


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Editor's Note

As India and Africa gear up to the India-Africa Forum Summit in October 2015, this issue looks at the India-Africa relationship, often mediated by third-parties. In the *cover story*, Pradeep Kumar Gautam casts light on the role of Indians as part of the British Indian Army during World War I in the East African theatre. His findings are based on ongoing archival research on the subject. It also dwells on Africa's peace and security predicament, an important issue for India since India's armed forces participate in UN mandated peacekeeping operations on the continent. In the *commentary*, Saurabh Mishra points to the increasing cooperation between the UN and African Union on matters of peace and security on the continent and explains the current dilemmas of this relationship. The issue also takes note of the India-Africa relationship at the multilateral level in the UN. In the *viewpoint*, Arpita Anant analyses the coming together of India and Africa on the issue of reform of the UN Security Council, and points to the direction for further cooperation on the issue. At a more bilateral level, the *book review* by Saurabhi Mukherjee, of the book titled *India's Engagement with East Africa: Opportunities and Challenges*, points to India's engagement with the East African Community (EAC) on matters of peace, security and development while also placing the relationship in the context of the presence of other external actors, mainly China and Brazil, in the region.

The *newstrack* for this quarter indicates that India is interested in furthering cultural ties with the EAC. In a vivid instance of give and take, while India provided Tanzania with funds for extension of the Lake Victoria water pipeline, Tanzania exported pulses to drought-affected parts of Uttar Pradesh. On the maritime front, India has also inked several agreement with Seychelles, economic and security related, during the visit of the President of the country to India on August 25-27, 2015. It also provided the naval ship for patrolling the coast of Mauritius.

Other important security-related developments on the continent include the Al-Shabaab over-running an AU base in Somalia and US getting more actively involved in fighting the group and Ghanaian universities becoming recruiting grounds for the IS.

We hope you will find the issue an interesting read.

Cover Story

INDIAN ARMY IN THE EAST AFRICAN CAMPAIGN IN WORLD WAR I

During the Great War, seven Indian Expeditionary Forces (IEF) from 'A' to 'G' were employed of which IEF 'B' and IEF 'C' are of interest. In the four year period from 1914 to 1918 nearly 50,000 Indian troops passed through East Africa. At any one time in-theatre there were about 15,000 troops.

PRADEEP KUMAR GAUTAM*



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Introduction

After a lapse of over a hundred years, it is good to recall what happened in the then German East Africa or GEA (now Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi). The British protectorates of Uganda (1894) and British East Africa (1886) in the north and Northern Rhodesia (1893) and Nyasaland (1891) in the south, bordered German East Africa¹. Belgian Congo (now Democratic Republic of Congo) was to the west of German East Africa. Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique) was to the south of Ruma River.

Objective history is best written after a lapse of time when the participants are no more alive and there is no victor or vanquished. The trend of inter - state war has drastically reduced, and today all participating entities of the yesteryears are free countries. Past enemies are now friends.

Unlike the Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, there is no official history of the Indian Armed Forces in the First World War. Recently commenced archival research reveals interesting details about Indian troops in Africa.² During the Great War, seven Indian Expeditionary Forces (IEF) from 'A' to 'G' were employed of which IEF 'B' and IEF 'C' are of interest. In the four year period from 1914 to 1918 nearly 50,000 Indian troops passed through East Africa. At any one time in-theatre there were about 15,000 troops. A total of 2,972 were killed, 2003 wounded and 43 missing or taken prisoners of war taking the total casualties to 5,018 including all ranks.³

Recently commenced archival research reveals interesting details about Indian troops in Africa.

The War

German Protective Force (*Schutztruppe*)

At the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, German East Africa in its Protective Force (*Schutztruppe*) had just over 200 Europeans and less than 2,500 native soldiers called *Askaris* recruited from the tribes such as Bantu, Wahuma, Masia and Zulu. There was limited artillery and other logistic units and as the war progressed, more *Askaris* were recruited and the white population also lent a hand in fighting, as also sailors with their naval guns, whose warships had been either sunk or rendered out of action near the coast. The basic fighting unit was an integrated company which was self contained for foot mobility and small boat for river crossings. 40 year old charismatic bachelor with excellent leadership qualities, Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, was the overall military commander. His grand strategy was to help the war effort in Europe by tying down the maximum number of enemy troops in this "African diversion that would attract Allied military resources".⁴ He relied on leading from the front, mobility, surprise and seizing the initiative. As he was outnumbered and cut off from supply base from Europe, he resorted to "Fabian Strategy"⁵ which avoided direct confrontation, harassing the enemy and cutting him off to exhaust him. In the four years of the war, the commander never surrendered and kept the front mobile by timely withdrawal and evasive action where possible. Three more factors can be attributed to superior performance of the Protective Force (*Schutztruppe*). First, the *Askaris* were hardy warrior-like locals who knew the terrain and were immune to the tropical diseases. The second was that they were operating on interior lines, and third, they were living off the land including getting local labour for defence works/porters. Due to blockade, the Germans also improvised local manufacture of ammunition and military stores. Although few German

There was limited artillery and other logistic units and as the war progressed, more Askaris were recruited and the white population also lent a hand in fighting...

'blockade runners' supply ships managed daringly to reach GEA from Europe, the Germans also resorted to what is the mantra of any guerrilla fighter : "the best quartermaster is the enemy" by capturing supplies, and equipment including that of the Portuguese from Mozambique .

Sequence of Events: IEF 'B' and IEF 'C'

In August 1914 it was decided to send IEF 'B' on an expedition to Dar Es Salam (later diverted to Tanga), and IEF 'C' to safeguard British East Africa (Kenya) by reinforcing the limited troops of the King's African Rifles (KAR) . The embarkation ports were Bombay and Karachi.

IEF were made up of three types of troops- units of Indian Army, Indian State Forces and Indian Volunteers (see Appendix). In brief the operation progressed as under :

(a) **September – December 1914.** IEF 'C' deployed to protect Uganda railways. 29th Punjabis saw first action. Attack on Longido under German control northwest of Kilimanjaro was unsuccessful. With a near 7:1 superiority IEF 'B' commenced a botched up landing after losing surprise at Tanga port in November. It was later disembarked at Mombasa to build up on IEF 'C' in British East Africa. An attack on Jasin (also spelt as Jasini or Yasini), a coastal village was a success.

(b) **1915.** Colonel Raghbir Singh Pathania, Commanding Officer (CO) 2nd J&K Rifles (State Force) was killed in action in January in the defence of Jasin, which was later recaptured by the Germans. To the south, in January, Mafia Island at mouth of delta of Rufiji River was captured. Using four lake steamers a mixed force of 2,000 men (which included 29th Punjabis and 28th Mountain Battery) captured Bukoba on the west coast of Lake Victoria. Minor offensives were undertaken such as on Mbuyuni near Kilimanjaro in July. Meanwhile German patrols kept on raiding Uganda railway

At Salaita, when two South African battalions broke up due to heavy German pressure, firm action by 130th Baluchis saved the day.

track. South Africa after the conquest of German South West Africa (now Namibia) reinforced British East Africa with the intention of invading GEA with a strong South African Expeditionary Force of white troops (barring one mixed unit). At Salaita, when two South African battalions broke up due to heavy German pressure, firm action by 130th Baluchis saved the day.⁶ South African General Jan Smuts became the theatre commander and from March and GEA was invaded through the

Mount Kilimanjaro region; from Nyasaland (now Malawi); from Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia); and across Lake Tanganyika by *Askaris* from the Belgian Congo (now Democratic Republic of Congo).

(c) **1916.** The offensive was first along the railway line and then Germans broke away and did a fighting withdrawal through dense bush. The advancing Indians and South African troops had to suffer miseries due to supplies and lack of administrative support in the tough terrain and climatic conditions. Finally the Germans were slowly pushed till the Rufiji River in the south.⁷ A series of sea-borne forces as left hooks were employed by Smuts on the ports. "Kilwa was captured by 40th Pathans and the 129th Baluchis and the King's African Rifles on 16 October 1916 and Kilbata thereafter. The Indian infantry units were supported by Dera Jat Mountain Battery".⁸

(d) **1917-1918.** It was wrongly declared by General Smuts (who was transferred to London) that the operations had ended. Under Van Deventer (the South African theatre commander), weary and exhausted columns of British, Indian and West African troops, with Belgian Congolese additions, advanced towards south east corner of GEA. With a massive expansion of King's African Rifles (KAR), European and Indian troops were later withdrawn.

Von Lettow-Vorbeck withdrew by crossing Rovuma River into Portuguese East Africa or PEA (now Mozambique). Although Portugal was an ally of the Triple Entente against the Triple Alliance, it was no match to the 2,000 German invaders who captured all their stores and ammunition. The Germans also successfully managed to slip away from a column which had attacked from Nyasaland and PEA ports. The tail end of three Indian units/subunits of artillery, engineers and infantry with logistical units like railways and medical troops remained in East Africa till end of hostilities.⁹

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Just before "an Armistice was being agreed to in Europe Von Lettow-Vorbeck had sprung a surprise on Van Deventer by entering GEA, marching around the north end of Lake Nyasa, and invading Northern Rhodesia".¹⁰ Two weeks after Armistice was signed, Von Lettow-Vorbeck surrendered with his troops at Abercorn, now Mbala, at the southern end of Lake Tanganyika and thus this campaign came to an end. All sides to this war had one thing in common - great privations suffered by all troops engaged: that is disease, weather and terrain.

Appendix¹¹

Total Summary of Three Categories of Units from India for the period 1914-1918

Indian Army

Cavalry- one squadron and one unit

Artillery – four mountain batteries

Sappers & Miners – one company, four railway companies, one pontoon park, one engineer field park, one Photo- Litho section and one printing section

Infantry – 17 units

Indian State Forces(Imperial Service Troops)

Artillery – one mountain battery

Sappers & Miners – one field company

Infantry - seven units

Indian Volunteer Force

One battery, one Maxim company , one machine gun company

¹ S.D. Pradhan, *Indian Army in East Africa: 1914-1918*, National Book Organisation, New Delhi, 1991, p.22.

² Since 2013, the Ministry of External Affairs is supporting 'India and the Great War Centenary Commemoration Project' being undertaken by the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR), United Service Institution of India (USI), New Delhi. This is an international project to reconstruct the history which includes making available archival military records of 13 theatres located in Europe, Africa and Asia.

- ³ Harry Fecitt (authored) , Rana T.S. Chhina (Ed.), *Indian Army and the Great War - East Africa 1914-1919*, USI of India and XPD Division , Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2015.
- ⁴ Ibid, p.5.
- ⁵ S.D. Pradhan, note 1, p.157.
- ⁶ Byron Farwell, *The Great War in Africa: 1914-1918*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 1986, p.253.
- ⁷ Harry Fecitt, note 3, p.14.
- ⁸ Maj Gen Ian Cardozo and Rishi Kumar, *India in World War I: An Illustrated Story*, Bloomsbury, India, 2014, p.26.
- ⁹ Harry Fecitt, note 3, p.21.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Based on Harry Fecitt, note 3.

Commentary

UN-AU COOPERATION IN PEACE AND SECURITY: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

The emergence of the AU as a player in maintenance of peace and security should not mean prioritising regionalism over the true spirit of internationalism that the UN ought to represent. This may need a reform or two on both sides.

Saurabh Mishra*

The United Nations (UN) was envisaged as the guardian of peace and security in the world. Although it has remained involved in peace negotiations as well as maintenance and enforcement of peace in various parts of the world since its inception, a majority of them have been in Africa. The UN has given, and still gives, most of its time and resources (approximately 80 per cent) to the conflict zones in the continent. But, over the period of its existence, the nature and extent of its peace initiatives have changed substantially. Presently, a relatively new organisation, the African Union (AU), is taking the 'lead' in settling disputes and maintaining peace and security in the continent; and the UN works in cooperation with the AU in many dimensions to achieve its purpose and goals.

Rationale for Cooperation: The failures of the UN in the 1990s, particularly in Somalia and other parts of Africa, in establishing peace, led to a rethinking on the strategy for ensuring peace and security. The allegations of the withdrawal of the West from peacekeeping in Africa, ineffectiveness of the UN peace missions, and the African consciousness to resolve its own issues became the drivers of the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter also provides for interaction of the UN with regional arrangements like the AU for maintenance of peace and security, provided their activities are consistent with the "purposes and principles of the United Nations".¹ However, maintaining the supremacy of the UN Security Council (UNSC), it clearly states that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council."² In principle, the provisions are in line with the spirit of cooperation and decentralisation of responsibility; in practice, there are several issues regarding the distribution of authority and legitimacy.

Legitimacy: The UN Charter considers the UNSC as the sole body to act or authorise a 'peace mission' whether on its own or through some regional organisation. Although the AU has organised itself along the lines of the UN as it also has a Peace and Security Council (PSC), the question remains whether it can be an authority outside the UN system to act and authorise missions for maintaining/enforcing international peace. There

There are instances of the UN faltering to act in time or with 'impartiality', pushing the AU to act without authorisation by the UNSC.

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are instances of the UN faltering to act in time or with 'impartiality', pushing the AU to act without authorisation by the UNSC. Technically, according to the UN Charter, such actions are illegitimate or illegal. Such acts may create tensions between the UNSC and the AU PSC. Although the UN is legally the conscience of the world, the AU feels that being a regional organisation it has better understanding and more information about the conflict zones, which can be true as well. But, sometimes UN seems to be more legitimate in its actions as it has a clear set of principles to establish a 'peace mission' and an ability to act as an impartial distant mediator/third party.

Convergence: Both the UN and AU have a common goal of peace and security in Africa. The primary criticism of the UN 'peace missions' in Africa has been that they do not act in a timely and effective manner. The members of the UNSC, especially permanent members, also look to serve their vested interests through these missions. In case of the conflicting parties' opposition to UN force deployment due to the aversion to the Security Council member states or non-African troops, the AU sometimes can be more legitimate and acceptable than the UN. Therefore, the UN has an interest in cooperating with the AU to achieve its goal. Although AU has structurally prepared itself for dealing with emergency situations in the continent, it is weak at the part of funding and logistics. Most of the funds for its peace and security missions come from external sources like the UN, European Union (EU) and the United States (US), etc. Though the African

The UN can be the most legitimate funding source for the AU...

countries also fund the missions through trust funds and emergency conferences initially, ultimately they have to look towards the sources outside Africa. The UN can be the most legitimate funding source for the AU for these missions. Hence, the goals, issues of legitimacy, funding and capability bring the UN and AU to a convergence for cooperation. Another convergence point is that the AU member states

are willing to provide troops for peace missions, while the permanent members or the countries from the West have been dragging their feet to go on a 'peace mission' in Africa until there is an 'interest' to serve. The AU troops fill this gap of troop requirements, while the UN and other external powers provide training, funds, capabilities and logistics. Hence, due to the involvement of politics and vested interests within the Security Councils of both the organisations, different spaces of legitimacy are generated for the two organisations in different cases and stages of the 'peace missions', thereby creating scope for cooperation on the basis of the "adherence to the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage."³ However, according to critics, this very basis might also become source of disagreement between the two.

Divergence: Despite the convergence and mutual complementarity, important differences on principle and implementation of 'peace missions' remain between the two organisations.

First, the UN missions follow three core principles – consent of the parties involved in the conflict, impartiality, and no use of force except for self-defence and defence of the mandate. The UN also

The AU feels that the UN principles delay peace missions and render them ineffective.

expects a positive engagement of the countries in the region of conflict. In contradiction to this posture of the UN, "The AU's peacekeeping posture in Burundi, Darfur and now Somalia points to the emergence of a different peacekeeping doctrine; instead of waiting for a peace to keep, the AU views peacekeeping as an opportunity to establish peace before keeping it."⁴ The AU feels that the UN principles delay peace missions and render them ineffective. While the UN avoids peace

enforcement missions, certain AU troop contributing countries have willingness for such provisions.

Secondly, there are disagreements on the issue of funds. The AU feels that the UN has no consistent and coherent policy for giving funds to the peace missions in Africa. Although the AU can initiate missions in extreme conditions, funds from its member countries only cannot sustain them. The AU ultimately wishes for the transition of these missions to full-fledged UN missions. However, given its principles and the dynamics of the Security Council, the UN remains selective in providing funds for the different AU missions. For example, while the UN funded the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) heavily, it has not done much for the mission in Mali. However, despite AU's demands, UN hesitates in funding AU missions and adopting them as its own missions.

Thirdly, the AU also feels that the permanent members and the advanced countries of the UN practice a 'peacekeeping apartheid' in Africa by not contributing their troops. It is primarily the Asians and African who contribute to the current peace missions in the continent. In effect, the UN members are paying and encouraging the Africans to fight in their own region. In the long run, this hampers the overall internationalist spirit of the UNSC as the cosmopolitan guardian of international peace and security.

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Fourthly, the two organisations have a tussle over the concept, form and command structure of the peace missions. Both want to keep control on these aspects of the missions. The general grievance of the African countries is that the UNSC has a preference for officers from the developed and advanced countries in positions of command and strategy formulation. The AU argues that its member countries have direct stakes in the region by the virtue of their location and contribution of troops. Therefore, they should have a control over the concept, strategy and strength of the missions in the region. However, the UN considers itself legally rightful and entitled to this control due to its authorising powers and funding capabilities.

Instruments of Cooperation

The UN has been cooperating with the AU since its inception through agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs).⁵ Despite a few crucial divergences in principle and other operational aspects, the common goal of maintenance of peace and security and the lack of the AU's capacity to sustain its missions for long bring the UN and AU together for cooperation, although in an inconsistent manner. Therefore, the two organisations, in November 2006, signed a document titled "Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU" (TYCBP) to establish a holistic, comprehensive and systematised edifice of cooperation. The programme was formulated to help effectively deliver on the AU's mandate. Its initial priority was peace and security; later, it focused on other areas as well – institution building, human resource development and financial management; human rights; political, legal and electoral matters; social economic and cultural and human development; and food security as well as environmental protection.

Coordinating with different mechanisms within Africa is a daunting task.

This is a comprehensive programme that includes cooperation with the Regional Economic Communities in Africa (RECs). The framework has a provision of triennial review of the state of cooperation between the two entities. Coordinating with different mechanisms within Africa is a daunting task. Some of the problems identified in the UN-AU cooperation, which the framework and its reviews face, are related to financial and budget management, data collection and statistical analysis, training of personnel within the AU and its peace missions, training programmes for RECs' officials, proper communication and information dissemination between the different bodies of the framework mechanism, lack of expertise within the AU, differences in AU's expectations

and demands and the UN response, differences in the analysis of a situation, differences in positions of the RECs, African UNSC members not necessarily being AU PSC members at the same time, preparedness and effectiveness of the regional standby forces, etc. The ten year framework attempts to deal with all these and formulate a coherent predictable mechanism to enable AU for delivering on its mandate. As highlighted in its triennial reports, there are implementation issues with the framework, but this has brought the level of cooperation between the UN and AU to an unprecedented level. The framework's evolutionary nature tries to address these problems. However, this programme is to end in 2016. Therefore, building on its accomplishments, the UN and AU have jointly proposed a new programme for UN-AU Partnership on Africa's Integration and Development Agendas (PAIDA).⁶

Conclusion

Despite divergences on many issues, the current level of the UN-AU cooperation on peace and security is unprecedented in the history of international 'peace missions'. The engagement will have a long-term impact on the nature and concept of such missions in future. Given the current realities, both the UN and the AU will have to adjust with each other or change in some of their institutional and constitutional aspects. Both might need reforms in their charters elaborating more on cooperation, and harmonising their principles and philosophies on different issues, especially 'peace missions'. Sovereignty, command and control together with sustainable funding would be the primary issues to settle. Currently, the UN has been pragmatic in authorising and legitimising some of the unilateral missions that began without its authorisation, but this cannot go on forever.⁷ The principle of mutual complementarity might, in the long-term, harm the UN in terms of its legitimacy, expertise and penetration to work/act throughout the world. There are also pertinent doubts about 'hybrid missions' being the best practice. Given all these, UN, the guardian of international peace and security in principle, would not remain so in the long-term if it is unable to resolve or narrow down the divergences with the AU soon. The emergence of the AU as a player in maintenance of peace and security should not mean prioritising regionalism over the true spirit of internationalism that the UN ought to represent. This may need a reform or two on both sides.

¹ Article 52(2) of the UN Charter.

² Article 53(1) of the UN Charter.

³ Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, *Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships*, International Peace Institute, New York, April 2013, p.7. Also see: Article 4(iv) and Article 21(1) of the Memorandum of Understanding between AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Regional Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa.

⁴ *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security: Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence*. AU Doc. PSC/PR/2. (CCCVII), January 9, 2012, para 71, p.19.

⁵ For example, the UNSC has helped develop the African Peace and Security Architecture through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the African Peace Facility, both started in 2004. These were done with the help of G8++ and the European Union. There have been several other instruments of AU-UN cooperation. See Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, *Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships*, International Peace Institute, New York, April 2013, p.4.

- ⁶ The Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme (TYCBP) for the African Union, *Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA)*, at <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/advocacy/capacity.shtml> (Accessed on 20 September 2015).
- ⁷ “For better or for worse, the AU and of course the UN have been left to cooperate and legitimise unilaterally initiated peace support operations in the interests of stability.” See: Timothy Otheino and Nhamo Samasuwo, “A Critical Analysis of Africa’s Experiments with Hybrid Missions and Security Collaboration”, *African Security Review*, 16(3), pp.25-39, p. 32. Unilateral peace missions, later authorised by the UN, are known as ‘hybrid missions’.

Viewpoint

INDIA, AFRICA AND UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

At the very least, the decision on text-based negotiations has brought some more legitimacy to the process of reform. However, there is no guarantee yet that Security Council reform is any closer or any less complicated. For Africa and India, the present predicament calls for greater flexibility on both sides to arrive at a common position, but also the maturity to contend with those who have not agreed with the substance and method of reform. As countries become members of coalitions that cater to their multiple identities and interests, this may even require a rethink on the best way forward on the issue of reform.

Arpita Anant*

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) has been an important venue for the coming together of India and Africa. It is here that independent and non-aligned India, with other colonies of the world, including those in Africa, waged a battle for decolonisation, end of apartheid, and a new international economic order. The UN, thus, was the instrument for the destruction of the global colonial order. Several decades on, India and Africa with its 54 countries are still engaged with the UN in several ways, including to reform the very instrument of their deliverance. One of its prime organs, the Security Council (SC), they argue, represents the archaic world order of 1945. Together with several other countries, they seek to make the institution more representative, democratic and effective.

The United Nations (UN) has been an important venue for the coming together of India and Africa. It is here that independent and non-aligned India, with other colonies of the world, including those in Africa, waged a battle for decolonisation, end of apartheid, and a new international economic order.

On September 14, 2015, after several rounds of discussion, the process of Security Council reform received a crucial thrust when the 69th General Assembly (GA) adopted, without a vote, a text that would be the basis for future negotiations on reform of the Security Council.¹ Currently, the main coalitions on the issue of reform in the UN are the L.69 (42 members), the G4 (4 members), the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group (12 core members, 20-30 informal supporters) and the African group (54 African countries represented in the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) by the Committee of Ten (C10) from the five regions of Africa).² India which is the leading country in the L.69, is also a part of the G4, together with Brazil, Germany and Japan.

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Africa's countries are all together in the African Group; and 11 of them are also in the L.69.³ In addition, there are several countries that have submitted their individual proposals.⁴ Other groupings that have a somewhat different position on the issue of SC reform, but have not contributed to the current framework document and have countries from Africa as their members are:

1. The Arab Group of the League of Arab States with Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia in it.
2. The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) with Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Sudan and Suriname. It also has as observers the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), League of Arab States (LAS) and the African Union (AU).
3. The Accountability, Coherence, Transparency (ACT) group (25 members), with Gabon, Ghana and Rwanda.

Africa, India and the current stage of SC Reform

A reading of the text adopted for further negotiation on September 14, 2015 reveals where the countries of Africa and India (African group, L.69, and G4) stand on the five issues identified as integral to Security Council reform.

1. Categories of Membership:
 - Permanent Members: Both G4/L.69 and African Group are in favour of an additional 6 permanent seats. However, African Group was firm on 2 seats for Africa, while G4 and L69 countries have not said so. While G4 and L.69 countries have said that the election of new members will be done by the General Assembly as is the current practice, African Group has not said anything on this in general. The African group has however said that the 2 African members must be selected by AU, which the G4 and L69 have not endorsed.
 - Non-permanent members with a two-year term: G4 would like 4-5 more, L.69 wants 6 more, and the African Group wants 5 members from Africa alone. On election procedure for these seats, L.69 and G4 would like to continue with the current process, while African Group would like the AU to select African members.
 - New categories of seats: Neither G4/L.69 nor the African group have a position on this matter.
2. Regional Representation
 - The African group was particular about having a place for Africa in the larger schema of equitable representation. The G4 however was in favour of cross regional arrangements to better represent the diversity of the General Assembly. It also favoured representation of small and medium sized states as well as the small island developing states (SIDS) in non-permanent category. The L.69 group proposed that smaller countries in the region must have representation in the non-permanent category and that this should be ensured by regional groups.

- Distribution of seats in permanent and non-permanent categories in case of expansion
 - Permanent seats: The African Group as well as G4 and L.69 favour at least 2 permanent seats for African states. In addition the G4 and L.69 also want 2 two seats for Asia-Pacific, 1 for Latin American and Caribbean states and 1 for Western European and other states.
 - Non-permanent Seats: The African Group and L.69 both would like African states to have 2 additional non-permanent seats at all times, while the G4 would like them to have 1-2 seats. The L.69 and G4 would also prefer to have 1 seat each for Asia-Pacific states and Latin American and Caribbean states. The L.69 by itself also supports 1 seat each for East European states, West European and other states and SIDS across regions.
 - Distribution of seats in case of longer term non-permanent seats: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.
 - Distribution of additional two-year non-permanent seats under any expansion model: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.
 - Distribution of seats during the gradual removal of categories: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.
1. Size of an Enlarged Security Council and Working Methods of the SC
- Size of an enlarged the Security Council: In a range of 21-27, the African Group would like the total membership to be no less than 26, the L.69 prefers 27 and the G4, 25 or 26.
 - Working methods of the SC
 - Votes required for decision making: The G4 would like 14/25 or 15/26 affirmative votes for a decision, whereas the L.69 would like 15/27 yes-votes for a decision to be adopted. The African Group has no position on this matter.
 - Presidency of the Security Council: G4 and L.69 groups would like the non-permanent members to hold the presidency of the SC at least once in their tenure. The African group has no position on this matter.
 - Participation of non-permanent members in the work of the SC: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.
 - Privileges of permanent membership: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.
 - Decision making in Subsidiary Bodies: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.
 - Secretariat Capacity: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.
 - Other issues related to working methods: The African group would like adherence to the Charter and prevent discussion on internal situation in a country which is not a threat to international peace and security. In addition, it wishes to limit the role of the Security Council to Charter mandates and ensure non-selectivity and impartiality in

the working of the SC.

- Participation of non-members in the work of the SC: The L.69 group proposes to give full power to such members in all pen-holding resolutions.
- Cooperation between the Security Council and entities outside of the SC: The L.69 group wishes that SC improves its interaction with regional organisations especially the African Union (AU), and help with capacity-building endeavours of the AU.
- Subsidiary Bodies and sanctions: The African group would like the SC to avoid recourse to imposing or extending sanctions for furthering political objectives of any state.
- Agenda of the SC: The L.69 group proposes that the SC should amend its procedure in such a manner that no issue remains on its agenda beyond a certain time.
- Rules of Procedure of the SC: The African group has proposed that the rules of procedure of the SC, which have remained informal, should be formalised for more transparency and accountability.
- Use of Chapter VI provisions: The L.69 group would like all chapter VI measures exhausted before resorting to Chapter VII measures. The African group too would like to see appropriate Chapter provisions used in cases that are not threats to international peace and security, including use of Chapter VI and VIII where appropriate, and using Chapter VII measures as a last resort.

4. The Question of the Veto

- The G4 countries would like the question of veto for new members be decided in a framework of a review. They also favour involvement of other member states in the process of review on the use of veto in certain circumstances.
- The L.69 group advocates that the right to veto be abolished, but as long as it exists it should be extended to all permanent members.
- The African group also advocates that the right to veto be abolished, but as long as it exists it should be extended to all permanent members in the interest of common justice.
- Voluntary limitation/restraint of use of veto: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.
- Mandatory restriction of the use of the veto: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.
- Explaining the use of veto: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.
- Veto trigger mechanism: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.

5. Relationship between the Security Council and the Assembly

- Mandates of the General Assembly and the Security Council: The African group and the L.69 group have both called for the Security Council to not encroach upon the charter mandated functions of the General Assembly and to limit itself to matters of international peace and security. The G4 has no position on this matter.

- Role of the General Assembly: The African group would like to see application of Charter provision that give powers and lay down rules of procedure for the General Assembly to act in urgent matters of peace and security. Neither the L.69 nor the G4 has a position on this matter.
 - Coordination between the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council: The African group, L.69 and the G4 would all like it if there is timely flow of information between the two.
 - Cooperation and communication between General Assembly and Security Council: None of the three groups have a position on this matter.
 - Annual Report and Special Reports of the Security Council to the General Assembly: The L.69 and G4 would like the SC to submit detailed annual and special reports to the Assembly. The African groups adds to this reports on current situations of international concern.
 - Participation and access for members of the General Assembly to the work of the SC: The African group would like all member states to know about positions taken by states and rationale for decisions of the SC. The subsidiary organs of the SC must provide all information to members of the Assembly. The L.69 group recommends that closed door meetings be stopped and non-members be given access to documents and records of the SC. In accordance with the Charter, non-members whose issues are under consideration must be invited to the SC for consultation. Non-member states must also have access to subsidiary bodies of the SC and be allowed to participate in discussions. The G4 would like to see more informal discussions between members and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission as well as Chairs of country-specific committees of the Commission.
 - Public meetings, public briefings and open debates: The African group would like more open meetings on the subject under consideration of the SC. It would also like open presentations of reports of Special envoys or Special Rapporteurs. The G4 would like the Security Council to meet in open format, hold open debates especially on working methods and make more use of informal interactive dialogues. The L.69 has no position on this matter.
 - Consultation with troop and police contributing countries: The African group would like to see more interaction of the SC with the UN Secretariat and consultations with troop contributing countries (TCCs) not only in drawing up of mandate but also during the operations and in changing of mandates. The Working Group of the SC on Peacekeeping Operation must consult TCCs in early stages of mission planning. The L.69 has a similar position on this matter. The G4 would, in addition, like finance-contributing countries to be consulted.
 - Selection and Appointment of the Secretary General: Neither of the three groups have a position on this matter.
5. Any other related matter
- Review: The L.69 would like a review of the situation created by amendments of the Charter. The G4 would like a review to take place every 15 years. The African group has no position

on this matter.

- The process of Charter amendments: The L.69 and G4 would like to present the amendments to the Charter required as a result of a framework resolution for approval by the General Assembly. The African group has no position on this matter.

Africa, India and the long quest for SC reform

In historical perspective, India and the countries of Africa have been together on this matter since 1979, when the first request for expansion of the Security Council since 1963 was made. The quest then was only for expansion of the non-permanent category. Algeria, India and Nigeria were among the 10 countries who submitted a proposal for expansion arguing that the membership of the UN had increased substantially but non-aligned and developing countries were under-represented in the non-permanent category.⁵ The next initiative came on November 23, 1992, when India along with 23 countries of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) sponsored a draft resolution on equitable representation in the Security Council.⁶ The African countries as a part of this initiative were Algeria, Egypt, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia and Zimbabwe. This was revised a bit in December 1992 and supported by 35 countries, including India. The new African entrants were Togo, Uganda and Gabon.⁷ The General Assembly adopted the resolution on December 11, 1992, which, as per the draft resolution, requested member states to submit their comments on the matter, the Secretary General to present a report on the submissions of member states and the General Assembly to continue this discussion in the next (48th) session in 1993.

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By July 1993, 50 countries submitted their views on the subject.⁸ India was indeed there, and had highlighted the falling ratio between the Security Council and the General Assembly from 1:10 to 1:36 in case of permanent members; and from 1:4 to 1:12 in case of non-permanent members. India also proposed certain criteria for membership, opposed rotational permanent membership, and favoured the election of new members by the General Assembly. From among the African nations, there were Gabon, Mauritius, Madagascar and Nigeria. Gabon suggested a relook at Article 27 (3) of the Charter which stipulates the affirmative vote of the P5 for making any change in the membership of the SC. Madagascar made only a general argument in favour of expansion. Mauritius had a very clear proposal of having 12 permanent members and 9 non-permanent members.⁹ In an addendum, three more African countries gave their suggestions. Algeria, proposed increase in non-permanent and permanent membership, inclusion of Africa in both categories, with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) playing a role in electing rotating non-permanent members and changes in the functioning of the Security Council. Libyan Arab Jamhariya made a strong case for expansion of unrepresented continents and regional groups and abolition of veto as it contradicts the principle of collective security. Finally, Sudan expressed the need to do away with the veto, give a rotational permanent seat to the Non-Aligned group and increasing powers of the Assembly to stand up to the SC.¹⁰ In a second addendum, Egypt suggested the addition of non-permanent and permanent seats, articulated the need for transparency and other changes in the working of the SC, a new category of membership to reflect regional realities (or the pre-eminence of regional powers), with two or more rotational seats, and more number of seats for Africa since the OAU had the most members as compared to other regional organisations.¹¹ Ghana made its submission in September 1993 and said that geographical representation in the expanded Security Council is a must and the permanent category must be expanded accordingly;

... on behalf of the League of Arab states, Egypt submitted a memorandum for their adequate representation in proportion to their numbers, given their historical and cultural links.

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As a result of this momentum, an Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) was set up by A/RES/48/26 on December 3, 1993.¹⁶ Given the increase in the issues on the agenda, the Report of the Open-ended Working Group submitted in 1995¹⁷ classified issues under Cluster I (to look at various aspects of expansion of SC)¹⁸ and Cluster II (to look at reforming the ways of working of the SC)¹⁹. Simultaneously, the NAM, which included India and all of Africa's countries at that time, submitted a 10 page proposal for consideration of issues in Clusters I and II.²⁰

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In a first in 1996, the position of the African group was rearticulated as the "African common position", though the substance of the position remained the same - demanding two permanent seats for Africa, nomination by regions and election by general assembly, no third category/rotational seats from a pool of 20.²¹ Developing on its position paper of 1995 on Cluster II issues relating to working and decision making of the Security Council, the NAM recommended that the measures taken thus far were ad hoc and needed to be institutionalised and formally conveyed by the General Assembly to the Security Council.²² In addition, Egypt circulated the text of the Twelfth Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned countries held in New Delhi in April 1997. The NAM insisted on not taking a decision on this issue without arriving at a consensus, and cautioned against unnecessary haste on the matter. The OAU's Harare Declaration submitted by Zimbabwe reiterated the points made earlier, but raised the total seats from 25 to 26, with Africa getting 5 non-permanent seats as compared to 4 suggested in 1993.

In 1998, Egypt requested the OEWG to undertake a thorough study of the legal basis and scope of the veto, since the constitutional basis and clarification of scope of its use had not been adequately done in the Report of the Working Group.²³ Alongside, a submission by Egypt on behalf of the NAM clarified this issue further, saying NAM had wanted limitation on the use of veto institutionalised rather than going by the 35 item list decided on by the General Assembly in 1949.²⁴ On the basis of an OAU decision of June 1998, Senegal presented the formula for selection of the rotational 2 permanent African nations in the Security Council.²⁵ Meanwhile, all the countries came together to stall attempts that were perceived as taking away from the role of the General Assembly,, which in their view had greater sanctity due to its universal membership. The reference here is to the Razali proposal for reform that was tabled in 1998.²⁶ In 2000, NAM requested the working Group to ignore proposals to leave the veto power untouched and argued for a curtailment of the veto power.²⁷

... a submission by Egypt on behalf of the NAM clarified this issue further, saying NAM had wanted limitation on the use of veto institutionalised rather than going by the 35 item list decided on by the General Assembly in 1949.

Following the Millennium Summit, Secretary General Kofi Annan constituted a High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The report of the panel released in December 2004 and titled "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility" proposed two models of a reformed SC.²⁸ Meanwhile, following the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, the African Common Position was tabled as a draft resolution with a proposal to:

- (a) Enlarge the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories and improve on its working methods;
- (b) Accord the new permanent members the same prerogatives and privileges as those of the current permanent members, including the right to veto;
- (c) Grant Africa two permanent and five non-permanent seats in the Security Council and increase its membership from fifteen to twenty-six with the eleven additional seats to be distributed as follows:
 - (i) Two permanent seats and two (additional) non-permanent seats for African States;
 - (ii) Two permanent seats and one non-permanent seat for Asian States;
 - (iii) One non-permanent seat for Eastern European States;
 - (iv) One permanent seat and one non-permanent seat for Latin American and Caribbean States;
 - (v) One permanent seat for Western European and other States;
- (d) Amend the Charter of the United Nations accordingly.²⁹

In September 2007, the OEWG recommended, among other things, the initiation of intergovernmental negotiations (IGN). A four member task force had studied the proposals submitted thus far and recommended that new ways and compromises may be considered since no one proposal had sufficient support from all quarters including through IGN.³⁰ India and the African countries were now parts of newer coalitions such as the L.69³¹, G4³² and the African Group³³, and pushed for the formalisation of the process by initiating the IGN. In September 2008, vide decision 62/557, the General Assembly adopted a resolution by consensus on the need for IGN on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters. The main areas of focus were also outlined:

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- categories of membership;
- the question of the veto;
- regional representation;
- size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the SC; and the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly.

After the launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations in February 2009, member countries

overwhelmingly supported the idea of text-based negotiations. Several existing and new groups submitted their proposals for Intergovernmental Negotiations. In May, Ambassador Zahir Tannin presented a 31-page text based on all inputs received and lists all options given in it.³⁴ In the first revision of this text, suggestions of the African group were incorporated. These were for 2 permanent and 5 non-permanent seats for African countries to be selected by the African Union, veto to all permanent members as long as it exists as a matter of common justice, geographical representation as regional representation to be decided by the AU, 26 member SC, several changes in working methods of the SC.³⁵ The L.69 group wanted the inclusion of provision for review of permanent and non-permanent seats, addressing the issue of non-representation of some regions and less representation of developing countries to be addressed and a closer look at the working methods of the SC. The Non Aligned group wanted to work towards elimination of the veto, support for enhanced and increased African representation in the SC, and changes in the working methods of the SC. G4 felt new permanent members should not exercise veto until the issue of veto is decided in the new framework document; regional representation means equitable geographical representation, 25 member SC, and changes in the working methods of the SC.

By August 2010, the second revision of the text was readied, and these were circulated in a text of February 2011 as third revision. This time, the African group affirmed that African members should be selected by AU and then elected by the General Assembly, the veto as in the first revision, need for African representation, 5 non-permanent seats for Africa, 2 permanent seats for Africa, allowing for special envoy briefings in public except in exceptional circumstances, consulting with Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) for all aspects in peace keeping, wider participation in formal and informal meetings with non-members, formalising the rules of procedures of the SC, preventing extension of sanctions unless it is in interest of international community, avoiding using Chapter VII except as last resort, SC should not take up for discussion an issue that does not constitute threat to international peace, refrain from pursuing political agendas, preventing erosion of powers of General Assembly, presentation of SC special and annual reports to GA, giving information on reasons behind a decision and reasons to act/not act on a particular issue. The L.69 group insisted on a provision for review for the expanded membership, places for under-represented regions and developing countries, enhanced access and transparency with non-members in work of SC, full implementation of Article 31 and 32 of the Charter, involving TCCs in all aspects of Peacekeeping operations. The G4 still said there should be no veto for new members regardless of category, regional representation should mean equitable geographical representation, there should be 1 additional non-permanent and 2 permanent seats for Africa, 2 for developing countries from Asia and 2 from Latin America and Caribbean; SC should meet in public fora and only in exceptional cases in private, hold timely and qualitative briefings for non-members to inform them of references and findings of subsidiary bodies of SC, informal consultations, consult with interested parties, consult with TCCs, finance contributing and mission receiving countries; subsidiary bodies must give information to non-members, implement Articles 31 and 32, forecast of meetings to be shared with members earlier than later, non members should be given draft resolutions for information, presidential statements and other draft documents tabled in the Security Council; Charter separation of powers between SC and GA should be maintained and stay complementary, SC to submit annual and special reports to GA, President of SC to have regular consultation with PGA and President of ECOSOC.

The NAM pushed for curtailing use of veto and moving towards its eventual elimination, support for Africa, transparency, openness and consistency in work of SC, reducing the number of closed meetings and informal consultations; called on the SC to allow for briefings by Special Representatives in public forums (as by Africa group), consult with affected parties, take on board

suggestions of the affected parties (as by Africa group), subsidiary bodies to inform general membership of matters (as by African group), formalise the rules of procedures of the Security Council (as by African group), sanctions to be clearly defined, imposed for a short period and not preventively applied, use of Chapter VII as last resort (as by Africa Group); SC should not take up for discussion an issue that does not constitute threat to international peace (as by Africa Group); improve relationship between GA and SC and stick to their respective mandates; SC to present special and annual reports to GA (as by Africa group), reports should be more analytical and comprehensive.

The multiplicity of proposals led to an impasse, which the L.69 group tried to break by a proposal of September 6, 2011 attempting to arrive on a common ground by agreeing to the African group's demand for veto power. In March 2012, a discussion was arranged to discuss the L.69 proposal. The L.69 representative explained that they supported Africa's claim for permanent seat with veto and suggested consultations with the S5, a group of five small countries, considering similarity of positions.³⁶ The convergence with the L.69 group and a possible common platform was mentioned by the President of the C.10, which represents the AU. The tension between L.69 and G4 position on veto, especially since the L.69 has some G4 members, was pointed out by Egypt. In April, 2013 an updated third revision was submitted to the PGA.

The multiplicity of proposals led to an impasse, which the L.69 group tried to break by a proposal of September 6, 2011 attempting to arrive on a common ground by agreeing to the African group's demand for veto power.

Further, groups like the LAS and the OIC, which had member states from Africa also, came up with position papers from time to time. The LAS submitted a working paper in May 1997 (based on a resolution of the League taken in September 1993), in which they supported the position of NAM on working methods and most other issues. They asked for 2 non-permanent seats and 1 permanent seat for Arab countries which would be rotational, to be implemented in consultation with the Asian and African regional groupings.³⁷ The League of Arab States as well as those states who are members of the NAM said that, if expanded, the group of Asian states should get 2 permanent seats on a rotational basis.³⁸ In the first revision of the text, the OIC asked for adequate representation for the Islamic Ummah, developing countries and regional organisations, while the Arab group reiterated the need for Arab representation. In the second revision, they repeated these proposals, while the OIC also called for transparency in the working of the SC and the SC not encroaching upon GA prerogatives.

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Recounting the Perplexities

While the attempt to have text-based negotiations to get clarity on the positions of countries has certainly been achieved with countries contributing to the framework document, these positions reveal the difficulty of arriving at a common ground. Analysing the Africa-India dyad on this issue, and its relation with other groups of which the African countries are members, is replete with instances of complexities involved in the process. Some among the many perplexities are highlighted below, first at dyadic level and then on how they relate to other coalitions or individual countries outside the dyad, both category-wise.

First, on the issue of categories of membership, at the dyadic level, how would the G4 and L.69 reconcile to the African group's insistence that the AU be the arbiter in choosing the African

permanent and non-permanent members for the SC, rather than their preferred mode of election by the General Assembly? Assuming that they do, how will they deal with those opposed to having any additional permanent seats (Ireland, Lichtenstein and Panama)?

Second, on the question of regional representation, the African group has spelt out that it would like Africa to have two seats each in the two categories. The G.4 and L.69 however seem to have a preference for cross-regional and small country representation, especially in the non-permanent category. Will the African group agree to this? Will the African group as a whole support the G4/L.69 proposals for regional representation? Assuming they do, would the three groups come together for instance to reject questions related to distribution of seats in case of longer term non-permanent seats (proposed by Ireland and Lichtenstein), distribution of additional two-year non-permanent seats under any expansion model (proposed by Montenegro, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland Serbia and Ukraine) and distribution of seats during the gradual removal of categories (proposed by Panama)?

Third, on the question of the size of the expanded Security Council, within the dyad, whose number preference will eventually prevail, though the difference in sizes proposed falls in a narrow range of 25-27? Outside of the dyad, how will they convince Montenegro that a 21-member SC is too small? On the more serious question of the working methods of the SC, two of the groups have made some proposals that do not overlap with the other. For instance, the African group has proposed that the SC should play a non-political and Charter-mandated role. On the other hand the L.69 group proposed that non-members should be allowed to vote in all pending decisions and the SC should deal with every issue in a time-bound manner. Will they come together on this? There are instances where the proposals of the G4 and L69 overlap such as the issue of presidency rights of non-permanent members. What position will the other countries in the African group take on this issue? There are instances where L.69 proposals overlap with African group proposals such as the use of appropriate charter provisions (Chapter VI, VII or VIII) in particular crises. Would the G4 concur with this? Assuming convergence between them, outside of the dyad, the challenges may not be many as most opinions are for more transparency of the SC and for its better relations with other organs of the UN system.

Fourth, on the question of the veto, within the dyad, the G4 group is for a review of the veto before the new members are given veto powers. The L.69 and African group favour veto powers for all or none. Where does India really stand on this issue? Assuming they resolve this matter, how will they deal with the proposal of not granting veto powers to new permanent members (Australia, Chile, Ireland, Singapore, and UK)? Again, how will countries of the dyad that are not in the G4 respond to proposals for restraint on uses of veto in instances of mass atrocities? (Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ukraine, and several others).

Fifth, on the subject of the relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council, there is a great deal of convergence within the dyad as the emphasis is on more communication between the two bodies, their respective presidents, open debates and substantive consultations with troop contributing countries regarding peacekeeping operation starting with the setting of their mandates. Similarly, proposals of countries outside the dyad too are convergent.

Sixth, on other related matters, within the dyad, the G4 and L.69 groups would like the General Assembly to approve the required amendments to the Charter. Would other countries in the African group agree to this? They would also like a review of the amendments, though the duration for such a review is not agreed upon. Again, will the African group agree to this? Outside of the

dyad, there are no substantially different suggestions on this matter.

Finally, common to all these dilemmas is the added nuance that India has taken some positions as part of the G4 and some others as part of the L.69. On the question of regional representation, for instance, while India as part of G4 favours cross-regional representation, as part of L.69 it favours regional groups to ensure representation of smaller states. Will India be able to convince the others in the G4 to endorse the L.69 proposal or indeed the others in L.69 to favour the G4 position? Similarly, how will countries that are part of the African group as well as the L.69 vote? Will they favour the African group proposal for AU arbitration of the election of African members or the L.69 proposal of following the present practice of election by the General Assembly?

Assuming all of this is resolved, they would have to start contending with those who have not participated in the IGN process, and that is a significant number. Importantly, three of the five permanent members whose yes-vote will be an essential for the reform of the Security Council³⁹ have not accepted the process of text-based negotiations.⁴⁰

Persistent Differences and the Continuing Conundrum of SC Reform

What emerges quite clearly from the discussion above is that, starting from 1992, as countries who wanted expansion and reform of the SC also became part of emerging groupings other than the Non-Aligned Movement, though not necessarily breaking away from it, the number of issues on the reform agenda increased. Also, some differences have remained on the board for a long time. First is the difference in understanding the object of equitable representation. While India has remained steadfast on equitable representation for developing countries, Africa's countries have come to justify regional representation. As part of OIC and LAS, they also seem open to consideration of a religious or cultural criteria within developing countries. Second is the issue of veto. Formally, India is committed to not having veto powers for new permanent members to begin with, however, Africa's countries are firm on having veto powers. Third is the process of election of new members. While India continues to favour election by the GA, Africa favours a two-step process with a selection by the AU coming before an election by the GA. On the methods of working of the SC, there are not many serious differences.

At the very least, the decision on text-based negotiations has brought some more legitimacy to the process of reform. However, there is no guarantee yet that Security Council reform is any closer or any less complicated. For Africa and India, the present predicament calls for greater flexibility on both sides to arrive at a common position, but also the maturity to contend with those who have not agreed with the substance and method of reform. As countries become members of coalitions that cater to their multiple identities and interests, this may even require a rethink on the best way forward on the issue of reform. The two sides can use the consensus achieved thus far and the goodwill enjoyed by them in other coalitions and/or individual countries in them to do so.

¹ "General Assembly Adopts, without Vote, 'Landmark' Decision on Advancing Efforts to Reform, Increase Membership of Security Council", September 14, 2015 at <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ga11679.doc.htm>, (Accessed on December 1, 2015).

² For summaries of their positions see Lydia Swart, "Timeline UN Security Council Reform 1992- November 2015", *Centre for UN Reform Education*, pp. 1-9, at <http://centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/>

[Timeline%20November%202015%20final.pdf](#), (Accessed on December 1, 2015). The C10 consists of Algeria, Congo Brazzaville/Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia.

- ³ In 2007, when the grouping came together, nine African countries in L.69 were Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Liberia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles and South Africa.
- ⁴ For their inputs to the framework document see Annex, "Submissions of the member states to the Framework Document", General Assembly of the United Nations, President of the 69th Assembly (PGA), Letters, "Intergovernmental Negotiation on Security Council Reform", July 31, 2015, at <http://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/11/Security-Council-reform-IGN-31-July-2015.pdf> (Accessed on October 4, 2015).
- ⁵ A/34/246, November 14, 1979. The other countries were Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Guyana, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. They argued that "the global average of the number of countries represented by one non-permanent seat in the Security Council is 14.7. The number of Asian countries represented by one non-permanent member is 18.5. The corresponding figure for African States is 16.3, for Latin American States, 14, for the West European and other States 9.11 and for Eastern European States 10. This state of affairs constitutes an under-representation of non-aligned and developing countries on one of the principal organs of the United Nations. So request to amend the Charter must be taken up by the 34th General Assembly."
- ⁶ A/47/L.26, November 23, 1992. The other countries associated with the initiative were Bhutan, Brazil, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Japan, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Paraguay, Venezuela and Vietnam.
- ⁷ A/47/L.26/Rev.1, December 9, 1992. Other new countries associated with the initiative were Barbados, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, Jamaica, Jordan, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Peru.
- ⁸ A/48/264, July 20, 1993.
- ⁹ Permanent: Americas - 2, West Europe and Other States Group - 4, East Europe - 1, Africa - 2, Asia - 3. Non-permanent: Africa and Asia - 4, East Europe - 2, Latin America and Caribbean - 2 and West Europe and Other States Group - 1.
- ¹⁰ A/48/264/Add.1, July 26, 1993.
- ¹¹ A/48/264/Add.2, August 27, 1993.
- ¹² A/48/264/Add.3, October 4, 1993.
- ¹³ A/48/264/Add.4, November 12, 1993.
- ¹⁴ A/48/264/Add.5, November 30, 1993. The proposition was that: (a) The membership of the Council should be increased from 15 to 25. Five of these will be the present permanent members while the remaining 20 will be composed as follows: Africa (6), Asia (5), Latin America and the Caribbean (4), Western Europe (3) and Eastern Europe (2); (b) The application of Article 27, paragraph 3, should be limited to action under Chapter VII of the Charter; (c) By virtue of their economic might and their ability to assume increased obligation, Germany and Japan should become permanent members against seats allocated to their geographical groups; (d) Africa should be granted two permanent seats against the six seats; (e) Latin America and the Caribbean should be allocated one permanent seat against the four seats; (f) Asia, which already will have had China and Japan as permanent members, should be allocated an additional permanent seat against the five allocated to them; (g) The details of the agenda items for discussion in the Security Council should be published in the Journal of the United Nations as is done with the General Assembly;
- (h) The reports of the Security Council to the General Assembly, in compliance with Article 24, paragraph 3, should be more comprehensive and analytical to enable the General Assembly to discharge its duties under Article 11 of the Charter.
- ¹⁵ A/43/264/Add.8, March 3, 1994.
- ¹⁶ Lydia Swart, n.2.
- ¹⁷ Report of the Open-ended Working Group, A/49/47, September 15, 1995.

- ¹⁸ This cluster would deliberate on the principles for the expansion of Security Council membership; size and composition of the permanent membership; size and composition of the non-permanent membership; new categories or new types of membership, and the qualifications of and modalities for the selection of members of each of these categories or types; the overall size of the expanded Security Council; voting procedure in the Security Council, including the question of the veto; and the question of periodic review.
- ¹⁹ This cluster would deliberate on measures taken and practices adopted by the SC to enhance its transparency and working methods and their streamlining, expansion or possible institutionalisation; the retention, modification or finalisation of the SC's provisional rules of procedure; the briefings by the SC Presidency; the enhancement of mechanisms for information-gathering and analysis; wider consultations with concerned or interested parties; increased consultations between the SC and troop-contributing States; the relationship of the Security Council to other United Nations organs, including the reports of the Security Council to the General Assembly.
- ²⁰ A/49/965, September 18, 1995.
- ²¹ A/50/Add. 1, September 9, 1996.
- ²² A/51/47, 1997, Annex.
- ²³ A/52/47 (Supplement No 47), Annex XIII, 1998.
- ²⁴ The Question of Veto, Egypt Working Paper, Annex VII, NAM paper of March 27, 1996, A/50/47/Rev.1, 1998.
- ²⁵ A/52/47 (Supplement No 47), Annex XXIV, 1998.
- ²⁶ Lydia Swart, n.2.
- ²⁷ A/55/47, Annex XIX, 2001.
- ²⁸ Ibid. "Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas..." and "Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year nonpermanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas....", p. 2.
- ²⁹ A/59/L.67, July 18, 2005.
- ³⁰ A/62, 47, 2008.
- ³¹ "Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters", September 14, 2007, at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/61/L.69/REV.1&Lang=E (accessed on December 28, 2015). The countries included Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Burundi, Cape Verde, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Liberia, Mauritius, Nauru, Nigeria, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
- ³² Global Policy Forum, "Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters", July 6, 2005, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/0706g4resolution.pdf>, (accessed on December 28, 2015). The G4 resolution was also supported by Afghanistan, Belgium, Bhutan, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, France, Georgia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Kiribati, Latvia, Maldives, Nauru, Palau, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Ukraine.
- ³³ Global Policy Forum, Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters, July 14, 2005, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/0718auresolution.pdf>, (accessed on December 28, 2015). The resolution was sponsored by 43 African countries. Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
- ³⁴ Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Letter dated May, 10, 2010, at https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Afghanistan_Letter_from_Amb_Tanin_May_10_2010.pdf, (Accessed on

December 20, 2015).

- ³⁵ Letter dated May 26, 2010. https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Afghanistan_Letter_from_Amb_Tanin_May_26_2010.pdf, (Accessed on December 20, 2015).
- ³⁶ L.69 Statement in the 8th Round of IGN, March 13, 2012, <http://www.centerforunreform.org/sites/default/files/L69%20Statement%20delivered%2013%20March.pdf>, (Accessed on December 20, 2015).
- ³⁷ A/51/47, Annex.
- ³⁸ A/52/47 (Supplement No 47), 1998.
- ³⁹ Article 108 reads thus: Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. See Charter of the United Nations, Chapter XVIII, Amendments, at <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-xviii/index.html>, (Accessed on December 12, 2015).
- ⁴⁰ See the letters of representatives of US, Russia and China in Annexes to the letter of PGA, n.4.

Book Review

Dr. Nivedita Ray, *India's Engagement with East Africa: Opportunities and Challenges*

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Sourabhi Mukherji*

India's Engagement with East Africa: Opportunities and Challenges is a fresh, detailed and modern analysis of India's relations with East Africa. The book comprises of 5 chapters covering a variety of themes like economic linkages, diaspora relations, and security challenges, among others. The sources used vary from numerous scholarly articles to official reports and era-relevant books, although the author has not relied much on news media sources.

Nivedita Ray attempts to make this a relevant piece of literature by identifying from the get go the new drivers of engagement between India and East Africa and moving beyond the old rallying points of anti-colonialism and the Non-Aligned Movement. The *Introduction* mentions some of the key issues that are of interest to India like emerging markets, oil, piracy, terrorism etc. and also poses some important questions regarding how India can and should conduct its engagement with East Africa. This chapter is also used by the author to begin advocating partnership as the new model of engagement. The introduction is very helpful for context but it would have benefitted from some much needed copy-editing.

What is interesting in this chapter though is that Ray also wants to investigate whether the expectations of the East Africa Community (EAC) are being met with these new forms of engagement being embraced- and not subject the topic to a purely clinical assessment.

In Chapter One, titled "*India and East Africa Partnership: Historical Experiences and Current Realities*", the author makes a relevant observation that relations have moved onto a pragmatic phase and that the 2008 India-Africa Summit was a turning point. She begins with an overview of the region and clarifies that by "East Africa", she specifically means Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, and not the other eastern Horn of Africa states like Eritrea and Somalia. Then follows a brief country-wise description of the recent geopolitical developments, security environment, economic growth etc.

In this chapter, there are undertones of the author never letting the reader forget that the very same things that are attracting India to trade with East Africa, are attracting the rest of the world as well. Increased economic activity (Africa's share of India's global trade increased from 5.8% in

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2002-03 to 8% in 2006-07) is bolstering Indian efforts to increasingly link economic diplomacy in Africa to its economic requirements. The author also seems to agree with those experts who believe that East African oil will overtake that of the Middle East. While such a development is unlikely anytime soon, the author maybe onto something in that East African oil maybe easier and safer to engage with.

Apart from discussing why East Africa seems attractive to India, this chapter also addresses what it is about India as a partner that is attracting East Africa. This region has suffered a bad track record of dealing with Western aid and double standards in development-related engagement. India's experience as a colony and rising economic power can therefore be a more valuable set of lessons than Western contribution. Apart from having democratic institutions, it is India's image of a supporter of agriculture, SMEs, IT, biotech, green revolution etc. that attracts Africa to India, according to the author. Such sections of the book tend to pitch India as the better, more honest, respectable and reliable trade and development partner to have, as compared to the West. And this has been substantiated to quite an extent.

Chapter Two, titled "*India and East Africa: Development Cooperation*", is strictly devoted to the development cooperation between India and East Africa. The author reiterates the South-South cooperation factor driving engagement and development programmes by emerging powers like China, India and Brazil in the region.

The aspect of development cooperation in Indian foreign policy stems from the Panchsheel doctrine and is characterized by key components like self-reliance. The author argues that it was the 2008 India-Africa Summit in New Delhi that was a milestone in the relationship between these two regions and marked a renewed Indian focus on East Africa. Ray further attempts to give a thorough explanation of the Indian institutional mechanisms and nature of development assistance given to East Africa of which the main instruments include Lines of Credit and traditional technical assistance managed by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, as well as the major Indian initiative of the Pan-African e-Network of 2009 aimed at bridging the digital divide, capacity building, development of students, and also support for e-governance, connectivity for telemedicine etc. The author stipulates that while India tries to consolidate development linkages throughout East Africa, it does not instruct, impose or even demand certain approaches or projects, but simply offers to contribute. This is how Ray intelligently and gradually reveals the reasons for India's successful East Africa engagement. She underscores the point that India's approach and the foreign policy objectives underlying its development assistance have been different from that of traditional donors; and this is exactly what she set out to do in the beginning of this book.

Chapter Three is titled "*India-East Africa Economic Linkages: Role of Indian Private Sector*", which is something the author touched upon in the previous chapter of development assistance. A separate analysis is required and nicely undertaken because of the very noticeable presence of the Indian private sector in East Africa. The author first addresses the factors promoting the India-East Africa economic linkages. Major events have been organized to review the progress made and Government-to-Government involvement has grown even more since the India-Africa Forum Summits of 2008 and 2011. The author highlights the crucial role played by the EXIM Bank (Indian Export-Import Bank) and that Indian private enterprise and state-owned organisations work closely in East Africa. However the author says we are yet to see whether this will lead to sustainable development of East Africa or not. Ray also argues that although India's scale of investment is much lesser than China's, its historical presence in the region has enabled a much smoother and less controversial involvement today, as opposed to that of China.

Chapter Four is called "*Indian Diaspora in East Africa as Heritage Resource*" and it addresses the presence of the Indian diaspora in East Africa and how in recent years, these Diasporas are starting to be treated as resources and assets to be mobilized. The chapter first discusses the Indian diaspora as a heritage resource (linkages with local identity, languages, cultures, their new roles and status in their host countries etc.); and then whether it has the potential to promote and further India's engagement with East Africa. The author essentially describes what motivated those Indians who came by choice starting from over 2 millennia ago, as well as those who were brought over by the colonizers. The economic crisis in India in the 1930s and the economic boom after World War II further drew Indians to East Africa where there were opportunities in government service, commerce, crafts, retail etc. as well as expansion of educational facilities. She also describes how the Indian population in East Africa grew over time. However episodes like the expulsion of Indians from Uganda, Kenyan discrimination, Tanzanian economic stagnation etc. reduced Asian populations in this region. Ray argues that Indian communities in East Africa have tended to invite racial animosity because while economically integrated, they were socio-culturally aloof. Therefore it remains to be seen how exactly this diaspora will be used as an asset. From a strategic perspective, the author argues that the fact that the Indian diaspora is deeply entrenched in East Africa and knows its way around is a huge advantage over other players in the region like China and the West and is also a way to foster sustainable partnerships. However, when analysing the practicalities of mobilising the diaspora as a resource, the author argues that there is a lack of policy level engagement by the Indian government.

Chapter Five, "*Security Challenges in East Africa: India's Cooperation for Stability*", looks at the India-East Africa relationship in light of the latter's changing security landscape. New kinds of security threats today are causing the international community to feel vested in domestic conflicts and therefore engage more frequently. However, India has also been contributing to peace in Africa in its own capacity. With a lot of investment and other efforts made in the East Africa region, India has a stake in helping maintain long-term peace and security in the region. This is also relevant since coastal East Africa is a part of the Indian strategic maritime frontiers- nearly 89% of India's oil is supplied via sea routes and protecting sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean is crucial. The author discusses some of the areas where India has been cooperating with East Africa. One is maritime security with a focus on combating piracy, especially that of Somali pirates. The Gulf of Aden and Straits of Malacca are particularly under threat which affects India's trade and position as a future trading superpower. There are also opportunities to work together: the author cites capacity building as a potential area of cooperation in order to enhance peace operations capabilities in East Africa and then goes on to enumerate the ways in which this cooperation can take place.

The author presents the Indian engagement activities in the region in an unbiased manner, in that it covers in great detail what the India government has done till date, but also analyses the various challenges and weaknesses in its engagement and highlights issues of interest to both India and the EAC. Although, in some sections of the book, the author tends to overestimate the degree and effectiveness of the engagement till date- just because an initiative or programme has been decided, does not mean that it will follow through. In the Indian diaspora chapter, the author only focuses on the positive contribution of Indians to East Africa. However there is not a single mention of a negative or criminal involvement of any section of the Indian diaspora- which is unrealistic. If any analysis is truly to be undertaken of a particular community's involvement or entrenchment in a foreign environment, all aspects of their involvement must be discussed, even if it is uncomfortable for the country of origin.

The book's main merit though is that while the author's expertise and obvious skill with nuanced analysis come across, the reader does not need to be a specialist in the subject in order to read and appreciate this book. The relatively coherent narrative, cogent arguments and strong use of examples aid Ray's attempt to accomplish the aim of the book. It also adds to the current body of literature on India-Africa engagement and will be useful not just to Indian officials and scholars working on this subject but also to their counterparts in East African states who can read this book to better understand the Indian elements in their economies, politics and societies, as well as their past and future involvement.

The sheer amount of detail and evidence is impressive and the book is very well organised and presented- all in less than 200 pages. This has resulted in a book that is not just a starting point for further reference, but also a detailed guide to almost anything and everything Indian about East Africa.

News Track

Conflict and Security

Botswana

Confusion over Border demarcations raises tension between Botswana and Namibia

Namibia is on the verge of a diplomatic fallout with Botswana over perpetual arrests, and sometimes shooting, of Namibians by that country's armed forces – Namibia's diplomat to Gaborone said this week. Mbapeua Muvangua was reacting to the latest incident last weekend when about 14 Namibians were captured by members of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) over suspected illegal fishing at Maunga, in the Kapani area of the Zambezi Region. The incident angered many Namibians, some of whom blamed the government for supposedly showing little, if any, willingness to engage with its Botswana counterparts over habitual borderline confrontations. But Muvangua, a former chief of protocol at State House, believes relations between the two nations are not acrimonious, saying there is simply some confusion over border demarcations between the two countries. The two nations have maintained cordial relations despite a spat in the 1990s over what Botswana called Sedudu Island, which in Namibia was referred to as Kasikili Island. The two countries each claimed the island was part of its territory, but the International Court of Justice ruled in 1999 that it belongs to Botswana.¹

Cote d'Ivoire

Ghana drags Cote d'Ivoire to the ITLOS over maritime boundary dispute

Ghana has filed a detailed memorial urging the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to ward off Cote d'Ivoire from disputed oilfields. The memorial (statement of case) was filed on September 4, 2015, thereby making it possible for Ghana to meet the deadline. The Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Marietta Brew Appiah-Opong, in an interview with the Daily Graphic in Accra, said "we have met the deadline of September 4, 2015 and I am glad the team worked round the clock to meet the timeline". Ghana went to the ITLOS in September 2014, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), seeking a declaration that it has not encroached on Cote d'Ivoire's territorial waters. It filed its suit based on Article 287 Annex VII of the 1982 UNCLOS. Cote d'Ivoire in February 2015 filed for preliminary measures and urged the tribunal to suspend all activities on the disputed area until the definitive determination of the case, dubbed: "Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean." But the Special Chamber of the ITLOS on April 25, 2015 declined to suspend production activities in the disputed area with the

¹ "Muvangua plays down tension with Botswana", *New Era*, July 3, 2015, <https://www.newera.com.na/2015/07/03/muvangua-plays-tension-botswana/>

explanation that “in the view of the Special Chamber, the suspension of ongoing activities conducted by Ghana in respect of which drilling has already taken place would entail the risk of considerable financial loss to Ghana, and its concessioners and could also pose a serious danger to the marine environment resulting, in particular, from the deterioration of equipment”.²

Ghana

Ghana witnessing Islamic State recruitment in universities

Ghana’s authorities are investigating several universities over links to suspected recruitment for the so-called Islamic State (IS), officials say. IS agents recruited students after urging them to join radical online forums, National Security Coordinator Yaw Donkor told state media. Mr Donkor confirmed that two Ghanaians had travelled to join IS; these are the first cases that have been reported. Ghana has so far been unaffected by Islamist militancy. The recruits had travelled through Burkina Faso or Nigeria, before receiving training at a camp in Niger, and then making the onward journey to Turkey or Syria, the National Security Coordinator said. Mohammad Nazir Nortei Alema, a 25 year old who studied geography at the prestigious Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, was confirmed as one of those who had joined IS. The radical group has established a presence in Africa, with militant groups in Nigeria, Egypt and Libya pledging allegiance to it and carrying out bombing campaigns in its name.³

Kenya

Kenyan convicted for funding terrorists, sentenced to 15 years in US prison

A Kenyan man was sentenced to 15 years in prison on August 28 by a judge in Miami after pleading guilty of funneling US\$11,600 to US-designated terrorist organisations in Africa and the Middle East. Mohamed Hussain Said, 27, was sentenced for conspiring to provide material support to al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in Iraq/Nusra Front and al-Shabaab. Said was arrested along with Gufran Ahmed Kauser Mohammed, a 31-year-old naturalised US citizen born in India, in Saudi Arabia in August 2013 and turned over to the US authorities. A 15-count indictment alleged they used online chatrooms popular with Islamic extremists to help fund and recruit fighters for Nusra Front, which is fighting to topple President Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria. His co-conspirator Mohammed was sentenced to 15 years in prison and 10 years of supervised release in November 2014 after pleading guilty to the charge in July the same year. The case was prosecuted in Miami in the Southern District of Florida because some of the wire transfers were sent to a Florida-based undercover agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.⁴

² “Maritime boundary dispute between Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire: Ghana files statement of case”, *Graphic Online.com*, September 8, 2015, <http://graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/49078-maritime-boundary-dispute-between-ghana-cote-d-ivoire-ghana-files-statement-of-case.html>

³ “Ghana investigates Islamic State recruitment in universities”, *BBC News*, August 28, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34084468>

⁴ “Kenyan sentenced to 15 years in US prison for funding Al-Shabaab”, *Standard Digital*, August 29, 2015, at <http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000174625/kenyan-sentenced-to-15-years-in-us-prison-for-funding-al-shabaab>

Kenya releases Norwegian ship after UN arms row

A Norwegian ship detained in Kenya's Mombasa port for more than a week on suspicion of carrying drugs and illegal weapons has been released. The UN says the arms were part of legitimate consignment for its mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Drugs tests carried out on a substance found around some of the UN vehicles were negative, the police said. The vehicles were allowed to be reloaded on board before the ship left, but the police have retained the arms. The rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, which were among the weapons found inside the UN vehicles, would be delivered under Kenyan escort to Indian peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mombasa County police commander Francis Wanjohi said. He said that it would be too dangerous for the MV Hoegh Transporter to continue its journey, because of the threat of piracy, if it was common knowledge that there were weapons aboard. The ship had been sailing from Mumbai in India, but its final destination is unknown.⁵

Nigeria

Half a million children internally displaced due to Boko Haram Crisis

Half a million children have fled attacks by the Islamist group Boko Haram over the past five months, the UN children's agency says. UNICEF says this brings the total number of displaced children in Nigeria and neighbouring countries to 1.4m. Tens of thousands are suffering from acute malnutrition and some of their camps have been affected by cholera. Boko Haram attacks have spiked after it was driven out of territory it held by a regional military offensive. "In northern Nigeria alone, nearly 1.2m children - over half of them under five years old - have been forced to flee their homes," UNICEF said in a statement. Another 265,000 children have been uprooted in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, it said. BBC Nigeria correspondent Will Ross says getting help to these remote, insecure areas is extremely difficult. UNICEF is treating malnourished children and providing clean water. It is also helping tens of thousands of children continue their education. But the organisation says it has received only a third of the \$50m (£32m) it needs for its work in the Lake Chad region, creating a shortfall in measles vaccinations and other aid.⁶

Rwanda

UK court dismisses Rwanda spy chief's "war crime" case

A UK court has rejected a bid to extradite General Karenzi Karake, Rwanda's spy chief, to Spain to stand trial for his alleged role in massacres after the 1994 genocide. General Karake was on bail in the UK following his arrest in June 2015 on a warrant issued by Spain. His arrest strained diplomatic relations between the UK and Rwanda. A Spanish judge indicted Karake in 2008 for alleged war crimes. The UK ruling has been welcomed by Rwanda's Justice Minister Johnston Busingye. General Karake had been the victim of "an unjust case", he said. Rwanda's Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo said she was "delighted" that Karake was returning to Rwanda.

⁵ "Kenya frees Norwegian ship from Mombasa after UN arms row", *BBC News*, September 26, 2015, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34370272>

⁶ "Nigeria's Boko Haram crisis: Half a million children 'flee in five months'", *BBC News*, September 18, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34289474>

For an extradition to be made following a European arrest warrant, the alleged offence must be against the law of both the prosecuting country (Spain) and the country of arrest (UK). There is, however, a list of 32 offences for which dual criminality is not required; and “war crimes” is not on the list. It appears that Karake’s defence team successfully argued that he was facing war crimes charges in Spain, and so “dual criminality” did not apply. In addition, Karake cannot be charged for war crimes committed in another country under UK law, as he can be in Spain.⁷

Paris prosecutors ask court to drop Rwanda genocide case

Two decades after Father Wenceslas Munyeshyaka was charged with genocide and torture, Paris prosecutors have asked for the case against the Rwandan priest to be dropped. Munyeshyaka stands accused by authorities in both Rwanda and France of taking part in the mass slaughter of Tutsis that erupted in April 1994. The Catholic priest has lived in France since 1995 after fleeing his country and has refused repeated calls to return to Rwanda, while French authorities have declined to extradite him. Munyeshyaka was charged by a French judge in July 1995 with genocide, torture, mistreatment and inhuman and degrading acts. He is accused of having turned over Tutsis sheltering in his Saint-Famille church – where hundreds had sought shelter – to Hutu militiamen surrounding the building. In 2006, a Rwandan military court sentenced him (in absentia) to life in prison for rape and helping extremist militias. However, Munyeshyaka, who is now a priest in the northern French town of Gisors, denies all the charges. If his case is dropped, it could further strain ties between France and Rwanda. Rwandan President Paul Kagame has frequently accused Paris of complicity in the genocide through its support for the Hutu national government of the time, accusations which France has always rejected.⁸

Rwanda and DRC start fresh talks on FDLR Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) launched a fresh round of security talks on September 24, 2015. The move have been described as “a new chapter” in their bilateral relations. This was announced following closed-door talks between the two countries’ defence ministers in Kigali, the first such meeting since June 2012. At the top of the agenda for the September 24 bilateral summit in Kigali was the issue of FDLR, the DRC-based militia, primarily composed of elements linked to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsis, which claimed at least a million lives. In a joint statement, Rwanda’s Defence minister James Kabarebe and his visiting Congolese counterpart Aimé Lusa-Diese Ngoi-Mukena said that both sides had agreed to urgently move to suppress FDLR, which has been under attack from the Congolese army, FARDC, over the past few months. Both sides also committed to subsequently cooperate in the repatriation of FDLR combatants, as well as to ensure the return to Congo of the former members of the M23 rebels, who crossed into Rwanda following their defeat, before they were disarmed and transferred to a camp in eastern Rwanda in 2013.⁹

⁷ “UK dismisses Rwanda spy chief Karenzi Karake case”, *BBC News*, August 10, 2015, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33846457>

⁸ “France asks to drop Rwanda genocide case”, *The Local*, August 19, 2015, at <http://www.thelocal.fr/20150819/paris-prosecutors-want-to-drop-rwanda-genocide-case>

⁹ “FDLR at heart of fresh talks between Rwanda and DRC”, *The New Times*, September 25, 2015, at <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-09-25/192885/>

Seychelles

Japanese Navy commander leading multi-national force calls on Seychelles' VP

Rear Admiral Hiroshi Ito, Commander of the Japan Maritime Defence Force, who recently began leading the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 off the coast of Horn of Africa, called on Seychelles' Vice-President (VP) Danny Faure on July 7, 2015. Speaking to the press after his meeting with VP Faure, Commander Ito said it was an opportunity to discuss issues related to counter piracy in the region, the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. Noting that the mandate of the EU (European Union) and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) forces in the region are expected to end in December 2016, he discussed the issue with VP Faure as well. As it is the first time that Japan takes command of a multi-national force in the post-war period, Commander Ito said it is an important moment for Japan and a great opportunity for him. While CTF 151 has counter piracy as its mission, Commander Ito said he is focusing his attention on maintaining the number of ships and aircraft in the force to patrol the area in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. In addition to its new responsibility to command the CTF 151, Japan has a counter-piracy base in Djibouti, used by two aircraft (*P3-C Orion*) and two destroyer vessels under the Japan Maritime Defence Force.¹⁰

Seychelles gets the chairmanship of the East Africa Standby Force

Seychelles has assumed the chairmanship of the East Africa Standby Force (EASF). The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Transport, Joël Morgan, hosted the EASF Peace Fund Preparatory Conference Committee held at the Berjaya Beau Vallon Bay on July 11, 2015. The Peace Fund is an initiative of the EASF to mobilise baseline resources for deployment and sustenance of its Standby Force in the Eastern African region. As the chairperson of the Council of Ministers of Defence and Security of the Eastern Africa Standby Force, Minister Morgan, expressed his commitment to ensure that the Seychelles provides good leadership to the organisation.¹¹

Somalia

US drone strikes in Somalia signify more direct involvement against al-Shabaab

The US is shifting to a more direct role in the near decade-old fight against al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab militants, launching as many as six drone strikes in southern Somalia to support African forces battling the group. The strikes, which preceded President Obama's arrival in the neighbouring Kenya, were near Baraawe, a port city where troops from Kenya and other African countries, along with the fledgling Somali army, had been battling Shabaab militants for weeks. Kenyan forces followed up the US attacks with an artillery barrage that killed more than 50 fighters. The drone attacks have continued, a rare instance in which American firepower has been used to

¹⁰ "Japanese commander of multi-national force calls on VP Faure", *Seychelles Nation*, July 8, 2015, at <http://www.nation.sc/article.html?id=245978>

¹¹ Seychelles heads East Africa Standby Force, *Seychelles Nation*, July 13, 2015, at <http://www.nation.sc/article.html?id=246037>

directly support ground skirmishes against the militants responsible for a wave of bombings and suicide attacks in East Africa.¹²

Al-Shabaab overruns African Union base in Somalia

Fighters from the al-Shabaab militant group overran an African Union military base in southern Somalia in the morning of September 1, 2015 in an attack that included a suicide bombing and an intense firefight. Claiming the responsibility for the attack, the terrorist group said that its fighters had killed 50 Ugandan peacekeepers at their base in the village of Janale, about 50 miles south of the capital, Mogadishu, in the Lower Shabelle region. The attack began when a car loaded with explosives rammed the base's gates, allowing the Shabaab gunmen to storm in. "We have completely taken over the Janale base," a Shabaab spokesman, Sheik Abu Muscab, said in an audio message posted on Somali websites. The statement said that African Union officials were trying to verify the number of casualties and the extent of the damage.¹³

Rise in illegal fishing off Somalia may revive piracy in the region

According to a new report by Secure Fisheries, a Colorado-based programme of the One Earth Future Foundation, the piracy that caused havoc to international shipping off Somalia's coast over the past decade may return if illegal foreign fishing, worth an annual US\$306 million, continues at its current pace. Local Somali fishermen, who earn US\$58 million per year, are angry about fishing by vessels from nations including Iran, Yemen, Egypt and Spain. Growing local resentment risks a revival of the piracy epidemic that roiled the region from about 2001 to 2012, the group said. "There is a real danger of the whole piracy cycle starting all over again," John Steed, Secure Fisheries' regional manager, said in a statement. "Illegal fishing was the pretext used by criminal gangs to shift from protectionism to armed robbery and piracy. Now the situation is back where it was."¹⁴

UK to deploy troops in Somalia and South Sudan

Prime Minister David Cameron of UK announced the deployment of British troops in Somalia and South Sudan to train African peacekeeping forces in order to have "less terrorism and less migration". The Prime Minister on September 27, 2015 said that he was offering forces to the UN and African Union (AU) missions to help tackle conflicts that are facilitating the rise of terrorist groups in Somalia and prompting mass migration from South Sudan, where 2 million people have been displaced by the battle between the government and rebels. About 70 military personnel will be offered to help in Somalia, where a peacekeeping unit is present to tackle the threat of the Islamist group al-Shabaab. They will not be involved in combat operations but will help train AU

¹² "U.S. airstrikes in Somalia signal a more direct role against Shabaab", *Los Angeles Times*, July 23, 2015, at <http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-us-airstrikes-somalia-20150723-story.html>

¹³ "Qaeda-affiliated group overruns African Union base in Somalia", *The New York Times*, September 1, 2015, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/world/africa/qaeda-affiliated-group-overruns-african-union-base-in-somalia.html>

¹⁴ "Illegal fishing off Somalia seen spurring piracy revival", *Bloomberg*, September 15, 2015, at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-15/illegal-fishing-off-somalia-may-spur-piracy-revival-group-says>

forces in areas including logistics, engineering and medical aid. Further troops - about 250 to 300 over the course of several missions - are being sent to carry out specific tasks in South Sudan, such as engineering advice and combat training.¹⁵

South Africa

UN chief denies statement asking South Africa to implement ICC arrest warrant against Bashir

The Sudanese government on Tuesday said that the United Nations Secretary General (SG), Ban Ki-moon, has denied that he asked the South African government to implement the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against president Omer Hassan al-Bashir. Bashir took part in the AU summit Johannesburg last month, defying two arrest warrants issued by the ICC against him for war crimes and genocide in Darfur region in March 2009 and July 2010. Immediately after his arrival in Pretoria, the ICC urged the South African government to arrest Bashir in line with the founding act of the court, the Rome Statute, and threatened to report the matter to the trial's assembly of states and the UN Security Council. However, he managed to leave Johannesburg despite a decision issued by a judge from the South African High court ordering the government of Johannesburg not to allow him to leave the country. Sudan's state foreign minister, Kamal al-Din Ismail, said the SG denied during his meeting with Sudan's first vice-president, Bakri Hassan Salih, in Addis Ababa that he made remarks about Bashir's participation in the African Union summit in Johannesburg last month. Bashir doesn't recognize the ICC and sees it as a tool used by colonial powers against Sudan and the African nations.¹⁶

South African President calls for reform of Security Council in UN Speech

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly, South African President Jacob Zuma stressed on reforming and restructuring of the UN Security Council in order to resolve conflicts surrounding Middle East and African nations. He specified that although significant progress has been made by the UN since the adoption of the World Summit Outcome in 2005, no reform has been made to the restructuring of the Security Council since the founding days of the organisation. He also called on the UN to allow more representation of countries through permanent and non-permanent membership at the Council, thereby keeping with the changed times. "The UN cannot pretend that the world has not changed since 1945. We are no longer colonies. We are free, independent sovereign states," he said. President Zuma of South Africa is among the many leaders who will address the general debate of 70th General Assembly which opened this year with the adoption of Agenda 2030 and 17 Sustainable Development Goals. Made up of all the 193 Member States of the United Nations, the Assembly provides a forum for multilateral discussion of international issues covered by the UN Charter.¹⁷

¹⁵ "British troops to be deployed in Somalia, South Sudan", *Zee News*, September 28, 2015, at http://zeenews.india.com/news/world/british-troops-to-be-deployed-in-somalia-south-sudan_1803375.html

¹⁶ "UN chief denied calling on South Africa to deliver Bashir to ICC: official", *Sudan Tribune*, July 14, 2015, at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55703>

¹⁷ "In UN speech, South African President calls for reform of Security Council", *UN News Centre*, September 28, 2015, at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52021#.Vklvn9IrLIU>

Tanzania

Tanzania extradites Ugandan rebel leader Mukulu for trial

Ugandan police have announced the extradition of Jamil Mukulu, the leader of Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) from Tanzania to the country to face charges of terrorism, murder, kidnapping and recruitment of children. Assan Kasingye, the police director of Interpol and International Relations, told that Mukulu, whose rebel group is currently causing havoc in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was airlifted to Uganda. Mukulu's extradition ends the three month long protracted legal battle between the accused and the Ugandan government in Tanzania, where he was resisting his transfer and trial. The ADF leader who has been on Interpol's most wanted list since February 2011 followed an order by a Tanzanian Magistrate Court to have him tried in Uganda where he faces several terrorism and murder charges. Interpol issued a red corner notice for Mukulu in connection with the 1996 Mpondwe attack in the western Ugandan district of Kasese and the June 1998 Kichwamba Technical Institute massacre in the western district of Kabarole, in which about 80 students were killed.¹⁸

Zimbabwe

Mugabe calls for ending continental and xenophobic conflict in AU Summit

African heads of state must find effective interventions to eradicate the scourge of war on the continent, Zimbabwean President and African Union Chairman Robert Mugabe told a gathering of African heads of state at the 25th African Union Summit in Johannesburg. He said peace and security were prerequisites for the achievement of the continental body's developmental targets, including Agenda 2063. The AU chairman said African countries must work together to eradicate xenophobic attacks similar to the spate of violence experienced in South Africa in recent months. The South African government deployed the army following the violence targeting African immigrants in Durban and Johannesburg. The country has also launched an ongoing crackdown on criminals and undocumented immigrants, code-named Operation Fiela. The operation is a joint one between the SA Police Service and the SA National Defence Force. Zuma assured African leaders gathered at the summit that the controversial Operation Fiela was not anti-immigrant. The high-level AU summit is being hosted by South Africa under the theme "2015: Year of Women's Empowerment and Development towards Africa's Agenda 2063".¹⁹

¹⁸ "Tanzania extradites ADF rebel leader to Ugandan", *Shabelle Media Network*, July 13, 2015, at <http://shabellenews.com/?p=9537>

¹⁹ "End continental conflict, stop xenophobia: Mugabe at AU Summit", *Africa News Agency*, June 15, 2015, at <https://www.enca.com/africa/end-continental-conflict-stop-xenophobia-mugabe-au-summit>

Politics

Cote d'Ivoire

Constitutional Council shortlists 33 candidates for presidential polls

Cote d'Ivoire's Constitutional Council on Monday published the provisional list of candidates who are to run for presidential elections scheduled for October 25, reminding them that they had three days to present their complaints or observations. Only presidential candidates, or political parties or groups sponsoring them, are allowed to submit complaints or observations on candidacies, the statement read by Ibrahime Coulibaly Kuibiert, Secretary General of the Constitutional Council pointed out. According to Mr. Coulibaly, on expiry of the 3 day deadline (Thursday September 3, 2015), no claims or observations will be received stressing that the Constitutional Council will enter into deliberations on the complaints received, to establish the final list no later than 45 days before the date of the first round. Thirty-three candidates, including incumbent President Alassane Ouattara on behalf of the Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP), Pascal Affi N'Guessan of Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), independent candidates Charles Konan Banny, Bertin Kouadio Konan also called KKB, Amara Essy among others, are on this provisional list transmitted by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) on 27 August 2015.²⁰

Ethiopia

Barack Obama praises Ethiopia's fight against terrorism but comments adversely on democratic record

US President Barack Obama, on July 27, 2015, praised key African ally Ethiopia for its fight against al-Shabaab militants in Somalia, but also challenged Addis Ababa on its democratic record. Obama was on the first-ever trip by a US president to Africa's second most populous nation, a close strategic partner for Washington credited for beating back the al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamists but a country also much criticised for its rights record. "Part of the reason we have seen this shrinkage of Shabaab in East Africa is that we have had our regional teams," Obama said, referring to African Union and Somali government troops. "We don't need to send our own marines in to do the fighting: the Ethiopians are tough fighters," Obama said.²¹

Ethiopia opposition group shifts to operate from Eritrea

The leader of a US-based Ethiopian opposition group relocated to Eritrea to organise civil and armed resistance against the government in the capital, Addis Ababa. Berhanu Nega, a former US

²⁰ "Cote d'Ivoire: Constitutional Council shortlists 33 candidates for presidential polls", *Star Africa*, August 31, 2015, <http://en.starafrika.com/news/cote-divoire-constitutional-council-shortlists-33-candidates-for-presidential-polls.html>

²¹ "Barack Obama challenges Ethiopia on democracy, praises Shebaab fight", *The Indian Express*, July 27, 2015, at <http://indianexpress.com/article/world/americas/barack-obama-challenges-ethiopia-on-democracy-praises-shebab-fight/>

resident, traveled to Ethiopia's northern neighbour following the merger of his Ginbot 7 group with the Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front, the group's spokesman Tadesse Kersmo said. "We are following a kind of merged strategy, blending peaceful resistance with non-peaceful resistance," Tadesse said by phone from London on July 21, 2015. Attacks on security installations seek to inspire Ethiopians to engage in non-violent opposition, he said. Ethiopia has fractious relations with Eritrea, which became independent from its larger neighbour in 1993 after three decades of armed struggle.²²

Kenya

Obama visits Kenya as US president

US President Barack Obama visited Kenya for three days, arriving in Nairobi on July 24, 2015. The return of the long-lost son, as President Obama is widely seen by Kenyans, had all the elements of a family reunion.²³ Obama struck a relentlessly upbeat tone, declaring, "Africa is on the move"; praising progress toward democracy and economic growth; and marveling over the changes he saw on the streets of this locked-down capital. But he found himself at odds with his hosts on human rights and same-sex marriage and gingerly tried to nudge them to change their ways. At a news conference, he said the fight against terrorism in Kenya should not be used to justify a crackdown on dissent and argued that no nation should discriminate against gays and lesbians, comparing it to the era of segregation of African-Americans. President Uhuru Kenyatta accepted the advice on human rights without argument, saying Kenya was trying to improve its handling of security and liberty. "This issue of terrorism is new to us," he said, "and as it is new, we learn with each and every step." But in a country where homosexuality is widely condemned, he flatly rejected Obama's views on gay rights.²⁴

Rwanda

Rwanda parliamentarians back move to let President Paul Kagame run for a third term

Rwandan politicians have backed a motion to let President Paul Kagame run for a third term in office, paving the way for a referendum to amend the constitution. Kagame, whose ruling party has controlled the country for the past decade, has not directly said that he wants to run again. But he is open to persuasion that the two-term limit in the constitution needs to be changed, and a petition to that effect has collected 3.8 million signatures. The parliamentary speaker, Donatille Mukabalisa, said MPs had voted unanimously to back the petition, adding that a referendum would be called on whether to amend the constitution.²⁵ However, the US has warned President

²² "Ethiopia opposition head to run campaign from Eritrea", *Bloomberg*, July 24, 2015, at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-24/ethiopian-opposition-leader-travels-to-eritrea-to-lead-rebellion>

²³ "President Obama starts two-day Kenya visit", *BBC News*, July 24, 2015, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33656895>

²⁴ "Obama in Kenya: An upbeat tone, but notes of discord, Too", *The New York Times*, July 25, 2015, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/world/africa/in-kenya-obama-hails-africas-growth-and-potential.html>

²⁵ "Rwanda elections: MPs back move to let President Paul Kagame run for unprecedented third term", *Independent*, July 14, 2015, at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/rwanda-elections-mps-back-move-to-let-president-paul-kagame-run-for-unprecedented-third-term-10388744.html>

Kagame that he faces instability and uncertainty if he presses ahead with plans to change the constitution of Rwanda to allow him to stay on for a third term.²⁶

Seychelles

Philippe Le Gall appointed as Seychelles' first resident HC to Sri Lanka

Philippe Le Gall, who was posted in China till April 2015, has become Seychelles' first resident High Commissioner in Sri Lanka. He presented his credentials to Maithripala Sirinena, the President of the Socialist Democratic Republic of Sri Lanka, on July 8, 2015. After expressing Seychelles' gratitude for what has been jointly achieved bilaterally to date until now through 27 years of diplomatic ties, Le Gall said that the Seychelles government is willing to take the relations of friendship and cooperation with Sri Lanka one step ahead for the mutual benefit of the two countries.²⁷

Somalia

Popular elections not possible in Somalia in 2016

The president of Somalia has told VOA that his government will not hold popular elections next year, due to continuing insecurity in the country. In an interview with VOA's Somali Service on July 29, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said that "one person, one vote" elections will not be possible under current circumstances. He added that the polls, when they happen, may take a different shape. "It's the pinnacle of democracy that everyone who is eligible votes to elect, but there is a big gap between there and where we stand," Mohamud said. "We never said an election is not possible. There are different phases and different models for elections, and we are aiming for the next best option, but we have not yet agreed on a format to transition in 2016." Mohamud denied that this will be seen as a failure by his government to honour pledges it made. "We never promised one person, one vote and to make a ballot box available in every meter of the country," he told VOA. The current government was mandated to lead Somalia into general elections following the election of Mohamud, a new parliament and adoption of a new constitution in 2012. However, militant group al-Shabaab continues to carry out violent attacks.²⁸

South Africa

South Africa's Julius Malema ejected from parliament

Fiery South African politician Julius Malema has been ejected from parliament after refusing to retract comments in which he accused Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa of being a "murderer".

²⁶ "US warns Paul Kagame not to seek third term as Rwandan president", *The Telegraph*, September 5, 2015, at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/rwanda/11846525/US-warns-Paul-Kagame-not-to-seek-third-term-as-Rwandan-president.html>

²⁷ "Seychelles' first resident HC to Sri Lanka accredited", *Seychelles Nation*, July 9, 2015, at <http://www.nation.sc/article.html?id=245988>

²⁸ "Somalia: No popular elections in 2016", *Voice of America*, July 29, 2015, at <http://www.voanews.com/content/somalia-says-no-popular-elections-in-2016/2883749.html>

Malema was thrown out by security guards after refusing to leave. Last month, Malema accused Ramaphosa of involvement in the 2012 killings of 34 striking miners shot by police near the Marikana mine. A commission of inquiry into the shooting exonerated Ramaphosa. He had been a non-executive director at Lonmin, the platinum producer that owned the Marikana mine. Parliamentary chairperson Mmatlala Boroto ordered Malema - head of the left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party - to withdraw his remarks, saying they were derogatory. When he refused to leave, parliament's sergeant at arms was called. There was a brief scuffle around the EFF benches as security guards took Malema away. He has been suspended from parliament for five days, officials from the governing African National Congress (ANC) party said.²⁹

Economy and Development

Botswana

World Bank warns Botswana over weak private sector and high household indebtedness

Consumer spending has replaced diamonds as the key driver of economic growth, a trajectory that is unsustainable owing to Botswana's weak private sector and high household indebtedness, warns the World Bank. In a Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) report released recently, the World Bank says while the reduction in reliance on diamonds as the anchor to economic output is welcome, growth that is largely dependent on consumer spending is not maintainable in the medium to long term. According to figures released by Statistics Botswana last week, Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased by 4.3 per cent in the first quarter of 2015 with the highest growth recorded in hotels and restaurants, vehicle dealers and retailers, which rose 8.9, 8.5 and 7.7 percent respectively. Botswana's weak capacity to create jobs has been identified as the key potential risk to the new pattern of consumption-led growth with the private sector estimated to have only been able to employ one of the six entrants into the labour market in the past decade.³⁰

Vice President of Botswana asserts attainment of MDG's at UN Assembly

The Vice President Mokgweetsi Masisi says Botswana has attained a lot of progress in the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG's) whose cycle ends this year with the adoption of the Post 2015 Development Agenda. Speaking at the UN Assembly in New York, Masisi however acknowledged that despite the notable achievements of the MDG's, serious challenges exist to close the gaps and disparities that still remain. Masisi said Botswana has achieved universal access to education and almost closed the disparity between girls and boys in schools. Masisi told the UN Assembly that in Botswana health services are practically free and have been brought within an 8 kilometer radius of each community across the country, while HIV anti-retroviral drugs are provided freely for all Botswana and transmission of the virus from mother to child is almost at zero. He added that Botswana has adopted focused interventions for youth employment and income-generating opportunities have resulted in the improved quality of life of Botswana. Masisi added that this has been a patent reminder of the role women can play in national

²⁹ "South Africa's Julius Malema ejected from parliament", *BBC News*, September 9, 2015, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34204640>

³⁰ "World Bank warns Botswana..." *Mmegi Online*, July 10, 2015, at <http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=52531&dir=2015/july/10>

development, when given the opportunity. He also noted that the means of implementation of the SDGs are a crucial element for success and welcomed the Addis Ababa Action Agenda adopted in July during the Third World Conference on Financing for Development.³¹

Cote d'Ivoire

French Company Bolloré Africa Logistics invests €30 million on Cote d'Ivoire-Burkina rail link

The French company Bolloré Africa Logistics has invested €30 million to buy new trains for the freight and passenger line it operates between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. Operator of the container terminal at the port of Abidjan and the rail company Sitarail, linking Côte d'Ivoire to Burkina Faso, Bolloré Africa Logistics said it had received a part of the order and was waiting for other nine trains to deserve the landlocked Burkina Faso for its exports and imports. The 1,260-km railway between Abidjan and Burkina Faso's capital Ouagadougou allows the two countries to exchange goods, animals and raw materials. According to Ivorian Prime Minister, Daniel Kablan Duncan, cargo traffic between the two countries stood at 610,000 tons last year, up from 402,000 tons in 2011. In August last year, the French conglomerate Bolloré and Pan-African Minerals had signed a memorandum of understanding on a rail project worth \$895 million, linking Abidjan to Burkina Faso's manganese deposit at Tambao. The project will increase capacity and enable the shipment of the manganese, 2 million tons of merchandise and about 2 million passengers.³²

Ethiopia

Ethiopia and Djibouti sign US\$1.5 bn agreement for pipeline construction

Ethiopia and neighbour Djibouti signed an agreement worth US\$1.55 billion for a fuel pipeline with developers Mining, Oil & Gas Services (MOGS) and Blackstone Group LP-backed Black Rhino Group. The two countries in the Horn of Africa signed framework agreements on September 29, 2015 for construction of the 550-kilometer line to transport diesel, gasoline and jet fuel from port access in Djibouti to central Ethiopia, the companies said. The pipeline is scheduled for completion by 2018. The pipeline will increase energy security, aid economic development and reduce harmful emissions. The 50-50 joint venture with MOGS, a unit of Johannesburg-based Royal Bafokeng Holdings, will seek to raise at least US\$1 billion of senior debt financing. The project, known as the Horn of Africa Pipeline, includes an import facility and 950,000 barrels of storage capacity in Damerjog, Djibouti, linked to a storage terminal in Awash, Ethiopia.³³

³¹ "MDG's Attained In Botswana, Masisi", *The Monitor, Mmegi online*, September 28, 2015, at <http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=54465&dir=2015/september/28>

³² "Cote d'Ivoire-Burkina rail link: Bolloré Africa Logistics injects €30 Mln", *Meda Africa Times.com*, September 12, 2015, at <http://medafricatimes.com/6601-cote-divoire-burkina-rail-link-bollore-africa-logistics-injects-e30-mln.html>

³³ "Bullish Ethiopia and Djibouti agree on \$1.55Bn pipeline; Kenya's LAPSET has reason to worry", *Mail & Guardian Africa*, September 30, 2015, at <http://mgafrika.com/article/2015-09-30-bullish-ethiopia-and-djibouti-agree-on-155bn-fuel-pipeline-kenyas-lapsset-has-reason-to-worry>

The number of Ethiopians needing food aid increases due to poor rains

The number of Ethiopians who will need food aid by the end of 2015 has surged by more than 1.5 million from earlier estimates, according to United Nations agencies. After failed rains, some 4.5 million people are now projected to require assistance, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the World Food Programme and the UN children's agency, UNICEF, said. This is an increase of 55 per cent on initial projections of 2.9 million. It also means that donors must urgently provide an extra US\$230 million to meet these needs. Gillian Mellisop, UNICEF representative and acting humanitarian coordinator, said donors had been generous but more was needed to prevent unnecessary human suffering.³⁴

Ethiopia on road to becoming fastest growing economy in the world

Ethiopia is on course to become the world's fastest growing economy. The new report "One foot on the ground, one foot in the air" released by the UK-based think tank group Overseas Development Institute (ODI) forecasts that Ethiopia's economy would significantly accelerate in the coming three years. The case study highlighted major strides in massive agricultural investment, a sector which employs three in four Ethiopians, and a government committed to pro-poor spending to halve its poverty. It also explores progress achieved in material wellbeing in Ethiopia, measured by reduction in income poverty, and two key contributors to material wellbeing: education and employment. "Ethiopia's stability and consequent ability to make long-term plans and investments in education, agriculture and infrastructure over the past 20 years has allowed the country to make great leaps in development", the report said.³⁵

Ghana

Ghana's oil output will rise to 500,000 barrels a day

Ghana's oil output could reach 500,000 barrels of crude oil per day by 2024. This follows the discovery of seven new oil blocks by US firm, Hess Corporation. Hess is set to drill a new appraisal well in the last quarter of this year to assess the commercial viability of the block and estimate recoverable reserves. A field development programme would be submitted in 2015 following the positive outcome from the new well which could give Ghana its fourth oil producing project. The well would be followed by a production test which will help Hess to also ascertain the level of production that would be targeted by the block. Ghana currently produces about 100,000 barrels of crude a day. Daily oil production hit 115,000 barrels per day in June 2013, significantly higher than the projected average for that year. Total oil revenue of GH¢1.15 billion also far exceeded the projected target by GH¢362.3 million. The country began commercial production of oil in 2010. Meanwhile, the Volta River Authority is close to agreeing to a new deal with three new gas production companies in Nigeria that could boost the country's gas supply by more than 100 million standard cubic feet per day. The agreement is to be signed with Nigerian independent firms, Network Oil and Gas, ND Western and Shara Oil.³⁶

³⁴ "UN says 4.5 million Ethiopians now in need of food aid after poor rains", *The Guardian*, August 25, 2015, at <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/aug/25/un-ethiopia-need-food-aid-after-poor-rains>

³⁵ "Research: Ethiopia to become world's fastest-growing economy", *Sudan Tribune*, September 18, 2015, at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article56427>

³⁶ "Ghana: Oil Output to Hit 500,000 Barrels Daily", *All Africa.com*, September 6, 2015, at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201509162127.html>

Kenya

Kenya falls out from the top 10 list of foreign investment destinations in Africa

Kenya has fallen behind Tanzania and Rwanda as the top investment destination in East Africa, dampening the country's ambition to become a regional leader in tapping foreign direct investment. A new report that lists the investment climate across all 54 economies in Africa indicates that East Africa's economic giant is trailing her neighbours in terms of attracting top investments. The study conducted by diversified financial services brand, Rand Merchant Bank, ranks Kenya 11th, having fallen from the top 10 bracket since the previous study released in 2014. South Africa has been ranked as the most attractive investment destination, extending its lead and maintaining its position as the leading economic powerhouse in Africa despite Nigeria's rebasing its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2014 and rising to the top position of African economies.³⁷

Madagascar

Exxon Mobil stops exploring oil in Madagascar

Exxon Mobil Corporation has ended its oil exploration in Madagascar after disappointing findings in its off-shore blocks, the Malagasy Mining and Petroleum Minister said on July 3, 2015. The US company had no immediate comment. Exxon's affiliates resumed exploration in Madagascar in 2013 after a four-year pause due to a force majeure declared after the 2009 coup on the Indian Ocean Island. Exxon has left Madagascar because it was not convinced by the potential of the oilfield.³⁸

Mauritius

Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between Mauritius and Zambia

Mauritius and Zambia signed an Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA) in Port Louis on July 14, 2015. The new IPPA will further reinforce and deepen economic cooperation between the two countries. The signatories were the Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Vishnu Lutchmeenaraidoo, and the Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry of Zambia, Margaret D. Mwanakatwe. In his address, Minister Lutchmeenaraidoo proposed the setting up of a Joint Economic Commission between the two countries in view of speeding up bilateral trade and investment exchanges as well as sharing of know-how. He also spoke about the vision of Mauritius to identify and explore new growth opportunities on the African continent

³⁷ "Kenya loses its position among Africa's top 10 foreign investment destinations", *Standard Digital*, August 4, 2014, at <http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000171567/kenya-loses-its-position-among-africa-s-top-10-foreign-investment-destinations>

³⁸ "Exxon Mobil ends oil exploration in Madagascar after poor finds: Minister", *The Economic Times*, July 4, 2015, at <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/exxon-mobil-ends-oil-exploration-in-madagascar-after-poor-finds-minister/articleshow/47936286.cms>

as part of a robust South-South cooperation. He further said that as Africa is rising, Mauritius endeavours to play an even more meaningful role in the African growth story.³⁹

Nigeria

Increasing power production key to prosperity for Nigeria

The World Bank has said that constant power supply will ensure overall prosperity and development for Nigeria. Speaking at a roundtable in Abuja on Monday, Richard Arkutu, Head, Africa Special Initiatives of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), said electrification would benefit Nigerians immensely. According to him, increasing power production to the level of South Africa can boost Gross Development Product (GDP) growth by 1.5 per cent. Arkutu said that Nigeria's current power consumption was a quarter of South Africa's consumption and about 50 per cent of consumption levels of comparable middle income countries. He said that 30 to 40 per cent of manufacturers' costs was power related; therefore, an increase in power generation and distribution was important. Other speakers at the roundtable, however, said that the World Bank had a role to play in ensuring that power supply in Nigeria was increased and sustained. The News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) reports that the IFC is a subsidiary of the World Bank.⁴⁰

Namibia

Namibian economy gives positive outlook

The outlook for the Namibian economy remains positive as the country ramps up its infrastructure, investment and commodity production. This is according to a forecast by Namene Kalili, Senior Manager Research and Development at FNB Namibia Holdings. He added that growth in the short-term is supported by strong household consumption that benefitted from moderate job creation, income growth, lower inflation and robust credit extension. Regarding the trade deficit, he remarked that this has widened by 41.9 per cent during the second quarter after export earnings fell by 39 per cent, which underscores Namibia's vulnerability to commodity markets after diamond revenues fell by 7 per cent. Kalili says the annual inflation rate for July increased to 3.3 per cent from 3.0 per cent in June and the rise was attributed to increases in the prices of food and non-alcoholic beverages, which consequently pushed up prices in the hospitality categories. "Rising utility and fuel costs are expected to push inflation from current low levels to 4.5 per cent by year-end and reach 5.1 per cent in 2016." He concluded that the government continued to implement its expansionary budget to tackle persistent inequality, unemployment, education, health care and decent housing.⁴¹

³⁹ "Mauritius and Zambia sign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement", *All Africa.com*, July 15, 2015, at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201507151445.html>

⁴⁰ "Power, key to prosperity in Nigeria- IFC", *The Guardian*, November 18, 2015, <http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/09/power-key-to-prosperity-in-nigeria-ifc/>

⁴¹ "Outlook for Namibian economy remains positive", *The New Era*, September 8 2015, <https://www.newera.com.na/2015/09/08/outlook-namibian-economy-remains-positive/>

Heavy investment by China in Namibia expected to multiply – Xin reveals

Due to excellent bilateral ties between the two countries, Chinese investments in Namibia since independence in 1990 total US\$4.6 billion (N\$62.1 billion) and created over 6 000 jobs by 2014. The long-term investment of US\$5 billion (N\$67.5 billion) in the Husab Uranium Mine in the Erongo Region could provide 2000 permanent jobs and make Namibia the second largest uranium producer and exporter in the world. Chinese Ambassador to Namibia, Xin Shunkang, revealed the latest trade figures on Chinese investment in Namibia at a reception hosted on Thursday in Windhoek to mark the 66th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. He said the pragmatic diplomatic cooperation between Namibia and China has deepened over the past 25 years. Xin also referred to the fact that China has become the number one trading partner of various African countries, with Chinese investment on the continent reaching a record high of US\$221.8 billion last year, an increase of five percent from 2013. He believes the current China-Africa cooperation is full of vitality and creates new opportunities for bilateral ties. He also said China's gross domestic product per capita in 2014 reached US\$7 500 (N\$101250) compared to US\$100 (N\$1350) when the republic was founded some 66 years ago.⁴²

Rwanda

China helps growing Rwanda agriculture sector

Over the years, the Chinese Government has supported a number of sectors in the Rwandan economy notably the agricultural sector which employs an estimated 90 per cent of the Rwandan population. *Rwanda's* Minister of State in Charge of Agriculture and Animal Resources, Tony Nsanganira, said that China has contributed to the growth of the agriculture sector in Rwanda by awarding Rwandan students scholarships every year for short courses and post graduate studies in order to get training on irrigation and mechanisation technologies. Over 100 Rwandese professionals are trained on technology based agriculture, especially on rice and mushroom. The support has culminated in the Rwanda Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centre (RATDC), which is a Chinese supported institution based in Huye district in the Southern province. China Geo-Engineering Corporation (CGC) has also supported irrigation farming in Rwanda.⁴³

Rwanda considers proposal for 'drone-port' to deliver medical supplies

There are proposals to set up "cargo drone routes capable of delivering urgent and precious supplies to remote areas on a massive scale", and the East African nation of Rwanda has been chosen as a test case. "Specialist drones can carry blood and life-saving supplies over 100 kilometer at minimal cost, providing an affordable alternative that can complement road-based deliveries," the proposal underlines. Rwanda, left in ruins after genocide in 1994, has rapidly rebuilt. The government has pushed initiatives to boost technology, and the powerful president, Paul Kagame, dreams of turning the capital, Kigali, into a regional hub for investors and multinational companies.

⁴² "Chinese investments in Namibia expected to multiply – Xin reveals", *New Era*, September 28, 2015, <https://www.newera.com.na/2015/09/28/chinese-investments-namibia-expected-multiply-xin-reveals/>

⁴³ "China boosts Rwanda agriculture", *East African Business Week*, July 26, 2015, at <http://www.busiweek.com/index1.php?Ctp=2&pl=3799&pLv=3&srI=84&spI=463>

The rolling landscape of a nation described as the “land of a thousand hills” means physical access to some areas is challenging. The proposal seeks to provide an easier and economical way in supplying medicines through these challenging routes.⁴⁴

Seychelles

Seychelles achieves ‘high-income’ status in World Bank classification

Seychelles has graduated to the status of a ‘high-income’ country within the World Bank classification. James Michel, the President of Seychelles, has welcomed the news but has however highlighted the importance of looking at development beyond the reductive practice of simply measuring gross domestic products (GDP) per capita. He has reiterated the importance of addressing the specific concerns of small island developing states (SIDS) and in particular the need to couple all measures of development in the context of countries’ vulnerability such as through a vulnerability index.⁴⁵ Seychelles also wants a new financing framework to empower developing countries. The country’s Vice-President Danny Faure called upon the third International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD3) to adopt a vulnerability index as a means of having a more rounded view of the development status of a country. Faure said that the existing models of assessing development gains solely on GDP (gross domestic products) per capita does not take into account the limitations and challenges being faced by member states.⁴⁶

Seychelles joins SADC Free Trade Area

Seychelles is now an official member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Free Trade Area (SADC FTA). This accession formally provides a pathway for enhanced trade between Seychelles and the Southern African region. This is another milestone in the Seychelles Government’s effort to identify and adopt strategies that will improve the business and private sector environment. The country’s accession efforts towards the SADC FTA dates back to December 2010 when its government found it would be beneficial to intensify efforts to join the SADC FTA. Seychelles submitted its accession to SADC FTA in May 2014 and on May 25, 2015 the Customs Management (SADC FTA) Regulations, 2015, were enacted into Seychelles’ laws providing legal platform for the accession. The SADC Protocol on Trade endeavours to promote economic growth and regional integration. The Protocol has been in effect since January 2000.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ “Rwanda chosen for world’s first ‘drone-port’ to deliver medical supplies”, *The Guardian*, September 30, 2015, at <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/30/rwanda-chosen-for-worlds-first-drone-port-to-deliver-medical-supplies>

⁴⁵ “World Bank classification - Seychelles achieves ‘high-income’ status”, *Seychelles Nation*, July 3, 2015, at <http://www.nation.sc/article.html?id=245926>

⁴⁶ “Seychelles wants new financing framework to empower developing countries”, *Seychelles Nation*, July 15, 2015, at <http://www.nation.sc/article.html?id=246055>

⁴⁷ “Seychelles formally joins SADC Free Trade Area”, *Seychelles Nation*, July 29, 2015, at <http://www.nation.sc/article.html?id=246211>

Somalia

UN reports that more than 850,000 people face acute food insecurity in Somalia

According to the latest United Nations-managed food assessment study released on August 31, 2015, Somalia's humanitarian situation remains "alarming" even after four years of a devastating famine with the number of people requiring emergency aid rising by 17 per cent to more than 850,000 and those in "food-stressed" situations still at 2.3 million. "The levels of food insecurity and malnutrition are critical," said UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, Peter de Clercq. "Humanitarian actors and donors have prevented the situation being a lot worse than it is, but we all need to do more." "The situation among internally displaced people is particularly worrying," he said.⁴⁸

South Africa

High interest rates to curb inflationary pressures: South Africa

South Africa raised interest rates for the first time in a year on Thursday, despite the continued economic woes engulfing Africa's most advanced nation. Lesetja Kganyago, governor of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), said that while the growth outlook remained subdued, the monetary policy committee was concerned that a failure to raise rates would increase inflationary pressures. The MPC raised the repurchase rate by 25 basis points to 6 per cent — a move many economists had predicted. It was the first rate rise since July last year when the repo rate — which was at a 30-year low — was increased by a similar amount. Since then, the country's growth outlook has deteriorated amid a power crisis that is causing almost daily electricity outages, bouts of labour unrest and weak consumer and investor confidence. Kganyago said the bank had marginally revised downwards its growth forecast for 2015 to 2 per cent, and to 2.1 per cent for 2016. Razia Khan, African economist at Standard Chartered bank, said the SARB had underscored its inflation-targeting credibility by raising rates in an environment of low growth.⁴⁹

Tanzania

Tanzania struggles to profit from 'Tanzanite' due to poor business environment

The opening up of Tanzania's economy over the past decade has enabled the country to move up the rankings and become the fourth largest producer of gold on the continent. The country is also set to exploit uranium and coal. However, the mining industry has suffered a few setbacks caused by heavy taxation, contracts not being honoured and even anxieties about the role of the state. Therefore, the country is struggling to take full advantage of its most unique natural resource – Tanzanite.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ "More than 850,000 people face acute food insecurity in Somalia, UN food assessment shows", *UN News Centre*, August 31, 2015, at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51757#.VjczQG4avjw>

⁴⁹ "South Africa raises interest rates to curb inflationary pressures", *Africa Economy*, July 23, 2015, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cfdd6cc6-3148-11e5-91ac-a5e17d9b4cff.html#axzz3reBoURHb>

⁵⁰ "Tanzania struggles to profit from unique mining treasure", *BBC News*, September 25, 2015, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34358097>

India-Africa Relations

Bharti Airtel states that it has no plan to exit Africa

Bharti Airtel Ltd, the biggest Indian cellphone carrier, said that it had no plans to exit Africa, despite beginning exclusive talks with France's Orange to sell four of its units there. "We remain fully committed to our Africa operations and will continue to invest in its growth and building a profitable business and accordingly have no plan to exit," the company said in a statement on July 21, 2015 in response to a query from Reuters. Orange had said, a day before, that it was in talks to buy Bharti's subsidiaries in Burkina Faso, Chad, Congo Brazzaville and Sierra Leone. The announcement had triggered speculation that this might be Bharti's first step towards a complete sale of the African business.⁵¹

India looks at strengthening relations with the EAC

Relations between India and the East African Community are set to be revitalised, especially in the areas of trade, cultural exchange and development cooperation. India's High Commissioner to Tanzania and Representative to the EAC, Sandeep Arya, said that his country was keen on strengthening trade and cultural ties with the EAC which date back several centuries. He also said that India already had bilateral projects in most of the EAC Partner States particularly health and agriculture, adding that they wanted to partner with the EAC to boost trade volumes and promoting industrial growth in East Africa. Arya further said that he would work closely with the Confederation of Indian Industries and the Indian Exim Bank in these initiatives, noting that these partnerships should for a start be between these two institutions and the East African Development Bank and the East African Business Council.⁵²

Indian Navy Ship Teg deployed for joint EEZ Surveillance in Mauritius

Indian Naval Ship Teg, a frontline Guided Missile Frigate, was deployed for a surveillance mission to patrol the Northern reaches of the vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Mauritius as from 10 July 2015. The ship was scheduled to call at Port Louis from 13 to 16 July and from 23 to 26 July 2015. During the course of the deployment, the ship would be conducting free medical camps for the outer-islanders and will render expert technical assistance for the equipment located on these islands. The Teg is the 18th Indian Navy ship deployed for dedicated EEZ Surveillance in Mauritius since 2009. These committed and custom-made deployments for joint patrol by Indian Navy ships with the National Coast Guard underscore the strong relationship and bonds between the two countries.⁵³

Seychelles' President James Michel visits India, India to gift naval boat, aircraft

Seychelles' President James Michel was on a three day visit to India from August 25-27, 2015. He

⁵¹ "Bharti Airtel says no plan to exit Africa, despite Orange talks", *The Times of India*, July 21, 2015, at <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Bharti-Airtel-says-no-plan-to-exit-Africa-despite-Orange-talks/articleshow/48161703.cms>

⁵² "India-EAC Relations to be strengthened", *East African Business Week*, September 27, 2015, at <http://www.busiweek.com/index1.php?Ctp=2&pl=4192&pLv=3&srI=67&spl=120>

⁵³ "Indian Navy ship Teg carries out EEZ surveillance in Mauritius", *All Africa.com*, July 10, 2015, at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201507101543.html>

was being accompanied by a high-level delegation, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Transport, Joel Morgan, and the Minister for Finance, Trade and the Blue Economy, Jean-Paul Adam. A business delegation was also accompanying the president.⁵⁴ In a statement after the end of a restricted meeting with President James Michel on August 26, India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that his country would gift Seychelles an Interceptor Coastguard boat and a second Dornier aircraft. Later, the two countries signed on five documents. These were related to the exchange of information with regard to taxes; a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for providing one Dornier maritime aircraft; an air services agreement; a protocol on framework of cooperation on blue economy; an MoU in agricultural research and education. Modi termed Seychelles a key strategic partner for India and said President Michel's visit has imparted additional momentum to bilateral relations.⁵⁵

Tanzania consults for implementation of US\$268m water project funded by India

The Tanzania Government is consulting with Tabora regional authorities over the planned US\$268 million Lake Victoria water pipeline extension being funded by India. According to the Director, Urban Water Department in the Ministry of Water, Justus Rwetabula, apart from being prepared for the project, Tabora, Igunga and Nzega town councils need to identify areas for the passage of the water infrastructure. "If this would not be possible, authorities need to conduct an evaluation so that those who would be affected will be compensated." Already, the government through the Ministry has written to Tabora region authorities over their preparedness for the project. The Ministry is now consulting with the office of Tabora Regional Administrative Secretary and the District Councils of Igunga and Nzega over how to implement the project. On June 19, 2015, the Export-Import Bank of India (Exim) and Tanzania's Ministry of Finance had signed an agreement to extend additional line of credit (LOC) of US\$268 million to Tanzania. The money would be for financing the extension of Lake Victoria water pipeline to Tabora, Igunga, and Nzega.⁵⁶

To meet a shortfall, India imports pulses from Tanzania

After unseasonal rainfall wreaked havoc across the Uttar Pradesh (UP) province of India in March 2015 and lowered the production of pulses, wholesalers are breathing easy since pulses imported from Tanzania in Africa are being used to meet the shortfall. Imported pulses started arriving in India on September 23, from the harbours in Mumbai. Now, they have started arriving in UP as well and are being sold in the wholesale markets of Meerut, a city in western UP. Although these pulses are of an inferior quality when compared to the lentils grown in India, it is certainly a relief to see the supply increase in the market.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ "President Michel in India for state visit", *Seychelles Nation*, August 26, 2015, at <http://www.nation.sc/article.html?id=246573>

⁵⁵ "President James Michel's state visit to India - India to gift Seychelles naval boat, aircraft", *Seychelles Nation*, August 27, 2015, at <http://www.nation.sc/article.html?id=246580>

⁵⁶ "Tanzania consults on \$268m water project", *East African Business Week*, August 2, 2015, at <http://www.busiweek.com/index.php/index1.php?Ctp=2&pl=3835&pLv=3&srl=49&spl=27&cl=10>

⁵⁷ "Pulses from Tanzania make their way to UP markets to meet shortfall", *The Times of India*, September 25, 2015, at <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/meerut/Pulses-from-Tanzania-make-their-way-to-UP-markets-to-meet-shortfall/articleshow/49105641.cms>

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IDSA invites articles, commentaries and book reviews for publication in *Africa Trends*, a quarterly newsletter on Africa. Submissions can focus on security, political and economic issues relating to African countries. Articles may focus on analysing bilateral, regional and multilateral developments of strategic significance to India's engagement with African countries.

Articles could be of approximately 2000 words. Commentaries can range between 1,000-1,500 words (excluding footnotes) and book reviews between 600-1,000 words. Guidelines for contributors may be found at: <http://www.idsa.in/africatrends>. Submissions may be emailed to the Editor at idsa.africatrends@gmail.com.