major Colombian paramilitary/ terrorist groups: the Popular Anti-Terrorist Army of Colombia (Ejercito Revolucionario Popular Anti-terrorista de Colombia - ERPAC) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia FARC) with the latter using proceeds from the cocaine trade to fund its insurgency against the Colombian government.²¹ Similarly, in West Africa, terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), have “taxed” the narcotics trade to obtain funding for their movements.²²

Within West Africa, the corrosive effects of the cocaine trade have and will continue to have a deleterious effect upon the weak structures of governance in the region. The subversion by corruption of law enforcement and military personnel has already taken place in many countries but in the cases of Guinea-Bissau and Guinea-Conakry, the ease at which international narco-trafficking groups were able to create strong relationships with the ruling elites of both countries, turning Guinea-Bissau into the world’s first narco-state.²³ Even stronger states may find themselves hard-pressed to prevent subversion should they not take effective action against the criminal networks.

...the corrosive effects of the cocaine trade have and will continue to have a deleterious effect upon the weak structures of governance in the region.

Conclusion

The cocaine trade between Latin America and West Africa is driven by the growing demand for the drug in Europe and the relative lack of effective interdiction efforts to halt flow of drugs to West Africa. The availability of aircraft and pilots and the absence of adequate air traffic monitoring make the route particularly attractive for the narco-traffickers. This has been made possible by an unfortunate combination of weakened cooperation between the Venezuelan government and the DEA, weak structures of governance in many West African countries and the susceptibility to corruption of government, military and law-enforcement officials on both sides of the Atlantic. There is no easy or quick solution to this situation – as evidenced by the continuing “war on drugs” in the Americas. Nonetheless, steps need to be taken to enhance cooperation and coordination between the national and international agencies tasked with combating the trade and also to plug, where possible, loopholes in the surveillance systems that might aid interdiction efforts. However, no efforts can succeed unless there is a

willingness to address the shortcomings in governing institutions and governance that make it relatively easy for the criminal nexus to operate. Needless to say efforts must also be made to curb demand for cocaine in Europe – a task which does not seem to be being addressed with sufficient determination.

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Commentary

THE NIGER DELTA AVENGERS: A FORMIDABLE THREAT?

At a time when the country is going through a political transition and the resultant realignment of patronage networks in Niger Delta region, economic woes due to low oil prices, and the revamping of oil industry, the emergence of NDA is a result of the 'politics of oil' in Nigeria that has been ongoing for years.

Nachiket Khadkiwala*

A new militant group has emerged in the Southern Nigeria's Niger Delta. Its attacks on oil installations in Niger Delta region has led to substantial disruptions in oil production in Nigeria. The group known as Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) is said to be behind many attacks on oil facilities, infrastructure and personnel in the oil rich Niger Delta. It has notoriously challenged the oil companies and the government of President Muhammadu Buhari. The attacks on oil facilities by the NDA reminds one of the conflict in the region led by the Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) a decade back. To those who have followed Nigerian politics for years, the timing of rise of NDA will not come as a surprise. At a time when the country is going through a political transition and the resultant realignment of patronage networks in Niger Delta region, economic woes due to low oil prices, and the revamping of oil industry, the emergence of NDA is a result of the 'politics of oil' in Nigeria that has been ongoing for years.

Nigeria's oil politics and rise of Niger Delta Avengers

The timing of the rise of militant group like the NDA suggests the probable motives of the group. Firstly, President Muhammad Buhari, a Northerner, is a president of Nigeria. The previous president, Goodluck Jonathan hailed from Niger Delta. His loss meant that Niger Delta groups lost prestige and privileged positions that President Jonathan had gained for them in the form of oil patronage networks and key portfolios. In an ethnically diverse country like Nigeria, identity based groups have organised around oil. Michael Watts has summed it up succinctly by stating that in "petro-states" ... the "logic of extraction figures centrally in the making and breaking of community".¹ Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) fought primarily for the distribution of oil revenues between the oil producing regions of Niger Delta and the central government. The struggle for oil resources got intertwined with other movements that called for compensation for land and environmental damage...

* Mr. Nachiket Khadkiwala is Research Assistant, ALACUN Centre, IDSA

for land and environmental damage that were direct result of extractive activities in the region. The movement was initiated by Ogoni ethnic group which lived in south-eastern part of Niger Delta in the region called Ogoni-land. Later, other large ethnic groups like the Ijaw joined the movement. The Nigerian government was finally able to quell the MEND by deploying an amnesty program in 2009 under President Umar Musa Yar'Adua. The amnesty program promised to give financial assistance and job training to the former rebels if they laid down arms.² Financial assistance consisted of security contracts to former rebels and massive patronage network which helped them get their share of oil rents. The MEND movement and involvement of ethnic groups like the Ijaw hurled Goodluck Jonathan to become the vice president of Nigeria. He later became the president after Yar'Auda's death. However, with political dynamics shifted after Jonathan's loss to a Northerner, the Niger Delta groups fear losing the patronage they enjoyed under the previous president.

President Buhari has already shown his intent in correcting the skewed policies of his predecessor. The amnesty program that was started by President Yar'Auda in 2009 has been slated to end in 2018 and there are fears among the Niger Delta elite that the president may not continue with it. The president has gone after the corrupt amongst former officials who were showered with oil

The current Nigerian government has also come down heavily on the smuggling networks that are widespread in Niger Delta.

rents and profits by Goodluck Jonathan. A prominent one among them is the former MEND commander Government "Tompson" Ekpemupolo.³ Ekpemupolo profited under the Jonathan presidency by getting security contracts to ferry passengers across the Delta creek and protect the oil and gas infrastructure. Ekpemupolo also received millions to disband his gang of fighters called the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities.⁴ A warrant was issued against Ekpemupolo in a land grabbing scheme worth \$65 million by the present government.⁵ Since then

Ekpemupolo is on the run. The current Nigerian government has also come down heavily on the smuggling networks that are widespread in Niger Delta. Many of these networks have the support of politicians of the region and top executives of Nigerian National Petroleum Cooperation (NNPC) that profit from oil smuggling and pilferage.

Secondly, the president is undertaking an overall reform of oil sector itself. The Petroleum Industry Governance and Institutional Framework Bill that is likely to be passed in 2016 has provisions that target the rampant corruption in the sector. The bill has proposed to split the colossal NNPC

...NNPC has both the production and regulatory roles, which leads to conflict of interest, rampant corruption and inefficiencies in the oil sector.

into smaller units.⁶ The sheer size of the NNPC has made it difficult to monitor and many irregularities aided by corrupt officials and politicians has made the company a major bedrock of corruption in the Niger Delta. Politicians including Jonathan had used the company to dole out favours to political supporters in the region.⁷ The new president through the Petroleum Bill wants to split the company into smaller manageable units.⁸ The NNPC is also likely to be privatized partially.⁹ A new regulatory

agency called the Nigeria Petroleum Regulatory Commission would be set up to monitor the company's upstream and downstream operations.¹⁰ Currently, NNPC has both the production and regulatory roles, which leads to conflict of interest, rampant corruption and inefficiencies in the oil sector.¹¹ For example, Nigeria lacks adequate refining capacity hence it swaps crude oil for refined products. These refined products are then sold to fuel distributors. However, this activity involves price inflations and payment of bribes and is mechanism for granting political patronage.

The vested interests that profit from this stutter the development of refining capacity in Nigeria.¹²

Hence the perceived disenfranchisement of Niger Delta groups after the political transition in Nigeria, President Buhari's attempt to destabilise the status quo in Niger Delta region and target the existing patronage network and the corruption in oil sector may have angered certain groups. NDA is a likely manifestation of this displeasure with the current president. NDA is a very secretive group and the profile of its members is not known. Its political motives also remain ambiguous. In such a scenario, it can be assumed that the group is a combination of rag tag militias and oil mafia that have earlier had political support of the Niger Delta politicians and former president Goodluck Jonathan, and now feel that their privileged position and their sources of rent are in jeopardy under the current regime.

Finally, the move to target the current president is well timed as Nigerian economy is suffering from low oil prices. Crude oil accounts for approximately 90 per cent of Nigeria's exports. The revenue from oil production and related activities are distributed between the central and the regional governments. The central government gets 54 per cent while the rest is distributed to regional states and other local governments.¹³ Lesser oil revenue means both the centre and the state have lesser means of financing their social and welfare activities. Hence the states are already clamoring with the centre to increase its share of the oil revenue. Already under stress, the NDA is targeting the oil sector to further hamstring the centre and cause wider discontent among the states against the central government.

Is the NDA formidable?

The question is that will NDA be successful and become as threatening as MEND. NDA has shown great alacrity at carrying out attacks on oil infrastructure. It dismissed brazenly the governments' proposal for peace talks. All this may seem to be signs of its strength, but the group might turn out to be transient band of criminals that lack purpose and popularity. Firstly, the group lacks the popular support that MEND had among various ethnic groups in Niger Delta. NDA operates within the Warri region and has not shown the ability to operate outside it. The former MEND militia commanders have distanced themselves from the group. Despite having been probed for corruption by the present government, Ekpemupolo has asked the NDA to give up violence and talk to the government. Secondly, the political elite of the Niger Delta region for the time being are not interested in armed confrontation with the government. Buhari has been very calculative and has not completely cut-off all patronage networks. He has co-opted many political elites within his regime. There is lack of support for armed insurgency in the region among former MEND commanders as they have no stomach to fight one more protracted armed conflict. In such an environment, it seems that NDA might turn out to be a group of criminals and smugglers that would not have the penetrative power of a popular movement like MEND. In the end the group might be just a flash in the pan.

NDA is a very secretive group and the profile of its members is not known. Its political motives also remain ambiguous.

The former MEND militia commanders have distanced themselves from the group.

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Viewpoint

THE NEW IMPETUS IN CHINA'S SECURITY ENGAGEMENT WITH AFRICA

The larger 'China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security' that was simultaneously launched was meant to integrate security issues into FOCAC, but was in need of further refinement to move from rhetorical commitment to more institutionalised involvement. Even though the complexities of this process remain a challenge to the Chinese leadership, not only clashing at times with its foreign policy principle of non-interference, but also creating novel situations on the ground that Beijing has to deal with, further steps have been taken to carve out a niche role for China's contribution to security in Africa.

Susanne Kamerling*

China's evolving engagement in African security matters has off late seen new impulses in multilateral and unilateral approaches to the continent, especially in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Since former Chinese president Hu Jintao announced Beijing's new security policy towards Africa at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2012, the aim of addressing China's concerns related to its local and global reputation, economic and business interests and protection of its citizens on the continent, have been at the forefront of Beijing's policy priorities.¹ The larger 'China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security' that was simultaneously launched was meant to integrate security issues into FOCAC, but was in need of further refinement to move from rhetorical commitment to more institutionalised involvement. Even though the complexities of this process remain a challenge to the Chinese leadership, not only clashing at times with its foreign policy principle of non-interference, but also creating novel situations on the ground that Beijing has to deal with, further steps have been taken to carve out a niche role for China's contribution to security in Africa. This simultaneously serves Beijing's aim of professionalizing and internationalizing its own security forces.

New Impulses

A new set of initiatives announced by Chinese President Xi at the 70th year anniversary of the United Nations in September 2015 in New York is part of the gradual approach of Beijing to increase its international security engagement. The anniversary celebrations have given Xi the opportunity to outline his UN agenda in what is generally perceived as a more proactive foreign policy. He has done so on several occasions where he has taken the main stage to announce 1) an assistance fund of 2 billion dollar for South-South cooperation plus 12 billion to the least developing countries by 2030 in the context of the SDG's 2) 1 billion to a China-UN Peace

China is trying to live up to the demands of the international community through the preferred UN framework, while at the same time brushing up its image of a responsible emerging power and leader of the developing world...

* Ms. Susanne Kamerling is a Lecturer at the Department of International Relations University of Groningen, Associate fellow the Clingendael Institute, The Netherlands, and Visiting Fellow, IDSA

Fund mostly aimed at boosting multilateral cooperation, the African Union in particular and 3) a UN peacekeeping stand-by force plus a peacekeeping police contingent.² These engagements mean a fresh impetus mostly to China's involvement with the African continent. With this China is trying to live up to the demands of the international community through the preferred UN framework, while at the same time brushing up its image of a responsible emerging power and leader of the developing world at a time that Beijing's 'go global' campaign is at its apparent height. Xi's broader initiatives came ahead of the last FOCAC meeting of early December 2015, where he committed to specific plans in contributing to APSA, in addition to many other areas. Support in boosting the capacity of the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis through 60 million dollars in aid to the African Union is one of the main pillars in this effort.

UNPKO and the PAP

In addition to these plans, Xi pledged to intensify its participation in UN peacekeeping missions in the context of China's multilateral approach to African security. Although India, Bangladesh and Pakistan have long been the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping missions, China is catching up, slowly moving towards providing more security and military personnel to UN missions instead of its traditional contribution of technical and medical staff. Beijing has already taken part in combatant roles in UN-missions in South-Sudan, Darfur and most recently Mali, although with mixed results.³ What is remarkable here though is the increased stake of the People's Armed Police (PAP), predominantly responsible for domestic security and stability and on which Beijing spends more than on its defence budget. Not only did Xi announce a peacekeeping stand-by force of 8000 troops, he also came forward with the establishment of a *permanent* peacekeeping

police squad. If all this comes through, China would become the largest troop-contributing force of the UN, and it would also be a huge leap from the current 3000 Chinese blue-helmet women and men currently deployed.⁴

Not only did Xi announce a peacekeeping stand-by force of 8000 troops, he also came forward with the establishment of a permanent peacekeeping police squad.

The PAP, falling under the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), is Beijing's newest tool in the widening deployment and internationalization of its security forces. Filling a gap in the much-needed work of police officers in UN missions, China will deploy more of its armed police forces in the years ahead. But

living up to the UN needs is far from the only reason the PAP is being propelled abroad. Liao Jinrong, director of the International Cooperation Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security told the China Daily that they would "deal with riots and mass incidents, as well as to help with security in large-scale activities, cybersecurity and counterterrorism actions".⁵ Not coincidentally, these are also on top of the priority list in China itself. But gaining experience in these type of operations abroad, cooperating with other nations and police forces on these matters, and gathering information about the situation on the ground is in Beijing's eyes a much-needed by-catch of partaking in UN missions in several African countries in a multilateral setting. This is broadening the scope of China's professed international security engagements so far.

Djibouti and Counter-piracy

China's unilateral approach to security matters has also experienced a new milestone. The long-awaited support facility that China will construct in Djibouti is a welcome facilitative logistical stepping stone not only for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and PLA Navy, but also the PAP to operate in a region far from China's shores.⁶ The piracy threat in the Gulf of Aden and Western

Indian Ocean being far less imminent, Beijing is looking for other ways to get practice in how best to safeguard its growing global interests. Especially, Beijing's ability to protect its citizens abroad is under intense scrutiny of China's active netizen-community. Xi was sure to respond quickly and fiercely to the beheading of the first Chinese citizen by ISIS last year, a prelude to more intensive Chinese involvement in fighting terrorism abroad.⁷ When three Chinese businessmen were killed in a terrorist attack in Mali in November 2015, the government rushed to declare through their media mouthpieces that Chinese troops in the country were too far away from the location of the attack, and were moreover present solely under UN mandate. On other occasions, China did set up evacuations to get Chinese and other citizens out of troubled areas assisted by frigates taking part in the counter-piracy missions in the Western Indian Ocean, most recently from Yemen in 2015. For China, despite clear limitations to its capability to act, both its multilateral peacekeeping efforts as well as its unilateral counter-piracy missions provide invaluable experience and lessons-learnt that it applies both at home and in its direct neighborhood. Therefore, ever since China has sent its first naval mission to the Gulf of Aden in 2009, there has been debate about whether China would opt for a military base in the region to sustain its missions on high seas or if it would continue to rely on commercial harbor facilities and logistic support through its system of diplomatic contacts as well as its globally present state-owned companies like COSCO.⁸ For years, Beijing has proclaimed not to open military facilities overseas. Even in 2015, when plans were well under way, some academics and military officers still stated - in line with the broader peaceful development discourse - that China would never opt for military bases, as it would pursue a different path than the US.⁹ However, in November 2015 China did announce what many expected; to open a 'support facility', carefully avoiding the phrase 'military base', in Djibouti. In February this year the construction work has started.¹⁰ They will not be alone in the small country in the Horn of Africa: next to France, the US and Japan already have military facilities there to support counterterrorism and counterpiracy operations. Chinese Defence Ministry's spokesman Colonel Wu Qian stated, "This facility will better ensure that the Chinese military can carry out responsibilities such as international peacekeeping, naval escorts in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters, and humanitarian assistance."¹¹ Xi used similar wordings at the 2015 FOCAC summit: "China will (...) support African countries' capacity building in areas such as defence, counter-terrorism, riot prevention, customs and immigration control."¹²

...ever since China has sent its first naval mission to the Gulf of Aden in 2009, there has been debate about whether China would opt for a military base in the region

Conclusion

The unilateral and multilateral approach of China in its security engagement towards Africa seems to be coming together in Djibouti, thereby functioning as a stepping-stone to its Africa-policy and potentially its Middle-East policy. China's role as a security player in the broader region seems to have been taken with yet another step not only of deeper involvement, but also a more comprehensive approach. The longer-term development of this set of initiatives will determine how this will affect security practices, not only in Africa (and APSA) but also of China itself.

¹ Chris Alden, "Seeking Security in Africa: China's Evolving Approach to the African Peace and Security Architecture," NOREF Report, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, March 2014.

- ² Jiao Wu and Yunbi Zhang, "China to Set up \$1b Peace Fund", *China Daily*, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xividit/2015-09/29/content_22005590.htm, (Accessed May 27, 2016).
- ³ Interview of the author with Dutch military officer and high level diplomat, Beijing, November 2015. On China's role in the MINUSMA mission, see Frans-Paul Van der Putten, "China's Evolving Role in Peacekeeping and African Security; The Deployment of Chinese Troops for UN Force Protection in Mali", Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, September 2015, at <http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Clingendael%20Report%20-%20China%20%80%99s%20Evolving%20Role%20in%20Peacekeeping%20and%20African%20Security%20sept%202015.pdf>, (Accessed May 15, 2016).
- ⁴ Janka Oertel, "How China Is Changing the UN," *The Diplomat*, October 5, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/how-china-is-changing-the-un/>, (Accessed May 15, 2016).
- ⁵ Yan Zhang, "UN Peacekeepers to Help Police Fight Crime," *China Daily*, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xividit/2015-09/17/content_21898965.htm, (Accessed May 18, 2016).
- ⁶ Although it must be noted that according to some estimates, the support facility in the Horn of Africa will take at least another 10 years to be turned into a military base that is in full professional swing.
- ⁷ This is in line with the Counter-Terrorism Law and National Security Law adopted by China in 2015. Also, China has recently published its first timely white paper on the Arab region, thereby stipulating the region's growing policy priority.
- ⁸ Susanne Kamerling and Frans-Paul Van der Putten, "An Overseas Naval Presence without Naval Bases; China's Counterpiracy Operation in the Gulf of Aden," *Journal of Contemporary China Affairs* 40, no. 4 (2011): 119–46.
- ⁹ Interviews of the author, Beijing, March-June and November-December 2015.
- ¹⁰ Jeremy Page and Gordon Lubold, "China to Build Naval Hub in Djibouti," *Wall Street Journal*, November 26, 2015, at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-build-naval-logistics-facility-in-djibouti-1448557719>, (Accessed May 18, 2016). Ankit Panda, "Confirmed: Construction Begins on China's First Overseas Military Base in Djibouti," *The Diplomat*, February 29, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/confirmed-construction-begins-on-chinas-first-overseas-military-base-in-djibouti/>, (Accessed May 15, 2016).
- ¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹² "Xi Announces 10 Major China-Africa Cooperation Plans for Coming 3 Years", *Xinhua Net*, December 4, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-12/04/c_134886420.htm, (Accessed May 15, 2016).

Book Review

Morten Boås and Kevin Dunn, *Politics of Origin in Africa - Autochthony, Citizenship and Conflict*, Zed Books, London and New York, 2013 ISBN: 978 184813 996 1

Saurabh Mishra*

The occurrence of ethnic conflicts throughout the world in general and in Africa in particular have raised new questions regarding the nature and roots of such conflicts. Africa has come to be known as the continent of conflicts where most of the United Nations (UN) conflict resolution efforts and resources have been invested. The authors of the book recognise the rise of autochthony (son of the soil sentiments) as a prominent feature of the contemporary politics around the world, and Africa in particular. The phenomenon is related to the individuals' primary need for identity and belonging with certainty. The book focuses on the phenomenon of autochthony in contemporary African politics; and the authors identify autochthony as a political term – "a strategy, not a fact". They bolster their argument and analysis with a study of four countries that are known for their autochthonous violent conflicts in recent times.

The book is organised in seven chapters, including the introduction and conclusion. The introduction discusses the theoretical aspects of the nature of autochthonic conflicts. Although conflicts in Africa are generally presented as resource-conflicts, the authors note that resource scarcity is not a sufficient and consistent reason for an outbreak of violent conflict. They do not share the assumptions made by the 'neo-Malthusian' and 'resource wars' approaches. The actual reasons of violent conflict lie elsewhere – as the politicians weave/construct narratives of exclusion based on the socio-economic factors of competition revolving around scarcity or distribution of land. The resulting 'son of the soil' principle provides a kind of illusive certainty to the people being addressed. Autochthony, for the authors, is a presentable and influential political metanarrative that politicians employ to attain, consolidate and sustain power.

The second chapter deals with the melancholy of autochthony, the "ontological uncertainty" of autochthony and the production of violence due to autochthony. The conditions favourable to the employment of autochthony by the politicians are the result of a convergence of multiple factors. Pre-colonial Africa, in general, was an open, untamed natural space for different communities and ethnicities who, although aware about their distinctions, moved from one land to another. Their living space was quite porous and not as strict as it became after the taming and colonisation of the African land space. The introduction of the concept of the modern state and territory to Africa increased the role of the land in the definition of identity and belonging as the colonisation process contributed to reification of communal identification, conceptualisation of nature as tamed stabilised spaces, and legal privatisation of land. Therefore, a mix of colonial and post-colonial socio-economic conditions together with the state-building processes in Africa have strengthened the tendency of deploying autochthonous narratives as a strategy to capture political power. The narratives, in general, identify certain aggressor group(s) of people – with

* Dr. Saurabh Mishra is Research Assistant, ALACUN Centre, IDSA.

reference to land rights, citizenship, economic and political privileges – who have taken away entitlements of a certain group of people who claim to be the ‘original’ inhabitants of a certain territory. The sense of loss, melancholy and victimisation generated through these historical narratives in Africa have generated violence instead of Freudian paralysis. Franz Fanon’s analysis better explains this phenomenon. Whatever be the case, these narratives put both the ‘invader’ and the ‘invaded’ in an anxiety that compels the groups to seek a primal sense of security and certainty through autochthonous violence. Howsoever be their narratives, both the parties in such conflicts remain in a constant state of anxiety that their status can be challenged anytime. The parties with specific autochthonous claims fear for their narratives being challenged anytime by some other community, generating an “ontological uncertainty”; for Africa has an ancient history of diverse migration and settlements that have happened at different points of time. So, the determination of a historically relevant period depends on the politics and the power configuration of the day, rather than any other ‘original’ claim. The authors have specifically identified the role of ‘regional big men’ in the generation and sustenance of autochthonous claims responsible for private gain and social conflict.

The changing post-colonial socio-economic conditions and the advent of globalisation and privatisation have also added to autochthony in their own ways. The failure of long-standing neo-patrimonial systems and the change in the rules of the game to attain and hold power has lured politicians to employ autochthony for these purposes. Chapters three, four, five and six of the book give insights into the particularities of the autochthonous conflict in Liberia, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo and Côte d’Ivoire, proving the authors’ points regarding the causality of violent conflict. Each of the cases highlight the role of state-building and politics in strengthening/perpetrating autochthonous conflict through citizenship and land laws. The politician in these states have a tendency to rely on patrimonial arrangements to hold power and allowing the formation of non-state militias. It is also strange to see employment of autochthonous claims in countries with diverse population where no specific ethnicity can claim dominance. People might think that simply following the modern liberal democratic principles would have kept the countries away from violent conflicts. But the authors believe that a sudden introduction of liberal democracy in patrimonial societies with traditional systems has paradoxically lead to the politics of belonging.

The book cannot determine just one reason or stage of history responsible for the phenomenon of the rise of autochthony in Africa. It describes the process of the evolution, reinforcement and the melancholy of the phenomenon leading to violent conflicts. The actual reason for the conflicts is not some ‘original’ essentiality determining autochthony but diverse socio-economic and political games primarily based on personal gains, land rights and citizenship. The state and ethnic boundaries in Africa are not in sync, making the issue of ‘original’ claim and citizenship more complex.

Given that the conflicts mentioned in the book are recent and a couple of them, despite some settlement, are simmering underground, the analysis in the book might be a help in strategising for further peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Recognising the negative role of the central state in each of the country studies in the book, the authors point that uncritical political liberalisation as a corner-stone for peacemaking processes is not helpful. The process might need some adjustments according to the local conditions; compelling the peace-makers to look for new conflict resolution models. The book’s strong theoretical foundation and lucid analysis help us understand the rise of autochthonous conflicts not only in Africa but in other parts of the world as well.

News Track

Conflict and Security

Burundi

AU plans to send peacekeepers in Burundi dropped

The African Union (AU) has abandoned its plan to send 5,000 peacekeepers to help restore stability to troubled Burundi. Officials said that they would instead encourage political dialogue between Burundi's opposing sides. Burundi's President Pierre Nkurunziza had fiercely opposed the AU plan to send peacekeepers. His decision in April 2015 to seek a third term in office has led to ongoing violence and fears that Burundi is sliding into ethnic conflict. At least 439 people have died and 240,000 have fled abroad since then, the UN says. The AU could have deployed troops without Burundi's consent – a clause in its charter allows it to intervene in a member state because of grave circumstances, which include war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity – but it would have been the first time had it done so.¹

US blames Rwanda of supporting violence in Burundi

The United States (US) has accused Rwanda of trying to destabilise troubled Burundi by recruiting refugees for armed attacks on the government. The American concerns were raised in the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee by two senior diplomats, who cited reports from colleagues in the field that point to Rwandan involvement in the Burundi crisis. "There are credible reports of recruitment of Burundian refugees from camps in Rwanda to participate in armed attacks by Burundian armed opposition against the Burundian government," said Thomas Perriello, US envoy for the Great Lakes region of Africa. Linda Thomas-Greenfield, US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, said: "We have seen a number of reports from our colleagues in the field that suggest the Rwandan government has been involved in destabilizing activities in Burundi." It is the first time the United States has publicly accused the government in Kigali of involvement in the crisis in neighbouring Burundi.²

UN starts probe into Burundian killings

A team of UN investigators is in Burundi to probe abuses and arbitrary killings in the country that have been going on since President Pierre Nkurunziza was controversially re-elected for a third term in April 2015. Since the re-election of Pierre Nkurunziza, Burundi has been embroiled in political turmoil and so far 400 people have lost their lives. The investigators' visit coincides

¹ "African Union abandons plans to send peacekeepers to Burundi", *BBC News*, January 31, 2016, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35454893>

² "US accuses Rwanda of stoking violence in Burundi", *The Telegraph*, February 11, 2016, at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/burundi/12151389/US-accuses-Rwanda-of-stoking-violence-in-Burundi.html>

with the discovery of a mass grave that authorities said contained remains of government supporters. The team also started its work a day before a summit of leaders from the East Africa Community (EAC), of which Burundi is a member, began in Arusha, Tanzania. Heading the team was the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns.³

Djibouti

China finalises deal to construct military outpost in Djibouti

Cementing a deal that has been hinted at for months, China is moving forward to build what's believed to be its first overseas military facility in the Horn of Africa nation of Djibouti. The outpost is meant to bolster the Chinese Navy's efforts to prevent piracy. At least three other countries – the US, France and Japan – have military bases in Djibouti, drawn to the country's strategic location and stability. The presence of military ships from those countries and China has been credited with reducing piracy in the region. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said that the new facility will give logistical support to China's fleet that performs escort duties in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast. He added that China and Djibouti have "reached consensus" on building the facilities, a plan that Chinese officials spoke about publicly last fall.⁴

Ethiopia

US closes down its drone base in Ethiopia

The United States is shutting down its drone operation in southern Ethiopia. The US military has been using a base in Arba Minch, some 400 km south of the capital, Addis Ababa, to launch the remotely-piloted aircraft since 2011. The US told the BBC that the drones were being used only for surveillance and not for air strikes as part of counter-terrorism efforts in East Africa. Security experts in the region say the drones from Ethiopia were used to launch attacks on al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda-linked Somali militants. US drone strikes have targeted a number of al-Shabaab militants including its leader Ahmed Abdi Godane in September 2014. An official from the US embassy in Addis Ababa told the BBC that following talks with the Ethiopian government "we reached a mutual decision that our presence in Arba Minch is not required at this time".⁵

Addis Ababa master plan cancelled after violent Oromo protests

Ethiopia's government is set to abandon plans to expand the boundaries of the capital, Addis Ababa, which have caused months of deadly protests. Demonstrations by people from the Oromo

³ "Burundi: UN investigators begin probe into killings", *Deutschwelle*, March 1, 2016, <http://www.dw.com/en/burundi-un-investigators-begin-probe-into-killings/a-19085859>

⁴ "China reaches deal to build military outpost In Djibouti", *NPR*, January 21, at <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/01/21/463829799/china-reaches-deal-to-build-military-outpost-in-djibouti>

⁵ "US shuts drone base in Ethiopia", *BBC News*, January 4, 2016, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35220279>

ethnic group have been sparked by fears that Oromo farmers could be displaced. Human rights groups have estimated that at least 140 people were killed by security forces during the protests. The ruling party in the Oromia region said that it was dropping the plan following discussions with local people. The Oromo People's Democratic Organisation (OPDO) made the decision after three days of talks. The OPDO, along with the Addis Ababa city authority, would have been responsible for implementing the "master plan". Oromia is Ethiopia's largest region, and completely surrounds the capital.⁶

Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of supporting armed groups for secession of Oromia

Ethiopia's Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn accused Eritrea of supporting armed groups seeking the secession of Oromia, the largest region in the country. Desalegn blamed the destabilisation of Oromia on "destructive forces" that have launched attacks targeting security forces and government facilities. "The people have understood that these destructive forces are on a mission to subvert the system and change the government," Desalegn said. The Prime Minister added that the issues in Oromia require a swift response and the government will address the situation as the law dictates. He warned that the government would prevent the growth of any secessionist campaign in Oromia.⁷

Kenya

Kenya military was 'warned' well before the impending attack

Kenyan forces in Somalia were warned of an impending al-Shabab attack 45 days before the group overran one of their bases, a Somali general says. Kenya was given "clear and reliable intelligence" about the threat, General Abas Ibrahim Gurey told the BBC. The Islamist militants say they killed more than 100 Kenyan troops in the attack, which would make it the deadliest attack on Kenya's army. The Kenyan military has not given a death toll or responded to Gen Gurey. In the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, President Uhuru Kenyatta said in a memorial service for the fallen soldiers that Kenyan troops would stay in Somalia despite the attack.⁸

Mozambique

First three HSI 32 interceptors from France on way to Mozambique

French shipyard CMN is in the process of delivering the first three HSI 32 interceptors to Mozambique, with the vessels en route to southern Africa. The first three interceptors were loaded onto the Dutch cargo ship Deltagracht on January 9, 2016. The cargo vessel is due to arrive in

⁶ "Ethiopia cancels Addis Ababa master plan after Oromo protests", *BBC News*, January 13, 2016, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35300471>

⁷ "Ethiopian Prime Minister accuses Eritrea of supporting armed groups seeking secession of Oromia", *Zegabi*, February 23, 2016, at <http://www.zegabi.com/articles/10061>

⁸ "Kenya military 'warned' over Somalia attack", *BBC News*, January 22, 2016, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35380255>

Porto Amelia, Mozambique, on February 1. Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie (CMN) is scheduled to deliver another three interceptors in the middle of this year. Mozambique had ordered three of the interceptors in 2013 and another three in January 2015. The September 5, 2013 contract Mozambique signed with CMN was worth Euro 200 million and covered three Ocean Eagle 43s, three HSI 32 interceptors and 24 fishing vessels.⁹

Renewed fighting in Mozambique forces thousands to flee

Some of the more than 3,000 refugees fleeing renewed fighting in Mozambique have accused government troops of killings, sexual assaults and razing villages suspected of harbouring opposition fighters, according to a journalist who visited the refugees in Malawi. The Mozambican government denies the charges. More than 20 years after the end of a decades-long civil war, sporadic fighting has again flared up between the government and fighters loyal to the opposition forcing growing numbers of refugees to cross the border into neighbouring Malawi. The ruling party, Frelimo, has been in power since Mozambique's independence from Portugal in 1975, but the opposition, Renamo, is urging an independent government in the north where it has support.¹⁰

Suspected MH370 debris found in Mozambique

A piece of aircraft debris that washed up on a sandbank in Mozambique has a "high possibility" of being from a Boeing 777, the same type of jet as the missing Malaysian airliner MH370, according to Malaysia's transport minister. Liow Tiong Lai said the debris would be taken to Australia for further examination and it was not yet possible to determine whether it was from the Malaysia Airlines aircraft that went missing on a flight between Kuala Lumpur and Beijing almost two years ago.¹¹

Rwanda

Rwanda Police shoots down the 'first ISIS recruiter' in the country

Rwandan police have shot dead a suspected recruiter for the Islamic State militant group (ISIS) in what a police spokesperson described as the first such case in the country. Muhammad Mugemangango was deputy imam of the Kimironko Mosque in the capital Kigali, according to a statement from Rwanda National Police released on January 25, 2016. He was shot dead by officers after attempting to flee a police vehicle when in transit. The statement said that Mugemangango

⁹ "First three HSI 32 interceptors on their way to Mozambique", *Defence Web*, January 13, 2016 at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=41953:first-three-hsi-32-interceptors-on-their-way-to-mozambique&catid=51:Sea&Itemid=106

¹⁰ "Thousands flee renewed fighting in Mozambique", *news24*, January 26, 2016, at <http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/thousands-flee-renewed-fighting-in-mozambique-20160126-6>

¹¹ "MH370 investigators to examine aircraft debris in Mozambique", *The Economic Times*, March 3, 2016, at <https://next.ft.com/content/380f82a2-e0d5-11e5-96b7-9f778349aba2>

was “under investigations [sic] for mentoring Rwandan youths into jihad and recruiting them to join Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria.”¹²

Tanzania

Tanzania endorses AU deployment to Burundi

Tanzania has become the first member of the East African Community (EAC) to openly endorse the deployment of African Union peacekeeping troops to strife-torn Burundi. During a meeting with the head of the African Union, Tanzanian Foreign Minister Augustine Mahiga urged cooperation from Burundi’s government, which considers the proposed mission as an invasion. Tanzania and Burundi are both members of the EAC, a regional intergovernmental organisation that also includes Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda. Tanzania has long played a leading role in the region. Tanzania was set to host peace talks between Burundi’s government and opposition groups in Arusha, after they opened in Uganda late December 2015. But a senior official in Burundi’s Foreign Ministry said the government will not partake in the talks because they included those who are “supporting violence”.¹³

Tanzania threatens of action to deport migrants from Ethiopia

Tanzanian authorities have threatened to deport hundreds of Ethiopian migrants who have crossed into the country illegally while trying to make their way to South Africa. The East African country is a major transit route for migrants, used by smugglers to ferry Ethiopians and Somalis to South Africa and Europe. Charles Kitwanga, Tanzania’s home affairs minister, said the government had launched a special operation to arrest and prosecute Ethiopians and other foreigners living or working illegally in the country. Ethiopia is experiencing its worst drought in 50 years, with more than 10 million people unable to feed themselves because their crops and animals have died. The Ethiopian migrants who pass through Tanzania travel thousands of miles packed into trucks. According to the government, migrants usually pay traffickers around US\$1,000 to US\$2,000 to reach South Africa.¹⁴

Politics

Kenya

ICC drops testimony in Ruto’s war crimes case

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has ruled that the key testimony against Kenyan Deputy President William Ruto cannot be used as evidence. Ruto is accused of committing crimes against

¹² “‘First ISIS recruiter’ in Rwanda shot dead by police”, *Newsweek*, January 26, 2016, at <http://www.newsweek.com/first-isis-recruiter-rwanda-shot-dead-police-419695>

¹³ “Tanzania backs African Union deployment to Burundi, urges cooperation as violence intensifies”, *International Business Times*, January 10, 2016, at <http://www.ibtimes.com/tanzania-backs-african-union-deployment-burundi-urges-cooperation-violence-2258510>

¹⁴ “Tanzania threatens to deport migrants from drought-hit Ethiopia”, *Thomson Reuters Foundation News*, January 26, 2016, at <http://news.trust.org/item/20160126125252-ugwau/>

humanity during postelection unrest. On February 12, 2016, appeals judges at the ICC ruled that recanted statements against Kenyan Deputy President William Ruto were inadmissible. The decision is a blow to prosecutors trying to convict Ruto over his alleged involvement in violence following disputed elections in 2007. Lawyers are now barred from using depositions recorded before the start of the trial by five witnesses because they have since changed their stories or refused to testify. Judges last year (2015) gave permission for recanted testimonies to serve as evidence against Ruto and his co-accused, radio broadcaster Joshua Sang, saying the witnesses had likely only backed out in the face of intimidation or bribes.¹⁵

Malawi

UN concerned about anti-gay killings in Malawi

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) said that it was concerned about developments in Malawi that could stoke anti-gay sentiment, including incitement to murder. It expressed fears that the decision by Malawi's chief prosecutor to drop charges against an individual accused of inflammatory statements against gays and lesbians could have serious consequences. In early January, the spokesman of one of the country's main political parties publicly, and on several occasions, described gay and lesbian people as "worse than dogs" and called for them to be killed. A criminal case was subsequently lodged against People's Party spokesman Kenneth Msonda by two civil society organizations, charging him with inciting others to break the law.¹⁶

Mauritius

China keen for Mauritius to join its Maritime Silk Road

The President of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, has expressed interest for Mauritius to be part of the 21st century new Maritime Silk Road owing to the country's strategic location which position Mauritius as a natural extension of the said Silk Road. On February 2, this was at the fore of discussions by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Wang Yi, during a courtesy call on the Prime Minister, Sir Anerood Jugnauth, at the Treasury Building in Port Louis. Minister Wang Yi spoke of the possibilities evoked by the President of the People's Republic of China, on how Mauritius can extend cooperation in the historic process of rejuvenating that Silk Road.¹⁷

¹⁵ "ICC throws out testimony in Ruto's Kenya war crimes case", *Deutschwelle*, February 13, 2016, at <http://www.dw.com/en/icc-throws-out-testimony-in-rutos-kenya-war-crimes-case/a-19046112>

¹⁶ "Incitement to anti-gay killings in Malawi concerns UN", *Voice of America*, January 22, 2016, at <http://www.voanews.com/content/un-concerned-by-incitement-to-anti-gay-killings-and-malawi/3157782.html>

¹⁷ "China expresses interests for Mauritius to be Part of the 21st century New Maritime Silk Road", *All Africa*, February 2, 2016, at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201602021396.html>

Rwanda

Paul Kagame would run for the third term

The Rwandan president, Paul Kagame, is to seek a third term in 2017, confirming a decision widely expected after the approval of constitutional changes. He said, "(Y)ou requested me to lead the country again after 2017. Given the importance and consideration you attach to this, I can only accept. But I don't think that what we need is an eternal leader." Kagame has been president since 2000, but he has effectively been in control since his forces marched into the Rwandan capital, Kigali, to end the 1994 genocide. He was originally limited to two terms, but Rwanda has approved changes to the constitution that would effectively allow Kagame to stay in power until 2034.¹⁸

Uganda

General opposed to Museveni arrested in Uganda

General David Sejusa, who had called President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda a dictator, has been detained at military barracks in the Ugandan capital Kampala. Sejusa's arrest raised tensions before the presidential elections on February 18, 2016. Neither the government nor military commented on why Sejusa was detained. Museveni has ruled Uganda since 1986, when he led a group of rebels, including Sejusa, against a government they accused of rigging elections. In 2013, Sejusa had written a letter to the domestic spy chief urging him to investigate allegations of a plot to kill high-ranking government officials seen as being opposed to the political rise of Museveni's son, a brigadier who commands the country's Special Forces.¹⁹

Uganda's Supreme Court validates presidential election

Uganda's Supreme Court rejected, issuing a ruling on March 31, 2016, a challenge to the presidential election held in February that secured President Yoweri Museveni a mandate for another five-year term. The vote of February 2016, was seen as a pivotal moment in Uganda's democracy, as it was the last time Museveni was legally allowed to appear on a presidential ballot, and was marred with irregularities and widespread criticism.²⁰

¹⁸ "Rwandan president Paul Kagame to run for third term in 2017", *theguardian*, January 1, 2016, at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/01/rwanda-paul-kagame-third-term-office-constitutional-changes>

¹⁹ "Uganda general opposed to Museveni arrested", *Voice of America*, January 31, 2016, at <http://www.voanews.com/content/uganda-general-opposed-to-museveni-arrested/3170557.html>

²⁰ "Uganda's Supreme Court rejects challenge to presidential election", *The New York Times*, March 31, 2016, at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/01/world/africa/ugandas-supreme-court-rejects-challenge-to-presidential-election.html?_r=0

Economy and Development

Djibouti

No limits for Iranian tankers due to snapping off Iran-Djibouti ties

Nasrollah Sardashti, the commercial Director of the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) has dismissed any probable disruption in the passage of Iranian tankers through Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb due to the country's severed ties with Djibouti. He told that the passage of oil tankers through international and territorial waters is subject to a set of global regulations and one country alone cannot violate these rules. Sardashti dismissed the possibility of any disturbance in the passage of Iranian oil tankers toward Europe through the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb which is located between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula, and Djibouti and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa, saying "in the current conditions, and even after the severed diplomatic ties with Djibouti, Iran has dispatched about 8 giant oil tankers to the Mediterranean region through Mandeb Strait in a month."²¹

Ethiopia-Djibouti pipeline project set to be built

Black Rhino, a company owned by United States investment firm Blackstone Group is gearing up to launch the construction of a 550 km fuel pipeline linking landlocked Ethiopia to Djibouti. The United States Assistant Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, told reporters on February 11 that construction of the US\$1.55 billion project will soon be launched. Ethiopia and Djibouti had signed an agreement in 2015 to carry on the construction of the fuel pipeline due to be completed in 2018. When the fuel pipeline project also known as Horn of Africa pipeline (HOAP), goes operational, it will transport diesel, gasoline and jet fuel to the horn of African nation whose annual fuel demand grows at an average rate of 15 per cent.²²

China confirms beginning of the construction of military base in Djibouti

China's first overseas naval base – which is under construction in Djibouti – will be concerned chiefly with logistical tasks rather than projecting power, at least for now, mainland analysts say. The defence ministry of China confirmed that the construction of the base's infrastructure and facilities had begun. Analysts say the building of the base shows the ambition of the People's Liberation Army to expand its international presence and influence. Located where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden, the port at Doraleh watches over one of the world's busiest waterways, with traffic passing through the area to reach the Suez Canal. The location is seen as ideal for supporting the PLA's operations in the Indian Ocean.²³

²¹ "Iran-Djibouti cutting ties poses no limits for Iranian tankers", MEHR News Agency, January 15, 2016, at <http://en.mehrnews.com/news/113592/Iran-Djibouti-cutting-ties-poses-no-limits-for-Iranian-tankers>

²² "Ethiopia and Djibouti oil pipeline project set for construction", Sudan Tribune, February 11, 2016, at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article57990>

²³ "China starts work on Horn of Africa military base in Djibouti, defence ministry confirms", South China Morning Post, February 26, 2016, at <http://www scmp com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1917210/china-starts-work-horn-africa-military-base-djibouti>

Ethiopia

Ethiopia suffers worst food crisis in the last 30 years

The Save the Children charity says that it has raised less than a third of what it needs to help Ethiopia cope with a drought which has left 10.2 million people critically short of food. Experts say the drought is worse than the one seen in 1984, when years of conflict followed by a lack of rain led to a famine that killed up to one million people. Save the Children President Carolyn Miles said that she recently visited the country to see the extent of the problem. "The scale of the need is really huge and has outstripped the Ethiopian Government's ability to do this on their own," Miles said. The drought has mainly been blamed on El Nino, a weather pattern causing rainfall to decline in some areas of the world and floods elsewhere.²⁴

Kenya

Kenya set to benefit from China's economic transition

The slowdown in China's economy and its transition to a consumer-led economy presents a major opportunity for growth of Kenya's exports, a report by the World Bank Group suggests. The report titled 'Deal or No Deal: Strictly Business for China in Kenya' says that the world's second largest economy is a major player in Kenya and dismisses the notion that Chinese are in Africa primarily for natural resources. It cites Kenya's cut-flowers, tourism and manufacturing as the likely major beneficiaries of China's transition to consumption-driven growth. The report states that benefits have mainly come through shipping of affordable goods to Kenyan consumers and the financing of critical infrastructure projects, which were previously overlooked by the traditional investors from the Western countries.²⁵

Kenya expects an economic growth of 6.3 per cent in 2016

Kenya has forecast its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to grow at 5.9 percent in 2015/2016, 6.3 percent in 2016/2017 and 6.4 percent by 2018/2019. The Kenyan Treasury said that the broad-based growth would be supported by increased production in agriculture, completion of infrastructural projects to boost economic activity while continuing with other infrastructural investment projects and recovery of tourism. The economic growth prospects for 2016/17 financial year and the medium term takes into account developments in the global environment and internal risks while accommodating the government's national strategic objectives as outlined in the second Medium Term Plan (MTP) for the period 2013-2017 of Vision 2030 and the broad development policies of the government.²⁶ Kenya's economic growth is expected to accelerate both this year

²⁴ "Ethiopia drought driving worst food crisis in 30 years, Save the Children says", *ABC*, January 23, 2016, at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-01-23/ethiopian-drought-driving-worst-food-crisis-in-three-decades/7109270>

²⁵ "Kenya now tipped to reap from China's economic transition", *The Star*, March 26, 2016, at http://www.thestar.co.ke/news/2016/03/26/kenya-now-tipped-to-reap-from-chinas-economic-transition_c1319817

²⁶ Kenya forecasts economic growth of 6.3 pct in 2016", *ShanghaiDaily.com*, February 2, 2016, at http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=318550

and the next, helped by low oil prices, improved agricultural output, a supportive monetary policy and infrastructure investments, the World Bank said on March 31, 2016.²⁷

Malawi

Malawi food crisis 'becoming dire'

A lack of funds may have severe consequences for more than 23,500 refugees at Dzaleka Refugee Camp in Malawi, the United Nations World Food Programme and the UN Refugee Agency said. The WFP, which needs US\$2 million to resume providing full food rations for the next 12 months, has had to reduce rations and even suspend some foodstuffs during the last six months, according to a joint statement by the two United Nations organizations. Malawi is the country worst-affected by food insecurity in southern Africa, where about 2.8 million people need assistance. This situation is due to severe flooding at the beginning of 2015, followed by prolonged dry spells that have been exacerbated by the global El Nino weather phenomenon.²⁸

RMB50 million interest-free Chinese loan to Mauritius

The People's Republic of China has granted an interest-free loan of RMB 50 million, to the Government of Mauritius and handed over a letter of exchange for technical cooperation with the Mauritius Broadcasting Corporation. Agreements to this effect were signed on January 27, 2016 in Port Louis by the Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Seetanah Lutchmeenaraidoo, and the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of China in Mauritius, Li Li. The funding will help support development projects in priority areas in Mauritius. In his address at the signing ceremony, Lutchmeenaraidoo underlined that the two agreements will further enhance friendly relations between Mauritius and China and will bring the economic and technical cooperation to new heights.²⁹

Mauritius postpones starting automatic tax information exchange to September 2018

Mauritius will start automatic exchange of tax information with other nations only from September 2018, as it has postponed by a year the implementation of global common reporting standard on tax matters. The delay could impact Indian authorities' efforts to gather more tax-related information from Mauritius, which is allegedly being used by some entities to route illegal funds into India. Once the standard is in force, there would be stringent measures to curb illicit fund flows, including the requirement to carry out due diligence procedures to record tax residence of clients opening new accounts.³⁰

²⁷ "Kenya: World Bank sees faster economic growth", *The Africa Report*, March 31, 2016, at <http://www.theafricareport.com/East-Horn-Africa/kenya-world-bank-sees-faster-economic-growth.html>

²⁸ "United Nations agencies say Malawi food shortage 'becoming dire'", *Bloomberg*, January 19, 2016, at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-19/united-nations-agencies-say-malawi-food-shortage-becoming-dire->

²⁹ "China grants interest-free loan of Rs 250 million to Mauritius", *All Africa*, January 28, 2016, at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201601280476.html>

³⁰ "Mauritius to begin automatic tax information exchange from Sept 2018", *The Economic Times*, January 31, 2016 at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016-01-31/news/70222475_1_automatic-exchange-tax-treaty-tax-information

Mauritius issues licence to Bank of China

The Mauritius central bank said it has issued a banking licence to Bank of China, the first Chinese bank licenced to operate in the country. Zhang Xiaoqing, who is leading a team setting up the Mauritius unit, said Bank of China wanted to provide financial services to African businesses and serve multinationals and others doing business between China and Mauritius. Bank of Mauritius Governor Ramesh Basant Roi told reporters that the bank was expected to start operations in the next few months but did not give a date.³¹

Mozambique

Gas production can make Mozambique one of Africa's largest economies

Mozambique could join Africa's largest economies such as Nigeria and Angola by 2028 once its offshore natural gas, the biggest ever discovered on the continent, reaches full production capacity as planned, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said in a recent report. According to the IMF, the economy of one of the poorest countries in the world could grow by an annual 24 per cent between 2021 and 2025, before slowing down to about 3 to 4 percent by 2028. In 2010, The country discovered an estimated 180 trillion cubic feet of natural gas – equivalent to the entire gas reserve of Nigeria – in Rovuma Basin in the Cabo Delgado province.³²

Rwanda

Trade leads DRC, Rwanda to open borders for 24 hours

The Democratic Republic of Congo government has announced that the Rwanda-DRC border in Rubavu, has been re-opened for 24 hours business, in a move that could help boost bilateral trade according to The East African. The decision was taken by DRC government "to thank" Congolese people from North Kivu province (bordering Rwanda) who supported their national team, Leopards during the recent concluded African Nations Championship in Rwanda (Chan). However some media reports say the move to increase the border's hours of operation is beyond the Chan tournament celebrations, "The government aims to consolidate bilateral relations between Rwanda and DR Congo."³³

³¹ "Bank of China targets Africa with Mauritius banking licence", *Reuters*, March 18, 2016, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/mauritius-china-idUSL5N16Q1NO>

³² "Gas production could propel Mozambique to one of Africa's largest economies - IMF", *AFK Insider*, January 18, 2016, at <http://afkinsider.com/110135/gas-discovery-to-propel-mozambique-to-one-of-africas-largest-economy-imf/>

³³ "DRC, Rwanda reopen borders for 24 hours to boost trade", *CNBC Africa*, March 8, 2016, at <http://www.cnbcfrica.com/news/special-report/2016/03/18/rwanda-drc-border-open-24-hours/>

Seychelles

Blue bonds planned in Seychelles for sustainable fisheries

Seychelles plans to offer so-called blue bonds, which will fund the development of sustainable fisheries to investors later in 2016. The country's Treasury is in talks with multilateral agencies including the African Development Bank and the World Bank to facilitate the sale of US\$10 million of the government-backed debt, Finance Minister Jean-Paul Adam said in an interview on January 22, 2016. The securities are modeled on green bonds, which channel their proceeds to projects that save energy, curb pollution and recycle resources. Seychelles is considering the debt as its US\$169 million of bonds due January 2026 outperform other sub-Saharan African nations.³⁴

First direct flight from Beijing welcomed by Seychelles

Air Seychelles, the national airline of the Republic of Seychelles, celebrated the arrival of its inaugural non-stop scheduled service from Beijing on February 3, 2016. The flight was welcomed by a ceremonial water-cannon salute and a delegation including Joël Morgan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Transport and Chairman of Air Seychelles, Alain St. Ange, Minister of Culture and Tourism, senior management of Air Seychelles, as well as representatives from the travel trade and media.³⁵

South Africa

Africa forced to rethink on GM opposition

A scorching drought in southern Africa that led to widespread crop failure could nudge African nations to finally embrace genetically modified crops to improve harvests and reduce grain imports. The drought, which extends to South Africa, the continent's biggest corn producer, has been exacerbated by an El Nino and follows dry spells in 2015 that affected countries from Zimbabwe to Malawi. Oxfam has said 10 million people, mostly in Africa, face hunger because of droughts and poor rain. It has brought GM crops to the fore, especially corn, which is a staple crop grown and consumed in most sub-Saharan countries.) Many African countries have banned GM crops, arguing that they will cross-contaminate other plants, pollute the environment and have long-term health effects for humans.³⁶

Crisis in South African economy

The South African economy is 'in crisis' says the country's finance minister Pravin Gordhan. The comments came ahead of his Budget speech, in which he cut the country's growth forecast for

³⁴ "Seychelles plans blue bonds to develop sustainable fisheries", *Bloomberg*, January 25, 2016, at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-24/seychelles-plans-blue-bond-sale-to-develop-sustainable-fisheries>

³⁵ "Air Seychelles makes first direct flight from Beijing", *Air Seychelles*, February 3, 2016, at <https://www.airseychelles.com/en/about-us/news/2016/02/seychelles-welcomes-first-air-seychelles-non-stop-flight-beijing>

³⁶ "Drought forces Africa to rethink GM opposition", *The Western Producer*, January 14, 2016, at <http://www.producer.com/2016/01/drought-forces-africa-to-rethink-gm-opposition/>

2016 to 0.9 per cent, down from 1.7 per cent. He conceded the economy was struggling with shrinking growth, 25 per cent unemployment, and widespread poverty. The South African currency, the rand, which has halved over the past five years, fell further after the speech. It dropped 2.25 per cent to make one rand worth around US\$0.0639. The measures announced in Parliament were aimed at stopping the country falling into recession and to appease the rating agencies who have threatened to downgrade South Africa to junk status, which would raise borrowing costs for the country.³⁷

Tanzania

Construction of Tanzania's US\$10 billion Bagamoyo Port to start soon

The Government of Tanzania said the US\$10 billion Bagamoyo Port development project, one of the largest port developments currently planned worldwide, has not been suspended and that work on the project would commence in July 2016. The ministry of works, transport and communications issued a statement to clarify the status of the project following reports it had been suspended and that the government was instead planning to focus on improving the capacity, performance and efficiency of the existing Dar-es-Salaam and Mtwara ports. The statement said that the work on the project would start in July after the conclusion of negotiations on financing with China Merchants Holding International and the Sultanate of Oman. It said the negotiations were expected to finish in March 2016.³⁸

Retail food vendors from China start services in Tanzania

Zanzibar's Minister of State in the Second Vice President's office, Mr. Mohammed Aboud, launched the NTS MART Tanzania, a new retail company in the country that supplies one-stop foodservice and hospitality products. The company is a joint venture between the Shef Limited and China's Guangzhou Nantian Sources Company Limited. The former has 49 per cent shares while the latter owns 51 per cent, according to Project Coordinator Saleh Dola.³⁹

Tanzania-Uganda agree to run pipeline to the Indian Ocean coast

Tanzania and Uganda's agreed to build a crude pipeline linking their countries, connecting landlocked oilfields to the Indian Ocean, Tanzanian President John Magufuli said. The proposed link will cover 1,120 km and its construction will create 15,000 jobs. The heated pipeline will cost about US\$4 billion and the two countries' government plan to "move very fast" to implement the project, said James Mataragio, managing director of the state-owned Tanzania Petroleum Development Corp. Tanzania is competing with neighbouring Kenya for the pipeline that will

³⁷ "South Africa's economy 'in crisis'", *BBC News*, February 24, 2016, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35650701>

³⁸ "Tanzania says mega-port project will start in July", *joc.com*, January 11, 2016, at http://www.joc.com/port-news/international-ports/tanzania-says-mega-port-project-will-start-july_20160111.html

³⁹ "Retail Chinese food vendors launch services in Tanzania", *Daily News*, March 1, 2016, at <http://www.dailynews.co.tz/index.php/business/47470-retail-chinese-food-vendors-launch-services-in-tanzania>

tap Ugandan oil deposits being developed by companies including Total SA of France, China National Offshore Oil Corp. and London-based Tullow Oil Plc.⁴⁰

Gas reserves worth US\$8 billion discovered in Tanzania

Dubai-based Dodsal Group said that it has discovered gas reserves worth an estimated US\$8 billion in Tanzania, which could help lift the eastern African nation's economy. The family-owned conglomerate said it struck 2.7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas deposits at a field in the Ruvu Basin which is located about 50 kilometers west of the country's largest city, Dar-es-Salaam. It began exploring the site in 2009, two years after obtaining the concession rights there.⁴¹

Uganda

Turks to set up operations in Uganda SEZ

ASB Group of Companies, one of the Turkey's largest holdings concerns is to set up operations in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Uganda. The SEZ is located at Kaweweta, Nakaseke district, Northwest of Kampala. This ushers in a critical investment in manufacturing and agribusiness, particularly livestock and meat production in Uganda. The project will accelerate infrastructure development, create 15,000-20,000 jobs, increase productivity, technological transfer, and is projected to cause a GDP growth of the Ugandan economy," Matia Kasaija, the Minister of Finance, said at the announcement.⁴²

India-Africa Relations

Crude price fall lets India scout for oil and gas assets in Africa

India is eyeing oil and gas assets in Africa as the crude collapse makes assets affordable and provides a big opportunity for the energy-hungry economy to secure supplies. State firms, led by Oil and Natural gas Corp (ONGC), have already spent about US\$6 billion in acquiring oil and gas assets in the resource-rich continent over the last few years and plan to enhance their investment as they go along. "India needs a lot of equity oil and so Africa is a natural hot spot for us," Oil Minister Dharmendra Pradhan said at the curtain-raiser of the fourth edition of the India-Africa Hydrocarbons Conference.⁴³

⁴⁰ "Tanzania agrees with Uganda to run oil pipeline to its coast", *Bloomberg*, March 1, 2016, at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-01/tanzania-says-uganda-agrees-to-run-oil-pipeline-to-its-coast>

⁴¹ Dodsal Group discovers gas reserves worth \$8 billion in Tanzania", *The Wall Street Journal*, March 28, 2016, at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/dodsal-group-discovers-gas-reserves-worth-8-billion-in-tanzania-1459171005>

⁴² "Turks eye economic zone set for Uganda", *East African Business Week*, January 10, 2016, at <http://www.busiweek.com/index1.php?Ctp=2&pI=4630&pLv=3&srl=68&spI=107>

⁴³ "India scouts for oil and gas assets in Africa on crude price fall", *The Economic Times*, January 16, 2016, at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016-01-16/news/69816281_1_oil-minister-dharmendra-pradhan-india-africa-summit-equity-oil

Mauritius

Mauritius offers transfer of biofarming technology to India

Eyeing greater economic cooperation with India, Mauritius has offered transfer of biofarming technology to India along with enhanced cooperation in the healthcare sector. Possible areas of cooperation were also identified at the first joint committee meeting between India and Mauritius for the cooperation in Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSME) sector. The areas are in line with the pact signed between the two countries on December 13, 2015. The two sides also agreed to formulate an action plan in the area of coir, khadi and handicraft sectors.⁴⁴

Indian Government clears investment by Mauritius-Based FIL Capital in Cipla subsidiary

Drug major Cipla has been given approval by the Government of India for investment by Mauritius-based FIL Capital Investments in its subsidiary Cipla Health Ltd. The investment is still subject to other conditions precedent and the transfer of company's consumer healthcare business to Cipla Health Ltd. The government approved 10 foreign investment proposals involving an inflow of Rs 607 crore, including Cipla's proposal of Rs 145.22 crore.⁴⁵

Goa Shipyard Limited launches FPV built for Mauritius Coast Guard

In a new chapter in Indo-Mauritian Defence co-operation, Goa government launched a Fast Patrol Vessel (FPV), 'MCGS Victory', designed and built in-house by Goa Shipyard Limited for Mauritius Coast Guard. Chief Minister Laxmikant Parsekar, while addressing a gathering at the launch here on February 29, 2016 lauded the work being done in the shipyard. On the occasion, Mauritius High Commissioner J. Goburdhan highlighted the important role of the vessels, being built at GSL, in safeguarding their vast maritime zone. GSL's Chairman and Managing Director Rear Admiral (Retd.) Shekhar Mital said, "Contract of the vessel was signed on May 17, 2014, while the keel of the vessel was laid on Dec 18, 2014." Launching of first of the series vessel within 14 months of keel laying is a record in itself, he said.⁴⁶

Indian Navy ship joins in Mauritius National Day celebrations

Indian Naval Ship Tabar, a stealth frigate, reached Port Louis in Mauritius on March 10, 2016. It was on four-day visit to participate in the National Day celebrations of the island country on March 12. The ship consisted of a marching contingent in addition to fly-past by Chetak helicopters and performance by the Indian naval band. India and Mauritius have traditionally enjoyed close

⁴⁴ "Mauritius offers biofarming technology to India", *Money Control*, January 22, 2016, at http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/economy/mauritius-offers-biofarming-technology-to-india_5112921.html

⁴⁵ "Cipla gets nod for investment by Mauritius-based FIL Capital in subsidiary", *NDTV*, February 16, 2016, at <http://profit.ndtv.com/news/corporates/article-cipla-gets-nod-for-investment-by-mauritius-based-fil-capital-in-subsidiary-1278175>

⁴⁶ "Goa CM launches FPV built for Mauritius Coast Guard", *The New Indian Express*, March 1, 2016, at <http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/Goa-CM-Launches-FPV-Built-for-Mauritius-Coast-Guard/2016/03/01/article3304763.ece>

and friendly relations. The National Day Celebrations in March 2015 had coincided with the Joint Commissioning of MCGS Barracuda by the Prime Ministers of both countries.⁴⁷

Seychelles

India to gift Seychelles an interceptor boat

In a bid to enhance maritime cooperation with Indian Ocean island nations, India will gift an interceptor boat to Seychelles, as assured by Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his visit to the archipelago in 2015. The interceptor boat, which will be used for patrolling, will be handed over to the Government of Seychelles on January 21, 2016. The boat manufactured by Larsen and Toubro will travel a distance of 1524 nautical miles to Seychelles to be handed over. A similar interceptor boat is used by India to patrol its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).⁴⁸

India, Seychelles conduct 'Exercise Lamitye'

The 7th joint military exercise of Indian Army and Seychelles People's Defence Forces (SPDF) was organised in Victoria from February 15-28, 2016. The joint exercise - Lamitye 2016 - was conducted at Seychelles Defence Academy (SDA). SPDF were represented by 20 personnel from Tazar (Special Forces Unit) and 32 from Seychelles Infantry. The Indian contingent comprised an infantry platoon and representatives from the Special Forces. India and Seychelles have been conducting joint drill since 2001 and 'Exercise Lamitye', which means friendship in Creole (local dialect), is conducted biennially with the aim of enhancing military cooperation and interoperability between the two countries.⁴⁹

Indian Navy aircraft to help surveillance Seychelles' EEZ

Signalling India's deepening naval engagement in the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy has for the first time deployed one of its advanced maritime reconnaissance aircraft to Seychelles for surveillance of the island nation's Exclusive Economic Zone. It is the first such deployment of the Boeing P 8I to a foreign country. According to the Indian Navy, the move is "in accordance with the MoU between the Governments of India and Seychelles". "It is a significant tactical development that India is able to extend this kind of surveillance," said C. Uday Bhaskar, Director, Society for Policy Studies.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ "Indian Navy ship in Mauritius for National Day celebrations", *The Economic Times*, March 10, 2016, at <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indian-navy-ship-in-mauritius-for-national-day-celebrations/articleshow/51347818.cms>

⁴⁸ "Maritime cooperation: India to gift interceptor boat to Seychelles", *The Economic Times*, January 7, 2016, at <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/maritime-cooperation-india-to-gift-interceptor-boat-to-seychelles/articleshow/50611928.cms>

⁴⁹ "India, Seychelles joint military exercise begins tomorrow", *Business Standard*, February 14, 2016, at http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/india-seychelles-joint-military-exercise-begins-tomorrow-116021400684_1.html

⁵⁰ "Navy's aircraft on mission in Seychelles", *The Hindu*, March 21, 2016, at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/navys-aircraft-on-mission-in-seychelles/article8381962.ece>

New Indian coastal radar commissioned by Seychelles

The Seychelles Coast Guard (SCG) has completed installation of a new Indian-made coastal radar system which the government said will be used to protect its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The new surveillance system was commissioned into service by Foreign Affairs Minister Joël Morgan in Victoria in a ceremony on March 21, 2016 that was attended by Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister of State (independent charge), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation and Planning and Defence, and commanders from the Indian Navy, the SCG and the Seychelles People's Defence Force (SPDF). It was ordered from India's Bharat Electronics. The maritime surveillance system has for the first time given the SCG and SPDF the ability to monitor all ship movements transiting through the country's territorial waters while maintaining surveillance to prevent maritime crimes within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).⁵¹

South Africa

Strong demands from India and Africa lifts South Africa 2015 coal exports

Coal exports from South Africa's Richards Bay Coal Terminal (RBTC) rose by 5.7 per cent to 75.4 million tonnes in 2015 helped by demand in Africa and India. Africa's largest coal export facility, a major supplier to Europe and Asia, RBCT had set a target of 75 million tonnes and aims for similar results in 2016. "It's going to be hard to beat 75 million tonnes, because of where prices are sitting this year," Chief Executive Nosipho Siwisa-Damasane told a news conference. Shipments to other countries in Africa and India rose sharply, offsetting a fall in demand from Europe and from China, where RBTC said it did not send a single vessel in 2015. Coal prices have tumbled in recent years due to a glut of supply and weaker demand growth, pushing some producers to curtail activity, sell or shut coal mines.⁵²

South Africa targets one lakh Indian tourists in 2016

South Africa is eyeing around one lakh visitors from India in 2016, as it undertakes a number of initiatives including roadshows to position the country as a preferred destination. South African Tourism, the country's national tourism agency, has launched in India its 13th annual roadshow, an interactive programme planned to increase destination awareness among travel planners in India for this purpose. Currently, business and MICE (Meetings, Incentive, Conferencing and Exhibition) segment constitutes the largest segment of visitors to South Africa followed by leisure.⁵³

⁵¹ "Seychelles Coast Guard commissions new coastal radar", *Defence Web*, March 31, 2016, at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=42913:seychelles-coast-guard-commissions-new-coastal-radar&catid=108:maritime-security&Itemid=233

⁵² "Strong India, Africa demand lifts South Africa 2015 coal exports", *CNBC Africa*, January 19, 2016, at <http://www.cnbcfrica.com/news/southern-africa/2016/01/19/strong-india-demand-lifts-south-africa-coal-exports/>

⁵³ "South Africa eyes one lakh visitors from India in 2016", *The Economic Times*, January 19, 2016, at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016-01-19/news/69900348_1_preferred-destination-slabber-visitors

Tanzania

Bharti Airtel to sell its towers in Tanzania

Bharti Airtel has signed a deal with American Tower Corporation (ATC) for selling some 1,350 of its towers in Tanzania for roughly US\$180 million, as the mobile phone operator takes further steps to reduce debt and turn profitable in Africa. The transaction, signed by Bharti Airtel through its subsidiary, Airtel Tanzania Ltd., is expected to close during the first half of 2016, subject to customary closing conditions and regulatory approvals, the two companies said in a joint statement.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ "Bharti Airtel enters agreement to sell towers to ATC in Tanzania", *The Economic Times*, March 22, 2016, at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016-03-22/news/71732578_1_christian-de-faria-bharti-airtel-congo-b

Call for Contributions

IDSA invites articles, commentaries and book reviews for publication in *Africa Trends*, a quarterly magazine on Africa. Submissions can focus on security, political and economic issues relating to African countries. Articles may focus on analysing bilateral, regional and multilateral developments of strategic significance to India's engagement with African countries.

Articles could be of approximately 2000 words. Commentaries can range between 1,000-1,500 words (excluding footnotes) and book reviews between 600-1,000 words. Guidelines for contributors may be found at: <http://www.idsa.in/africatrends>. Submissions may be emailed to the Editor at idsa.africatrends@gmail.com.

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Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg,

Delhi Cantt., New Delhi - 110 010

Tel.: (91-11) 2671-7983 Fax: (91-11) 2615 4191

Website: <http://www.idsa.in>

E-mail: contactus@idsa.in