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India's Role in Global Governance Assessment of Engagement with Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Arpita Anant



MANOHAR PARRIKAR INSTITUTE FOR
DEFENCE STUDIES AND ANALYSES

मनोहर पर्रिकर रक्षा अध्ययन एवं विश्लेषण संस्थान

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INTRODUCTION

It is through multilateral engagements that states contribute to the governance of various issues in the international realm, which in turn have global implications. Among the oldest and most prominent institutions that have been in the business of governing globally is the United Nations (UN). Its main constituents, that is, governments of various states, as well as some non-state actors, have thus been in the act of global governance much before the term actually came into vogue.¹ An important question in the study of global governance is: who contributes to it, in what manner, and to what effect? States that can influence the structure of global governance of various issues are regarded as powerful. It is no wonder then that the ability of emerging or rising powers to contribute to global governance and the nature of their contribution has been under academic scrutiny.²

Multilateralism has been a critical aspect of Indian foreign policy. However, scholarly attention on the subject focussed very little on it until a decade ago.³ At that point in time, the only studies that focussed

¹ The term global governance was first used in 1992.

² Several prominent international journals have published special issues on this subject. See for instance *International Affairs*, *Negotiating the Rise of New Powers*, 89 (3), *Rising Powers Quarterly* published by the Marmara University since 2016, *Ethics and International Affairs*, *Rising Powers and International Order*, 32 (Special Issue 1), Spring 2018.

³ Notable among them are studies on India as an emerging power by Stephen Cohen, Sumit Ganguly and T.V. Paul and Baldev Raj Nayyar. All the three studies focus on the rising material capabilities, the factors that contribute to the rise, and their impact on India's bilateral relations with neighbouring countries and other prominent countries. For a comparative assessment of the three books see review essay by Dinshaw Mistry, 'Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of India as an Emerging Power,' *India Review*, 3 (1), January 2004, pp. 64–87.

on resurgent powers were those that looked at the role of these powers in the World Trade Organization (WTO) — the first multilateral forum where they began to exert their influence almost a decade after the end of the Cold War.⁴ In an edited volume by David Scott *Handbook of India's International Relations* (2011), Scott highlights India's engagement with the UN and the regimes and/or forums dealing with international terrorism, nuclear weapons, climate change, and outer space.⁵ According to one interpretation, Indian practice reflects an attempt at influencing global governance through oligarchy, be it through the Five Interested Parties in WTO, Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC) in Copenhagen Climate Change Summit 2009, or the G4 in United Nations Security Council (UNSC).⁶ Three other comprehensive volumes add to the understanding of India's multilateralism during the decade: WPS Sidhu et al edited *Shaping the Emerging World, India and the Order* (2013), David M. Malone et al edited *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy* (2015), and Teresita and Howard Schaffer authored *India at the Global High Table* (2016).⁷

In this context, on the positive side, there are arguments that despite several limitations, India, along with other emerging powers, has

⁴ For pioneering work on India in this context see Amrita Narlikar, 'WTO Decision-Making and Developing Countries,' *Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity (T.R.A.D.E.) Working Papers*, 11, 2001 and several others by the same author.

⁵ David Scott (ed.), *Handbook of India's International Relations*, Routledge, London, 2011.

⁶ Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone, "From High Ground to High Table: The Evolution of Indian Multilateralism", *Global Governance*, 17 (3), July–September 2011, pp. 311–329. Also see David Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2011, pp. 249–273.

⁷ Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Bruce D. Jones (eds.), *Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2013; David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015; Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard B. Schaffer, *India at the Global High Table: The Quest for Regional Primacy and Strategic Autonomy*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2016.

contributed to changing the norms of global governance in several issue areas. Notable among these are the continuing efforts at evolving an equitable economic order through reform of the Bretton Woods institutions and the rules of the international trade regime.⁸ On the negative side, it has been argued that leading powers such as India (also China and Japan) are more concerned with developing and legitimising their national power aspirations than with contributing to global governance.⁹ More specifically, India's approach towards the UN and its related bodies has been explained in realist terms as being aimed at maximising its influence through seeking representation at the high table mainly in order to enhance its status rather than leading developing nations through its thought or action.¹⁰

Several studies have focussed attention on India as rising power. However, as discussed above, most of them have looked at India in the multilateral economic realm. How countries like India could become norm makers rather than norm takers in fields like global energy governance where the norm of market access could be replaced by norms of energy security and clean energy is also an emerging area of study.¹¹ Much less has been said about their contribution to matters of international peace and security. To add to this dimension, this study seeks to understand India's contribution to the global governance of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

⁸ Shyam Saran, *The Evolving Role of Emerging Economies in Global Governance-An Indian Perspective*, at <http://www.ficci.com/EmergingEconomiesPaper-shyam-saran.pdf>, (Accessed 4 January 2012).

⁹ Amitav Acharya, "Can Asia lead?, Power Ambitions and Global Governance in the Twenty-First Century", *International Affairs*, 81 (4), 2001, pp. 851–869.

¹⁰ Sreeram Chaulia, "India and the United Nations", in David Scott (ed.), *Handbook of India's International Relations*, Routledge, London, 2011, pp. 277–288.

¹¹ Navroz K. Dubash, "From Norm taker to Norm maker? Indian energy governance in global Context", <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2011.00123.x/pdf>, (Accessed 15 March 2013), pp. 66–79.

INDIA IN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING

India's role in peacekeeping has been well documented. It is widely appreciated that India is the largest contributor to peacekeeping with 2, 53,000 troops taking part in 49 missions.¹² At present, it is the third largest troop contributor with 5,538 troops contributing to various peacekeeping missions. However, a survey of the literature on India in peacekeeping indicates that there has been precious little said and known about India's diplomacy on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, which is the focus of this study. This is despite the oft stated importance of peacekeeping as an example of India's commitment to multilateralism and the UN "...where such operations are based on a general consensus among the members of the United Nations".¹³

Prominent studies on India's engagement with peacekeeping recount the Indian involvement with peacekeeping since the days of the Korean crisis. In *For the Honour of India: A History of Indian Peacekeeping* (2009), the authors led by Lt. Gen. (Retd) Satish Nambiar outline in great detail the role played by the Indian contingent in various peacekeeping operations. Interestingly, they also highlight the contributions of senior Indian political leadership and Indian force commanders of various UN missions.¹⁴ The website of the Permanent Mission of India to the UN in Washington D.C. cited above also showcases India's contributions to past and present UN peacekeeping operations. Among the major achievements in these peacekeeping operations from a military

¹² Permamnet Mission of India to UN New York (PMI), India and United Nations: Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, at https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/menu/submenu__1260383365.pdf, (Accessed 7 December 2021).

¹³ J. N. Dixit, "India's Approach to Multilateralism", in C. Uday Bhaskar, K. Santhanam, Uttam Sinha and Tasneem Meenai (eds), *United Nations: Multilateralism and International Security*, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Shipra Publications, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 63–72.

¹⁴ Lt Gen (Retd) Satish Nambiar, *For the Honour of India: A History of Indian Peacekeeping*, Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research/USI, New Delhi, 2009.

perspective¹⁵ mention has been made of India as the chair of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Force Commander of the Custodian Force dealing with prisoners of war in the aftermath of the Korean War; India as Chair of each of the International Commissions for Supervision and Control set up in Vietnam,¹⁶ Laos, and Cambodia after the Geneva Accords of 1954; the forceful role of the peacekeepers that helped in the re-unification of Congo; 11 years of peacekeeping as part of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) I in Gaza; providing the Head of Mission and force Commander for United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR); keeping the peace in the politically sensitive areas of Cambodia as part of United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC); provision of naval warships to Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia, followed by humanitarian assistance and civic action in very difficult circumstances; and ensuring the conduct of free and fair elections in Namibia.¹⁷

Another genre of studies on peacekeeping highlight the rationale of Indian involvement in peacekeeping. Prominent among the writings on this aspect are those by Francis Parakatil (1975)¹⁸ and Alan Bullion (1997).¹⁹ They both emphasise the moral imperatives, such as helping non-aligned or developing countries dealing with issues of peace and security and providing humanitarian relief. Kabilan Krishnasamy (2003)

¹⁵ Indian Army, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, London, Wisconsin, 1997.

¹⁶ For more details see Ramesh Thakur, "Peacekeeping and Foreign Policy: Canada, India and the International Commission in Vietnam, 1954-1965", *British Journal of International Studies*, 6, (2), July 1980, pp. 125-153.

¹⁷ Also see Arjun Ray, "India's experience in peacekeeping, capacity building and training of UN peacekeepers", in Ministry of External Affairs, *New Delhi Seminar on UN Peacekeeping: Assessment, Prospects*, 1999.

¹⁸ Francis Parakatil, *India and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Sultan Chand and Company, New Delhi, 1975.

¹⁹ Alan Bullion, "India and UN Peacekeeping Operations", *International Peacekeeping*, 4 (1), Spring 1997, pp. 98-114.

argues that India contributes to peacekeeping for a combination of reasons, significant among them being projecting its image as a player in maintaining international peace and security. This also finds an echo in the words of former Chief of Army Staff:

Indian army in peacekeeping operations is a reflection of India's quest for international peace...responsibility as a Harbinger of peace...the role that is in consonance with its growing stature as an emerging power.²⁰

Among the other reasons that Krishnasamy refers to are scoring points over Germany and Japan in its quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council²¹ and strengthening bilateral and multilateral relations, for instance, through the Joint Working Group on peacekeeping.²² He contends that through peacekeeping India also seeks to negate its image as a regional belligerent by projecting itself as the global peacekeeper.

Frank Rooyen (2010)²³ and Ruchita Beri (2008)²⁴ highlight that while India participated in only one peacekeeping operation in Africa during the Cold War, its engagement since then has increased. The imperative for peacekeeping in Africa is a combination of altruism and national interest. Alan James Bullion (2005) also looks at Indian peacekeeping in Africa and raises concerns regarding Indian involvement in places

²⁰ "Foreword", in Indian Army (1997), no. 15.

²¹ Manish Kumar Yadav, "India's Quest for United Nations Security Council Permanent Seat with special references to its peacekeeping credentials", *Global Journal of Political Science*, 2, (1) January 2014, pp. 1–11.

²² Kabilan Krishnasamy, "The paradox of India's peacekeeping", *Contemporary South Asia*, 12 (2), June 2003, pp. 263–280.

²³ Frank van Rooyen, "Blue Helmets for Africa: India's Peacekeeping in Africa", SAIIA Paper No.60, May 2010, at <http://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/blue-helmets-for-africa-indias-peacekeeping-in-africa>, (Accessed 21 April 2014).

²⁴ Ruchita Beri, "India's Role in Keeping Peace in Africa", *Strategic Analysis*, 32 (2), 2008, pp. 197–221.

such as Sierra Leone and Somalia where the country's strategic interests were not directly affected and where the risks involved were substantially high.²⁵

Yeshi Choedan (2010) states that the rationales for Indian participation in peacekeeping have changed with time. Until 1964, India was participating in peacekeeping operations to prevent the UN from being paralysed due to the Cold War.²⁶ Since then its participation reduced until the end of the Cold War due to domestic security issues, heavy financial burdens of operations in Congo and Gaza, rise in new troop contributors, the low stature of the Prime Minister's since Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi's lack of interest in the UN and UN peacekeeping.²⁷ Post-Cold War again saw a rise in India's involvement in peacekeeping though with "a critical and reflective stance, judging each new operation on its relative merits and demerits".²⁸ C. Raja Mohan (2013) explains that due to concerns of intervention in Kashmir India had moved away from participation in peacekeeping. However, more current rationales such as "the new imperatives of India's national security, the changing nature of its great power relations, the logic of maintaining a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region, India's growing military capabilities, the renewed awareness of its role as a regional security provider, and its increasing weight in the international system" would result in greater Indian involvement in peacekeeping.²⁹

²⁵ Alan James Bullion, "India", in David S. Sorenson and Pia Christina Wood (eds.), *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, Frank Cass, London and New York, 2005, pp. 196–212.

²⁶ Yeshi Choedan, "India's Role in UN Peacekeeping Operations: An Analysis of the Rationale of Participation", in Ankush B. Sawant (ed.), *Sixty Years of India's Contribution to the United Nations*, The Centre of International Strategic and Development Studies, Authors Press, New Delhi, 2010, pp. 247–268.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 251.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 252.

²⁹ C. Raja Mohan, "India and International Peace Operations", *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security*, No. 2013/3, April 2013, at <http://books.sipri.org/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1303.pdf>, p. 8, (Accessed 21 April 2014).

Richard Gowan and Sushant K. Singh (2014) have attributed India's interest in peacekeeping to the Nehruvian ideal of supporting developing countries.³⁰ Over the years, it has also been important for the military as it aids the military in force projection and gives it some financial gain in the form of reimbursements. Garima Mohan and Olivia Gippner (2015) argue that the Indian participation in peacekeeping is best explained using a realist paradigm. According to them, India participates in peacekeeping as it has a large-sized army that can be sourced upon for troops. In the early years after its independence, it helped India show its foreign policy commitment to processes of decolonisation and establish solidarity and better relations with newly decolonised countries. In the post-Cold War era, peacekeeping serves to fulfil India's international political aspirations.³¹

The Indian contribution to the discourse on peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the UN, which falls in the realm of diplomacy has not received much attention. Yeshi Choedon (2013) argues that India's engagement with peacekeeping has not been limited to contribution of troops.³² Choedon (2010) recognises that in the early years of the evolution of the UN, the Cold War precluded the collective security role of the Security Council. India, along with other countries, played a role in conceptualising the idea of sending observers and commissions that could intersect between warring parties and bring about an end to conflict.³³ India's engagement with peacekeeping continued

³⁰ Richard Gowan and Sushant K. Singh, "India and UN Peacekeeping: The Weight of History and a Lack of Strategy", in Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Bruce Jones (2013), no.7, pp. 177–195.

³¹ Garima Mohan and Olivia Gippner, "Chinese and Indian Approaches to United Nations Peacekeeping: A Theoretical Appraisal of Contributing Patterns and Decision-Making Structures", *Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice*, 7 (1), 2015, pp. 47–77.

³² Yeshi Choedon, "Indian and Chinese Engagement in UN Complex Peacekeeping Operations: A Comparative Perspective", *China Report*, 2013, 49 (2), pp. 205–226.

³³ Yeshi Choedon (2010), no. 26.

notwithstanding the multidimensional nature of peacekeeping in the era of increasing intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War years. This engagement was characterised by several objections and caveats regarding policy issues related to peacekeeping such as renewed emphasis on minimum use of military means, reservations regarding humanitarian interventions, steady finances for peacekeeping, a stand-by brigade for the UN, training for UN peacekeeping, overreliance on regional organisations, jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) over peacekeeping forces, need for consultation with troop contributing countries and their increased role in decision making.³⁴ Indian concerns regarding robust peacekeeping that requires use of force when necessary and raises issues of legal immunity of peacekeepers as well as the implications of use of force for sovereignty of states has been studied by Sandeep Dewan and Lotte Vermeiji (2014).³⁵ An incisive account of India's non-permanent membership of the Security Council by C.S.R. Murthy also provides valuable inputs on India's position on some aspects of peacekeeping.³⁶

Richard Gowan and Sushant K. Singh (2014) offer a critical perspective by arguing that Indian policy makers have not made any major contribution to discussions about peacekeeping strategies. They contend that India's diplomacy at the UN is centred on 'tactical processes' rather than strategies.³⁷ There is a contradiction in India's stand of peacekeeping where as a 'rule defender' it stands firm on respect for the principle of sovereignty of states, yet as a 'rule bender' it does robust peacekeeping where required. They also refer to India working with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) bloc to counter robust peacekeeping in the Committee of 34. They, however, acknowledge that India very ably

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Sandeep Dewan and Lotte Vermeiji, *Indian Perspectives on the Use of Force and the Growing Robustness of UN Peacekeeping*, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Policy Brief, 8/2014.

³⁶ C.S.R. Murthy, "India's Non-permanent Membership in the Security Council", in Ankush B. Sawant (2010), no.26, pp. 39–62.

³⁷ Rihard Gowan and Sushant K Singh (2014), no. 30, p. 179.

voiced the need for substantial consultations between the troop contributing countries and the Security Council in 2008–09. Also in 2011, as a member of the Special Advisory Group, it was a prime player in the quest for better funding of UN peacekeeping operations. There is, however, no detailed study of the Indian diplomacy's engagement with issues of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War years.

On the subject of peacebuilding there is very little scholarly literature. Some insights on the way India does peacebuilding is available in recent studies of emerging powers (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS)) and their contribution to peacebuilding.³⁸

According to them, India's approach to peacebuilding is human centred, contributing to payment in kind for food, and supporting education, agriculture, and healthcare. In Afghanistan, India's peacebuilding contribution has been in the form of supporting infrastructure projects. Here too there is no appreciation of Indian diplomacy's engagement with issues of peacebuilding.

From the perspective of global governance, there has been some focus on understanding the implications of the increasing involvement of emerging powers in peacekeeping. A question that interests scholars is whether emerging powers will challenge the status quo in the Western dominated field of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.³⁹ The conclusion

³⁸ Oliver P. Richmond and Ioannis Tellidis, "The BRICS and International Peacebuilding and Statebuilding", *NOREF Report*, January 2013, at http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/5f8c6a3d43ec8fff5692d7b596af2491.pdf, (Accessed 21 April 2014). Jeremy Allouche and Jeremy Lind, 'Beyond the New Deal: Global Collaboration and Peacebuilding with BRICS Countries,' *IDS Policy Briefing*, April 2014, at http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/3817/AD_ID176_PB;jsessionid=00FBF8BA49F601D84460286DFD20124E?sequence=1#59_BeyondNewDeal_2.1.pdf, (Accessed 21 April 2014).

³⁹ Thierry Tardy, "Emerging Powers and Peacekeeping: An Unlikely Normative Clash", GCSF Policy Paper 2012/13, at <http://www.gcsp.ch/Leadership-Crisis-Conflict-Management/Publications/GCSP-Publications/Policy-Papers/Emerging-Powers-and-Peacekeeping-an-Unlikely-Normative-Clash>, (Accessed 21 April 2014).

is that for a variety of practical and financial reasons they are unlikely to challenge the normative consensus on these issues for after all, these issues are not as strategically significant as say their relationship with the United States (US), or a UNSC seat. There is, however, no study that outlines what the global governance of peacekeeping and peacebuilding entails in the first place.

This study aims to fill these gaps. Based on an intensive study of the interventions made by the representatives of India in the various bodies and committees of the UN, it argues that this engagement with peacekeeping and peacebuilding must be construed as a contribution to the global governance of these issues. The study is structured in the following manner:

Chapter II: Multiple Facets of India in Global Governance

Chapter III: Global Governance of Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Chapter IV: India and Peacekeeping in the Security Council

Chapter V: India and Peacekeeping in the General Assembly

Chapter VI: India and Peacebuilding

Conclusion: Indian Contribution to Global Governance of Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

MULTIPLE FACETS OF INDIA IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

“Global governance is governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers. Global governance is doing internationally what governments do at home.”⁴⁰ Further, it is “any purposeful activity intended to “control” or influence someone else that either occurs in the arena occupied by nations or, occurring at other levels, projects influence into that arena.” To institutionalise governance, “we must say the institution in question is a means of governance, a governance organization or agency, or an actor in governance”.

Generically, it has been argued that emerging powers are culturally, politically, and economically different from established powers and have a substantial impact on global governance. Their influence has resulted in the emergence of six trends in global governance, namely: that global governance is increasingly contested; there is contest for leadership and privilege; the liberal social purpose of global governance is taking a backseat; existing multilateral institutions are facing a deadlock; informalisation is increasing; and there is a fragmentation of global governance as witnessed in the formation of new trade blocs, new institutions in development finance, and new informal blocs.⁴¹

More specifically in the context of this study, the focus is on India as an actor in global governance. The rise of India has shown itself through exemplary growth rates, rise of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), fall

⁴⁰ Lawrence S. Finkelstein, “What is Global Governance?”, *Global Governance*, 1 (3), September–December 1995, pp. 367–372.

⁴¹ Mathew D. Stephen, “Emerging Powers and Emerging Trends in Global Governance”, *Global Governance*, 23 (3), (July–Sept. 2017), pp. 483–502.

in poverty rates, rise in imports and exports, and increasing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).⁴²

As a country in a 'post-post-colonial phase',⁴³ India's policies are constantly adapting to the geopolitical trends of the day. India, however, remains steadfast in its adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, namely: 1. Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty 2. Mutual nonaggression 3. Mutual non-interference in internal affairs 4. Equality and mutual benefit 5. Peaceful coexistence. These, it has been argued, are the bases for "India's staunch support for the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states."⁴⁴ India is predominantly seen as a country that has preferred bilateral and plurilateral engagements over engagements with institutions of global governance.⁴⁵ It is also noted as a country that has overcome its non-aligned and third world tilts and as an emerging power indulges in global governance by oligarchy that is, working through small groups and coalitions.⁴⁶ As an actor, India contributes to the governance of several issues that are in the global realm. The nature of India's contribution to global governance can be

⁴² Arvind Panagariya, "India: A Global Economic Power? Revisiting the Past and Contemplating the Future", *Journal of International Affairs*, 64 (2), SPRING/SUMMER 2011, Sino-Indian Relations, pp. 197–212. Stephen P. Cohen, "India Rising", *The Wilson Quarterly*, 24 (3), Summer, 2000, pp. 32–53. Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi, 'India Rising: What Is New Delhi to Do?', *World Policy Journal*, 24 (1), Spring, 2007, pp. 9–18.

⁴³ Jean-Luc Racine, "Post-Post-Colonial India: From Regional Power to Global Player", *Politique Étrangère*, 73, Autumn 2008, Special Issue: World Policy Conference 2008, pp. 65–78.

⁴⁴ David P. Fidler and Sumit Ganguly, "India and Eastphalia", *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 17 (1), Winter 2010, pp. 147–164.

⁴⁵ Poorvi Chitalkar and David M. Malone, "India and Global Governance", in David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan (2015), no. 7, pp. 581–595.

⁴⁶ Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone, "From High Ground to High Table: The Evolution of Indian Multilateralism", *Global Governance*, 17 (3), Special Issue: Emerging Powers and Multilateralism in the Twenty-First Century, July–Sept. 2011, pp. 311–329.

discerned through its engagement with the many issues. Based on an analysis of India's engagement with governance of such issues in the post-Cold War era, this chapter delineates the many facets of India in global governance.

2.1 CLIMATE CHANGE

The governance of climate change at the global level takes place through the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change that was adopted at the Rio Summit in 1992. India participated actively in the making of the Convention. It highlighted the issue of per capita emissions and was responsible for replacing the norm of 'common responsibilities' with that of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' in favour of developing countries.⁴⁷ It was instrumental in the setting up of a separate institutional mechanism for climate funding. In the adoption of Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which laid out binding targets for climate mitigation by developed countries, India galvanised a Green Group of 72 countries to push through the protocol. At the Conference of Parties (COP) 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, India was part of the BASIC forum and along with other large developing countries accepted mitigation actions and reduction in the intensity of emissions if supported financially by the developed countries. At the Durban conference in 2011, India was part of a group of Like-minded Developing Countries including China, members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) that together argued for removal of barriers to transfer of technology, especially intellectual property rights.⁴⁸

A sea change in India's engagement with the climate change regime was witnessed at the COP21 in Paris in 2015 where India made a transition from being a veto player to an agenda setter.⁴⁹ India introduced

⁴⁷ Navroz K. Dubash and Lavanya Rajamani, "Multilateral Diplomacy on Climate Change", in David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan (2015), no. 7, pp. 663–677, p. 664.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Amrita Narlikar, "India's role in Global Governance: A Modi-fication", *International Affairs*, 93 (1), 2017, pp. 93–111.

the idea of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), which would enable each country to adopt its own commitments based on its level of development and capabilities for adaptation and mitigation. For the first time, India made a commitment to source 40 per cent of its electricity from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030. India also forwarded the idea of developed countries contributing financially to help developing countries adapt to newer climate-friendly technologies and undertake steps for mitigation of hazards. By speaking about ‘development without destruction’ India made its own contribution to the idea of sustainable development. India also showcased a ‘problem solving’ approach by launching the International Solar Alliance with its headquarters in India. This, it has been noted, was a big change from an India that mainly spoke of common but differentiated responsibilities and objected to accepting any carbon emission cuts while laying the responsibility for climate action mainly on the developed countries.⁵⁰ At the COP26 held in 2021, India accepted some nationally determined targets such as to get 50 per cent of its energy from renewable resources by 2030; creating 500 gigawatts (GW) of non-fossil electricity capacity; reduce total projected carbon emissions by one billion tonnes by 2030; emissions intensity of the GDP by more than 45 per cent by 2030; and finally to get to net zero by 2070.⁵¹ Thus, India in the global governance of the issue of climate change can be seen as an actor that brought forth the concerns of the developing countries vis-à-vis climate change since it affected their course of development. From a non-budging developing country position, India has now transitioned to an emerging power position of accepting some self-imposed deadlines on its adaptation and mitigation targets.

2.2 DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

The governance of development assistance has been dominated by the trio of International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and

⁵⁰ Alyssa Ayres, “Will India Start Acting Like a Global Power: New Delhi’s New Role”, *Foreign Affairs*, 96 (6), November/December 2017, pp. 83–92.

⁵¹ MEA, National Statement by Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi at COP 26 Summit in Glasgow, November 02, 2021.

the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The assistance that gets provided to developing countries through these three channels is conditional and available for pre-determined kinds of projects. India for long has been a beneficiary of both the IMF balance of payments facility and the World Bank's project lending.⁵² India's main point of contention regarding the IMF has been the need to increase the quota for developing countries to give them more voice in the functioning of the institution. Having made limited progress in doing so, an economically vibrant India has entered the domain of development assistance by offering to countries a 'development partnership'.⁵³ India's development partnership is demand driven, meaning it is based on the requirements of the recipient country and is not conditional upon social justice, environmental sustainability, democracy, and human rights.⁵⁴ It is comprehensive and involves multiple instruments including the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, grants-in-aid, lines of credit and capacity building, and technical assistance. Together, they serve India's strategic and commercial interests.⁵⁵ India's development partnership has been largely confined to its neighbourhood and some countries in the Indian Ocean Region and is now extended to several countries in Africa. India set up the India–UN Development Partnership Fund in 2017 to help the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the achievement of their Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

⁵² Devesh Kapur, "India and International Financial Institutions and Arrangements", in Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Bruce D. Jones (2013), no. 7.

⁵³ MEA, Overview of India's Development Partnership, at mea.gov.in/Overview-of-India-Development-Partnership.htm, (Accessed 24 January 2022).

⁵⁴ Fahimul Quadir, "Rising Donors and the New Narrative of 'South–South' Cooperation: what prospects for changing the landscape of development assistance programmes?", *Third World Quarterly*, 34 (2), 2013, pp. 321–338, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2013.775788

⁵⁵ Ibid.

Other significant ways in which India is seeking to affect the realm of development assistance is through setting up alternative finance mechanisms in collaboration with other countries. India has become a pivotal member of plurilateral grouping such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and India, Brazil, South Africa Forum (IBSA). The BRICS grouping was formed with the intention of reform of global and economic governance, facilitation of market integration, sharing indigenous knowledge and development experiences across key sectors, etc.⁵⁶ The New Development Bank (NDB) of the BRICS is a multilateral lending institution set up in 2015 that provides funds for sustainable infrastructure projects in the BRICS countries. As on date, the NDB has approved projects worth USD 25.07 billion, with 18 projects worth USD 6.9 billion in India.⁵⁷ The IBSA, on the other hand, is a forum committed to South–South Cooperation.⁵⁸ It consists of a forum for consultation and coordination on global and regional issues. It also has 14 working groups and six people-to-people forums. Finally, there is the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Trust Fund, which is part of the UN system and provides funds for projects in LDCs for alleviation of poverty and hunger. India has also contributed to the China-led Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB). All these platforms have given India a larger say in the disbursement of aid and enabled it to reach out to countries beyond its immediate geographic confines. Thus, India as an actor in global governance of the issue of development assistance can be seen as an innovator that has created its own way of providing development finance. It can also be seen as an actor that is challenging the very structure of Western-led development aid.

⁵⁶ Samir Saran, “India’s Contemporary Plurilateralism”, in David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan (2015), pp. 623–635, no. 7.

⁵⁷ BRICS India 2021, at brics2021.gov.in/ndb, (Accessed 25 January 2022).

⁵⁸ Chris Alden and Marco Antonio Vieira, “The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and Trilateralism”, *Third World Quarterly*, 26 (7), 2005, pp. 1077–1095.

2.3 TRADE

The governance of trade has been under the control of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) until 1995 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) subsequently. India's position on various issues related to trade have earned it the title of a naysayer or a veto player.⁵⁹ In various phases of negotiation under the remit of the GATT and WTO, India built coalitions of developing countries to make its case for their mutual interests. India was a prominent country in the setting up of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and worked in it through the G-77 coalition to make the connect between trade and development.⁶⁰ In the Uruguay Round that began in Punta Del Este in July 1986, India was part of the G10, a coalition of the inward-looking economies of Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Egypt, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia that opposed the “deep integration” that went beyond border measures to bring about changes in domestic legislation in the interest of the liberalisation of trade. They continued to favour state intervention and import substitution, more liberalisation of textile and agriculture, and the non-inclusion of services and intellectual property in the new round of trade negotiations. In the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, India was able to hold up the linking of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to issues of public health (the production of generic drugs). In the Singapore Ministerial in 1996, India also opposed the making of the linkage between labour standards and trade.

India entered the Doha Round of negotiations proposing the idea of ‘inclusive globalisation’. In the Doha Round, India was able to secure the TRIPS and Public Health Declaration in 2000, and amendments to it in 2005–06 to secure a waiver from TRIPS rules for the health sector.

⁵⁹ Amrita Narlikar, “Is India a Responsible Power?”, *Third World Quarterly*, 32 (9), 2011, pp. 1607–1621.

⁶⁰ This section draws on the author's analysis on trade in Arpita Anant, *Development and India's Economic Multilateralism: Where From?...Where to?*, IDSA Monograph Series, No. 68, December 2020.

This amendment to TRIPS was ratified by 54 countries by 2010. India and others also opposed the inclusion of new issues – competition, investment, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation – in the Doha Round. The reason given was that they were not part of the development agenda. It formed an alliance called the Like-Minded Group (LMG) to prevent this inclusion and mobilised the support for this in G-77 and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Through the Doha Round, in the Cancun Ministerial of 2003 and the Hong Kong Ministerial of 2005, India called for end to agricultural subsidies in the developed countries.

At the WTO Ministerial meeting in Bali in 2013, it was decided that a Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) for simplifying procedures for handling trade at borders (not limited to agriculture) would be attempted. It was agreed that there would be a 4-year peace clause that would enable developing countries to hold more than 10 per cent of their produce in agriculture stockpiles, and that negotiations on the TFA would continue. However, with the change in government in 2014, India held up the TFA for the agriculture stockholding agreement. India was alone in the WTO on this decision. In the WTO negotiations on environmental goods and services launched in 2014, an attempt was made (mainly by the United States of America (USA) to remove trade and non-trade barriers for environment-friendly goods and services that are dual use, and largely being produced by developed countries. Only 18 products in the single-use category being produced by developing countries were to be allowed reciprocal zero-duty access to developed country markets. This too was not acceptable to India.

Thus, in the global governance of trade, India has been an actor that has constantly put forth its concerns either on its own or as part of ad hoc coalitions. It has never been shy of holding up agreements if it felt that they were contrary to India's interests. However, its actions and positions have always been in the interests of the developing countries and so are better dubbed as 'developmental multilateralism'.⁶¹

⁶¹ Charalampos Efstathopoulos and Dominic Kelly, "India, developmental multilateralism and the Doha Ministerial conference", *Third World Quarterly*, 35 (6), 2014, pp. 1066–1081.

2.4 DISARMAMENT

The governance of disarmament has taken place through the formulation and working of treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Together they form the arms control and disarmament regime. India's engagement with this regime has been a fascinating story. India has usually begun by evincing great interest in negotiating these treaties and eventually not signed on to them citing strategic and normative reasons.⁶²

Between the 1960s–80s, India used the implicit nuclear umbrellas and international institutions to shield itself from nuclear threats.⁶³ India signed on to the Partial Test Ban Treaty mainly to constrain China from developing its nuclear weapons. India keenly negotiated the NPT but rejected the final draft of the treaty because it was aimed at preventing the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons rather than rolling back existing nuclear weapons programmes. It thus discriminated between the nuclear haves and have-nots. In addition, it added two crucial elements to the NPT: that peaceful nuclear energy would be made available to the non-nuclear states, and that non-proliferation was not an end in itself, but a step towards universal nuclear disarmament.⁶⁴ India refused to sign the CTBT as it would not be able to prevent the sub-critical tests and computer simulations. And finally, India refused to sign the FMCT as it merely curtailed the future production of fissile material and had no proviso for dealing with existing stockpiles.

⁶² Rajesh Rajagopalan, "Multilateralism in India's Nuclear Policy: A Questionable Default Option", in David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan (2015), pp. 650–662, no. 7.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 651.

⁶⁴ Amrita Narlikar, "Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation? Explaining the Negotiating Strategy of a Rising India", *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 82, (1), Perspectives on Emerging Would-Be Great Powers, January 2006, pp. 59–76.

In 1974, India conducted its peaceful nuclear explosion to announce to the world that it had the ability to produce nuclear weapons. However, the nature of the test was such that it allowed India to position itself in the category of non-nuclear weapons states. In 1998, India conducted overt tests to become a de facto nuclear weapon state and continued to remain outside the purview of the NPT. This resulted in the imposition of sanctions for a brief period of time. India emerged from the sanctions by presenting itself as a responsible owner of nuclear technology and signing of the 123 Agreement on civilian uses of nuclear energy with USA. Eventually, it was also able secure the required waivers from the NSG to participate in nuclear commerce.

Having acquired the de facto nuclear weapon status, India went back to its pacific roots. Rather than follow the usual trajectory of building nuclear arsenals following the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD), India showcased its pacific intent by announcing a ‘no first use’ policy.⁶⁵

Then, in 2010, it announced that it would maintain credible minimum deterrence, with its pledge for ‘no-first-use’ being applicable vis-à-vis non-nuclear weapon states.

Thus, as an actor in regime governing nuclear weapons, India has shown remarkable resilience in holding off discriminatory treaties such as the NPT. It has also displayed the ability to stay away from instruments such as the CTBT and FMCT since they did not contribute to genuine disarmament and were at best half-steps. In the manner in which it went about its nuclear tests, weathered the sanctions, and secured for itself a way back into the fold of responsible nuclear weapon states, India has been an agenda setter.⁶⁶

The foregoing analysis of India in global governance showcases India as a versatile actor. Its role in the governance of different issue areas

⁶⁵ Deep K. Datta-Ray, “India’s Gandhian Foreign Policy”, in François Godement, *What Does India Think?*, *European Council on Foreign Relations*, 2015.

⁶⁶ Amrita Narlikar (2011), no. 59.

has been tempered by the nature of the regime in each case. India is thus like the proverbial elephant, who is perceived by the blind men, each in their own way, depending on the perspective they approach it with. There are thus, many facets of India in global governance. Bearing this conclusion in mind, we can now move on to understanding the Indian engagement with peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING

Both peacekeeping and peacebuilding have been ongoing since much before the concept of global governance came into vogue. With the end of the Cold War, as the attention of the world turned towards intra-state conflict, issues of peacekeeping, peace-making, and peacebuilding and factors adversely affecting human security and sustainable development gained ground. The UN Secretary-General supported the institution of the Commission on Global Governance in 1992. The Commission's report entitled *Our Global Neighbourhood* recommended wide-ranging reforms for promoting security, managing economic interdependence, reforming the UN, and strengthening the rule of law worldwide.⁶⁷ While it accorded a central role to the UN in this process and emphasised the importance of states in implementing several of these new rules, it also recognised the increasing role of civil society and private actors in contributing to these processes. Since then, peacekeeping and peacebuilding as issues in global governance have received a fair deal of attention from the UN and the academic community.

3.1 GOVERNANCE OF PEACEKEEPING

The governance of peacekeeping involves the Security Council, the troop/police contributing countries, the UN Secretariat, The Committee of 34 (C-34), the Fifth (Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) Committee of the General

⁶⁷ Report of the Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, 1995, at <http://www.sovereignty.net/p/gov/ogn-front.html>, (Accessed 04 March 2013).

Assembly, and the Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) Working Group.⁶⁸ The Secretary-General asks the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to prepare a report on the need of the mission and its mandate. This report is then sent to the Security Council. Here, the pen-holding countries, or the United Kingdom (UK), France, and the US, prepare the mandate, discuss it first with Russia and China, and then with the elected members of the Council.⁶⁹

In the early years, the first UN peacekeeping operations namely, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) were set up by the Security Council itself. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), however, was established by the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution as a result of the deadlock in the Security Council. Subsequently, the Secretary-General issued regulations for the functioning of the UNEF. A Secretary-General's report started to codify the principles of peacekeeping.⁷⁰

In 1965, a Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations with 33 member countries was established (C33) to deal with the impasse on the funding of peacekeeping operations when the Soviet Union and France refused to pay their assessed contributions as per Article 17 of the Charter. The Committee, established under the 4th Committee of the General Assembly, however, began to focus on developing guidelines for peacekeeping and did so for much of the 1970s and 1980s. The Committee's membership expanded first, to include China in 1988 (hence it became C34) and subsequently all observer member countries

⁶⁸ Lisa Sharland, *How Peacekeeping Policy gets made: Navigating Intergovernmental Processes at the UN*, International Peace Institute, New York, May 2018, at https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/1805_How-Peacekeeping-Policy-Gets-Made.pdf, (Accessed 10 September 2021).

⁶⁹ Kseniya Oksamytna and Magnus Lundgren, "Decorating the "Christmas Tree": The UN Security Council and the Secretariat's Recommendations on Peacekeeping Mandates", *Global Governance*, 27, (2), 2021, pp. 226–250.

⁷⁰ Lisa Sharland (2018), no. 68, p. 5.

since 1996. By 2018, its membership stood at 153 countries.⁷¹ In 2010, the C34 became the site for several contestations between the Western and non-Western countries as well as representatives of troop/police contributing countries on issues of reimbursements for peacekeeping. The C34 conducts an annual review of peacekeeping called the “Comprehensive review of the whole questions of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects”.

With the end of the Cold War, the Secretariat started to become more professional regarding the growth and expansion of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s. From 2000, its role in making peacekeeping policy increased.⁷² The Security Council too became active and authorised several multidimensional peacekeeping operations.⁷³ A Security Council Summit restructured the Secretariat and established the DPKO in 1992. In 2001, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1353 to facilitate consultations with the troop contributing countries as part of the process of renewal of peacekeeping mandates. In 2007, the Department of Field Support and a Division of Policy Evaluation and Training (in the DPKO) were set up. The 5th Committee of the General Assembly or the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) too became an important structure for the global governance of peacekeeping since it was here that several debates took place over the lack of funds for peacekeeping and inappropriate levels of reimbursements for peacekeeping troops. In the Committee debates on peacekeeping, the G-77 countries stood united for the cause of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). In 2013, the Committee resolved the issue by revising the rates for reimbursement.

⁷¹ Ibid, p. 6, p. 9.

⁷² Ibid, p. 8.

⁷³ Philip Cunliffe, “The Politics of Global Governance in UN Peacekeeping”, *International Peacekeeping*, 16 (3), 2009, pp. 323–336.

The debate on reformulating the basics of peacekeeping began in the aftermath of the Cold War. There were several landmarks in this process. The Agenda for Peace (1992) recommended that UN missions require to not only prevent conflict by peacekeeping, but also to undertake peace-making and peacebuilding. The decade of the 1990s, when the UN came in for severe criticism for being unable to keep the peace in Rwanda and peacekeepers performed various roles going beyond peacekeeping, led to the formation of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000). The Panel's report, also called the Brahimi Report, advocated 'robust peacekeeping' wherein peacekeepers could go beyond use of force in self-defence to keep the peace.⁷⁴ The Brahimi Report also emphasised the role of the Secretariat in advising the Security Council, briefings by the Secretariat, consultations between the TCCs and the Council, and establishment of a Working Group as envisaged by Article 29 of the Charter.⁷⁵ Subsequently the report of the High-Level Panel (2004) recommended the formation of the Peacebuilding Commission.⁷⁶

The Capstone Doctrine (2008) envisaged that peacekeeping should become the instrument to protect peace processes. The New Horizon Initiative (2009) laid out that there be partnerships to generate more military and police personnel for peacekeeping. It also spelt out the reforms in the management of field operations through the Global Field Support Strategy. This was followed by the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO, 2015). The latest among the initiatives is the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P), which recommends collective action by member states to support peacekeeping.

⁷⁴ Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000.

⁷⁵ Lisa Sharland (2018), no. 68.

⁷⁶ Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, A/59/565, December 2, 2004.

3.2 ISSUES IN THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF PEACEKEEPING

In the post-Cold War years, the traditional principles of peacekeeping namely, impartiality, consent of the host state, and non-use of force except in self-defence came to be challenged. Thus, in the case of Yugoslavia, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was deployed preceding the end of conflict as a result of which it ended up supporting Muslims against the hostility of Serbs. The impartiality of the mission was therefore questionable.⁷⁷ Similarly, impartiality was not maintained when the mandate itself was aimed at removing the military junta from power in Haiti and Sierra Leone.⁷⁸ It was partisan when sanctions were imposed on one side in Angola, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone. It was negated again when leaders of one of the parties to the conflict were arrested and prosecuted in Rwanda, Somalia, and Yugoslavia.

The requirement of consent of the host state for authorising a peacekeeping mission had to be compromised in the case of the missions in Somalia and Rwanda where there was no proper state authority to give consent. In order to circumvent the requirement of consent, authorisations were given under chapter VII of the UN Charter in the cases of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II), United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) and United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in Croatia, United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), etc.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Jane Boulden, "Mandates Matter: An Exploration of Impartiality in United Nations Operations", *Global Governance*, 11 (2), April–June 2005, pp. 147–160.

⁷⁸ Michael J. Matheson, *Council Unbound: The Growth of UN Decision Making on Conflict and Post Conflict Issues after the Cold War*, USIP, Washington D.C., 2006, pp.123–124.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p. 121.

The dictum of non-use of force except in self-defence too needed to change, though derogations from it were made even in earlier peacekeeping missions such as the UNEF II, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC).⁸⁰ In the post-Cold War years many peacekeeping operations had to be robust or muscular, that is, using force, such as in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan. In such cases, the distinction between peacekeeping operations and collective enforcement was blurred and there was a clear move away from the norm of minimum use of force.⁸¹

The need to protect refugees and civilians to prevent humanitarian crises of the kind seen in Srebrenica and Rwanda led to a debate on humanitarian interventions⁸² and the idea of responsibility to protect adopted by the World Summit in 2005. A notable work on this subject is the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001).⁸³ The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMISIL) was the first in a series of UN missions with protection of civilian (POC) mandate. The debate on protection of civilians in the UN commenced in 1998 and the issue found mention in the Brahimi Report (2000) and the Capstone Doctrine (2009).⁸⁴ The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was actively involved in including POC concerns in the work of the

⁸⁰ Ibid, pp. 140–142.

⁸¹ Yeshi Choedon, *Politics of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Resource Mobilisation and Alternative Arrangements*, KW Publishers Private Ltd, New Delhi, 2015, p. 40.

⁸² Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, *International Organisations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London, 2004, pp. 325–326.

⁸³ Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, December 2001, at <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>, (Accessed 10 June 2014).

⁸⁴ Michael G. Smith, Jeni Whalan and Peter Thomson, “The Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Recent Developments”, *Security Challenges*, 7 (4), Summer 2011, pp. 27–38.

UN. The C34 ensured that the DPKO and Department of Field Support (DFS) developed an operational concept of POC and a Strategic Framework to enhance the implementation of POC.⁸⁵

Peacekeeping also became multidimensional and involved support to ad hoc semi-sovereign mechanisms to provide effective transitional authority such as the Supreme National Council in Cambodia, the Commission for Peace in El Salvador, the National Consultative Council in East Timor, and the Bonn/Sintra Peace Implementation Council for Bosnia.⁸⁶ Such multidimensionality led to a debate on the civilian requirements of peacekeeping operations⁸⁷ and on improving the interaction between the peacekeepers and local social actors.⁸⁸ With increased deployment of civilian police in peacekeeping operations it was argued that there is need for integrated missions with military and police components. This was especially needed in areas where the Blue Helmets deployed consisted of contingents from various countries without joint training and joint operations, resulting in lack of unity of command.⁸⁹ With emphasis on protection of civilians, there was also a felt need for ‘bridging operations’ that could make the transition from self-defence forces to peace enforcement forces.⁹⁰

As peacekeeping operations became large and complex in the post-Cold War years, the issue of financing them became very important. A

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Michael Doyle, “Building Peace”, *Global Governance*, 13 (1), January–March 2007, pp. 1–15.

⁸⁷ Mark Plunkett, “Re-establishing Law and Order in Peace-Maintenance”, *Global Governance*, 4 (1), Peace-Maintenance Operations, January–March 1998, pp. 61–79.

⁸⁸ Beatrice Pouligny, “Peacekeepers and Local Social Actors: The Need for Dynamic, Cross-Cultural Analysis”, *Global Governance*, 5 (4), Oct.–Dec. 1999, pp. 403–424.

⁸⁹ Fred Tanner, “Addressing the Perils of Peace Operations: Toward a Global Peacekeeping System”, *Global Governance*, 16 (2), April–June 2010, pp. 209–217.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

combination of several factors resulted in shortage of funds, and this had several operational implications. The payments to TCCs, Police Contributing Country (PCCs), and for Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) were delayed. Shortages were felt in various facets of peacekeeping missions.⁹¹ For instance, air transport support could not be provided to the missions in Chad, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The mission in Liberia had to be wound down due to funding limitations. It also meant resorting to several alternative sources of funding such as trust funds that are based on voluntary contributions or self-financing of peacekeeping.⁹² In addition, there was shortage of staff in the DPKO and sourcing of inappropriate troops for peacekeeping.⁹³ Shortage of funding has also resulted in subcontracting of peacekeeping operations to individual states, coalitions of states, regional and sub-regional actors. While there are several instances of regional organisations doing peacekeeping such as Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Chad; Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Sierra Leone and Liberia; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan; and Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Moldova; serious doubts came up regarding their administrative, financial, military, and logistical capacities for peacekeeping.⁹⁴

3.3 GOVERNANCE OF PEACEBUILDING

United Nations Peacebuilding is governed by the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and the voluntary Peacebuilding Fund. Together they form the peacebuilding architecture. The Commission was set up in 2005 by the General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions to streamline

⁹¹ Yeshi Choedon (2015), no. 81, pp. 60–69.

⁹² Ibid, pp. 123–127.

⁹³ Alan James, “Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era”, *International Journal*, 50 (2), Spring 1995, pp. 249–265.

⁹⁴ Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst (2004), no. 82, p. 310.

peacekeeping tasks, especially in later stages of peacekeeping that had increased considerably due to rise in multidimensional peacekeeping. “The Commission is an advisory body composed of 31 states that brings together the permanent members of the Council, the leading financiers and personnel contributors to peacekeeping. The Commission works through country-specific committees focused on states that have ceased hostilities.”⁹⁵

The Agenda for Peace (1992) identified that main components of peacebuilding as “disarming warring parties, restoration of order, custody and possible destruction of weapons to protect human rights, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation”.⁹⁶ Following this, the Brahimi Report (2000) endorsed “integrated missions” that would combine military actions with humanitarian and developmental assistance, thus making peacekeeping and peacebuilding inter-related.⁹⁷ The Secretary-General’s report titled “No Exit without Strategy” (2001) also defined peacebuilding as “fostering the capacity to resolve future conflicts by three means...consolidating internal and external security...strengthening political institutions by increasing effectiveness and participation...and promoting economic and social reconstruction.”⁹⁸

The focus in peacebuilding has been on post-conflict reconstruction and democratisation aimed at preventing future armed conflict,

⁹⁵ Philip Cunliffe (2009), no. 73, p. 331.

⁹⁶ Alberto Cutillo, “International Assistance to countries emerging from conflict: A Review of fifteen years of interventions and the future of peacebuilding”, IPI, New York, February 2006, at https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/cutillo_e_rpt.pdf, (Accessed 23 September 2021), p. 2.

⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 3.

⁹⁸ Michael Doyle (2007), no.86, p. 9.

redressing past human rights abuses, building effective state institutions, (re)creating a social fabric, and fostering a healthy civil society.⁹⁹ Much attention has been given to reform of governance or democratisation with the belief that this would provide for long-term peace. At one point in time, the United Nations Development Programme spent nearly 60 per cent of its funds on promoting democratic governance in 145 countries.¹⁰⁰ For instance, in Nigeria, it focused on use of income from drilling and export of oil and ensured the oversight of development activities through the Independent Monitoring Group. In Guatemala it fostered the Vision Guatemala to build consensus on essential parameters of governance. In Sierra Leone, support was provided to conduct elections and for voter education. In Afghanistan, the *loya jirga* or an assembly of villagers was used to form a transitional government and a Justice Commission was formed to revive the system of justice using Afghan experts.

3.4 ISSUES IN THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF PEACEBUILDING

It has been pointed out that in several instances of interventions for peacebuilding, there has been very little involvement of the people at large.¹⁰¹ For instance, in Afghanistan assistance was provided to form an interim government. In Namibia, partnerships were built with a departing occupier. In Cambodia, attempts were made to control the divided factions. Such ‘social interventions’ were seen to be a result of the ‘subculture of UN missions’ that focussed on institution building of certain type and engaging with an elite minority.¹⁰² Instead, a call

⁹⁹ Charles T. Call and Susan E. Cook, “Introduction: Post Conflict Peacebuilding and Democratisation”, *Global Governance*, 9 (2), April–June 2003, pp. 135–139.

¹⁰⁰ Mark Malloch Brown, “Democratic Governance: Towards a Framework for Sustainable Peace”, *Global Governance*, 9 (2), April–June 2003, pp. 141–146.

¹⁰¹ Jarat Chopra and Tanja Hohe, “Participatory Intervention”, *Global Governance*, 10 (3), July–September 2004, pp. 289–305.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 290.

was made for ‘participatory interventions’ under the guidance of regional experts and anthropologists with greater involvement of the people to provide them a sense of ownership. Such interventions were experimented with through the *shura* in Afghanistan, the regional and district council of elders in Somalia, and a Community Development Committee in Rwanda.

Moreover, peacebuilding has essentially become associated with liberal values.¹⁰³ There is, for instance, a great deal of importance attached to implementing transparent government practices or human rights in prisons. If a recipient state is found wanting on these parameters, then it stands to lose the funding for peacebuilding. Worse still, the focus of peacebuilding on such expensive mechanisms as legal tribunals comes at the cost neglecting the rural hinterlands where there are high levels of child and maternal mortality as a consequence of war and post-conflict poverty. Such misplaced priorities are a result of privileging of individual rights over social responsibility. The liberal priorities of external actors and internal elites come in the way of achieving ‘popular peace’.¹⁰⁴

One of the main critiques of peacebuilding has been the lack of accountability in terms of outcomes.¹⁰⁵ Those engaged in peacebuilding do have several tasks related to formal accountability such as writing donor proposals, ensuring that money is spent on schedule and according to prescribed objectives, monitoring progress towards global indicators, etc. However, these do not assess the impact of the project on the ground. As a result, local institutions that are in need of reform do not receive the attention they require. International organisations, international non-governmental organisations, bilateral donors, and

¹⁰³ David Roberts, *Liberal Peacebuilding and Global Governance: Beyond the Metropolis*, Routledge, Oxon, 2011, p. 2.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, p. 115, p. 118.

¹⁰⁵ Susanna P. Campbell, *Global Governance and Local Peace: Accountability and Performance in International Peacebuilding*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018, p. 232.

country offices are more loyal to the headquarters than to those whom they seek to serve. Those who develop less formal accountability systems on the other hand are able to transform local institutions towards democratic governance.¹⁰⁶

The peacebuilding architecture itself has been the focus of several debates. Some of the weaknesses of this architecture are lack of a clear vision of peacebuilding; an incoherent institutional framework that involves the DPKO, Department of Political Affairs (DPA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and OCHA, each having their own idea of peacebuilding jostling with the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO); the country-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) that sign agreements with other governments for peacebuilding work while the PBC itself lacks “the funding, the technical know-how, or the operational capacity to ever deliver what it has promised in these agreements”; and the plethora of agencies, programmes, and funds in the field that lead to fragmented field operations.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 230.

¹⁰⁷ Michael Von Der Schulenburg, *Rethinking Peacebuilding: Transforming the UN Approach*, International Peace Institute, September 2014, at https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_rethinking_peacebuilding.pdf, (Accessed 23 September 2021).

INDIA AND PEACEKEEPING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

There are some interesting anecdotes and details available on the role played by India in relation to peacekeeping. It is now known that in the Suez crisis of 1956, when Israel, Britain, and France attacked Egypt and the Security Council was paralysed by the veto, it was India's representative, Arthur Lall, and his Yugoslav counterpart, Josua Brilej, who raised the idea of using the Uniting for Peace Resolution to take the matter to the General Assembly, and so it was that the first emergency session of General Assembly was held which set up the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).¹⁰⁸ Lall was also on the Advisory Committee established by the General Assembly to work with the Secretary-General for dealing with issues regarding deployment of UNEF.¹⁰⁹ Behind the scenes, it was Lall who was in touch with the Egyptian Ambassador to ensure that the UNEF was deployed as per Egyptian wishes, and it was then that India contributed the maximum forces to UNEF so that it doesn't come across as an occupation force.¹¹⁰ Another Indian draft proposal to extend the work of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Egypt instead of appointing the more expensive UNEF did not receive support. There were 20 or so resolutions calling for withdrawal of the British, French, and Israeli forces that were drafted by Lall on behalf of the non-aligned group of nations.¹¹¹ There were 21 resolutions that were supported by the

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Arthur Lall, United Nations Oral History Project, June 27, 1990, p. 13.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 22.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p. 23.

¹¹¹ Ibid, p. 27.

US, mainly because they did 'condemn' the British and the French in an outright manner.

Another account is of the role played by Indian troops who were part of the peacekeeping operation in Congo in 1960. The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was the first peacekeeping operation where the troops were mandated to use force beyond what is required for self-defence to deal with the secessionist forces of Katanga. There is a glowing account of an unnamed Indian Brigadier General who would lead the troops and that would scare the Katanga gendarmarie so much that they would flee rather than face the UN forces.¹¹² It has also been said that the Indian troops that did most of the policing in Leopoldville were "first rate".¹¹³

While it is hard to find such details in the post-Cold War era, the engagement of India with peacekeeping can be traced with the help of the interventions made by India's representatives in various forums of the UN that debated issues related to peacekeeping. Before turning to these, it is important to highlight some of the actions taken by India that showcase its commitment to the cause of peacekeeping. Over the years, India has shown its commitment to increasing women's participation in all stages of the peace processes by systematically integrating a gender perspective into all stages of analysis, planning, implementation, and reporting. As in Liberia, in South Sudan too, India sent a fully formed female unit and in Congo a female engagement group was deployed. India welcomed the uniformed gender parity strategy as part of A4P. India has accorded immense importance to the training of peacekeepers. The Centre for UN peacekeeping in India partners with UN Women to train women peacekeepers. Pre-deployment training and gender sensitisation of peacekeeping troops is also undertaken.¹¹⁴ India was the first country to support the Secretary-

¹¹² Interview with Harlan Cleveland, United Nations Oral History Project, April 22, 1990, p. 13.

¹¹³ Interview with G. McMurtrie Godley, United Nations Oral History Project, April 20, 1990, p. 9.

¹¹⁴ S/PV.8508, United Nations peacekeeping operations: Women in peacekeeping, April 11, 2019.

General's Trust Fund for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. To strengthen prosecution of offenders, India contributed to the Residual Special Court of Sierra Leone that convicted people for crimes of this nature, including use of child soldiers and forced marriages.¹¹⁵ In order to enhance performance of peacekeepers, India has placed great emphasis on training.¹¹⁶ It provides training with particular focus on preventing sexual exploitation and abuse and related discipline. India also contributed funds to the tune of \$300,000 to the United Nations Pipeline to Peacekeeping Command Programme, with a focus on the conduct and discipline of future commanders and managers.¹¹⁷ With an eye on training, India partners with member states through co-deployment in missions such as with Kazakhstan in United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), provides mission specific pre-deployment training, and conducts field training with 18 African countries. India also offers training in human rights as laid out in the modules of the Integrated Training Service of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Strict screening is done to avoid sending officials with a history of misconduct. In-mission training on human rights is also being conducted.¹¹⁸ India has been proactive in the realm of actually protecting the protectors. To do so, India signed a memorandum of understanding with the UN in support of the Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping initiative and the United Nations C4ISR Academy for Peace Operations in Entebbe, Uganda.¹¹⁹ India took the lead in the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2589 (2021) on accountability of crimes against United Nations

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ S/PV.8521, United Nations peacekeeping operations: Investing in peace: improving safety and performance of United Nations peacekeepers, May 7, 2019.

¹¹⁷ A/C.4/73/SR.17, Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, December 11, 2018.

¹¹⁸ Statement by T.S. Tirumurti, UN Security Council High-Level Open Debate on Peace Operations and Human Rights, July 7, 2020.

¹¹⁹ S/PV.8838, United Nations peacekeeping operations, Protecting the protectors: technology and peacekeeping, August 18, 2021.

peacekeepers, as well as the first Security Council document in the form of a presidential statement S/PRST/2021/17 on technology for peacekeeping. As a practical help, at the peak of the COVID crisis and in response to the call by the Secretary-General, India upgraded the medical facilities of UN peacekeeping missions in Goma in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Juba in South Sudan.¹²⁰ India also delivered 200,000 doses of the Made in India COVID-19 vaccines to vaccinate all uniformed personnel deployed in various field missions, which benefitted approximately 140,000 field personnel.¹²¹

In partnership with UN DPKO Department of Operational Support India has developed a mobile tech platform called UNITE AWARE, which helps increase situational awareness and provides terrain-related information to peacekeepers. The project cost USD 1.64 million.

In the words of Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar, former Head of Mission and Force Commander of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, India's troops have by their actions, demonstrated the need for limited use of force and limiting collateral damage. They have long experience of these through their involvement in internal counter insurgency operations.¹²² According to Lt. Gen. Chander Prakash, former Under Secretary-General in the UN DPKO and Force Commander of the UN Mission in DRC, another distinct and actioned contribution of the peacekeepers from India following from the domestic realm, has been conducting people-centric peacekeeping aimed at winning the hearts and minds of local people.¹²³

More significant from the perspective of this study, India has made contributions to the debates on peacekeeping in all the forums associated with the global governance of peacekeeping.

¹²⁰ PMI, K. Nagaraj Naidu, Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Follow-up on the Implementation of resolution 2532 (2020), January 25, 2021.

¹²¹ PMI, K. Nagaraj Naidu, Peacekeeping Operations: Improving safety and security of peacekeepers, May 24, 2021.

¹²² Interview with Lt. Gen. (Retd) Satish Nambiar, New Delhi, June 8, 2015.

¹²³ Interview with Lt. Gen. Chander Prakash, New Delhi, June 20, 2016.

4.1 INDIA IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Indian interventions on the subject of peacekeeping in the Security Council are significant because India requested to be party to such discussions even when it was not a non-permanent member of the Council. These are testimony to India's abiding interest in the subject and the desire to influence the working of the peacekeeping mechanism in the most influential of the forums in the global governance of peacekeeping. As explained by Ambassador B.S. Prakash, Joint Secretary, UN Peacekeeping (2001–2005), for India, peacekeeping has almost been an article of faith undertaken with noble and altruistic motives.¹²⁴

One of the early developments in relation to peacekeeping was the report of the Secretary-General called the Agenda for Peace (1992). It had made a case for stronger peacekeeping. The Supplement to the Agenda came out in 1995 and reinforced the traditional principles of peacekeeping that India firmly endorsed namely, consent, impartiality, and non-use of force. The Indian representative defended India's stand, pointing to the fact that the Supplement recognises the negative fall outs of peace enforcement and recognises that it is contrary to the political and military tasks of peacekeeping.¹²⁵ He emphasised that accepting the good offices of the UN must not be made into a norm as it violates the principle of consent. India endorsed the creation of a mechanism under Article 50 of the UN Charter to ease the consequences of sanctions for states affected by it by further creating a fund from assessed contributions. It suggested that the creation of small field offices must be avoided as they can lead to large entanglements. India, he said, was firmly of the belief that the complementary Agenda for Development would serve as the basis of lasting peace rather than peacekeeping and peace-making.

Again, in the context of the Agenda for Peace, India's representative expressed satisfaction with the ongoing mechanism of consultation

¹²⁴ Interview with Ambassador B.S. Prakash, New Delhi, June 9, 2016.

¹²⁵ S/PV.3492 (Resumption 1), An Agenda for Peace: Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations (S/1995/1), January 18, 1995.

with the troop contributing countries (TCCs) held by the President of the Security Council and the Representative of the Secretary-General.¹²⁶ He, however, felt the need for 'streamlining' it further and outlined the need for regular consultations rather than consultations just before a mandate is about to expire or needs to be renewed. He called for consultations before the mandate is finalised. He called for transparency in the renewal or amending of mandates. For this, the Secretariat must provide detailed reports to all the concerned actors. He said the Secretary-General's report on peacekeeping must be made available to the TCCs simultaneously as to other members of the Council.

Later, in a focused discussion on strengthening cooperation between the Security Council and TCCs, the Indian representative pointed out that the recommendation of the Brahimi Commission on increased consultation between troop contributors and the Security Council was not endorsed by the Council, which proposed more efficiency in the existing system and private consultations with the TCCs.¹²⁷ He pointed out that the first private meeting was held in October 2000 when India and Jordan sought to exit from the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). In September, the mandate of UNAMSIL was expanded despite reservations expressed by the TCCs. Their request for participation in the Security Council meeting on UNAMSIL in spring 2000 were also ignored. This was in complete contrast to the Security Council meetings on the Congo crisis in 1960s when the troop contributors were allowed to be present in the Council and participate in the debate on the whole crisis and what the UN should do. Since their views were not given regard, six countries withdrew from the Congo operation. In Congo, the General Assembly appointed a Conciliation Commission consisting of TCCs and a Secretary-General appointed along with an Advisory Commission to help deal with the crisis. A similar role has been played by Groups of Friends of Secretary-General in later cases and these should be considered in the present

¹²⁶ S/PV.3611, An agenda for peace: Peacekeeping, December 20, 1995.

¹²⁷ S/PV.4257, Strengthening cooperation with troop-contributing countries, January 16, 2001.

day as well. Consultations must first be held once the Secretariat has decided which countries will contribute troops. Operational information must be shared with the TCCs. The TCCs must also interact with other offices of the UN that will have a role in the conflict areas, such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), to know the exact role they have to play in support of these offices. Reconnaissance missions before actual deployment of troops must be made mandatory and should be funded by the UN. Their findings must be shared with the DPKO and the Council. The TCCs often get accused of taking sides; rebels use that as an excuse to step back from the peace agreement as in the case of Sierra Leone. Collective decisions are needed, not just consultations.

In case of Sierra Leone, the reality of the ground was not conveyed to the Council. Material changes arising out of changes in the mandate from Chapter VI to VII, India asserted, must be conveyed to TCCs. When force is used, Articles 43 and 44 of the Charter must be applied and TCCs must be consulted by the Council. If Special Courts are set up, they cannot try troops that enjoy immunity under status of forces agreement with TCCs. They cannot be bound by decisions to which they are not a party. There is need of a regular body for consultations between the Council and formed units. Reviving the Military Staff Committee, which could have members from any member states, must be considered for holding such consultations. Representatives of TCCs could be allowed to accompany the Council to the conflict area and interact with troops. During its visits to conflict areas, the Advisory Committee on Accounting and Budgeting Questions must interact with TCCs, and its report must be shared with TCCs and the Council. The TCCs must be allowed to meet donors to trust funds to explain the operational and political costs involved. A joint view of Council, Secretariat, and the TCCs must be given to the media in times of crises and the TCCs given due publicity for good work done.

As explained by another Indian representative, India endorsed the Resolution 1353 (2001) that allowed for private consultations of the Council with the TCCs.¹²⁸ India was a leading proponent of triangular

¹²⁸ S/PV.6075, United Nations peacekeeping operations, January 23, 2009.

consultations between the Council, Secretariat, and the TCC and an increase in the briefings provided by the Secretariat to the TCCs. But if such briefings are held on the eve of the renewal of the mandate, they provide limited scope for discussion. India argued that the TCCs must be involved in planning of operations at every stage as spelt out by the 2008 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping operations. India was critical of the tendency to change the rules of engagement and concept of operations, which are merely informed to the troops and there is no substantive discussion or consultation on them, thus undermining the spirit of Resolution 1353 (2001).¹²⁹ India also suggested that “the Council more regularly enlist the good offices and diplomatic engagement of TCCs and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) in countries or regions where peacekeeping operations are deployed and where their engagement could bolster efforts to overcome challenges and obstacles to a peace process.”¹³⁰ Given the limited availability of troops for peacekeeping, India suggested that mandate creation must be a two-stage process: first a draft resolution could be formulated and then it could get inputs from the Secretariat regarding the TCCs available before it is finalised.

Reacting to the Secretary-General’s Report titled *No Exit Without Strategy* (2001), which had detailed the manner of withdrawal from peacekeeping rather than abrupt closure or transformation of a peacekeeping operation, the Indian representative, Kamalesh Sharma, pointed out the limitations of the manner in which the missions were deployed in the first place. He said that both the Agenda for Peace and the Supplement to the Agenda had been overly optimistic about what a peacekeeping operation could accomplish.¹³¹ Peacekeeping forces could not be expected to deal with forces of violence. So, impartiality and consent were needed in both inter-state and intra-state conflicts. He said that history pointed out that peacekeeping missions had to be

¹²⁹ S/PV.6153 (Resumption 1), United Nations peacekeeping operations, June 29, 2009.

¹³⁰ S/PV.6603, United Nations peacekeeping operations; Peacekeeping: taking stock and preparing for the future, August 26, 2011.

¹³¹ S/PV.4223 (Resumption 1), No exit without strategy, November 15, 2000.

wound up every time a war broke out in the Middle East and yet in Sierra Leone, the UN Mission was mandated to force the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to adhere the Lome Peace Agreement. Another weakness he referred to was with the practice of disarmament, demobilisation, and rehabilitation, wherein disarmament was carried out without enforcing the other two prongs. This had led to the RUF reverting back to violence in Sierra Leone. Again, in the context of Sierra Leone, he was critical of the policy of the peacekeepers enforcing the diamond embargo by taking over the diamond fields from the RUF, something that endangers the peacekeepers themselves. Finally, he said that it was the Security Council that must ensure that neutral armed forces that are professional, apolitical, disciplined, and well equipped are selected for peacekeeping.

In the context of an exit from peacekeeping and transition to the peacebuilding phase, India was of the opinion that post-conflict peacebuilding must not be entrusted to peacekeepers as it is a very vast task.¹³² In yet another intervention on exit strategy, India's representative pointed out that peacekeeping and peacebuilding are not mutually exclusive, and both need to continue over periods of extended time. They need to be supplemented by policing and development administration. National authorities need to be supported in security sector reforms and provide inputs for socio-economic development, rather than going by the priorities of the donors. There cannot be objective criteria for exiting from a conflict situation. "Peace processes and political settlements cannot be subjected to budgetary discipline and evaluation by administrators."¹³³ Along similar lines, India reiterated that several peacebuilding activities such as disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform, rule of law, basic governance, institution building, and support to the democratic process are based on a proactive role of peacekeepers.¹³⁴ Thus, peacekeeping

¹³² S/PV.4223 (Resumption 1), No exit without strategy, November 15, 2000.

¹³³ S/PV.6270 (Resumption 1), United Nations peacekeeping operations: Transition and exit strategies, February 12, 2010.

¹³⁴ S/PV.6903, United Nations peacekeeping operations: A multidimensional approach, January 21, 2013.

and peacebuilding are two sides of the same coin. Therefore, they must not be compartmentalised as military vs. civilian. In case of protracted conflicts as in Haiti and Liberia, India spelt out the "...need to focus on long-term investment in sustainable development, institution-building and inclusive political processes."¹³⁵

On the subject of robust peacekeeping, India always sounded a note of caution. It was stated in one intervention that many times the mandates are for robust peacekeeping without defining what it actually means. Mandates also call for enforcing peace rather than keeping peace. Mandates must be clear and achievable as stated by the Brahimi Committee report.¹³⁶ India, it was asserted, was familiar with robust peacekeeping because of Gen. Dewan Prem Chand, who as Force Commander of the ONUC, worked to reverse the Katangese secession and restore authority to the Congolese government.¹³⁷ India lost 39 peacekeepers during this mission. But this operation was conducted after proper consultation on the mandate with the mission. In the present times, interpretation of the mandate and use of contingent-owned equipment (COE) and many actions are being left to the forces deployed. India expressed its reservation on giving a portion of peacekeeping troops a peace enforcement mandate as happened in the case of United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) under resolution 2098 (2013) of March 2013. This, India felt, exposes traditional peacekeepers to unnecessary risks of the internal conflict. It makes all peacekeepers "not only those of the interventionist peace enforcement brigade, (become) liable to be treated as enemy combatants under international law and, as such, effectively forgo both their impartiality and their immunity from prosecution."¹³⁸ This will result in

¹³⁵ S/PV.8033, United Nations peacekeeping operations: Their potential contribution to the overarching goal of sustaining peace, August 29, 2017.

¹³⁶ S/PV.6153 (Resumption 1), United Nations peacekeeping operations, June 29, 2009.

¹³⁷ S/PV.6178 (Resumption 1), United Nations peacekeeping operations, August 5, 2009.

¹³⁸ S/PV.7196, United Nations peacekeeping operations: New trends, June 11, 2014.

rising casualties and reducing the credibility of the Council. India also suggested that use of force must be for a limited period of time since in most cases, the solutions required are political, not military in nature.¹³⁹

On the subject of involving the regional countries in peacekeeping missions, India was critical of the UN approach of involving neighbouring or regional countries in peacekeeping since they invariably had vested interests in the conflict.¹⁴⁰ Later, it presented an evolved position; that peacekeeping must be strengthened with Chapter VIII mechanisms without actually regionalising it.¹⁴¹ Indicating its willingness to work in partnerships, India was particularly supportive of the African Union's (AU) involvement in peacekeeping.¹⁴² It gave \$2 million to the AU Mission in Somalia. It also committed itself to give training to the African Standby Force of the AU. India asserted the need for exhausting of all peaceful means under Article 52 of the Charter before authorising actions under Article 53 by regional organisations in hybrid environments, as their mandates are often different from Security Council mandates.¹⁴³ India emphasised that regional organisations apply principles of the Charter to their peacekeeping initiatives.¹⁴⁴ It asserted that it was important to build capacities of regional organisations. In a focussed discussion on cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, India reiterated that the UN must not disengage from peacekeeping where regional organisations come in.¹⁴⁵ India was of

¹³⁹ S/PV.7802, Maintenance of international peace and security: Peace operations facing asymmetrical threats, November 7, 2016.

¹⁴⁰ S/PV.4223 (Resumption 1), No exit without strategy, November 15, 2000.

¹⁴¹ S/PV.6075, United Nations peacekeeping operations, January 23, 2009.

¹⁴² S/PV.6592, United Nations peacekeeping operations, July 27, 2011.

¹⁴³ S/PV.7196, United Nations peacekeeping operations: New trends, June 11, 2014.

¹⁴⁴ S/PV.7228, United Nations peacekeeping operations: The United Nations and regional partnerships and its evolution, July 28, 2014.

¹⁴⁵ S/PV.7343, Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security: Peace operations: the United Nations-African Union Partnership and its evolution, December 16, 2014.

the view that regional organisations could assist the UN, but the primacy of the UN must be maintained. One must guard against the politicisation of a UN mission in the process of regionalisation and sub-regionalisation. India recommended that the relationship between the UN Security Council and the African Peace and Security Council must be strengthened. It also endorsed the Prodi Panel Report's recommendation of using assessed peacekeeping budgets for AU operations since there were challenges of resources for AU in undertaking peacekeeping missions.

In the context of threats to peacekeepers from non-governmental armed groups, based on the experience of Indian troops in MONUSCO, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), India suggested that all mandates of the Council must include "legally binding provisions for prosecuting, penalizing and neutralizing any non-governmental armed groups and armed militias causing or threatening to cause harm to those operations."¹⁴⁶ India's representative recognised that peacekeeping faces new challenges emanating from volatile environments where adversaries have access to advanced weaponry but more seriously have transnational ideologies and connections with trans-border criminal networks. One way to deal with this is "the use of offensive capabilities for peacekeeping missions that operate in asymmetrical and war-fighting environments. Following this approach, we can adopt new technology, intelligence gathering, standby and quick-reaction capabilities, and force enablers...."¹⁴⁷ In order to ensure the safety of peacekeepers, India made the case for improvement of the security infrastructure of camps, airlift capacities including night flights, and placing the air assets under the command of the force commander.¹⁴⁸ India recommended a comprehensive approach to the

¹⁴⁶ S/PV.7196, United Nations peacekeeping operations: New trends, June 11, 2014.

¹⁴⁷ S/PV.7802, Maintenance of international peace and security: Peace operations facing asymmetrical threats, November 7, 2016.

¹⁴⁸ S/PV.8218, United Nations peacekeeping operations Collective action to improve United Nations peacekeeping operations, March 28, 2018.

safety of peacekeepers which involved seven elements: limiting the mandate of peacekeeping operations, dedicated resources for countering improvised explosive device (IED) threats and advance patrol parties along with local security agencies to be made a norm, upgrading the security infrastructure of camps and providing quick casualty evacuation, provision of full medical facilities and use of new technology for peacekeeping.¹⁴⁹ More recently, India suggested a four-point frame work for the protection of peacekeepers:

First, we must focus on operationally proven, cost effective, widely available, reliable and field-serviceable technologies.... Secondly, we need a sound information and intelligence foundation... we must contribute to ensuring that technological improvements are continuous and are available on the ground in the gear that peacekeepers carry and the weapons and tools that they use to enhance their mobility, performance, endurance, range and load carrying capabilities, while guaranteeing their safety and security. That also includes the strengthening of communication within missions and enhancing the overall capacity to take informed decisions at a tactical or operational level... Fourthly, the consistent training and capacity-building of peacekeepers in the area of technology needs attention and investment.

India has also made some suggestions regarding improving the DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS). It was pointed out by India that it is important to develop policing and rule of law capability in peacekeeping missions of the UN where the DPKO must consult with countries that have substantial post-colonial nation building experience.¹⁵⁰ The DFS, it was said, must work like a military logistical support system as mission support is crucial to present day peacekeeping. India engaged the DPKO on the New Horizon Report

¹⁴⁹ K. Nagaraj Naidu, no.121.

¹⁵⁰ S/PV.6153 (Resumption 1), United Nations peacekeeping operations, June 29, 2009.

regarding the working of the DPKO and the DFS and where their focus should be. It asserted that the function of the DFS needs to be improved with a lean command structure.¹⁵¹ The DPKO, at that point in time, did not have the capacity for peacebuilding. So, peacebuilding needs to be done with the help of the global south.¹⁵² To make up for the slow process of recruitment in field and managerial positions within the DPKO and DFS it was also suggested that seconded capacities from governments of member states who have vast experience in nation building could be used.

On women, India co-sponsored a resolution on the mainstreaming of gender perspective in all policies and programmes of UN.¹⁵³ It also sponsored a resolution on prevention of sexual violence in conflict areas and gender-friendly peacekeeping missions, including the appointment of Women Protection Advisors (WPAs),¹⁵⁴ and finally a resolution on dealing with sexual violence in a comprehensive manner as part of the peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding operations of the UN, including participation of women in the missions.¹⁵⁵ India's contribution of an all-women police unit in Liberia in 2007, of which nine rotations were sent over the period of a decade, is cited as an example of the importance it accords to the role of women in post-conflict reconstruction.¹⁵⁶ As aimed, India provided an all-women police unit for deployment.¹⁵⁷ Since 2017, India has managed to give 15 per cent share of peacekeeping to women, something which only 26 other

¹⁵¹ S/PV.6178 (Resumption 1), United Nations peacekeeping operations, August 5, 2009.

¹⁵² S/PV.6270 (Resumption 1), United Nations peacekeeping operations: Transition and exit strategies, February 12, 2010.

¹⁵³ ECOSOC/Commission on Women, E/CN.6/2004/L.6, March 8, 2004.

¹⁵⁴ UNSC, S/2009/500, October 5, 2009.

¹⁵⁵ UNSC, S/2009/489, September 29, 2009.

¹⁵⁶ UNSC, Women and peace and security Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security (S/2015/716), S/PV.7533, October 13, 2015.

¹⁵⁷ UNSC, Women and Peace and Security, S/PV.8079, October 27, 2017.

countries have done.¹⁵⁸ It encouraged incentivisation of women for this and an audit of other countries' contributions on this score.¹⁵⁹ India noted that to accommodate countries that cannot contribute all women units, the policy framework was being diluted to make do with mixed units.¹⁶⁰ Instead, India called for the incentivisation of all-women units.

4.2 INDIA AND PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Since 1999, an important topic related to peacekeeping was added to the agenda of the Security Council for the purpose of thematic debate. It was the protection of civilians (POC). The POC was also added to the mandates of several peacekeeping missions. India has been an active participant in the debate on POC in the Security Council.

Reacting to the report of an independent study by the DPKO on the challenges of POC, India endorsed the findings of the study that despite dealing with the issues of POC for several years, the Security Council had been unable to arrive at a clear understanding of the issues involved.¹⁶¹

As a result, it had been not been able to give adequate directions to the DPKO on what it would like done and how it should function with regard to POC. The tendency of the Security Council to mainly authorise military and police operations for POC and not consider other measures

¹⁵⁸ S/PV.8218, United Nations peacekeeping operations Collective action to improve United Nations peacekeeping operations, March 28, 2018.

¹⁵⁹ A/C.4/73/SR.17, Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, December 11, 2018.

¹⁶⁰ S/PV.8508, United Nations peacekeeping operations: Women in peacekeeping, April 11, 2019.

¹⁶¹ Statement by Mr. Dhruva Narayana Rangaswamy, Member of Parliament and Member of the Indian Delegation on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict at the United Nations Security Council on November 11, 2009, at <https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/uploadpdf/78510ind1642.pdf>, (Accessed 29 November 2021).

too was lacuna. What was required was an integrated view based on the combined experience of several POC mandates and the development of norms and indicators that would help in performing the task effectively. Moreover, the Council had also not taken inputs from the troops on the ground about the practical requirements for POC. The Indian representative pointed out that one of main challenges for POC was the shortage of manpower resources. Thus 17,000 peacekeepers deployed as part of United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) were simply not adequate for POC in the vast areas of responsibility of the peacekeeping mission. In addition, there was need for sufficient equipment and enablers. Based on the Indian experience of deployment of air assets in Congo, it was pointed out that such enablers greatly assisted in POC. But the Security Council had not been successful in generating more air assets. Another Indian experiment of providing cell phones to the population with hotline numbers for contact in case of emergencies had resulted in reception of real-time information of violence being perpetrated against civilians. Such information was then used to immediately deploy troops and deter acts of violence. A database of those indulging in violence, patterns in their ways of operating and weapons used had also been created and this helped in making POC more effective. In addition, there was need to strengthen national capacities in the areas where peacekeeping missions are deployed. The experience of developing countries in building such capacities could also be sourced by the UN.

India recommended intergovernmental discussions to develop the normative and operational framework for protection of civilians.¹⁶² It lamented that fact that there was little appreciation of the operational

¹⁶² Statement by Ambassador Manjeev Singh Puri, Deputy Permanent Representative, on The Thematic Debate on “Protection of Civilians” at The United Nations Security Council on July 07, 2010, at <https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/Pdf/uploadpdf/26169ind1707.Pdf>, (Accessed 29 November 2021).

difficulties faced by peacekeepers in implementing the mandates of the Security Council. The operational challenges emanate from:

... situations where violence is low-intensity and often confusing, where belligerents are not necessarily combatants under international humanitarian law, where information is deficient, and where resources and infrastructure are woefully inadequate.¹⁶³

Citing the incident faced by the Indian peacekeepers of UNMISS who were unable to protect the Dinka refugees in their camp from the thousands of youth attacking them despite having a robust mandate to use force to do so, so as to prevent the loss of lives of the attacking youth, the Indian representative highlighted the operational dilemmas of POC.¹⁶⁴

India was also critical of the manner in which the reforms in the security sector were being carried out. The overemphasis on rule of law and augmenting of police forces, it felt, were the priorities of the donor countries and were overshadowing the national priorities of building institutions and stimulating growth. The priorities of national authorities, it felt, must take precedence over donor dominated agendas. Simultaneously, local mechanisms of protection that existed prior to take over by a peacekeeping mission must be nurtured.¹⁶⁵

In mandating for POC, India asserted that the Security Council respect the principles of the Charter in terms of respecting the sovereignty

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Statement by Ambassador Asoke Kumar Mukerji, Permanent Representative in the debate on “Protection of civilians in armed conflict: effective implementation of protection of civilians mandates in un peacekeeping operations” at the United Nations Security Council, February 12, 2014, at <https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/uploadpdf/97077ind09.pdf>, (Accessed 29 November 2021).

¹⁶⁵ Statement by Ambassador Syed Akbaruddin, Permanent Representative at the United Nations Security Council Open Debate on ‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’, on January 19, 2016, at <https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/IndiaatUNSC?id=MjgxNg>, (Accessed 29 November 2021).

and territorial integrity of the state and not intervene to fulfil any political motives.¹⁶⁶ It is in this manner of national reconciliation that respects state sovereignty that civilians can be protected in enduring manner.

India highlighted five normative aspects that needed attention if the challenge of POC has to be met. First, it is important that the response of the Council must be proportional to the threat involved and the methods authorised must be appropriate.¹⁶⁷ It must distinguish between instances that require military response from those that require a 'rule of law' response. The Council must be held accountable for the mandates it generates. Second, it must not be overly critical of national governments who have failed to protect civilians while not simultaneously holding accountable the armed groups who are endangering the civilians. Third, there needs to be emphasis on the manner in POC mandates are implemented and hence the importance of responsibility while protecting. Fourth, it is important to develop capacities of the national authorities for POC in an unbiased manner. The focus therefore must be on inclusive socio-economic development. Fifth, while engaging in POC, the Security Council must prioritise actions under Chapter VI, namely the use of pacific means, rather than the use of Chapter VII, or the use of force and not use it for political motives such as bringing about regime change. Humanitarian interventions, if required, must not be used to undermine state sovereignty.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ Statement by Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri, Permanent Representative, Open Debate on Protection of Civilian at The United Nations Security Council on November 09, 2011, at <https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/uploadpdf/61918ind1958.pdf>, (Accessed 29 November 2021).

¹⁶⁷ Statement by H.E. Mr. H. S. Puri, Permanent Representative, at the Security Council Open Debate on "Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict", on June 25, 2012, at <https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/uploadpdf/51654ind2040.pdf>, (Accessed 29 November 2021).

¹⁶⁸ UN Security Council Briefing on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Preserving Humanitarian Space, (July 16, 2021), India Statement as delivered by H.E. Mr. Harsh Vardhan Shringla, Foreign Secretary, at <https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/IndiaatUNSC?id=NDMwOQ>, (Accessed 29 November 2021).

Humanitarian action and actors must not be politicised by the Security Council.

India vociferously pointed out that POC is not the responsibility of parties to a conflict, UN peacekeepers, or humanitarian actors. Rather, it is the responsibility of national governments.¹⁶⁹

It must also be recognised that peacekeepers are mainly deployed not to protect civilians but to aid and assist the national authorities in this task. Since POC is primarily a national responsibility, the UN's role must be to build national capacity, mainly in the security and justice sectors.¹⁷⁰ National accountability mechanisms need to be developed to deal with violations of international humanitarian law.¹⁷¹ However, very little effort is made to build national capacities. Much needs to be done also to prevent damage to civilian objects or civil infrastructure by terrorists, non-state actors, state proxies, and state sponsors.¹⁷² Reliance on UN peacekeepers takes away from the international community investing in building up the national security forces to respond to these challenges.

¹⁶⁹ UN Security Council Open Debate, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, INDIA STATEMENT by Ambassador K. Nagaraj Naidu Deputy Permanent Representative May 23, 2019, at https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/uploadpdf/statements__1239363584.pdf, (Accessed 29 November 2021).

¹⁷⁰ Statement by Ambassador Asoke Kumar Mukerji, Permanent Representative, in the Security Council Open Debate on “Protection of Civilians in armed conflict” on August 19, 2013, at <https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/pdf/uploadpdf/35881pmi57.pdf>, (Accessed 29 November 2021).

¹⁷¹ UNSC open debate on “protection of civilians in armed conflict”, India statement by Ambassador K. Nagaraj Naidu, May 25, 2021, at <https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/IndiaatUNSC?id=NDI1OQ>, (Accessed 29 November 2021).

¹⁷² UNSC Open-Debate on “*Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Survival of Civilian Population*”, Statement by Ambassador T.S. Tirumurti, April 27, 2021, at <https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/IndiaatUNSC?id=NDIzNA>, (Accessed 29 November 2021).

INDIA AND PEACEKEEPING IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Different aspects of peacekeeping are subjects of discussion in the 4th, 5th, and the 6th Committee of the General Assembly. In each of these forums, India has actively participated in the discussions on peacekeeping.

5.1 INDIA IN THE 4TH COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

In the General Assembly, discussions on peacekeeping are held in the 4th Committee. The Committee holds an annual discussion on peacekeeping under the heading “Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their aspects”. It is based on the Report of the Committee of 34 (C34) or the Special Committee, which was formed in 1965. There are no records of the discussions in C34 and one has to rely on records of meetings in the 4th Committee to get a sense of what countries contribute to the discussions. However, as stated by Mr. Santosh Jha, former Joint Secretary, Policy Planning, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), as a longstanding member of the Committee of 34 (C34), India has actively contributed to the Agenda for Peace, the Brahimi Report, shaping the idea of Responsibility to Protect, and calibrating the role of the Security Council in humanitarian assistance.¹⁷³

Speaking in the General Assembly, India’s representative spelt out the five guiding principles of India’s approach to peacekeeping: consent of the host state, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, precise and workable mandate, consistent support of the Security Council,

¹⁷³ Interview with Mr. Santosh Jha, June 24, 2016.

and adequate financial resources for it.¹⁷⁴ The first two of these were important since peacekeeping was essentially a non-military activity.¹⁷⁵ These were reinforced by the non-aligned movement's principles for peacekeeping that India recommended be adopted by all member states:¹⁷⁶

(a) peace-keeping operations were no substitute for political solutions; (b) they should be of a temporary nature and be based on the consent of the parties concerned; (c) the use of force as a means of maintaining international peace and security should be undertaken only as a last resort, when all means for the peaceful settlement of disputes had been exhausted; (d) peace-keeping operations should strictly adhere to the purposes and principles of the Charter, should be non-interventionist, and should be mandated at the request of the Member State involved; (e) operations should be distinct from other types of United Nations field operations, which did not, however, preclude the need for overall coordination; (f) operations must be established with a clear mandate, time-frame, clear objectives, secure financing, and adequate resources; and (g) peace-keeping activities should not be financed at the expense of United Nations development activities.

India's representative sounded a clear note of caution in the use of humanitarian reasons for launching of peacekeeping operations.¹⁷⁷ Such instances, he said must be firmly non-partisan. The tendency to give the executive power of peacekeeping operations to coalitions of forces was also something India was wary of.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴ General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), Comprehensive Review..., A/SPC/45/SR.27, November 28, 1990.

¹⁷⁵ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/52/SR.14, February 16, 1998.

¹⁷⁶ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/50/SR.21, December 29, 1995

¹⁷⁷ GAOR, Plenary Session, A/48/PV.12, October 19, 1993.

¹⁷⁸ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/52/SR.14, February 16, 1998.

India was particularly vocal on matters pertaining to resources – men, material, and financial – for UN peacekeeping operations. Thus, India said that the Secretary-General must be provided with updated information regarding the number of military units, observers, civilian police, and key staff that every country can provide since this would help greatly in the start-up of an operation.¹⁷⁹ India also supported the establishment of a stand by forces planning team to provide men and material resources to the UN.¹⁸⁰ India pledged to keep stand by troops for UN peacekeeping.¹⁸¹ India preferred an improvement of the system of stand by troops to having a rapid-reaction capacity, which would need to be assessed for need, accountability, effectiveness, financial impact, and the attendant legal and political consequences.¹⁸² Later, India supported the creation of a strategic reserve at the UN Logistics Base at Brandisi and adoption of other measures that would enable rapid deployment of a mission between 30–90 days as recommended by the Brahimi Report.¹⁸³ In this connection, India was in favour of pre-positioning logistics and equipment enabling air and sea lift capabilities at Brandisi to enable troops to deploy rapidly.¹⁸⁴

On the financing of peacekeeping operations, India suggested that more responsibility must be shouldered by permanent members, and the limited capacities of developing countries must be recognised. On other matters of finance such as payments for peacekeeping, India asserted that as recommended by the Secretary-General, civilian personnel should be paid on par with military personnel. It urged that reimbursements for closed operations such as the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) must be expedited. For cost-effective use of resources, India

¹⁷⁹ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/SPC/47/SR.14, November 10, 1992.

¹⁸⁰ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/48/SR.23, February 8, 1994.

¹⁸¹ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/49/SR.26, November 18, 1994.

¹⁸² GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/50/SR.21, December 29, 1995

¹⁸³ GAOR, Comprehensive Review, A/C.4/56/SR.21, December 23, 2002.

¹⁸⁴ GAOR, Comprehensive Review, A/C.4/57/SR.14, November 26, 2002.

recommended global tendering as a method of procuring equipment, supplies, and services, as well as for sufficient advance planning in order to avoid unnecessary expenditure.¹⁸⁵ In order to have a secure source of funding for peacekeeping operations, India supported the idea of a peacekeeping reserve fund, which would draw upon assessed contributions.¹⁸⁶ It also urged the consolidation of peacekeeping accounts to overcome the issue of selective funding of operations to address the issue of timely payments for troop contributors.¹⁸⁷ India raised its concern regarding multidimensional peacekeeping, which required additional financial resources in equipment, logistics, and training.¹⁸⁸ It expressed its reservation regarding overemphasis on cost cutting measures such as preventing an overlap between outgoing and incoming troops as this prevented new comers from learning from the more experienced troops.¹⁸⁹

On institutional matters too, India gave several suggestions. India pointed out that the system of loaning a large number of military personnel to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) hinders the creation of an international civil service with expertise in peacekeeping and institutionalisation. To overcome this, it was suggested that the Secretary-General create additional military posts that could be paid for from the support account.¹⁹⁰ The inadequacy of the Brahimi Report was mentioned in the context of staffing in the DPKO and other management issues.¹⁹¹ India made a case for better representation of developing countries within the DPKO. India's representative categorically pointed out the several limitations of the Brahimi Report in this regard. It was also pointed out that the Brahimi Report did not

¹⁸⁵ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/SPC/45/SR.27, November 28, 1990.

¹⁸⁶ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/SPC/47/SR.14, November 10, 1992.

¹⁸⁷ GAOR, Comprehensive Review, A/C.4/62/SR.16, December 13, 2007.

¹⁸⁸ GAOR, Comprehensive Review, A/C.4/69/SR.16, January 12, 2015.

¹⁸⁹ GAOR, Comprehensive Review, A/C.4/74/SR.19, April 3, 2020.

¹⁹⁰ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/51/SR.17, September 4, 1997.

¹⁹¹ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/55/SR.19, March 15, 2001.

pay sufficient heed to systemic issues.¹⁹² Thus, its recommendation that the Secretariat needed to be strengthened by adding staff on an emergency basis was an ‘oversimplification’ of the problem with peacekeeping. The real issue was that the Secretariat took its inputs from military establishments of developed countries represented in it rather than from countries contributing troops.

The second issue the Report did not address was that of ill-trained and ill-equipped troops being provided for peacekeeping. This was happening because developed countries did not send their troops for peacekeeping, there was a tendency towards regional peacekeeping, and the UN did not have the resources to train troops adequately. The third issue that the Report wrongly addressed was the need to use force if there is opposition to the peacekeeping forces or to the agreement they are defending. A fourth issue that the Report did not address was that of greater involvement of troop contributing countries (TCCs) in decisions about peacekeeping. The DPKO, India pointed out, was staffed with people with a ‘combat mindset’ while the TCCs worked with a peacekeeping mindset, thus creating disconnect. Therefore, there was a simultaneous need for “the Military Division, particularly the Military Planning Service, the Civilian Police Division and the Office of Operations in the Department, ...(to be)...strengthened, but they should be largely manned by personnel from major troop-contributing countries.”¹⁹³

It was also important that there be equitable geographical representation and transparency in recruitment of the bureaucracy in DPKO. India argued that developing countries must be involved in setting standards and generating doctrines for peacekeeping. Field support needed more attention and the Department of Field Support (DFS) needed internal coordination and client orientation. Member states needed to be more involved with DFS.¹⁹⁴ India was concerned that major policy decisions

¹⁹² GAOR, Comprehensive Review, A/C.4/55/SR.21, March 16, 2001.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/64/SR.19, December 21, 2009.

regarding peacekeeping, such as the setting up of the force intervention brigade as part of United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), were being made outside the Special Committee and as a result actions of peacekeepers were being judged by those who were not contributing troops. Therefore, India suggested that the legislative role of the Committee mandatorily be reinvented.¹⁹⁵

With the increase in use of police personnel as civilian staff in peacekeeping operations, India called for greater clarity of principles and adherence to geographical basis in the appointment of senior police officials.¹⁹⁶ India's representative also welcomed the draft standard operating procedures for police in peacekeeping and the spelling out of the selection and training requirements for the police. The need for guidelines regarding the role of the police was also pointed out.¹⁹⁷ India was in favour of separation of the civilian police unit from the military division and its strengthening.¹⁹⁸ India supported the setting up of a standing civilian police capacity in 2006 to start up civilian work in peacekeeping.¹⁹⁹ It stated further that recruitment for the standing police capacity must be made in a transparent manner with due consideration for professionalism, geographical balance, and contributions of TCCs.²⁰⁰ It was argued that police contributing countries (PCCs) must be represented in senior advisory positions.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁵ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/67/SR.24, September 23, 2013. Also see GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/68/SR.17, January 13, 2014.

¹⁹⁶ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/53/SR.14, January 6, 1999.

¹⁹⁷ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/54/SR.11, November 30, 1999.

¹⁹⁸ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/55/SR.19, March 15, 2001.

¹⁹⁹ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/60/SR.15, November 18, 2005.

²⁰⁰ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/61/SR.15, November 3, 2006.

²⁰¹ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/62/SR.16, December 13, 2007.

Overtime, taking a cue from the report of High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, India became a vehement critic of the overly military focus of peacekeeping operations and the lack of attention given to political dialogue that would actually help in winding down conflicts.²⁰² This, it pointed out, had been the case of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which was given a Chapter VII mandate without conducting adequate political groundwork. India called for a reallocation of financial resources to support political processes that bring about the end of conflict.²⁰³

5.2 INDIA IN THE 5TH COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

In the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) of the General Assembly or the 5th Committee, India made several interventions on matters pertaining to financing of peacekeeping operations. These are particularly relevant in the context of the perennial shortage of funds for peacekeeping in the post-Cold War years and the need to rationalise expenses.

India stood in favour of the support fund for peacekeeping.²⁰⁴ Considering the fact that substantial expenses were being incurred on completed missions, India argued for the winding up of such missions rather than focus on funds being spent on on-going missions. Also, India felt the need to have additional people in the Claims Unit, given the many requirements of termination of peacekeeping operations, and so justified the Advisory Committee's recommendation for this. Speaking in 1998, India's representative pointed to the fact that the backstopping provisions of the support account had not taken into consideration the decline in the number of peacekeeping operations and the intensity of peacekeeping requirements.²⁰⁵

²⁰² GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/71/SR.15, December 2, 2016.

²⁰³ GAOR, Comprehensive Review..., A/C.4/70/SR.18, December 28, 2015.

²⁰⁴ GAOR, A/C.5/51/SR.65, May 29, 1997.

²⁰⁵ GAOR, A/C.5/51/SR.65, May 29, 1997.

Given the paucity of funding due to non-payment of dues, it was recommended that increases in the posts be made only when justified by the Secretariat and recommended by the ACABQ. At the same time India emphasised the importance of filling the vacancies in civilian posts in the Secretariat.²⁰⁶ It hoped for the early filling up of 93 posts related to field administration and logistics division. In 2003, India raised the issue of creation of 32 posts in the Headquarters while the actual number and complexity of peacekeeping operations had reduced. In this connection, it made the pertinent point that backstopping functions must be related to actual requirements and must not assume a life of their own.²⁰⁷ It was also concerned about the very high rates of vacancies, to the tune of 40 per cent, in the UN missions and the long duration of nearly 12 months taken to fill these vacancies.²⁰⁸ Even posts that were required to be filled on an emergency basis, it noted, had taken nine months to fill. India raised particular concerns regarding the high levels of vacancy in the missions in Africa and the practice of appointing staff to lower grades than those actually provided for.²⁰⁹ It also raised the issue of conversion of 300 series staff to 100 series without the approval of the General Assembly.

India stood strongly in favour of consolidation of peacekeeping accounts as it would help member states in financial planning.²¹⁰ It would also save the organisation the trouble resulting from unpredictable payment of individual assessments for every mission. Both the Report of the Secretary-General and ACABQ must give adequate attention to the consequences of consolidation of accounts. It raised concerns regarding depleting strategic deployment stocks and peacekeeping reserve funds.²¹¹ The fact that \$152 million had to be

²⁰⁶ GAOR, A/C.5/55/SR.59, July 19, 2001.

²⁰⁷ GAOR, A/C.5/57/SR.47, June 17, 2003.

²⁰⁸ GAOR, A/C.5/57/SR.47, June 17, 2003.

²⁰⁹ GAOR, A/C.5/58/SR.41, July 2, 2004.

²¹⁰ GAOR, A/C.5/57/SR.47, June 17, 2003.

²¹¹ GAOR, A/C.5/58/SR.34, March 29, 2004.

taken on loan for current peacekeeping operations was also disconcerting. Yet, it would not be appropriate to cross borrow funds from active peacekeeping missions. India therefore supported the only viable option – that of retaining cash balances from closed missions, as suggested by the Secretary-General. It was particularly open to the idea since this would not hamper the payment of dues related to the closed missions to the member states.²¹²

In association with the G-77 countries, India was particularly vocal about adherence to the assessed scales for contribution to peacekeeping operations that had been decided upon through resolutions of the General Assembly.²¹³ These scales, it was argued, must not be changed unilaterally and due regard must be given to the position of low-income countries placed in Group C of assessed contributions. Taking up another issue of importance for the developing countries, India raised the issue of rates for reimbursements for personal equipment and clothing that had remained unchanged at \$65.²¹⁴ The developing countries, it argued, were very open to a standard methodology being used to calculate troop costs and use of statistical tools to arrive at a representative figure, but these must be arrived at after taking their inputs seriously. It urged that an ad hoc arrangement be put in place to increase troop costs while a comprehensive review of the entire issue was ongoing. The third issue of importance for TCCs was the timely redressal of their claims. India called for strengthening the finance management and support service in claims processing.²¹⁵ In this connection, it raised its concern regarding the non-creation of posts in the claims and information management section as authorised by the General Assembly and creation of the said posts elsewhere, since this created unwarranted backlogs in the processing of the claims of TCCs.

²¹² GAOR, A/C.5/57/SR.51, July 8, 2003.

²¹³ GAOR, A/C.5/54/SR.65, July 11, 2000.

²¹⁴ GAOR, A/C.5/55/SR.62, June 1, 2001.

²¹⁵ GAOR, A/C.5/55/SR.67, June 7, 2001.

India was also engaged with the issue of reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment (COE) to the developing TCCs.²¹⁶ It called on the Secretariat to improve its procedures related to COE and its management of the closure of missions more carefully.²¹⁷ It was of the opinion that there were serious flaws in the system of management of COE and that the management of arrangements in the field and the Headquarters required serious attention, alongside the requirement of pre-arrival and operational inspections.²¹⁸ In 2004, it expressed its disappointment regarding the inability of the Working Group on reimbursements for COE to reach a consensus on several important issues, including rates of reimbursement and methods for revising these rates in terms of cost of troops.²¹⁹ Continuing its engagement with issues of troop contributing countries, India pointed out in 2004 that while the reimbursements due for troops and COE for past missions had witnessed improvements, the new issue was the non-payment of current assessed contribution and hence the payment for troops in current missions.²²⁰ India lamented that fact that the COE Working Group had not asked for substantially revised rates for COE and that this would eventually affect the sustainability of providing such equipment.²²¹

On the question of reimbursements for troops, India welcomed the creation of the Senior Advisory Group by the General Assembly as the “first attempt to address the question in a focused manner”. India was a member of the Senior Advisory Group and had participated in the survey related to the issue of reimbursements. The main point of contention was that the rates of reimbursement had remained unchanged since the 1970s, and India argued that adequate rates were an “essential element in the mutual obligations that bound the

²¹⁶ GAOR, A/C.5/56/SR.55, August 6, 2002.

²¹⁷ GAOR, A/C.5/55/SR.59, July 19, 2001.

²¹⁸ GAOR, A/C.5/56/SR.55, August 6, 2002.

²¹⁹ GAOR, A/C.5/58/SR.41, July 2, 2004.

²²⁰ GAOR, A/C.5/58/SR.41, July 2, 2004.

²²¹ GAOR, A/C.5/68/SR.38, July 15, 2014.

Organization to the troop-contributing countries.²²² In addition, the daily allowances had not changed for 20 years, and the rest and recuperation stipend had not been upgraded for 10 years. After a great deal of contentious discussions between the TCCs and the finance contributing countries, including the very questioning of the results of the survey, a revised rate of \$1,762 per month, upwards from \$1,028 per month, was agreed upon. Countering the arguments of finance contributing countries that their financial hardships made it difficult for them to revise the reimbursement rates, India argued that in the duration when the rates were not being revised, the TCCs too faced several economic hardships and yet did not stop contributing to peacekeeping missions. The issue of unpaid assessments to the tune of \$777 million for troops, formed police units, and COE owed to 86 countries of the world was also raised.²²³ India suggested that with the increased deployment of female units in peacekeeping operations, the costs associated with them must be accounted for separately.²²⁴ Also, pre-deployment costs must be paid for.

India endorsed the need for strategic deployment stocks to enable rapid deployment and suggested that the method for funding such stocks could be the same as that for the peacekeeping reserve fund.²²⁵ In the interests of austerity, India pointed to duplication of efforts of the DPKO and DFS and other departments and called for streamlining the staffing and avoiding duplication.²²⁶ India regretted the fact that in the Military Division the proposed Office of Military Affairs was not created, and instead ad hoc structures were created in response to the resource crunch.

²²² GAOR, A/C.5/68/SR.38, July 15, 2014.

²²³ GAOR, A/C.5/71/SR.34, July 5, 2017.

²²⁴ GAOR, A/C.5/72/SR.33, May 3, 2018.

²²⁵ GAOR, A/C.5/56/SR.55, August 6, 2002.

²²⁶ GAOR, A/C.5/61/SR.56, August 1, 2007. The interventions made from 2008–2012 are not available on the website of the UN.

5.3 INDIA IN THE 6TH COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

In the 6th Committee or the legal committee of the General Assembly (and occasionally in the Security Council), the issue of criminal accountability of UN officials and experts involved in peacekeeping missions has been discussed.

The issue of criminal accountability of troops came up for discussion as early as 2002 when the International Criminal Court (ICC) had come into force. India has been an advocate for immunity of the soldiers as accorded to them by the status of forces agreement signed with the TCC before the commencement of every peacekeeping mission.²²⁷ India argued that those countries that were signatories to the ICC may allow their soldiers to be subject to its jurisdiction on an individual basis. India was also of the view that most UN forces do not commit severe crimes and in the exceptional cases that they do, they could be prosecuted by the judiciaries of their respective countries.

In the context of rising cases of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by UN troops, there was a demand for a separate Convention governing such cases.²²⁸ While advocating a policy of zero tolerance towards such acts, India, however, was not in favour of a separate Convention for this purpose. India argued that countries like itself already had laws that governed the actions committed by its nationals outside the national territory. India felt that if a small number of countries did not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over its nationals, then such countries must be urged to frame laws for this purpose. It was felt that the process of drawing up a new Convention was long and tedious and hence swifter measures must be preferred. India also sounded a note of caution regarding a suggestion by the group of legal experts that UN officials be tried in the jurisdiction of the host country. This method, it was felt, was according to the principles of territoriality but had other limitations,

²²⁷ S/PV.4568, The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, July 10, 2002.

²²⁸ GAOR, A/C.6/62/SR.6, November 6, 2007.

namely, that the legal and law enforcement machinery in the host countries may not be well developed to conduct such trials. This will mean that “reliable, credible or legally admissible evidence” may not be available to complete the judicial procedures.

In order to make up for the jurisdictional gap in countries that did not have extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes committed by its citizens abroad, resolution 62/63 was adopted which required nations to include methods of cooperation with other countries for trial of errant citizens. India had complied with this resolution and had adopted legislation under its Code of Criminal Procedure to cooperate with other states in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions. India had also concluded bilateral agreements on mutual assistance in criminal matters. It already had in place the Indian Extradition Act (1962), which provided for extradition for offences in the treaty of extradition with the concerned state. In cases of absence of a bilateral treaty of extradition or of assistance in criminal matters, India pledged to provide assistance on a reciprocal and case-by-case basis.²²⁹ India also welcomed the adoption of the United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Staff and Related Personnel.

The Indian representative maintained that peacekeepers were exemplars of universal idealism and aberrations in the work of the Blue Helmets must not bring down the commendable role they had played for so long.²³⁰ Elaborating on the nuances of the issue, India's representative stated that accountability of UN personnel had become an issue due to respect for sovereignty and jurisdiction of the member states.²³¹ The UN had a legal personality and hence its members enjoyed some immunity and privileges. The functional capacity and willingness of

²²⁹ GAOR, A/C.6/66/SR.9, November 3, 2011.

²³⁰ UNSC, United Nations peacekeeping operations, S/PV.7642, March 10, 2016.

²³¹ GAOR, A/C.6/72/SR.8, October 31, 2017.

member states to prosecute the accused was also of consequence. India opined that the immunity enjoyed by UN as an organisation must not be confused with immunity for criminal acts of any kind by UN personnel. That said, the UN itself could only undertake disciplinary action and not exercise criminal jurisdiction. “The development of uniform rules, investigation capacity, organizational, managerial and command accountability, and individual disciplinary, financial and criminal accountability would help to address the issue effectively.”²³² It would help if the UN’s investigations could be accepted as evidence in criminal law proceedings in member states, and multiple investigations into the same allegations could be avoided by proper exchange of information between Member States and the UN and cooperation in the conduct of investigations.²³³

India’s contribution to this realm was attested by India’s permanent representative to the UN in the following words:

India was the first country to contribute to the Secretary-General’s Trust Fund for Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and also signed the voluntary compact on SEA with the Secretary-General in 2017. The Indian Prime Minister joined the “Circle of Leadership” on the prevention of and response to sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations operations. Indian peacekeepers too are playing an important mentoring role to prevent conflict related sexual violence.²³⁴

²³² GAOR, A/C.6/73/SR.6, January 3, 2019.

²³³ GAOR, A/C.6/75/SR.4, December 14, 2020.

²³⁴ PMI, T.S. Tirumurti, United Nations Security Council Open Arria Formula meeting “Call to lead by example: Ensuring the full, equal and meaningful participation of Women in UN-led Peace Processes”, March 8, 2021.

INDIA AND PEACEBUILDING

India has been a member of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) since its formation in 2006 as it is among the top five troop contributing countries (TCCs). It has taken keen interest in the conceptualisation of the PBC. India also contributes to the peacebuilding fund. India has been associated with the Working Group on Lessons Learned which has made recommendations on role of the Peacebuilding Commission.²³⁵ When called upon, India has readily made available civilian capacities to UN missions. Several Indian civilian officials were seconded to the UN missions in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan for post-conflict endeavours.²³⁶ India has been engaged in peacebuilding in Africa and done human resource development, institutional capacity-building, provision of information technology, etc.²³⁷

It has contributed to peacebuilding bilaterally through its Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, Lines of Credit, South—South Cooperation, and trilaterally through the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Fund. India has also done exemplary people-centric peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction work in Afghanistan.²³⁸ Braving the shadows of terrorism in the country, India has contributed to \$3 billion worth of grass roots and development partnership projects. Contributing the education, training, and capacity building, India set up the Afghanistan National Agricultural Sciences and Technology University in Kandahar. India's National Centre of

²³⁵ S/PV.6503, Post-conflict peacebuilding: Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its fourth session (S/2011/41), March 23, 2011.

²³⁶ S/PV.6533, Post-conflict peacebuilding, May 12, 2011.

²³⁷ S/PV.6897, Post-conflict peacebuilding, December 20, 2012.

²³⁸ PMI, T.S. Tirumurti, Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, November 3, 2020.

Good Governance trained senior officials of the Government of Gambia in best practices of administration and governance under the ITEC programme.

However, the engagement with peacebuilding is much more intense. Both in the Security Council and the General Assembly, India has been a leading participant in discussions on peacebuilding. Discussions on peacebuilding in the General Assembly have taken place in plenary sessions on the Report of the Peacebuilding Commission and Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund.

6.1 INDIA AND THE PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURE

Much before the PBC was formed, India had been a strong supporter of the role of the General Assembly in peacebuilding and had argued that peacebuilding lies outside the mandate of the Security Council.²³⁹ Citing the example of East Europe, it was asserted that conflicts may often end without the UN intervention and so the UN Security Council has no role to play in these cases, whereas the General Assembly will be critical to peacebuilding. Even regarding involvement in development activities, India argued that the responsibility must lie with the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and not the Security Council.²⁴⁰ Addressing the root causes of conflict such as poverty and deprivation too lies outside the purview of the Security Council.²⁴¹

In a discussion on the mandate of the proposed PBC, India supported the proposal of the Secretary-General to keep the mandate of the new body limited to post-conflict peacebuilding rather than an expansive remit of addressing structural causes of conflict.²⁴² It was also not in favour of granting the PBC an early warning or monitoring role. It

²³⁹ S/PV.4272 (Resumption 1), Peace-building: towards a comprehensive approach, February 5, 2001.

²⁴⁰ S/PV.7361, Maintenance of international peace and security, January 19, 2015.

²⁴¹ S/PV.7561, Maintenance of international peace and security, November 17, 2015.

²⁴² S/PV.5187, Post conflict peacebuilding, May 26, 2005.

envisaged a PBC that while reporting to the Security Council and the ECOSOC would remain accountable to the General Assembly. It should also provide coherence among all the Non-Government Organisations and actors involved in peacebuilding. It suggested that there be a strategic relationship between the PBC and the General Assembly, Security Council, and the ECOSOC to ensure continued flow of funds buttressed by political will.

In the formative years of the PBC, India gave substantial inputs on how the working of the Commission must be organised. Participating in a discussion on the first report of the PBC, the Indian delegate emphasised that the best results of the PBC would come not only from the empowerment of the country-specific configurations but also making the Organisational Committee of the PBC more result-oriented.²⁴³ It was suggested that the advisory role of the PBC could be improved such that the PBC could make available the advice of experts in peacebuilding to the countries concerned. A third suggestion was that the PBC focus on ways of getting more resources for peacebuilding and the peacebuilding fund became more transparent in the use of funds to improve its creditability. A fourth input was that the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) must be supported by others in terms of relaying information regarding requirements from the ground to the PBC.

Reiterating the need for PBC to be open to receiving inputs on the actual requirements on the ground, it opined that the main task of the PBC must be to enhance the “legitimacy, effectiveness and absorptive capacity of the country’s administrative and governing system” based on the information it receives.²⁴⁴ The PBC, it said, must be allowed to coordinate international efforts of all donors who are a part of the Commission. India highlighted the need for improvement in the manner in which additional countries were selected to be beneficiaries of the peacebuilding fund. There needs to be better collaboration between the PBC, the Peacebuilding Fund, and the PBSO to ensure better

²⁴³ GAOR, Plenary, A/62/PV.23, October 10, 2007.

²⁴⁴ GAOR, Plenary, A/63/PV.23, October 9, 2008.

utilisation of funds provided in the concerned country. India sought a dedicated office to deal with projects that are funded by the Peacebuilding Fund.

In conjunction with Sweden, India tabled the draft resolution that contained the revised terms of reference for Peacebuilding Fund.²⁴⁵ The purpose of this revision was to make the Fund more flexible and responsive by rationalising and simplifying its structure for providing peacebuilding support. It helped set up the twin facilities of the Immediate Response Facility and the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility through which funds would be allocated. It was also aimed at increasing the synergy between the PBC and the Fund through enhanced transparency and consultation. These would enable the Fund to provide short-term emergency funds in the early stages of peacebuilding and medium-term catalytic funding to address the causes of conflict. The Fund's performance would be assessed by the PBSO along with member states periodically as well as annually. India argued for a constant effort to improve the peacebuilding architecture to provide funds where required in the shortest possible time.²⁴⁶

On the organisational front, India expressed its concern regarding the fact that peacebuilding was being done not only by the PBC, but also by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Political Affairs, and yet others by the UN resident coordinator system.²⁴⁷ It supported and took active part in the January 2017 high-level dialogue on building sustainable peace initiated by the Secretary-General to integrate the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) into peacebuilding.²⁴⁸

On the issue of funding for peacebuilding, India put forward the idea of a Standing Fund for the PBC so as to ensure uninterrupted access

²⁴⁵ GAOR, Plenary, A/63/PV.90, June 17, 2009.

²⁴⁶ GAOR, Plenary, A/64/PV.50, November 20, 2009.

²⁴⁷ S/PV.6472, Post-conflict peacebuilding: Institution-building, January 21, 2011.

²⁴⁸ GAOR, A/71/PV.77, April 20, 2017.

to funds.²⁴⁹ The PBC, it argued, must connect the donors to the international community and the recipient states so as to encourage a sense of national ownership and ensure funding of activities agreed to between them. It suggested that the role of the Bretton Institutions must be optimised as they often make inappropriate suggestions.²⁵⁰ It pointed out to the need for better coordination between the UN and the World Bank to support the work of the PBC.²⁵¹ When the Peacebuilding Fund was operationalised, India contributed to the Fund and was associated with revising the terms of reference of the Fund which enabled it “to serve as a fast-disbursing, agile, responsive and risk-taking peacebuilding instrument.”²⁵²

India has lamented the fact that less than 1 per cent of the peacekeeping budget was spent on peacebuilding.²⁵³ It highlighted the tendency to divert development cooperation funds for humanitarian and emergency requirements.²⁵⁴ It has supported the connections of the Commission with other stakeholders such as the World Bank, African Development Bank, and other international financial institutions (IFIs).²⁵⁵

6.2 INDIA ON PEACEBUILDING

India's position on peacebuilding was spelt out much before the PBC was formed. It was that peacebuilding must be locally owned and not

²⁴⁹ S/PV.5187, Post conflict peacebuilding, May 26, 2005.

²⁵⁰ S/PV.5895 (Resumption 1), Post-conflict peacebuilding, May 20, 2008.

²⁵¹ S/PV.6165 (Resumption 1), Post-conflict peacebuilding Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (S/2009/304), July 22, 2009.

²⁵² S/PV.6224, Post-conflict peacebuilding: Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its third session (S/2009/444), November 25, 2009.

²⁵³ S/PV.8033, United Nations peacekeeping operations Their potential contribution to the overarching goal of sustaining peace, August 29, 2017.

²⁵⁴ GAOR, A/71/PV.77, April 20, 2017.

²⁵⁵ GAOR, Peacebuilding and sustaining peace and Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund, A/72/PV.90, May 24, 2018.

based on foreign models.²⁵⁶ An Indian representative spelt it out in the following words:

India is strongly supportive of nationally led plans for peace consolidation, while arguing for a constructive approach and a “lighter touch” by the PBC in extending advice, support and in extending its involvement.²⁵⁷

India’s fundamental approach to peacebuilding efforts is to respect national ownership and to be guided by member states’ development priorities.²⁵⁸ India argued that reconciliation too must be a home-grown process. Another important articulation in this connection was:

...if peacebuilding is to move beyond being an exercise in social engineering, we must acknowledge that peacebuilding resources exist within conflict-affected societies themselves.²⁵⁹

According to India, peacebuilding must be guided by three principles; first, there ought to be minimal external footprint. Second, there must be authorisation from the Security Council. Third, there must be express consent from the host state.²⁶⁰

Similarly, in the context of making provision for justice and rule of law in post-conflict scenarios, India indicated a preference for nationally driven approaches and the representation of major civilisations and principal legal systems in the constitution of courts to address rule of law issues.²⁶¹ It was critical of the entire project of providing justice in the process of transition from conflict to peace on the grounds that

²⁵⁶ GAOR,A/C.4/59/SR.17, December 31, 2004.

²⁵⁷ Permanent Mission of India, New York, India and UN Peacekeeping, at <https://www.pminewyork.org/pages.php?id=5>, (Accessed 10 June 2014).

²⁵⁸ PMI, T.S. Tirumurti, Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, November 3, 2020.

²⁵⁹ S/PV.8668 (Resumption 1), Peacebuilding and sustaining peace, November 19, 2019.

²⁶⁰ GAOR, Plenary, A/68/PV.78, March 26, 2014.

²⁶¹ UNSC, S/PV.6705, January 19, 2012.

such projects had become steeped in ‘western liberalism’ and therefore was of little solace to the people concerned. India’s representative argued that:

Effective transitional justice is not only a question of whether there should be a domestic versus an international trial, a truth commission versus an international trial or a cultural alternative versus a traditional trial. The question is: What is beneficial to the people whose lives have been disrupted or even destroyed by the perpetrators of violence?²⁶²

On yet another occasion, India’s representative argued that:

Peacebuilding needs to integrate indigenous and informal justice mechanisms into judicial reforms instead of viewing such mechanisms as incompatible with Western liberal values. In some post-conflict societies, the bulk of disputes are handled through customary law. In such situations, the allocation of scarce resources to formal institutions would be wasteful if such institutions had little to do with the realities of the population.²⁶³

India also expressed reservations regarding a peacekeeping mission being extended to a peacebuilding mission. The Brahimi Report that drew on the success of peacekeepers doing peacebuilding in the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), it argued, had been unduly optimistic about the prospects of such experiments. In these cases, which are an exception, peacekeepers were involved in the efforts to provide transitional administration and hence they could do some peacebuilding. But, in most cases such as the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) or the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), peacekeepers had been

²⁶² S/PV.8723 (Resumption 1), Peacebuilding and sustaining peace, February 13, 2020.

²⁶³ GAOR, Plenary, A/68/PV.78, March 26, 2014.

deployed on borders to monitor withdrawal of forces or ceasefires and would have very little awareness of the social and economic requirements of the place. Finally, in many instances, troops that do peacekeeping come from countries where they have overthrown their own governments. It would be a travesty to engage such troops in peacebuilding and setting up of new democracies. In the words of an Indian representative:

Post-conflict peacebuilding cannot be achieved through peacekeepers... While, perhaps, peace-building elements need to be integrated into the overall approach from the outset, peacekeeping can only lay the ground for post-conflict reconciliation, reconstruction and development. This further responsibility is best left to the funds and programmes of the United Nations system and, in the final analysis, must be locally owned... (when peacekeepers do peacebuilding) such examples of mission creep would continue to be viewed with suspicion... peacekeepers have (no)... intrinsic role in conflict resolution or in addressing the underlying causes of conflict, especially where these are largely socio-economic in nature, such as poverty and deprivation.²⁶⁴

As the PBC became functional, India emphasised the importance of an institutional method of conveying the national priorities to the PBC rather than rely on the inputs of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.²⁶⁵ For best results there should be a two-way dialogue between the PBC and the country concerned.²⁶⁶ India suggested that in order to fulfil the requirement of civilian staff for peacebuilding activities, a partnership with governments of member states and secondment of government officials must be followed. Such a system, it was argued, would not only give quick access to the UN to the required personnel but also make it convenient to scale the numbers of officials up and down as per requirement. It would also help draw in staff that is

²⁶⁴ S/PV.4970 (Resumption 1), May 17, 2004.

²⁶⁵ S/PV.5895 (Resumption 1), Post-conflict peacebuilding, May 20, 2008.

²⁶⁶ S/PV.6224, Post-conflict peacebuilding: Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its third session (S/2009/444), November 25, 2009.

familiar with establishing and working the structures of government.²⁶⁷ This requires good channels of communication with the member states.²⁶⁸

India proposed that developing countries be supported to play a role in peacebuilding by offering suggestions on national priorities.²⁶⁹ This is because the experience of developing countries like India in nation building would serve as a good example to emulate. One of the most critical elements of peacebuilding is decentralised governance. It helps in privileging the weak and marginalised groups on the society. In this regard too, the Indian experience of political and legislative decentralisation could be put in place in several post-conflict scenarios.²⁷⁰ The Indian experience of weaving together a vast diversity of people into a unified country can be emulated in cases where ethnic, racial, and religious identities are at the roots of conflict.²⁷¹

Several years into the experience of peacebuilding and despite its early demand for a clear demarcation between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, India accepted that peacekeepers can become effective early peacebuilders.²⁷² This was based on the role played by India's peacekeepers in Cambodia, Somalia, Congo, Sudan, Liberia, and Haiti to restore institutions and administrative processes, strengthen policing,

²⁶⁷ S/PV.6533, Post-conflict peacebuilding, May 12, 2011.

²⁶⁸ S/PV.6805, Post-conflict peacebuilding: Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its fifth session (S/2012/70), July 12, 2012.

²⁶⁹ S/PV.6165 (Resumption 1), Post-conflict peacebuilding Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (S/2009/304), July 22, 2009.

²⁷⁰ S/PV.6472, Post-conflict peacebuilding: Institution-building, January 21, 2011.

²⁷¹ Remarks by Minister of State for External Affairs Shri V. Muraleedharan in UN Security Council High Level Open Debate 'Peacebuilding and sustaining peace-Diversity, State-building and the search for peace', October 12, 2021, at <https://www.pminewyork.gov.in/IndiaatUNSC?id=NDM4NA>, (Accessed 30 November 2021).

²⁷² S/PV.6472, Post-conflict peacebuilding: Institution-building, January 21, 2011.

activate judicial mechanisms, restart educational institutions, and set up livestock units to spruce up the economic activity were cited as examples of how peacekeepers can help in peacebuilding. However, reacting to a report of the PBC, which called for the integration of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, India proffered the view that since actors involved in humanitarian and development work and those involved in peacebuilding and peacekeeping perform distinctly different tasks, their functioning should be integrated only if it helps the sustain peace.²⁷³

India strongly endorsed a role for regional organisations in peacebuilding and in this context, greatly appreciated the role played by the African Union on post-conflict reconstruction.²⁷⁴

India displayed keen interest in the nitty-gritty of peacebuilding. It pointed out that there is need for coordination within the UN system for carrying out security sector reform and putting in place development administration in the host country.²⁷⁵ On the subject of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of armed groups, India emphasised the need to take a longer-term view and provision of livelihoods for facilitating reintegration. On the issue of police reform, India advocated that given the paucity of resources, the emphasis must be on impartiality in recruitment and vetting and training of recruits rather than attempting full scale cultural change.

²⁷³ GAOR, Plenary, A/68/PV.78, March 26, 2014.

²⁷⁴ GAOR, Plenary, A/66/PV.101, March 19, 2012.

²⁷⁵ S/PV.6299 (Resumption 1), Post-conflict peacebuilding, April 16, 2010.

CONCLUSION

It is through multilateral engagements that states contribute to the governance of various issues in the international realm, which in turn have global implications. Among the oldest and most prominent institutions that have been in the business of governing globally is the United Nations (UN). Its main constituents, that is, governments of various states, as well as some non-state actors, have thus been in the act of global governance much before the term actually came into vogue. Multilateralism has been a critical aspect of Indian foreign policy. On the positive side, there are arguments that despite several limitations, India, along with other emerging powers, have contributed to changing the norms of global governance in several issue areas. Notable among these are the continuing efforts at evolving an equitable economic order through reform of the Bretton Woods institutions and the rules of the international trade regime. On the negative side, it has been argued that leading powers such as India (also China and Japan) are more concerned with developing and legitimising their national power aspirations than with contributing to global governance. More specifically India's approach towards the UN and its related bodies has been explained in realist terms, as being aimed at maximising its influence through seeking representation at the high table mainly in order to enhance its status rather than leading the developing nations through its thought or action.

Several studies have focussed attention on India as rising power. However, most of them have looked at India in the multilateral economic realm. Much less has been said about their contribution to matters of international peace and security. To add to this dimension, this study seeks to understand the Indian contribution to the global governance of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. India's role in peacekeeping has been well documented. It is widely appreciated that India is the largest contributor to peacekeeping with 2, 53,000 troops taking part in 49 missions. At present, it is the third largest troop contributor with 5,538 troops contributing to various peacekeeping

missions. However, a survey of the literature on India in peacekeeping indicates that there has been precious little said and known about India's diplomacy on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, which is the focus of this study.

INDIA AND THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING

Among the few studies that have focused on this dimension are Yeshi Choedon's (2013) who argues that India's engagement with peacekeeping has not been limited to contribution of troops. Choedon (2010) recognises that in the early years of the evolution of the UN the Cold War precluded the collective security role of the Security Council. India, along with other countries, played a role in conceptualising the idea of sending observers and commissions that could interject between warring parties and bring about an end to conflict. India's engagement with peacekeeping continued notwithstanding the multidimensional nature of peacekeeping in the era of increasing intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War years. This engagement was characterised by several objections and caveats regarding policy issues related to peacekeeping such as renewed emphasis on minimum use of military means, reservations regarding humanitarian interventions, steady finances for peacekeeping, a stand-by brigade for the UN, training for UN peacekeeping, over-reliance on regional organisations, jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) over her peacekeeping forces, and need for consultation with troop contributing countries and their increased role in decision making. Indian concerns regarding robust peacekeeping that requires use of force when necessary and raises issues of legal immunity of peacekeepers as well as the implications of use of force for sovereignty of states has been studied by Sandeep Dewan and Lotte Vermeiji (2014). An incisive account of India's non-permanent membership of the Security Council by C.S.R. Murthy also provides valuable inputs on India's position on some aspects of peacekeeping. Richard Gowan and Sushant K. Singh (2014) offer a critical perspective by arguing that Indian policy makers have not made any major contribution discussions about peacekeeping strategies. They contend that India's diplomacy at the UN is centred on 'tactical processes' rather than strategies. There is a contradiction in India's stand of peacekeeping where as a 'rule defender' it stands firm on respect for the principle of

sovereignty of states, yet as a 'rule bender' it does robust peacekeeping where required. They also refer to India working with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) bloc to counter robust peacekeeping in the Committee of 34. They however acknowledge that India very ably voiced the need for substantial consultations between the troop contributing countries and the Security Council in 2008–09. Also in 2011, as a member of the Special Advisory Group, it was a prime player in the quest for better funding of UN peacekeeping operations. There is however no detailed study of the Indian diplomacy's engagement with issues of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War years.

On the subject of peacebuilding, there is no appreciation of Indian diplomacy's engagement with issues of peacebuilding. There is, in fact, no study that outlines what the global governance of peacekeeping and peacebuilding entails in the first place. This study aims to fill these gaps. Based on an intensive study of the interventions made by the representatives of India in the various bodies and committees of the UN, it argues that this engagement with peacekeeping and peacebuilding must be construed as a contribution to the global governance of these issues.

MULTIPLE FACETS OF INDIA IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Rising India's engagement with the global governance of various issues is a subject that has received some attention. Four such issues have been focused on in this study: climate change, development assistance, trade, and disarmament. They bring out the many facets of India as an actor in global governance. India in the global governance of the issue of climate change can be seen as an actor that brought forth the concerns of the developing countries vis-à-vis climate change since it affected their course of development. From a non-budging developing country position, India has now transitioned to an emerging power position of accepting some self-imposed deadlines on its adaptation and mitigation targets. India as an actor in global governance of the issue of development assistance can be seen as an innovator that has created its own way of providing development finance. It can also be seen as an actor that is challenging the very structure of Western-led development aid. In the global governance of trade, India has been an actor that has constantly put forth its concerns either on its own or as

part of ad hoc coalitions. It has never been shy of holding up agreements if it felt that they were contrary to India's interests. However, its actions and positions have always been in the interests of the developing countries and so are better dubbed as 'developmental multilateralism'. As an actor in regime governing nuclear weapons, India has shown remarkable resilience in holding off discriminatory treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It has also displayed the ability to stay away from instruments such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) since they did not contribute to genuine disarmament and were at best half-steps. In the manner in which it went about its nuclear tests, weathered the sanctions, and secured for itself a way back into the fold of responsible nuclear weapon states, India has been an 'agenda-setter'. This analysis of India in global governance showcases India as a versatile actor. Its role in the governance of different issue areas has been tempered by the nature of the regime in each case. There are thus, many facets of India in global governance.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING

The governance of peacekeeping involves the Security Council, the troop/police contributing countries, the UN Secretariat, the Committee of 34 (C34), the 5th (Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) Committee of the General Assembly, and the contingent-owned equipment (COE) Working Group. The debate on reformulating the basics of peacekeeping began in the aftermath of the Cold War. There were several landmarks in this process. These are: the Agenda for Peace (1992), the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000), the High-level Panel (2004), the Capstone Doctrine (2008), the New Horizon Initiative (2009), the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO, 2015), and finally the is the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative.

In the global governance of peacekeeping, several issues came up for discussion. The traditional principles of peacekeeping namely, impartiality, consent of the host state, and non-use of force except in self-defence came to be challenged. The need to protect refugees and civilians to prevent humanitarian crises of the kind seen in Srebrenica

and Rwanda led to debate on protection of civilians, humanitarian interventions, and the principle of responsibility to protect was adopted by the World Summit in 2005. Peacekeeping also became multidimensional and involved support to ad hoc semi-sovereign mechanisms to provide effective transitional authority. Such multidimensionality led to a debate on the civilian requirements of peacekeeping operations. With the increased deployment of civilian police in peacekeeping operations, it was argued that there is need for integrated missions with military and police components. As peacekeeping operations became large and complex in the post-Cold War years, the issue of financing them became very important. Shortage of funding resulted in subcontracting of peacekeeping operations to individual states, coalitions of states, regional, and sub regional actors. Serious discussions were held regarding their administrative, financial, military, and logistical capacities for peacekeeping.

United Nations Peacebuilding is governed by the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and the voluntary Peacebuilding Fund. Together they form the peacebuilding architecture. The main landmarks in the development of the idea of peacebuilding are the Agenda for Peace (1992), the Brahimi Report (2000), and the Secretary-General's report titled *No Exit without Strategy* (2001).

Several issues have come up in the global governance of peacebuilding. First, a case was made for 'participatory interventions' under the guidance of regional experts and anthropologists with greater involvement of the people to provide them a sense of ownership. Second, it has been contended that the liberal priorities of external actors and internal elites come in the way of achieving 'popular peace'. A third issue has been the lack of accountability in terms of outcomes. And finally, there are issues relating to the working of the peacebuilding architecture itself.

INDIAN CONTRIBUTION TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF PEACEKEEPING

India has made several contributions to the global governance of peacekeeping by participating in the debates on peacekeeping in all forums associated with the global governance of peacekeeping. The

Indian interventions on the subject of peacekeeping in the Security Council are significant because India requested to be party to such discussions even when it was not a non-permanent member of the Security Council. These are testimony to India's abiding interest in the subject and the desire to influence the working of the peacekeeping mechanism in the most influential of the forums in the global governance of peacekeeping. In the Security Council, first, India supported the basic principles of peacekeeping namely, consent, impartiality, and non-use of force, and endorsed the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace (1995) which recognised the negative fall outs of peace enforcement and argued that peace enforcement is contrary to the political and military tasks of peacekeeping. India critiqued both the Agenda and the Supplement for being overly optimistic about what peacekeeping forces could accomplish once war or violence broke out. Second, India has been very vocal about the need for substantial consultations between the troop contributing countries (TCCs), the Security Council, and the Secretariat and made several interventions on this subject periodically. On this matter, India even suggested that the TCCs must interact with other offices of the UN such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs so that they play a more useful role in the conflict. The TCCs must be allowed to meet donors to trust funds to explain the operational and political costs involved. The TCCs must have interactions with the Advisory Committee on Accounting and Budgeting Questions to give their inputs to the Committee. A joint view of Council, Secretariat, and TCCs must be given to media in times of crises and TCCs given due publicity for good work done. India made the case for an enhanced role for the TCCs and police contributing countries (PCCs) by way of using their good offices and diplomatic engagement to bolster peace processes. Third, India was actively involved in debating the exit strategy from a peacekeeping operation. In this context, India pointed out the importance of there not being a sudden exit from a theatre of conflict considering the proactive role played by peacekeepers in disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform, rule of law, basic governance, institution building, and support to the democratic process. Fourth, India has engaged in the debate on robust peacekeeping and sounded a note of caution regarding exposing peacekeepers to the dangers of engaging in actual combat. Fifth, India

has evolved from a position of complete opposition to the involvement of regional organisations in peacekeeping to actually building the capacities of regional organisations (AU) to enable them to undertake peacekeeping. It gave several constructive suggestions on finding the right balance between the UN and the regional organisation's involvement in peacekeeping. Sixth, India has been a strong votary of giving explicit mandates to peacekeeping troops to use force in defending the mandates when confronted with non-state armed groups and trans-border criminal networks. Seventh, India has been an ardent supporter of the safety of peacekeeping troops and has helped to put in place the UNITE AWARE platform that will improve the real-time situational awareness of the peacekeepers and provide for their safety. Eighth, India suggested several ways in which the working of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support DFS could be improved. The DPKO, it felt, could use the expertise of the countries of the South in its peacebuilding activities. Ninth, India has led by example in increasing the role of women in peacekeeping operations. It has included gender sensitisation as part of its training programmes to contribute towards safety of women through exemplary behaviour of its peacekeepers deployed in conflict areas. Tenth, India has engaged substantially with the issue of protection of civilians (POC) in armed conflict. India pointed to the need to place more troops on the ground to ensure protection of civilians. India could suggest practical ways of improving POC by providing enablers such as air support to peacekeepers, providing cell phones to local population to attend to the security needs in real-time, and creation of databases on patterns of violence. India provided an important corrective in the debate on POC by contesting the idea that POC was the responsibility of the peacekeepers. Rather, it said the main responsibility for POC lay with national governments and peacekeepers must only play a supportive role or build national capacities to perform these tasks.

Different aspects of peacekeeping are discussed in the 4th, 5th, and 6th Committees of the General Assembly and India has been actively participating in them. The 4th Committee holds an annual discussion on peacekeeping under the heading "Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their aspects". In

the 4th Committee, India was particularly vocal on matters pertaining to resources —men, material, and financial — for UN peacekeeping operations. It supported the stationing of stand-by troops and rapid reaction forces to help in timely deployment of peacekeeping missions. India was in favour of pre-positioning logistics and equipment enabling air and sea lift capabilities at Logistics Base in Brandisi, Italy to enable troops to deploy rapidly. On the financing of peacekeeping operations, in addition to proffering several other suggestions, India supported the idea of a peacekeeping reserve fund which would draw upon assessed contributions. India pointed out the several shortcomings of the Brahimi Report in addressing institutional shortcomings such as that of the DPKO. Several important suggestions were made on effectively using civilian police for peacekeeping. India supported the setting up of a standing civilian police capacity in 2006 to start up civilian work in peacekeeping. Finally, India made a strong case for privileging political dialogue and setting in motion political processes rather than conduct of stronger military action by peacekeeping forces.

In the 5th Committee of the General Assembly or the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), India made several interventions on matters pertaining to financing of peacekeeping operations. These are particularly relevant in the context of the perennial shortage of funds for peacekeeping in the post-Cold War years and the need to rationalise expenses. India gave several nitty-gritty suggestions on reducing the expenditure on completed missions by closing them fully, filling up of administrative posts and vacancies in missions to ensure their proper functioning, consolidation of peacekeeping accounts, retaining cash balances from closed missions, and establishing rates of reimbursement for troops and equipment that were contributed mainly by developing countries.

In the 6th Committee of the General Assembly, the issue of criminal accountability of United National officials and experts involved in peacekeeping missions has been discussed. Here, India advocated for immunity of the soldiers as accorded to them by the status of forces agreement signed with the troop contributing country before the commencement of every peacekeeping mission. India argued that those countries who were signatories to the International Criminal Court

(ICC) may allow their soldiers to be subject to its jurisdiction on an individual basis. In the context of rising cases of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by UN troops, there was a demand for a separate convention governing such cases. While advocating a policy of zero tolerance towards such acts, India, however, argued against a separate convention for this purpose. India was in favour of using national laws on extraterritorial jurisdiction to deal with such cases, and adoption of such laws where they were absent.

INDIAN CONTRIBUTION TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF PEACEBUILDING

India has been a member of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) since its formation in 2006 as it is among the top five troop contributing countries. It has taken keen interest in the conceptualisation of the PBC. India also contributes to the peacebuilding fund. India has been associated with the Working Group on Lessons Learned, which has made recommendations on role of the Peacebuilding Commission. It has contributed to peacebuilding bilaterally through its Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, Lines of Credit, South-South Cooperation, and trilaterally through the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Fund. India has also done exemplary people-centric peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction work in Afghanistan. However, the engagement with peacebuilding is much more intense. Both in the Security Council and the General Assembly, India has been a leading participant in discussions on peacebuilding. India has contributed to the making of the PBC. In the formative years of the PBC, India gave substantial inputs on how the working of the Commission must be organised. In conjunction with Sweden, India tabled the draft resolution that contained the revised terms of reference for Peacebuilding Fund.²⁷⁶ The purpose of this revision was to make the Fund more flexible and responsive by rationalising and simplifying its structure for providing peacebuilding support. It helped set up the twin facilities of the Immediate Response Facility and the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility through which funds would be

²⁷⁶ GAOR, Plenary, A/63/PV.90, 17 June 2009.

allocated. It supported and took active part in the January 2017 high level dialogue on building sustainable peace initiated by the Secretary-General to integrate the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) into peacebuilding. On the issue of funding for peacebuilding, India put forward the idea of a Standing Fund for the PBC so as to ensure uninterrupted access to funds. When the Peacebuilding Fund was operationalised, India contributed to the fund and was associated with revising the terms of reference of the Fund, which enabled it “to serve as a fast-disbursing, agile, responsive and risk-taking peacebuilding instrument”. India has lamented the fact that less than 1 per cent of the peacekeeping budget was spent on peacebuilding. It highlighted the tendency to divert development cooperation funds for humanitarian and emergency requirements. It has supported the connections of the Commission with other stakeholders such as the World Bank, African Development Bank, and other international financial institutions (IFIs).

An important Indian intervention on peacebuilding has been its view that peacebuilding must be locally owned and not based on foreign models. In the context of making provision for justice and rule of law in post-conflict scenarios, India indicated a preference for nationally driven approaches and the representation of major civilisations and principal legal systems in the constitution of courts to address rule of law issues. It was critical of the entire project of providing justice in the process of transition from conflict to peace on the grounds that such projects had become steeped in ‘Western liberalism’ and therefore was of little solace to the people concerned. India also expressed reservations regarding a peacekeeping mission being extended to a peacebuilding mission. India suggested several ways of improving the relationship of the country concerned with the PBC and of making available the required staff of doing peacebuilding. India proposed that developing countries be supported to play a role in peacebuilding by offering suggestions on national priorities. This is because the experience of developing countries like India in nation building would serve as a good example to emulate. India strongly endorsed a role for regional organisations in peacebuilding and in this context, greatly appreciated the role played by the African Union on post-conflict reconstruction.

Thus, as an actor in governance of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, India has been active participant on various fronts and has made interventions on various issues in the global governance of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It has shown the will to stay engaged with the many forums in the UN which deal with these issues over the years. It has gone out of its way to participate in the Security Council debates on peacekeeping and peacebuilding even while it is not serving a term on the Council. It is keenly aware of the normative, administrative, and operational aspects of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. More importantly, it has demonstrated the way to work with the system to improve the governance of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

POLICY SUGGESTIONS

The governance of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, two critical issues in the maintenance of international peace and security, takes place through the Security Council, the various committees of the General Assembly, and the Peacebuilding Architecture. Based on the foregoing analysis, it emerges that India has contributed quite substantially to the governance of the issues of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. A few policy suggestions follow:

1. While India has engaged with several issues that come up for discussion to improve peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities, this engagement has not been consistent. For instance, while one does come across interventions made to discuss certain aspects of the reports related to peacekeeping such as the Agenda for Peace, the Brahimi Report, etc., a full-fledged response to these reports providing an Indian perspective is missing. Given the substantial Indian involvement in peacekeeping and the experience that has accrued over the years, an effort could be made to consistently engage with major UN initiatives for reform of peacekeeping.
2. Given the system of the governance of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, India's ideational and substantial contributions to these aspects could be maintained in the form of position papers and made available on website of the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, New York.

3. India has a position of privilege as a member of the C34 on peacekeeping operations and a membership in the PBC. However, the inputs given by India to these forums is not publicly accessible. An insight into the contribution made by India to debates in the C34 and the PBC would be valuable in further understanding of India's contribution to the governance of peacekeeping in peacebuilding. Such access may be provided to scholars in accordance with the rules for sharing such inputs in the public domain.

An analysis of India in global governance showcases India as a versatile actor. Its role in the governance of different issue areas namely climate change, development assistance, trade and disarmament has been tempered by the nature of the regime in each case. As an actor in governance of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, India has been active participant on various fronts and has made interventions on various issues in the global governance of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It has shown the will to stay engaged with the many forums in the UN which deal with these issues over the years. It has gone out of its way to participate in the Security Council debates on peacekeeping and peacebuilding even while it is not serving a term on the Council. It is keenly aware of the normative, administrative and operational aspects of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. More importantly, it has demonstrated the way to work with the system to improve the governance of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

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