

Shooting for a Century: Finding Answers to the India–Pakistan Conundrum, by Stephen P. Cohen, New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2013, 234 pp., INR 599

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That conflict and rivalry between India and Pakistan is likely to endure for several decades more, even up to the year 2047—a 100 years since their emergence as modern states—is the thesis of this compelling book written by Stephen P. Cohen. Hence the title, *Shooting for a Century*—a play on the cricketing term for scoring a 100 runs. Why would this be so? To answer this question, Cohen ranges over the entire gamut of India–Pakistan relations: the origins of their conflict; issues in dispute; mutual threat perceptions; varied opinions in each country about the other and how to deal with the other; multiple explanations for the underlying causes and persistence of the conflict; and third-party and unofficial diplomatic efforts undertaken so far to foster an accommodation. Although not a history per se of India–Pakistan relations, a fact which Cohen highlights, *Shooting for a Century* is at once an introduction to, a contemporary snapshot of, and a perspective on the dynamics of this relationship.

Cohen traces the roots of the conflict to the contrasting visions of post-colonial India articulated by the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League. While Congress aspired for a united India informed by a composite nationalism, a democratic polity and a strong central government, the League wished to establish an independent state for Muslims who constituted a separate nation and did not wish to live

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in a country dominated by the majority Hindus. In other words, the Congress viewed Hindus and Muslims as constituting one nation and the League perceived them as two distinct nations. In sum, the Congress articulated a one-nation theory and the League, a two-nation theory.

Although initially confounded by the League's demand, the Congress eventually agreed to the establishment of Pakistan in order to avoid a civil war as well as to move ahead with its own nation-building project in an unencumbered manner. But it refused to countenance the League's grander territorial aspirations—undivided Bengal and Punjab where non-Muslims constituted more than 40 per cent of the provincial populations¹ as well as a 700 mile land corridor across Indian territory to connect the two parts of Pakistan.² This stance, combined with India's hard bargaining on the division of the British Raj's assets and statements by Indian leaders about Pakistan's unviability and imminent collapse, laid the seeds for an enduring suspicion in the Pakistani mind that India was not reconciled to the existence of Pakistan and was therefore intent on crushing it. These suspicions were reinforced by India's incorporation of the princely states of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir, as well as by its later role in East Pakistan's emergence as independent Bangladesh—all seen by Pakistanis as examples of Indian efforts to discredit and destroy the two-nation theory. Further, the communal carnage and mass exodus of people in both directions that accompanied Partition, and persisting memories of these horrendous events, added fuel to mutual animosity, a feeling that was particularly acute in West (today's) Pakistan where migrants from India constituted about one-fourth of the population in the early 1950s.

On the other hand, Pakistan's use of the two-nation theory to justify its territorial claims to the princely states of Junagadh with which it did not share a border, Hyderabad that lay in the heart of Indian territory and Jammu and Kashmir, which acceded to India because of Pakistan's use of irregulars to wrest that state, led Indians to believe that Pakistan was bent upon further dividing their country. In later decades, Pakistan's repeated attempts to wrest Kashmir through war or the employment of insurgent and terrorist groups as well as its extension of material support for separatist groups elsewhere in India convinced Indians about the Pakistani design of destabilising India.

In effect, each country has come to view the other as a mortal, duplicitous, untrustworthy, aggressive and irreconcilable enemy. As a result, they

have not been able to establish a 'normal' bilateral relationship. By that, Cohen does not mean the establishment of peace but a relationship based on 'modified Westphalian terms'.³ In the traditional Westphalian order, states adhered to three basic standards of behaviour: respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-interference in internal affairs; and preventing non-state actors based in own territory from assaulting another. At the same time, in the contemporary, economically interdependent world, a normal relationship also involves the peacefully regulated movement of goods, people and ideas across borders.

Cohen points out that neither of these aspects has so far been a feature of India–Pakistan relations. For one, both countries have intervened in the internal affairs of the other; Pakistan in Kashmir and India in East Pakistan. Of course, such a juxtaposition fails to make the distinction between an interventionist policy that has persisted for decades and includes support for murderous terrorist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba on the one hand, and a one-off intervention not driven by irredentism but necessitated by brutal repression and the imperative of ensuring that 10 million refugees returned to their land on the other.

As for the other aspect of the regulated flow of goods, people and ideas, Cohen points out that while protectionism has been a key reason for low levels of trade, conflict and rivalry have particularly served to dampen economic cooperation. Although a constituency in favour of greater economic cooperation has emerged in both countries during the last few years and the two governments even agreed to a road map for full trade normalisation in September 2012, progress has been stymied by recurrent ceasefire violations along the border and their adverse impact on the broader relationship.

Another anomalous feature of the relationship is the emergence of water as an emotive issue since the 1990s, especially in lower riparian Pakistan, with Pakistani terrorist groups threatening violence against India for 'water aggression'. Given the growing need for water and electricity in both countries as well as China's concerted efforts to tap the Himalayan rivers for its own developmental purposes, the water issue is likely to grow in salience in the coming years. In Cohen's view, at least a technical solution akin to the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty will have to be found to address this issue.

A big stumbling block preventing normalization is the persistence of multiple territorial disputes—the emotive issue of Kashmir in particular, but also the dispute over the Siachen Glacier and where exactly the

undefined border on that northern extremity of Kashmir lies, and the less significant dispute over Sir Creek. Kashmir, in Cohen's view, is basically irresolvable because it has become inextricably linked to the national identities of both countries, to their security perceptions, and even to the new issue of control over and exploitation of common river waters whose sources lie in that state. A resolution would necessitate major concessions from both India and Pakistan, an unlikely prospect given how Kashmir has become tangled with other vital issues. Further, China is also a party to the Kashmir issue because it controls portions of the state, acquired either through aggression against India or ceded to it by Pakistan. 'In sum', Cohen notes, 'it is practically useless to talk about solving the Kashmir problem when there are many Kashmir problems, most of which are not amenable to any solution over the long or short term.'

Normalisation is also impeded by the lack of consensus in each country about the other's identity and about how best to deal with the other. 'Indians', Cohen notes, 'see Pakistan in many ways: as a retrograde Muslim state, an irredentist state, a militarily dominated state, a member of hostile alliances, a state that strays from a workable past identity, and a potential South Asian partner.' And depending upon the assessment of Pakistan's identity, the range of policy options advocated are:

1. Accommodate Pakistan and forge cooperation in economics, culture, water and even terrorism.
2. Moderate Pakistan through the cultivation of greater business and trade contacts.
3. Deter Pakistan until it changes its aggressive posture and actions.
4. Balance against an unchangeable Pakistan because it poses a fundamental threat to India's identity and territorial integrity.
5. Break up an aggressive, albeit vulnerable, Pakistan either through war or support for separatists or even sheer economic exhaustion.

Cohen observes that these options boil down to two stark policy approaches: working towards strategic accommodation with Pakistan; or driving that crisis-ridden country to its destruction. But in his assessment, 'the Indian debate has not yet reached the point at which these alternatives are clearly thought out. India still does not know what it wants to do, and its policy will likely remain one of drift, unless events compel a decision.'

Similarly, opinion about India and how to deal with it is also varied in Pakistan, although Pakistani views are more ideological in terms of defining their country as an Islamic homeland for 'oppressed' Indian

Muslims and perceiving India as ‘evil and corrupt’ as well as ‘a permanent threat to the purer “Islamic” Pakistan’. Nevertheless, opinion about normalising relations with India extends across a spectrum ‘from eager suitor to bitter opponent’. Cohen espies five different Pakistani views on normalisation with India:

1. Yield to democratic and pluralist India because Partition was a mistake and while it cannot be undone now, full normalisation would help make the best of a bad situation.
2. Accommodate an economically vibrant and democratic India so as to improve Pakistan’s own lot, while at the same time safeguarding basic interests.
3. Use external balancers to both exert pressure on India and help build internal strength; in other words, persist with the policy adopted since 1947 so as to negotiate from a position of strength.
4. Balance against, counter and keep unstable a uniquely vulnerable multi-ethnic and democratically chaotic India in order to wring concessions.
5. Break up the unnatural entity called India and ‘restore a larger Muslim political order, by force if necessary, along the lines of the Mughal Empire’ to which the ‘naturally subservient’ Hindus would consent to.

Cohen notes that while, until recently, Pakistani opinion tended towards the latter policy options, ‘more dovish views are being articulated now than at any time in Pakistan’s history’. He attributes this trend to globalisation’s influence in ‘diminishing the insularity of the Pakistani elites’ and to the ‘relative success of the Zardari presidency’ in terms of sheer survival and not giving cause to the military to take power. A decisive turn towards normalisation with India is, however, contingent upon the ability of the military and civil society—neither of which is ‘dominated by the jihadists’ in Cohen’s view—to define a national identity compatible with both ‘the tenets of Islam and the realities of Pakistan’s neighbourhood.’

Because he is conditionally pessimistic in his assessment of the prospects of normalisation, Cohen notes that there are reasons for ‘cautious optimism’. For one, there is a growing realisation in India about the importance of normalising relations with Pakistan and transforming it into a peaceful neighbour. At the same time, the Pakistan military, which ‘is desperately afraid that any concessions to the larger India would put it on a slippery slope, heading toward surrender, from which there would be no

return', has endorsed the initiative of its political leadership to normalise trade relations with India. Yet, as noted earlier, the two countries have not been able to move forward in this regard during the last two years because of recurrent border tensions and their deleterious impact on the dialogue process. This turn of events vindicates Cohen's 'conditional pessimism' and 'cautious optimism' about the prospects of normalisation.

Why is the India–Pakistan conflict so intractable? What underlying cause or causes explain their enduring and even 'eternal' rivalry? Scholars and analysts have offered six different explanations in this regard. The first of these is Samuel Huntington's thesis of the clash of civilisations. In this view, India and Pakistan are destined to clash because the former is a Hindu civilisation and the latter a representative of Islamic civilisation. Cohen does not agree with this thesis, given the many cultural commonalities between India and Pakistan, including cuisine, popular culture and persistence of the vestiges of European tradition, several historical examples of Hindu and Muslim rulers reigning over Muslim and Hindu populations, and the emphasis on peace and compromise in both Hindu and Islamic traditions. Although ideologues in both countries subscribe to this thesis and exaggerate minor differences, they do so, in Cohen's assessment, mainly to distinguish the distinct identities of their respective states.

The second explanation revolves around differences in state identity, between a secular democracy and a communal–dictatorial polity. Cohen contends that while Indians tend to highlight this distinction as an explanation for the enduring nature of the conflict, Pakistanis counter this thesis by arguing that conflict endures because 'India's democracy is a sham', it represses Muslims and is inherently expansionist. Both contentions are untenable in his assessment. For one, the distinctions between democracy and dictatorship and secular and communal polity are employed as euphemisms for cultural or moral differences. Further, neither has democracy and secularism prevented India from fostering good relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia nor has Pakistan's view of India as a sham democracy prevented it from establishing close ties with China, North Korea and Saudi Arabia. Instead, in Cohen's assessment, the key factor in the India–Pakistan conflict is the employment by both countries of opposing national ideas to define and distinguish themselves from each other.

The unresolved Kashmir issue is the third explanation generally offered for the persistence of India–Pakistan conflict. But Cohen contends that this is, at best, an ‘inconclusive’ explanation, given that India–Pakistan conflict and rivalry are likely to endure even if Kashmir were to be resolved. While Kashmir *qua* Kashmir is the most important territorial dispute, what is more critical is Kashmir’s interaction with other factors: its importance for the territorial defence of India and Pakistan; its centrality in their ‘shared water and ecosystems’; and ultimately, its connections with their very national identities. Thus, Kashmir ‘is not the whole story’ and conflict and rivalry are likely to endure unless these other ‘important differences, even pathologies’, are addressed.

The fourth explanation dons the realist lens to proclaim that India and Pakistan are engaged in a pursuit of power through conventional and nuclear build-ups, alliances and wars, in order to overcome their security dilemma vis-à-vis each other. Cohen concedes the validity of this thesis, but uncharacteristically scolds India and Pakistan for engaging in the unrealistic game of *realpolitik* ‘without either the resources of the truly major powers or the understanding that they are fighting a foe with pretty much the same strategic interests as themselves.’ He seems to believe that the security dilemma and the pursuit of power to overcome it are luxuries best perceived and pursued by the great powers! In the process, he misses the vital connection between the security dilemma driving India and Pakistan and the source of this insecurity in their conflicting national identities, which latter is his own preferred lens for explaining the India–Pakistan conflict.

India and Pakistan’s ‘systematic creation of identities in conflict with each other’ is the fifth explanation for the persistence of their conflict and rivalry. In this regard, Cohen points to Pakistan and India defining each other as ‘enemy’ states ‘through legislation regarding the properties left behind’ by people who fled to the other country and ‘literally seizing “enemy” property’ under these Acts. In addition, popular characterisations of the other country in educational curricula and in the hyper nationalist media have tended to perpetuate mistrust. In India, the Pakistani is characterised as a ‘religious fanatic’; and in Pakistan, the Indian is described as a ‘bully’. Further, the educational curricula in the two countries have tended to ‘promote a strong national identity’ while, at the same time, emphasising upon the differences and even negative characteristics of the other.

The sixth explanation is the role of the major powers in sustaining the conflict by extending support to Pakistan and thus enabling that much weaker country to resist and even challenge the more powerful India. Cohen does not entirely disagree with this thesis. All that he concedes is that great power support to both India and Pakistan meant that the former did not promote cooperation and instead made normalisation more difficult by 'reducing incentives to compromise'. And he further points out that outside support for Pakistan is no longer a factor given its acquisition of nuclear weapons—'the great equalizer between large and small, rich and poor'. Cessation of great power support to Pakistan will therefore no longer suffice to solve the India–Pakistan conflict.

After thus critiquing and finding partial merit in each of these explanations, Cohen seeks to consolidate them 'into a single description'. For this purpose, he advances the concept of 'paired minority conflicts', which are characterised by each country in such a dyad viewing itself as the weaker and morally superior victim and the other as an unjust aggressor. But he does not specify how exactly the six different explanations fit into this conceptual framework. He could well have said that India and Pakistan's conflicting national identities and their struggle to define and distinguish these identities have led them to exaggerate marginal cultural and political differences, mischaracterise the other, not compromise with the other, perceive the other as an existential threat and seek to overcome their security dilemma as well as realise territorial and moral claims through the pursuit of power in the internal and external domains. Instead, he digresses into a discussion of six attributes that have perpetuated the India–Pakistan conflict, attributes that are not entirely coterminous with the various explanations for their conflict. These attributes are:

1. Mutual distrust and consequent unwillingness to offer 'concessions or compromise on even trivial issues'.
2. Routine portrayal of the other as the immoral aggressor and oneself as the righteous victim.
3. Clinging to the hope that, in time, the other will collapse.
4. Viewing the other as an existential threat, thus justifying both the refusal to compromise and the resort to violence.
5. An overlap between the search for justice and the pursuit of power.
6. A search for allies against the other.

In Cohen's assessment, these attributes indicate that India and Pakistan are engaged in 'a latent and protracted civil war' in which both sides 'are divided as to the very nature of their differences'. They cannot agree whether their conflict is about the territory of Kashmir or the authority to speak on behalf of Kashmiris and even Indian Muslims, or ideology, or a struggle for power. Further, some groups in both states contend that there cannot be a normal relationship unless the other side completely concedes its position on any one or all of these issues. Together, these issues and factors have made the conflict intractable.

None of the efforts undertaken so far to resolve the conflict or facilitate accommodation has had any success. Track II dialogues and bilateral back-channel talks have failed to make progress because neither government has been enthusiastic about them or about addressing fundamental issues. Further, since the interlocutors in Track II are invariably former government officials or even citizens with links to their governments, they remain fixed in their ideas, tend to engage in verbal duels or simply stick to the official line.

For their part, the two countries have perfected the art of insincerity by alternately advancing proposals for 'joint defence' and 'no war' pact, which each knows would be unacceptable to the other. But in extending this argument of insincerity to the division of Kashmir along existing territorial lines, Cohen commits a factual error with regard to changes in the Indian position. He states that Nehru rejected the 1954 proposal of Pakistan's then Governor General, Ghulam Mohammed, to explore 'the possibility of formalizing the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir as an international boundary'. In the absence of any reference to a source, it is not possible to verify the basis for this conclusion. But the published record of Jawaharlal Nehru's conversations with the visiting Prime Minister (Mohammad Ali) and Interior Minister (Iskander Mirza) of Pakistan in 1955 indicates otherwise. According to Nehru, the informal proposal that Ghulam Mohammed had conveyed through intermediaries actually involved India ceding to Pakistan 'a large piece of territory in Jammu, north of the Chenab', as well as the establishment of 'some kind of a joint control of a joint army' in Kashmir proper.⁴ It was this proposal that Nehru rejected. Instead, in his conversations with Ali and Mirza, he reprised his 1948 offer made to Liaquat Ali Khan on the sidelines of the Commonwealth Conference in London about dividing Kashmir, albeit

with minor territorial modifications. India has consistently stuck to this position, as is evident from the proposals it advanced during the 1962–63 Swaran Singh–Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto talks and again, during the Simla talks in 1972. Needless to add, it is Pakistan that has found such a division unacceptable.

Nor have mediatory efforts undertaken by the major powers to resolve the conflict yielded any result. The American and Soviet efforts in the 1960s are the most prominent examples in this regard. In recent years, and especially after the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan, the international community has begun to favour stability and normalisation. American and European views on Kashmir in particular have evolved to favour the status quo as a result.

What then is the future of India–Pakistan relations? Cohen predicts that ‘a hurting stalemate will likely continue, albeit one with less tension’, given some forward movement on the trade and visa issues. And the relationship is ‘likely to oscillate within a band: it is unlikely to go to the nuclear level, nor is steady normalization in sight’. Such a scenario is all the more likely because of ‘the strong possibility that stalemate may be more attractive to each side’ than compromise. For Pakistan, a stalemate would help tie down Indian forces in Kashmir as well as afford the opportunity to enhance conventional and nuclear weapon capabilities for equalising the military balance. For India, a stalemate is preferable to a compromise on Kashmir that would adversely impact upon its secular political order and the place of its Muslim minority.

At the same time, Cohen also points out worse possible, albeit less likely, futures. For one, Pakistan could actually fail given a stagnating economy, demographic explosion, separatism in several provinces and the threat posed by Islamic revolutionary groups. A failed Pakistan ‘could spew out millions of refugees’ into India, enable terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons and ‘serve as a base for radical Islamic movements that recruit Indian Muslims and target India’. Second, the two countries could engage in an expanded rivalry in Afghanistan, which would adversely impact upon their efforts to normalise the trade relationship as well as heighten mutual threat perceptions. Finally, a war may break out involving the use of nuclear weapons.

Notwithstanding these possible scenarios and given his own conclusion that Pakistan will muddle through, Cohen points out that the

acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan and the emergence of Islamic radicalism as a common threat to both countries actually offers an opportunity for them to reappraise their relationship and bring an end to their rivalry. But in stating that Islamic terrorism has emerged as a common threat to both countries, he does not factor in his own acknowledgement of Pakistan's continuing support for and toleration of those Islamic terrorist groups that are seen as 'assets' against India and in Afghanistan. Thus, for India, the threat of Islamic terrorism is not merely one posed by Islamic groups but Islamic groups supported and used by elements of the Pakistani state apparatus. But for Pakistan, it is a self-inflicted wound.

Even while acknowledging this, Cohen particularly emphasises India's interests in normalising its relationship with Pakistan and helping that country overcome its self-inflicted wounds. For, even an economically enfeebled and identity-challenged Pakistan 'remains capable of mortally hurting India through its growing nuclear capability and by rubbing salt in Kashmir's wounds.' Further, India would also have difficulty in emerging as a major Asian power 'if it has to haul a wounded Pakistan around.' But what is it that India can do to help Pakistan overcome its self-inflicted wounds? Cohen does not specify except to tartly point out that '*hoping* that Pakistan becomes a more normal state is not a policy.' Nor does he agree with the view held by some of his American and Indian interlocutors that India's normalization of its relationship with 'a fatally wounded' Pakistan 'will have to be postponed indefinitely'. Pakistan is too nuclear to be allowed to fail and therefore, must be rescued from itself both by India as well as by the international community led by the United States.

What can the United States do to ameliorate the India–Pakistan conflict and foster normalisation? Cohen disagrees with the general American view that the India–Pakistan dispute is a 'hopeless' one and that 'nothing can be done' to foster normalisation between the two countries. He concedes that America can 'do little directly to address the core identity and strategic disputes'. But 'it can do much indirectly' to foster cooperation through support for regional economic cooperation, dialogue and collaborative research among scholars and strategic cooperation in Afghanistan.

In addition, America should do three other things. First, it should 'indicate support for making the present Line of Control (LoC) the

international boundary', but subject to the condition that India, Pakistan and Kashmiris on both sides agree to such a settlement. As indicated earlier, India has officially advanced such a proposal repeatedly since 1948. Cohen believes that this is true of Pakistan as well and he even asserts that 'it was part of Musharraf's plan'. But in his report on the back-channel talks between Indian and Pakistani interlocutors, Steve Coll has recorded that Musharraf 'made it clear from the start' that transforming the LoC into an international border 'would be unacceptable' and that Pakistani interlocutors subsequently demanded 'something close to shared governance' over Kashmir.⁵ Given this record, it is not clear why Cohen asserts that Pakistan would be willing to accept the transformation of the LoC into the international border. Nevertheless, his suggestion itself is undoubtedly a sound one.

Second, America should redefine its policy of de-hyphenation, which has come to treat India and Pakistan separately. This approach does not, however, address the reality of their conflict. It simply hopes that the two countries 'would not push their crises very far'. But since hope is not policy, America should actively engage with both countries and help transform their conflict. That this call has found no favour even within a Democratic administration is indication enough of its unrealistic nature.

Third, America should encourage the two countries to 'work toward a stable nuclear regime' and maintain tight control over the use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, it should help them develop nuclear safety centres, share technology to help them monitor and determine the origins of nuclear detonations, work with their national disaster mitigation centres, fund the exchange of scientists, and offer courses on nuclear safety. These are all sensible suggestions. But what is impractical is his contention that Pakistan should be incentivised to go down this path by being offered a civil nuclear deal similar to the one concluded with India. There is no denying the logic of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme being brought in from the cold at some point in the future. But such a step should be contingent upon its success in stabilising the fraught internal security situation and demonstration of the commitment to stop using terrorist groups as an instrument of state policy. Otherwise, a nuclear incentive will also go the way of the \$26 billion American incentive to elicit Pakistan's cooperation in Afghanistan. Attempting to incentivise a state that is deeply committed to pursuing its security interests without heed to their self-destructive consequences would only tantamount to

an expression of hope. But hope, as Cohen himself recognises, is not policy.

These recommendations stem from Cohen's contention that the normalisation of the India–Pakistan relationship is in America's interest. Indeed, from the American perspective, India–Pakistan normalisation 'is more important than Afghanistan's stabilization or building India up as a barrier to an expanding China'. For, normalisation would mean an economically vibrant India plus a stable and democratic Pakistan. Together, they would be able to create 'a strategically cooperative South Asia that would be the best barrier against Chinese expansion'. Cohen's evocation of such a vision appears to have blinded him to the reality of the motives underlying the all-weather friendship between China and Pakistan. More damagingly, this vision is far removed from the reality of India–Pakistan relations that he himself portrays so painstakingly throughout the book: that they will be shooting for a century; that the prospects of normalisation are poor; and that normalisation does not mean peace but only a more stable rivalry.

Perhaps, hope eventually triumphs over reality in Cohen's mind, especially hope about Pakistan emerging as a modern, democratic and moderately religious polity. Perhaps, inspired by Shelley, he is endeavouring 'to hope till hope creates from its own wreck the thing it contemplates'. But, as he himself repeatedly points out, hope is not policy. Nor can it be the premise for policy, which has to necessarily address the extant reality. And the extant reality today and in the policy-actionable future is the continuing identity-driven conflict between India and Pakistan, the enduring China–Pakistan *entente cordiale* and the persisting alliance between the Pakistani state and Islamic terrorist groups.

NOTES

1. On the percentages of Muslim and non-Muslim populations in pre-Partition Punjab and Bengal, see B.R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India* (online edition), Columbia University, Appendices IV and V, available at http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00ambedkar/ambedkar_partition/, accessed on 20 January 2015.
2. On Jinnah's demand for such a corridor, see Ayesha Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics* (Kindle edition), Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2014, p. 38.
3. Unless otherwise indicated, all quoted phrases and sentences are from the book under review.

4. 'Talks with Mohammad Ali and Iskander Mirza—II', in Ravinder Kumar and H.Y. Sharada Prasad (eds), *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Vol. 28*, New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2001, p. 254.
5. Steve Coll, 'The Back Channel: India and Pakistan's Secret Kashmir Talks', *The New Yorker*, 2 March 2009, available at <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/02/the-back-channel>, accessed on 13 September 2014.