


Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg
Delhi Cantonment, New Delhi-110010



Journal of Defence Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.idsa.in/journalofdefencestudies>

Learning Lessons and Revisiting Myths from Kameng

P.K. Gautam

To cite this article: P.K. Gautam (2012): Learning Lessons and Revisiting Myths from Kameng, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol-6, Issue-4.pp- 141-154

URL: http://www.idsa.in/jds/6_4_2012_LearningLessonsandRevisitingMythsfromKameng_PKGautam

Please Scroll down for Article

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.idsa.in/termsfuse>

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

Views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Learning Lessons and Revisting Myths from Kameng

*P.K. Gautam**

Episodes in the modern military history of a nation need to assist in deriving lessons. At the same time, due to reasons such as fading public memory, local discourse in the area of conflict, non-availability of archival data, poor recording of history, and over-securitisation leads to the creation of myths. This article discusses tactics of victory employed by the Chinese in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. It then assesses the need to sustain capacity for mobility in the Himalayas. It also highlights the fact that local perceptions have not been understood at the national level. Thus the current discourse is placed to understand the war and society school of the locals, and how myths—both military and non-military—are generated. The article also shows how reputed international scholars who have studied the war have used rigorous research methodology to construct very authentic narratives and accounts. The paper concludes by re-emphasizing the need for basic soldiering routines and skills.

This article will deliberate on some basic, tactical and operational issues, induction training of units, an understanding of the locals as it relates to Kameng region of Arunachal Pradesh, the creation of myths and insights on scholarship by some leading political scientists on the methodology of writing their books.

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Having served in Kameng region of erstwhile North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in early 1970s for three years, revisiting the region by road till

* The Author is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. He can be reached at pkgautam2003@yahoo.co.in.

ISSN 0976-1004 print

© 2012 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, October 2012, pp. 141–154



Tawang in 2008 for a field trip to study Buddhism in the region, and after a survey of open literature, it is my conclusion that ahead of the Mago Chu or in first phase of October 1962, we can blame civil leadership for what is recorded well by Brigadier (Brig) J.P. Dalvi in his masterpiece, *The Himalayan Blunder*.¹ To be fair to the Indian Army, after the defeat at the battle of Namka Chu, Tawang Ridge was not suitable tactically for defence as it was on a slope and did not have any domination. It was also possible to easily bypass and outflank it. Sela and Bomdila in the rear were tactically suitable for taking up defence. Thus, when widely distributed 7 Mountain Brigade in penny packets broke up ahead of Twang Chu River, the next tactical line of defence was Sela.²

But the second phase of 4 Infantry Division's bolt from Sela/Bomdila in November 1962 is purely a military defeat. One aspect which has not received sufficient attention is the deception and ruses by the Chinese. Chinese infiltrators, wearing tribal dress or captured Indian uniforms, penetrated Indian positions close enough to open deadly fire with concealed weapons. The Chinese intercepted Indian radio communications and issued orders in local dialects.³ This was possibly a part of information and electronic warfare.

What we may also unearth and revive for the army are the skills of Chinese tactics of attack by infiltration with foot and animal pack mobility. Jonathan Bailey, in his book *Field Artillery and Firepower*, has shown that equipment mobility such as of mortars enabled the Chinese to concentrate fire with greater ease.⁴ Mortars of sorts lend best for mobility by pack animals. As regards ammunition, I have interacted with serving officers of present generation who confidently state that there was no ammunition, etc., at Sela, thus the defeat was justified. This is far from the truth. Even if dumped ammunition was absent, first and second line was probably available. Basic training of administration and logistics is that a second line is meant to beat back one attack. The defenders withdrew before attacks were launched. We need to be professional enough to analyse our tactical weaknesses and shortcomings rather than make excuses for not undertaking research.

Books by veterans as secondary source and oral history can now record the history of 1962 war well so that we draw proper lessons. From declassified Chinese literature, as quoted by Major General (Maj Gen) Ashok Kalyan Verma in his book,⁵ it is now known that about one-and-a-half division worth of troops were used by the Chinese in NEFA. This could be an underassessment. Using Chinese language sources from

China, Harvard Professor Roderick MacFarquhar shows that the Chinese divided Aksai Chin under Commander of Xinjiang Military District, He Jaichan. In the east, a headquarter was set up under the Commander of the Tibet Military Region, Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Zhang Guohua. Marshal Liu Bocheng, the Head of the Military Affairs Commission's (MAC) strategy small group, had predicted an Indian attack and was deputed to oversee the planning of a Chinese counter-attack. In their pre-planned attack in both east and west on 18 November, they deployed eight infantry regiments and three artillery regiments on the NEFA front.⁶ Importantly, a recent work in India, reconstructed from translated Chinese literature, shows total Chinese strength of 22,000 troops, equivalent of eight regiments plus in Kameng (one Chinese regiment equals one Indian brigade). The Commander was Zhang Guo Hua. The divisions were 419 Tibet Division, 11 Infantry Division, 55 Infantry Division and support troops.⁷ Thus, the overall Chinese superiority was not overwhelming but about 22,000:12,000 troops or less than 2:1.

It is clear that calling the Chinese withdrawal in 1962 post-ceasefire as a blunder, in current Chinese perception, is an afterthought. It was logistic difficulties and overstretch that made the Chinese withdraw from NEFA after declaring ceasefire in 1962. According to John Garver, the circumstances and reasons for unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal by Chinese troops were developed during the planning stage in early October 1962. Some practical difficulties associated with China's domestic situation had a bearing on this decision.⁸

The human wave story so ingrained in public memory is also overhyped. V.K. Krishna Menon (the then Defence Minister) mentions in his book that:

The Chinese have got guns behind and guns in front. Therefore, these masses of men have no choice, but to hurl themselves forward. This is how these relays of men are hurled against us. The invading hordes do not all possess weapons. When one man is dead, his weapon is picked up by the fellow behind.⁹

This is probably a fake story. This has led to an extant national myth that the Chinese are supermen. The History Division of Ministry of Defence, combined with the Ministry External Affairs, should produce a history of the period, including history of the erstwhile Indian Frontier Administrative Service, to make public events of national importance which unfolded in NEFA.¹⁰

Rather than grudging that 'let us await the release of Henderson Brooks report' (which was only an internal army enquiry),¹¹ professionalism such as oral history must be undertaken with staff rides by formations for newly posted military and civil officials. Some veterans who fought in the 1962 war—like retired Lt Gen Vinay Shankar, Lt Gen Pran Pahwa, Maj Gen K.K. Tewari, Brig Darshan Khullar, Brig Laxman Singh, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) J.R. Saigal and others—need to be requested to provide oral history. Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and men of that era can also be traced by motivated researchers via regimental centres. This oral history project of the veterans in and around Delhi as a beginning will revive our lost knowledge of that era.¹² Funds must be made available by Ministry of Defence to think tanks and formations who need to take the initiative to demand it for their research agenda for the future. The effort needs to be well coordinated like a knowledge commission. A task force of academics, including local scholars, and veterans may be formed. Simultaneously, studies could be outsourced to formations in the border region for local oral history.

Ever since the Wangdung incidence of 1986–7, 5 Mountain Division was moved forward from Tenga to Tawang. The operational alert was renamed 'Operation Falcon' and the deployment today is named as such.¹³ Thus, the case of Tawang is also a case of proactive defence. Now Bomdila is not occupied, and so is Sela. All defences are in forward posture. Both political and military leadership need to be sure that Tawang town is defensible. From terrain point of view, a determined enemy will be able to thrust down to Tawang. With that as a reality, what measures will India take is important. Abandoning Tawang as in the past (till 1980s), or treating it as early warning, or covering troops position for divisional vital grounds at Sela in rear is not acceptable. Tawang is like Amritsar. Thus, the forward posture needs to be defended by offensive defence and creative use of surface delivered missile and air power.

INDUCTION TRAINING OF UNITS

Newly inducted units marching on foot to their operational locations from rail head at Misamari or from the foothills at Balekpong has been done away with. This practice was essential in the 1960s after 5 Mountain Division got inducted to replace the defeated 4 Infantry Division. For newly inducted officers likewise, there was the practice of visiting the entire divisional-defended sector as a patrol called 'Parichaya'. Best practices of collective training were during the spring and autumn ritual during the

operational alert when all defences in and around Sela used to be occupied and two-sided exercises such as 'Do Tarfi' or early warning/covering troop exercises such as 'Savdhan' series were conducted. It was routine for troops to operate on man-pack or animal-pack basis for weeks. Umpiring was of a high order, with the higher control deploying equivalent rank umpires with companies and battalions. Many fatal casualties used to occur due to terrain and high altitude-related sickness. This showed that regular training and acclimatization is an unending process which needs to be mastered gradually.

To understand change, continuity first must be grasped. In the terrain such as in Arunachal Pradesh, basic war-fighting principles have hardly changed in this region even with advances in technology. The folds of the mountains along with low visibility and thick vegetation will favour the side that uses high foot mobility. In mountainous terrain, war is an aggregate of battles to dominate the heights. Irrespective of the quantum of troops employed, mountain warfare is all about capturing and consolidating the dominating heights. The defences in the mountains can be turned around in many ways: by capturing features in the rear of the defensive position; capturing the second tier of defences; dominating the axis of maintenance; etc. The same will be required if one wants to take the battle into enemy territory. This would call for high foot mobility and a high degree of sustainability. Even if enough road infrastructure is developed, operations cannot be planned along these axes, although maintenance will perforce have to be based on them. With the availability of precision weapon systems, it would be naive to consider that the enemy will not disrupt these axes. Thus, any operation in these areas will involve moving in a less-developed sector with most of the troops moving cross country. This will especially be true once the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is crossed. These forces would need to be self-contained for a number of days. The load-carrying capacity of men gets restricted at high altitudes. Two major issues become apparent in this scenario: one, soldiers need to be physically tough as per terrain requirement; and two, there will be a requirement for well trained and battle inoculated animal transport in large numbers. These will become even more critical for operations across the LAC. Other important issues that require consideration are modifications to weapon systems to make them suitable to be carried on animal transport and quantification of loads as per the latest inventory of equipment held by fighting soldiers and especially catering for their high ammunition requirements.

Other than World War II and the 1962 conflict, there have hardly been large-scale military operations in high altitudes in recent history. The Chinese capacity to operate on animal and man pack with such swiftness must not only be admired but needs to be emulated. Chinese 11 Infantry Division, in its outflanking move on the eastern axis Tse La, Poshing La and Thembang to cut off road Dirang Dzong–Bomdila, marched 160 kms for six days and nights.¹⁴ There is no substitute for this mode of mobility in the Himalayas. The enemy is the best teacher. During the war, the Chinese managed to attack in-depth positions such as Sela and Bomdila by infiltration using man pack and infantry mortars moved by draught animals. The movement of such deep penetration is one understudied aspect. However, what is clear is that such a capability is still a virtue.¹⁵

UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOCALS AS IT RELATES TO KAMENG REGION

Another narrative which is ripe (or I should say overripe) is attitudes and travails of the locals. In Arunachal Pradesh, we have not recorded oral history of the people. The same could be true for Ladakh. Quoting from books by Indian authors such as B.N. Mullik¹⁶ and D.K. Palit,¹⁷ Peter Stephen Rosen in his book on the Indian military writes:

The colonial outlook of the Indian Army in NEFA was nowhere better exemplified than in its unwillingness to enlist the cooperation of friendly tribals especially Mompas of Tawang who suffered under Tibetan rule and who, initially were pro-Indians. As a result when crisis arose it was the Chinese who utilised Mompas—as guides and informers and for providing safe houses.¹⁸

How Rosen has reached these conclusions remains a mystery. There are no archival accounts in open access to the history of the conflict. This discourse is unfair to the locals. One Chinese account mentions that for the outflanking move to cut road Dirang Dzong–Bomdila, 1,000 porters recruited locally were used. In this context, the meaning of locally is unclear. Does it mean locals from Tibet or NEFA? Further, it says that one outflanking column to reach Senge Dzong was led by an old man from Monpa tribe.¹⁹ On a deeper study of extant secondary sources, it could be concluded that Tibetan porters were confused with the locals in some accounts. B.N. Mullik, in his book, does allude to the fact that the ‘Chinese had evacuated the population from the frontier in the Tsona-Le Shao sector and had brought Tibetans from the rear areas to assist them’.²⁰

Later, he mentions that Tibetans were used as slave labourers to build roads.²¹

Refreshingly, the present local discourse makes this above-mentioned assertion stand on its head. A story in the *Hindustan Times* in 2008 recalls days of horror faced by the locals such as Kangola Lama (age 78) and Tenzin Briangju in 1962.²² Passang Dinnga, leader of the All Arunachal Pradesh Students Union, was vocal when he asked as to why is it that they have to raise voices to let the country know that they are Indians, who died for the country in 1962 and will defend another attack to till death.²³ During the inaugural ceremony of the Maitrya Mela in Tawang in October 2008, senior military officers said that the locals of Tawang had a rather different story to tell about the 1962 war. First, they said that unlike the Indian Army, they never ran away, thus 'we the Monpas are truly Indians'. Second, they observed that all military structures ahead of Bomdila built till date by the military appear to be temporary unlike, say, in Tenga/Rupa where permanent accommodation has come up, implying that the military is still not certain whether it will continue to occupy the area and may withdraw. While these observations are to some extent anecdotal, they bring out one fundamental issue. That is of the assimilation of the people of north-east and the border regions in India has many more avenues and issues. It is well known and recorded how the people of Arunachal Pradesh are integrated with India. They speak Hindi with pride, unlike those in other regions.²⁴ Field visits by *Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses* (IDSA) scholars in the recent past have shown very positive nationalistic feelings among the locals in Arunachal Pradesh.²⁵ In March 2011, most people interviewed across the tribes stated that Chinese claim is not validated by history. The monks said that China's claim is a distortion of history. China is not attractive to the local people.²⁶ Recent work at IDSA on Arunachal identifies the next three challenges of delivery on governance (improving infrastructure), riparian issues and better roads and border security.²⁷ The raising and training of the four battalions of Arunachal Pradesh Scouts, similar to erstwhile Ladakh Scouts (since then the Ladakh Regiment), is one good step.²⁸

The way forward is now to encourage familiarization of troops to local culture, religion and customs. This can be done by a short cadre on induction, and as refresher for all ranks, which will go a long way in winning the respect of the people who inhabit that area. This will also generate a new phase of patriotic nation building.²⁹

THE CREATION OF MYTHS

On 17 November 1962, 4 Garhwal Rifles, having withdrawn from Tawang region in October 1962 under Chinese pressure, was occupying delaying position in area Jang, ahead of Sela. The covering position at Nuranang came under attack. The Chinese brought a medium machine gun (MMG) which needed silencing. Subedar Udai Singh Rawat, Lance Naik Trilok Singh Negi and Rifleman Jaswant Singh volunteered for the mission. In the charge and assault which lasted for about 15 minutes, Jaswant Singh neutralized the MMG with a grenade but was fatally shot. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. Vir Chakras were awarded to Lance Naik Tirlok Singh Negi (posthumous) and Rifleman Gopal Singh Gusain.³⁰ A monument in memory of those and hundreds of our brave men who laid down their lives in this sector during the Sino-India War of 1962 has been constructed and is known as Jaswant Garh.³¹

A recent myth which media has generated is about a local woman called Sela who was in love with Rifleman Jaswant Singh. In my interaction with retired Brig Laxman Singh (a veteran of the war and an author) recently, he was also puzzled by this story.³² One officer from the Garhwal Rifles who must remain anonymous argues that the battalion had been using local yak herders to gather information which contributed to the myth; Nura and Sela obviously are 'filmy' names based on Nuranang and Sela Pass. In one media report, it was mentioned that Sela and Nuranang were named after two local women (Sela and Nura) who helped soldier Jaswant Singh hold the marauding Chinese army for over 72 hours. The journalist reports that local Monpas and Buddhist leaders have realized there are no memorials to remember these two valiant women and over 300 nameless local martyrs.³³ It is obvious that myth may be a signal by the locals for recognition for their contribution in the war. This is understandable. But this myth is further worsened when scholars do not even bother to go through regimental histories and other open sources. Professor Dibyesh Anand, in April 2012, even delivered a talk at the IDSA on 'Remembering 1962 War: Politics of Memory', in which he informed the audience that he is doing a book on this myth without even being aware of the regimental history. This sort of academic work in absence of proper documentation and official histories of the war in open domain is bound to lead to research and academic discourse being built upon false media reports

and anecdotes. If archival work is not done, we in India would have to continue to rely on second-hand foreign accounts about our own country. Working on our archives would also ensure that Indian scholars are not excessively influenced by the conceptual frameworks developed elsewhere. Opening up the military and diplomatic archives would thus help in generating useful policy-related and academic work of a high standard.³⁴

**METHODOLOGICAL INSIGHTS ON SCHOLARSHIP BY
SOME LEADING POLITICAL SCIENTISTS**

How did the scholarship for the 1962 Sino-Indian War develop? My meeting with two authors—Steven Hoffmann³⁵ and Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger³⁶—confirmed a unique way of research in political science at the strategic level. Steven Hoffmann has used the international crisis behaviour model on the decision making. Steven Hoffmann examines documentary and secondary sources with interviews. His findings focus on coping and choice under stress organized around four crucial aspects of decision making: information processing; patterns of consultation; decisional forums; and the search for and consideration of alternatives. Steven Hoffmann found that India's behaviour in its crisis with China was remarkably similar to that of other states in foreign policy crisis. Yaacov Vertzberger's scholarship on source, methodology and structure categorizes authors and literature on the Sino-Indian War in various categories:

- (a) Indian apologists, who shift blame from certain individuals or organizations to others;
- (b) Chinese 'treachery', emphasizing India's and Nehru's generosity towards China and attempts to legitimize the Chinese regime in the international arena like non-aligned movement, Afro-Asian Conference and the United Nations;
- (c) blaming Indian leadership of being aggressive and unyielding;
- (d) 'guilty' from legal point of view—here, he includes political and historical material for different claims in support of both Indian view and Chinese view; and
- (e) objective historical account without taking any positions.

The common feature in both is that the authors did not visit the Himalayan battleground. They wrote the books based on interviews,

media reports, books and other sources. This speaks volumes of their methodological rigour. Yaacov Vertzberger elaborated that methodological rigour and conception is important. Scholars cannot await opening up of archives as that takes very long. Some work of Cold War era done this way now tallies with the declassified records and archives as it relates to East–West rivalry during the Cold War.³⁷

These two works show that it is possible to explain behaviour and solve research puzzles in contemporary times with open access information on macro issues of negotiations, foreign policy and decision making at strategic level. But in no case does it replace archival work—more so at grassroots tactical and operational level.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Discerning continuity and identifying change is the essence of a historical analysis. Many aspects have undergone transformation since 1962. However, fundamentally, military operations in high altitudes such as the Himalayas would be no different today except the understanding of the capabilities and limitation of vertical mobility like use of helicopters, surface delivered firepower, including long-range and extremely accurate surface-to-surface missiles, un-manned aerial vehicles both for surveillance and precision attacks and surveillance resources like satellites. Yet, unpredictable weather such as in Arunachal Pradesh may not at crucial times allow use of helicopters due to clouds and poor visibility (borne out by the number of helicopter crashes in recent times). Extreme of weather events brought about by climate change may cause more number of landslides, cloudbursts (as in Ladakh in August 2010) and roadblocks. This will again demand rapid foot and hoof mobility or capacity to operate on animal and pack basis and matching logistics. Like in cyber defence, redundancy or alternatives mean of communication now assume importance. The redundancy or capability to move by helicopter or on foot, both will demand sustained attention in the training and employment of infantry. There is unlikely to be any substitute to acclimatization of troops measured in weeks.

CONCLUSION

Myths of 1962 war must not be allowed to pop up with unknown ‘market forces’. There is also a tendency for distorting history. While there are various schools of history, military history of wars, events and

campaigns must be truthful and accurate (though may not be timely in many cases).

The Sino-India conflict of 1962 is very strong in national consciousness. However, the bitterness seems to have gone. It is thus the right time for historians to enter the field with oral history and archival data declassified and made accessible to scholars. Why are sports so important in military life? They teach a spirit of losing and winning. In the case of 4 Infantry Division, we need to admit that we were defeated. Seeds of victory are sown in defeat. But the seeds need to sprout, both in the military preparation field and in the academic field.

Acknowledgement

I thank the anonymous reviewer for the suggestions, some of which I have incorporated.

NOTES

1. Dalvi, J.P., *The Himalayan Blunder*, Dehardun: Natraj, 1997 (reprint). The book was first published in 1969.
2. Palit, D.K., *War in the High Himalayas: The Indian Army in Crisis in 1962*, New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991.
3. Russell, Brines, *Indo-Pakistan Conflict*, London: Pal Mall Press, 1968, p. 194.
4. Bailey, J.K., *Field Artillery and Firepower*, Oxford: The Military Press, 1989, pp. 256–7.
5. Verma, Ashok Kalyan, *River of Silence*, New Delhi: Lancer, 1998, p. 28.
6. MacFarquhar, Roderick, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: The Coming of the Cataclysm 1961–1966, Vol. 3*, London and New York: The Royal Institute of International Affairs and Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 304.
7. Sandhu, P.J.S., '1962—Battle of SeLa and Bomdi-La', *The Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol. CXXI, No. 586, October–December 2011, pp. 575–94.
8. As quoted as note 3 in *Ibid.*, p. 585. The difficulties listed out are: poor economic situation, famine and likelihood of resultant social unrest.
9. Menon, V.K. Krishna, *India and the Chinese Invasion*, Bombay: Contemporary, 1963, p. 36.
10. One good example of a similar work is McKay, Alex, *Tibet and the British Raj: The Frontier Cadre 1904–1947*, Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997. This can be used as the basis of the history.
11. Some senior retired generals have pointed out in private that if one

reads open literature and books by D.K. Palit and Neville Maxwell, one does not need to read the Henderson Brooks inquiry as the essence is the same.

12. It is learnt that the United Service Institution (USI) of India had a session in August 2012 for oral history in mind by inviting veterans. The Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR), of the USI, is now planning to undertake an oral history project. Indirectly, many veterans who had participated or had served in the Sela and Bomdila sector during or just after the war responded to first of its kind article published in the USI journal based on Chinese archives as given in Sandhu, '1962—Battle of SeLa and Bomdi-La', *The Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol. CXXI, No. 586, October–December 2011, pp. 575–94. See 'Letters to Editor', by Lt Gen Harbhajan Singh (Retd), Brig Jasbir Singh (Retd) and Col S.K. Bose (Retd), *The Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol. CXXII, No. 587, January–March 2012, pp. 144–5 and Lt Gen S.C. Sardeshpande (Retd) and D.K. Khullar (Retd), *The Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol. CXXII, No. 588, April–June 2012, pp. 290–3.
13. Anonymous, *Mystical Kameng: The Ball of Fire Division*, 5 Mountain Division, c/o 99 Army Post Office, Printed at Galaxy Offsets (India), September 2006, p. 70. Being the divisional history, the book makes no mention of the move forward of 21 Mountain Division.
14. Sandhu, '1962—Battle of SeLa and Bomdi-La', p. 582.
15. For the need to reassess the requirement of animal transport in the Indian Army and ensure high physical standards of the troops in the mountains, see Kumar, Virander and P.K. Gautam, 'Back to the Basic: Foot and Hoof Mobility in the Mountains', IDSA Policy Brief, 2011, available at <http://idsa.in/policybrief/BacktotheBasicsFootandHoofMobiltyinthMountains>, accessed on 1 September 2012.
16. Mullik, B.N., *My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal*, New Delhi: Allied, 1971.
17. Palit, *War in the High Himalayas*.
18. Rosen, Peter Stephen, *Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 240–1.
19. Sandhu, '1962—Battle of SeLa and Bomdi-La', p. 582.
20. Mullik, *My Years with Nehru*, p. 343.
21. *Ibid.*, 345.
22. Rahul Karmakar, 'Turbulent Paradise', *Sunday Hindustan Times*, 27 January 2008, p. 13.
23. *Ibid.*
24. One unintended outcome of spread of Hindi is loss of local languages, such as Koro. See Anderson, Gregory D.S. and Ganesh Murmu, 'Preliminary

- Notes on Koro, A “Hidden” Language of Arunachal Pradesh’, *Indian Linguistics*, Vol. 71, Nos 1–4, 2010, pp. 1–32.
25. See Das, Pushpita, ‘Management of India–China Border Area: A Case Study of Arunachal Pradesh’, *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 3, July–September 2008, pp. 92–105; Goswami, Namrata, ‘China’s Claim on Arunachal Pradesh: Local Perspectives’, *IDSAs Issue Brief*, 7 July 2011, p. 17.
 26. *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4.
 27. *Ibid.*
 28. Sushanta Talukdar, ‘MP Seeks IAF Base in Arunachal’, *The Hindu*, 14 June 2009. One battalion of Arunachal Scouts has since been raised with the training centre located initially at Shillong, in the Assam Regimental Centre complex.
 29. This is also the recommendation of a study done at IDSA. See Gautam, P.K., Jagannath P. Panda and Zakir Hussain, *Tibet and India’s Security: Himalayan Region, Refugees and Sino-Indian Relations*, IDSA Task Force Report, New Delhi: IDSA, May 2012, pp. 175–83, available at <http://idsa.in/book/TibetandIndiasSecurity>, accessed on 1 September 2012.
 30. Hasnain, Syed Mehdi, *Historical Record of the Garhwal Rifles 1947–1987*, Landsdowne: The Commandant, The Garhwal Rifles Regimental Centre, April 1996, pp. 58–74. The citation of Number 4039009 Rifleman Rawat Jashwant Singh of 4 Garhwal Rifles, Maha Vir Chakra, Posthumous, is available in Gandhi, S.S. (ed.), *Portrait of Valour: India’s Highest Gallantry Awards and Their Recipients* (third edition), New Delhi: The Defence Review, 2006, p. 206 and Chakravorty, B.C. and U.P. Thapliyal (eds), *Stories of Heroism (PVC and MVC Winners)*, New Delhi: History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India and Allied, 1995, p. 307. A coffee table book of IV Corps has devoted two pages to Battle of Sela and Jaswant Garh Memorial. See *The Gajraj Corps: Born to Charge*, HQ 4 Corps, c/o 99 Army Post Office, 2007, pp. 56–7.
 31. *Ibid.*
 32. My referring to this myth doing the rounds in the media was done in Gautam, P.K., ‘The Need for Renaissance of Military History and Modern War Studies in India’, IDSA Occasional Paper No. 21, November 2011, p. 28, available at <http://idsa.in/occasionalpapers/TheNeedforRenaissanceofMilitaryHistoryandModernWarStudiesinIndia>, accessed on 1 September 2012.
 33. Rahul Karmakar, ‘Tawang Remembers its ’62 War Heroes’, *Hindustan Times*, 1 January 2008.
 34. Gautam, ‘The Need for a Renaissance’, p. 30.
 35. Hoffmann, Steven A., *India and the China Crisis*, London: Oxford University Press, 1990 and ‘Rethinking the Linkages between Tibet and the China–India Border Conflict: A Realist Approach’, *Journal of Cold*

War Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, Summer 2006, pp. 165–94. The author was a visiting fellow at IDSA in 2009.

36. Vertzberger, Yaacov Y.I., *Misperception in Foreign Policy Making: The Sino-India Conflict, 1959–1962*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984. Author visited IDSA in February 2011 during the 13th Asian Security Conference.
37. Discussion by the author with Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger at IDSA, New Delhi, 17 February 2011.