Strategic Lessons of 1962: A Contemporary Retrospective
Rahul K. Bhonsle


URL: http://www.idsa.in/jds/6_4_2012_StrategicLessonsof1962AContemporaryRetrospective_RahulKBhonsle

Please Scroll down for Article

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.idsa.in/termsofuse

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

Views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Strategic Lessons of 1962
A Contemporary Retrospective

Rahul K. Bhonsle*

The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.

—Field Marshall Lord Roberts of Kandahar (1832–1914)

INTRODUCTION

The 1962 India–China War is one of the most debated subjects in India’s recent military history. The discussion has been enriched by accounts of the war by a large number of principal Indian military protagonists, some to justify their own role which had come up for criticism in perspective. The report of the Henderson Brookes Enquiry has not been made public, however, Neville Maxwell, who was correspondent of The Times from 1959, and later went on to write the book, India’s China War, has quoted extensively from the same. Portions of the report have also been published in the April 2001 issue of Economic and Political Weekly.

* Rahul K. Bhonsle, a veteran brigadier of the Indian Army is presently Director of Sasia Security-Risks.com, a South Asian risk and knowledge management consultancy, New Delhi.
recollections and Maxwell’s critique of the war provide a treasure trove of lessons for the future.

Even though the war has been extensively analysed, reviewing lessons from the contemporary perspective may be relevant. An attempt is therefore being made for a retrospective of lessons of 1962, focusing on those that assume salience and, in turn, possibly provide a window on possible correctives to prevent recurrence today. A key challenge for such an exercise is current environment scan. Clinical and objective evaluation of the present is wrought with peril of misjudgement, primarily due to incomplete information. To avoid the same, lessons for application in the current systemic, as assessed generically falling in the overall rubric of military strategy and operational art, have been considered for inclusion. These include role of the military and war in grand strategy, civil–military relations and management of higher defence, operational art, employment of air power, management of higher military appointments and cliques, defence preparedness and role of the media.

**Role of Military in Grand Strategy**

In India, the role of the military in grand (national) strategy is frequently obscured, and this was the case in 1962 as well. In fact, the government lost sight of military as an instrument for attaining national goals and objectives in the 1950s. This trend was accentuated in early 1960s before the outbreak of the war in 1962. International idealism and pacifism espoused by national leadership then naturally disfavoured a strong military role; yet, the environment in the region was of power-centric realism rather than liberalism. Thus, the exercise of raw power by a resurgent People’s Republic of China (PRC) led by Mao Dzedong, with the motif of ‘power flowing through the barrel of the gun’, internally as well as externally, was not fully appreciated in New Delhi. This led to the neglect of military capability as well as isolation of army leadership from national security decision making. Moreover, those military commanders who had the ear of the political leaders did not inspire confidence in the armed forces. This led to limited military capability accretion in the 1950s. The outcome was a force underprepared for war in 1962 and when pliant higher commanders did not resist coercion for brinkmanship, a disaster was foredoomed.

There is continued reluctance to accept military as an instrument of grand strategy today, with built-in inhibitions due to organizational,
structural and institutional biases. The military, on its part, can be faulted for not having created a niche for itself in the national security system. The dominant military discourse in the media is on personal and institutional perks and privileges, which has undermined space for a well-reasoned debate on role of the armed forces in grand strategy by creating civil-military firewalls. 

**Role of War in Grand Strategy**

War remains the ultimate instrument of grand strategy when vital national interests are adversely affected. National leadership should undertake recourse to war as a last resort when all other options have failed. This is particularly true of developing countries such as India where costs of going to war are prohibitive. Yet, preparedness for war and undertaking the extreme step if sovereignty is threatened has to be a deliberate and well thought of consensual act by national leadership after full preparations. India was faced with a major dilemma in the 1950s after discovery of Chinese movements in Aksai Chin, reported for the first time by the newspaper, *The Statesman*, on 17 November 1950. The construction of road by the Chinese in the area from 1956–8 was again through a news report in September 1957. To counter adverse parliamentary and public reaction, precipitate military action of pushing up military posts, such as Galwan in November 1961, was undertaken as a part of the Forward Policy. That these could lead to war with China was not fully appreciated, and even more so, the fact that the military was not prepared for a conflict could not be driven home forcefully by the army leadership.

Indian military commanders seemed to have learnt the lesson of thorough preparations before war fairly quickly. Thus, in 1971, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, the then Army Chief, clearly sought more time to launch operations in Bangladesh postponing the same from March to December. In recent times, the sagacity in avoiding war in 1999, 2001 and 2008 against the nuclear backdrop also seems to suggest that this lesson may have been imbibed by the national and military leadership.

**Brinkmanship and Military Strategy—The Linkages**

While brinkmanship has a role in military strategy, it is a psychological ploy and has to be based on rational logic of inter se capability of enemy
and own forces. Where the differential is limited, brinkmanship can be adopted to effect by a marginally weaker force; however, in the case of very wide variation in force potential, brinkmanship can be disastrous. India's Forward Policy and actions for eviction in 1962 lacked cold calculations of inter se military capability and were based on the faulty presumption that China will not react.  

Rhetoric of the offensive was also used as a shield from adverse public opinion. Under the circumstances obtained in 1962, the outcome was disastrous. Today, brinkmanship has got an added edge of the nuclear dimension. With Pakistan having the entire range from the tactical to strategic nuclear weapons, brinkmanship will have to be deliberate and thought through. This does not imply a defensive strategy but a flexible one with doctrinal and capability-based interventions to create contingencies to achieve objectives of war without fighting.

Civil–Military Relations
Fractured civil-military relations are a bane of democracies, particularly when a nation plans or goes to war. This is also true in countries where supremacy of political over the military is well acknowledged, as in India. The underlying reasons for fault lines in 1962 between the civil and the military in India have been analysed in a fair amount of detail with a number of factors, such as variation in pre-independence culture of the political and military class, lack of adaptation and clash of personalities, amongst others. Incidents such as resignation by General Thimayya and its subsequent withdrawal were symptoms of this warped system where institutional trust was lacking or was eroded purposefully. This benefited individuals who could take advantage of the system, or lack of it, and win trust of the political leadership thereby cornering plum posts to which they were least qualified.

The key lesson that can be learned from 1962 in terms of civil–military relations—that could be applied universally—could be a structured system of controls devoid of personal idiosyncrasies and enforcement of a free and fair promotion policy to the higher ranks based on professional merit. Such a system, if adopted in 1962, would have prevented conflict in the highest echelons between the Ministry of Defence and the army and ensured that the right men rose to the top posts and held operational appointments which they had earned through professional exposure in the hierarchy over the years. Much of this is
rectified today, though glitches do exist and need to be ironed out over a period.

**Management of Higher Defence**

Numerous treatises on the 1962 war have highlighted imperfections in the system of management of higher defence. National defence as a function of governance includes the military represented by the Ministry of Defence, foreign affairs and intelligence. These three primary arms are supported by finance. A viable structure for defence management post-independence was not in place. Clear-cut responsibility for management of external security was absent. Thus, till 1959, the Ministry of External Affairs and Assam Rifles were responsible for security of the Indo-Tibetan border in the North-East. An institutional mechanism for intelligence which could generate assessments was lacking and in many ways, was replaced by personal inclinations of chief of the primary intelligence agency, Intelligence Bureau (IB). There was no agency for collection of external intelligence and reports by ambassadors that constituted inputs for assessments of intentions of adversaries.\(^{15}\)

A result of these deficiencies was occupation of Aksai Chin by the Chinese which went unnoticed. Lack of simple instruments for decision making, such as maps or air photos with clear demarcation of the McMahon Line, resulted in orders to establish posts on the Thag La Ridge, and for subsequent eviction, without due appreciation of facts on the ground.\(^{16}\) This also led to rejection of reports by field commanders both in the western and the eastern sectors, though in the former, the military leadership succeeded in evolving a viable plan for imposing delay and neutralizing the Chinese offensive before it reached vital areas.

The importance of military inputs in higher defence decision making was also highlighted in 1962. While a Forward Policy was advocated, difficulties of implementing this decision logistically was not factored in as the military top brass in Delhi never succeeded in forcefully bringing this facet out at the highest level despite protests by commanders in the chain.\(^{17}\)

The non-institutionalized decision-making structures, as the crisis evolved, were evident as no efforts to discuss the overall policy and strategy in the Cabinet were made and even the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) never met during crucial days before the war.\(^{18}\) In fact, in September 1962, as war clouds were building up, members of the DCC were outside the country.\(^{19}\)
Today, with two high-powered committees-cum-task force in the past decade plus, some of these deficiencies have been overcome. The Cabinet Committee on Security meets regularly to take critical decisions and service chiefs are incorporated when so required. Some structures such as clear accountability in management of borders during peace time with sectoral allotment of responsibilities have evolved. Nuclear command and control has also been streamlined. However, there continue to be structural deficiencies in higher defence decision making which have to be overcome. Some of these such as appointing a permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee have been addressed by the Task Force on National Security headed by Mr Naresh Chandra, if what is appearing in the media is to be believed.

**Operational Art**

Performance of higher military commanders in 1962 has faced severe censure, except those who were operating on the western front who came out with flying colours in comparison with their eastern counterparts. Lack of exposure of Indian officers to higher operational command is considered as one of the main reasons for this deficiency. Indian officers were not exposed to higher command and staff and General Thimayya was the only Indian to command a brigade during World War II. Moreover, British military tradition did not nurture rigorous military education in the mistaken belief that wars could be won through a mix of bravado and team work, replicating a game in Harrow or Eton, two famous British public schools. Ironically, on 8 September 1962, when Chinese troops surrounded the Dhola Post, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 4 Division as well as the Commander of 7 Infantry Brigade were playing golf in a tea planter's club in Thakurbari, Assam. That training also suffered due to this casual approach was evident as 7 Infantry Brigade, which bore the brunt of the Chinese attacks in Namka Chu on the front line, had not carried out any collective training from 1959 to 1962.

On the other hand, in World War II, Germans had developed a middle tier of commanders who excelled in general staff duties and operational art. The latter is a function of fitting tactical battles into a campaign as a part of the larger national military strategy.

Indian commanders lacked this exposure and the deficiency was most noticeable in 1962. This was evident in failure to envisage impact of the Forward Policy in the Himalayas, or occupation of, say, Hatung La, or
Strategic Lessons of 1962

Eviction of the Chinese from Dhola in the operational perspective by senior commanders at corps and command level on the eastern front. Thus, protests by tactical commanders at brigade or division level were outrightly rejected and some, such as 7 Infantry Brigade commander, were asked to rush to the front line only to be taken as prisoner of war. These decisions were also a result of over-reliance on leadership and battlefield bravado rather than cold calculations at the operational level.  

The one viable plan that emerged was the Thorat Plan, the essence of which was to accept penetration of the front line and fight the battle on ground of own choosing. Lieutenant (Lt) General S.P.P. Thorat had evolved this after conduct of a table-top exercise on defence of North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) as the GOC-in-Chief of Eastern Command. This had gone into a number of details, including possibility of the Chinese launching air-borne operations in the plains of Assam. This was however rejected due to political compulsions of non-acceptance of loss of territory. At the same time where military commanders on the western front, such as Lt General Daulet Singh, the GOC-in-Chief, effectively applied operational art, ignominy was avoided. Thus, commanders in Ladakh issued timely orders for withdrawal of forces from posts which were considered indefensible, inducted reserves from other sectors of Jammu and Kashmir and were well prepared to take on the main Chinese attacks having exploited full potential of troops and resources at their disposal.  

This led to clear orders issued to troops to hold ground till the last man, thus defence of Rezang La is now a glorious chapter in the annals of Indian military history. Construction of roads and build-up of logistics was also dovetailed to demonstrate admirable operational acumen. This does indicate that higher commanders who understood nuances at this level were able to take necessary measures to prevent loss of men under their command, as well as territory that could be defended.  

Apparently recognizing importance of exposing officers to the operational level, some correctives have been applied in the Indian Army with this subject introduced recently in competitive examination for entrance to Defence Services Staff College. The importance of early nurturing is also evident due to short tenures in higher operational command division or corps that are prevalent today, varying from a few months to a year plus which may not be adequate to develop an operational perspective which requires many years of study and reflection apart from active experience.
Offensive Air Support

The decision not to use offensive air support has remained one of the enigmas of 1962. Air power has a major influence in a situation of aerial asymmetry in terms of relative control of airspace. In 1962, People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) had limited capability to operate from airfields in Tibet, and overall operational potency was assessed to be weak. India enjoyed exceptional advantage which could have been exploited by employment of offensive air support to assist ground troops, particularly those devoid of integral fire support, such as the 7 Infantry Brigade in the Namka Chu–Thag La area which had only two 75 mm artillery guns. Moreover, the effect on morale of army formations operating in NEFA in particular would have been seminal.

A review of various points of view on the decision not to use offensive air support in 1962 indicates three factors that may have played an important role. First, the IB assessment of superiority of the PLAAF; second, division of opinion in the Indian Air Force (IAF) Headquarters on effectiveness of tactical air support due to terrain in NEFA and lack of ground-to-air communications; and third, influence of then American Ambassador, John Kenneth Galbraith, on the political leadership to prevent escalation with the bait also to keep Pakistan out of the war.

In the study carried out by Lt General S.P.P. Thorat in Eastern Command in 1960, it is believed that the parachute brigade commander and later GOC of 4 Infantry Division had indicated likely problems faced by the Chinese in employment of tactical air support, which implied no hindrance for operations by the IAF. Similarly, in a note prepared for the chief of the army staff, by the Military Operations Directorate on 2 May 1962, as quoted by Major General D.K. Palit, the Director Military Operations (DMO), in War in High Himalaya, offensive air action was recommended. While the army leadership was convinced of effectiveness of tactical air support, inability to persuade the IAF and political hierarchy may have contributed to this grave strategic omission.

The PLAAF is attaining greater potential today than it had in 1962, but some fundamentals have not changed. Limitations of operating from the plateau continue despite recent reports of deployment of PLAAF fighters in Tibet round the year, including winter. An additional factor that will weigh in strategic calculus is ballistic missile arsenal fielded by PLA’s Second Artillery Force. In all likelihood, PLAAF and Second Artillery will be used in tandem to create a shield of deterrence against use of the IAF in a future war on the northern borders.
On the other hand, India’s present missile armoury is restricted to Agni-2 ballistic missile which has a range of 2,000 kms, thus countervalue targets that can be engaged are limited. While the IAF would have evolved possible alternatives in the current scenario for conduct of viable air operations, there is a need to sell the proposition to the national leadership so that there is no hesitation in taking the decision to employ air power if so required in a future contingency.

**Higher Military Appointments**

Gross deficiencies were noticeable in the process of promotions and selection of officers for higher military command appointments in 1962. This ignored principles of merit and experience. The recommendations of the service chiefs were set aside even in respect of principal staff officers, such as the Quarter Master General (QMG). Thus, no institutionalized system was in place. Resultantly, square pegs were fitted into round holes in 1962.

Raising of IV Corps Headquarters is a classic example of command mismanagement. Given that Commander of XXXIII Corps posed difficulties in implementing orders for Forward Policy from Delhi for eviction of the Chinese, a new corps headquarters (IV) was created, and a general officer selected without credentials in combat but in whom there was a belief that he would implement the same orders. Another example is of GOC 4 Infantry Division, selected for his performance in the World War II, recalled from a sinecure in the National Cadet Corps (NCC). A brigade was left without a commander to accommodate the request of the divisional commander for an officer of his own choosing.

Moreover, the practice of higher commanders carrying selected staff officers of choice from one appointment to another was also prevalent. This practice prevents alternate opinions emerging in a military discourse that is so essential in promoting flexibility and examining contingencies in operations.

Today, while a fairly evolved system of promotions is in place, some key appointments have come under scrutiny recently, including the Military Secretary, a corps commander and others. Moreover, tenure in higher appointments at corps and command or equivalent continue to be limited even though this is one of the factors that had led to laying down a restriction of age for assumption of command of an active corps.
Generals at War?

A result of lack of institutionalization of promotions and appointments as well as political patronage of the military was cascading confrontations in the higher ranks. The GOC-in-Chief of Eastern Command and GOC of IV Corps had major personal and professional differences. The emergence of cliques referred to as ‘boys’ prefixed by names of a military commander, currying favour with those seen to be rising up the hierarchy and not military professionalism, became the order of the day.

Some officers fell for the easy way out, yet others fought the system and survived—one of them being Sam Manekshaw who later rose to become the Chief of the Army Staff who led India to splendid success in the war in 1971. Ironically, it was Manekshaw who took over IV Corps when it had virtually disintegrated after the debacle in Sela–Bomdila.

Healthy differences on professional matters in senior ranks of the military are not unknown. However, in 1962, these were on personal issues as well, with some currying favour for furthering their careers in the belief that tagging along with a senior officer while vilifying at his behest others may serve them to rise up the chain.

Differences between senior officers in the Indian Army in the past half a decade or so have become the grist of the media mill, including reports of cliques supporting one or the other group. The divisions seem to be mostly on personal rather than professional basis, and have been aired in the public. The facts of the same cannot be verified based on limited authentic inputs available. Given lack of a confirmation either way, suffice to say that there is a need for the military hierarchy to confront the trend head-on and destroy roots of unprofessional behaviour. The ides of 1962 should be a reminder of perils of allowing such trends to take deep roots.

Defence Preparedness

Defence preparedness suffered in the 1950s in many ways. There was limited budget support to the military, with development getting priority over defence. Moreover, Gandhian views of non-violence seemed to prevail over hard realism of possible war on two-and-a-half fronts, Pakistan, China and internal security. Accretions in defence budget were opposed in the Parliament and constant tussle between the
Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Finance was exacerbated by a personality clash resulting in continued neglect of the requirements of the military.

Ironically, a series of letters was written by the army in the early 1960s to the Ministry of Defence, including one in which there was a specific request for placing it before the DCC; however, no action was purportedly taken.\textsuperscript{44} Personal requests were also made to ministers by senior officers of the army but to no avail, for the government of the day remained firm on non-diversion of resources from development. What is also relevant is that there was no parliamentary support for an increase in defence budget.

The situation may be somewhat similar with reports of correspondence by a former army chief with the Ministry of Defence and the prime minister leaked to the media by unknown sources raising alarm over hollowness in military readiness in early 2012. The debate on ‘Demand for Grants for Ministry of Defence for 2012–13’ in the Parliament in May 2012, however, denotes that there is a more realistic appraisal of the requirements of defence than existing in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{45} This signals an awareness and understanding of defence financing by Members of the Parliament which is welcome. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence has also made some scathing observations on defence management issues, including defence budget and functioning of the Ministry of Defence. Yet, defence readiness remains mired in procurement delays, organizational inefficiencies and bureaucratic inertia.\textsuperscript{46}

**Role of Media**

The role of media in today’s information age is significant. Media influence was no less seminal in 1962. Military commanders used the media to sponsor their agenda. A commander nominated to take over a corps (IV) asked staff officers to brief the media, which violated all norms of information security. Newspaper headlines the next day highlighted formation of a task force to oust the Chinese after the particular military commander took over command.\textsuperscript{47} The media in this case included respected journalists of reputed newspapers who failed to check the facts, or question the actual possibility of such a happening, given the state of preparedness of the armed forces. On the other hand, they seemed to glorify the commander in question, even calling him ‘a
soldier of extraordinary courage’, when he had thus far no operational experience.48

By refusing to seriously question the powers that be and reporting what was fed to them by the defence hierarchy, including military officers in their individual capacity, the media in 1962 did not provide a fair perspective to the nation. Today, the Indian media is far more alert and questioning on military matters. This change has come about after the Kargil conflict in 1999 which provided Indian television media the first exposure to military matters.

Yet, the relationship between the military and media remains challenged due to mutual apprehensions and lack of transparency. The media’s focus on newsworthy stories of the military vis-à-vis the need for a reasoned national debate on defence preparedness is also a contradictory requirement which has to be balanced.49

**Conclusion**

Fifty years after the India–China War, in 2012, Indian armed forces face the challenge of rapid military modernization by the PLA. There is a sense of foreboding that despite extensive debate on the subject in the country, including media, there is a growing deterrence gap which may lead to exposure of the country to another military adventure by the potential adversary.

Comparison of the situation today with that in the 1960s may not be correct and does injustice to our defence establishment, capability of the Indian armed forces and their recent operational experience. Yet, a few selective lessons of 1962, which may have relevance today, have been highlighted to benchmark possible deficiencies. This exercise is challenged by lack of adequate information on the current military developments, and thus should be used for comparative evaluation of status in 1962 and as obtained today to assess our level of military preparedness and undertake corrections as considered necessary.

**Notes**

1. This quote is purported to have been referred to in the Henderson Brookes Enquiry report which has not been published so far. However, excerpts of the report have been quoted by Maxwell, Neville, ‘Henderson Brooks Report: An Introduction’, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 36, Nos

2. Of the many accounts, some are relevant given that these are first-person rendition of events in the crucial years of the war, such as by Brigadier John Dalvi who commanded the 7 Brigade in Namka Chu (Dalvi, J.P., The Himalayan Blunder, Bombay: Thacker, 1969); by General B.M. Kaul (The Untold Story, Bombay: Allied, 1967); by Lieutenant (Lt) Colonel J.R. Saigal (The Unfought War of 1962: The NEFA Debacle, New Delhi: Allied, 1979); by General Niranjan Prasad (The Fall of Towang 1962, New Delhi: Palit & Palit, 1981); and by General D.K. Palit (War in High Himalaya, New Delhi: Lancer, 1991). The official history by S.N. Prasad (ed.), History of the Conflict with China 1962, New Delhi: History Division, Ministry of Defence (MoD), Government of India, provides factual information.

3. Maxwell, Neville, India’s China War, Dehradun: Natraj, 1997, p. 13. Neville Maxwell has indicated in the Preface of the book that he was given access to material from unpublished files and reports of the Government of India by officials who, as he says, believed that a full account of the war should be published. This could have possibly included the Henderson Brooks report.


5. Palit, War in the High Himalayas, p. 20.

6. In 1962, army occupied centrality in equations in the three services, being the most dominant with the largest pre-independence profile extending to the 1947–8 operations.

7. A survey of the national debate on military issues over the last few years could bear out this trend. The debate on military modernization in the public domain has been restricted to a few issues, such as weapons procurement or appointment of Chief of Defence Staff in the higher defence organization, rather than evolving a viable military doctrine which can form the basis of greater acceptability of proposals by the armed forces.

8. Maxwell, India’s China War, p. 87.


10. Ibid., p. 237.

11. This decision is criticized by many but possibly, Manekshaw’s exposure to the 1962 war when he took over IV Corps may have influenced the same.
12. Kargil intrusion in 1999 and terror attack on the Parliament in 2001 and Mumbai in 2008 are the closest situations when India could have gone to war with Pakistan in the last decade.


16. Ibid., pp. 182, 189–90.

17. Ibid., p. 160.


20. This includes the Arun Singh Committee and Group of Ministers Report of 2000 and the Task Force on National Security headed by Mr Naresh Chandra in 2011–12.

21. *The Times of India* has been regularly publishing excerpts of the Task Force on National Security headed by Naresh Chandra in July–August 2012.


23. Though this is a popular quote, the actual quote attributed to the Duke of Wellington is, ‘There grows the stuff that won Waterloo’, implying the hardness that schools as Eton were seen to nurture.


27. Ibid., p. 54.


30. Ibid.


32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.


36. Ibid., pp. 166–8.
37. Maxwell, *India’s China War*, p. 188.
38. Ibid., p. 371.
39. Ibid.
41. Ibid., p. 21.
42. Maxwell, *India’s China War*, p. 196.
44. Maxwell, *India’s China War*, p. 183.
47. Maxwell, *India’s China War*, p. 328.
48. Ibid.