

Editorial

In April 2017, the Headquarters of the Integrated Defence Staff released the second edition of the *Joint Doctrine for the Indian Armed Forces*. The doctrine provides a reference point for strategists to envisage India's current military status and future. According to Admiral Sunil Lanba, Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, the doctrine '...pitched at the Military Strategic level, is meant to guide all members of the Indian Armed Forces, on the necessary concepts, principles, and ideals under which to achieve the higher goals set upon [them]...' Most importantly, he recommends that the '...Doctrine is to be a part of the initial training curriculum and should be re-visited at all subsequent stages of training and education, to extend [...] understanding and collative competence.' Jointness and integration are the mantras guiding leading militaries the world over, and the Indian Armed Forces are no exception. As India aspires to be a leading nation both regionally and globally, its armed forces would play a key role in helping achieve this. The updated doctrine thus comes at the right time and deserves a closer and detailed examination.

This issue begins appropriately with a perspective by G.S. Katoch titled 'Military Change: Survival of the Most Adaptable'. Deriving from a varied and broad professional experience, Katoch opines how there are myriad examples in history that show how lack of or delay in change led to military setbacks. The study of military change, thus, is necessary to avoid the hazard of remaining bogged in the history of past victories and then falling prey to the oft-repeated specious wisdom 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it'. Beginning with a broad overview of how war experiences and changes in operational environments have driven military change over the years, Katoch brings out key moments and issues faced by the Indian Armed Forces that aided or impeded change. The perspective shows how change in the Indian set-up is constrained by a status quoist mental make-up, for which the current professional military education, rigid hierarchy, and career path orientation could (and should) be apportioned part of the blame. The author feels that it is important not just to identify

where change is required, but also to flesh out *what* change is required and *how* to implement it. A key takeaway from this piece is the need to think about military change unceasingly.

The issue also carries two detailed research articles. In 'Economic Sanctions as an Option to Fight Pakistan Sponsored Terrorism', Vivek Chadha discusses how nuclearisation of the Indian subcontinent has limited the conventional military options available to India for punishing Pakistan's employment of terrorism as a tool of state policy. He finds that while India has rightly balanced the use of diplomatic and limited military means over a period of time, even as these remain relevant, the option of economic sanctions deserves deeper analysis for its efficacy and impact. The article discusses how economic measures can be undertaken both in the form of direct and indirect actions against a target country, individual or an organisation with varied degrees of impact. It uses the US sanctions against Iran, which were successful to a large extent, as a case study. Chadha's article discusses the reasons for the same while underlining contextual differences in the Indian scenario. It further provides options for placing economic sanctions against Pakistan, along with the challenges and potential for impact in each case, thereby providing policy alternatives that can be explored.

In 'International Law on the Use of Force against Terrorists Since 9/11: The Contrasting Cases of Israel and India', Yashvi Chandra discusses how the international law on the use of force against terrorists has experienced a radical revision since the rise of transnational jihad of Al-Qaeda. The law has sufficiently expanded to accommodate actions against terrorists in foreign territory in the wake of terrorist attacks, particularly when the foreign State hosts terrorists and does not cooperate with the victim State. However, says Chandra, the new legal framework does not give *carte blanche* to States to use force against terrorists. While using force States must strictly follow the law. Attempts to bypass the law discredit a state's self-defence claim, even if that state has been the victim of terrorism. This article uses the two evident but contrasting examples of this assertion as case studies: Israel's actions in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2014) and India's surgical strikes in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) in 2016. While the former circumvented the law and faced international criticism, the latter's actions were within the international law and therefore, found international support.

Finally, the issue includes three book reviews: Jasneet S. Sachdeva reviews *The Ashgate Research Companion to Military Ethics*; Titli Basu

reviews *Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Under the 'Abe Doctrine': New Dynamism or New Dead End?*; and Sampa Kundu reviews *Heading East: Security, Trade and Environment between India and Southeast Asia*.

The JDS Editorial Board would like to hear more from our readers about the current issue as well as about topics they feel should be addressed in the journal. Do write to the Managing Editor, *Journal of Defence Studies* at ddg.idsa@nic.in. We also invite contributions for forthcoming issues on emerging security threats and scenarios; civil-military relations; higher defence planning; doctrines and concepts; organisations and structures; command and control mechanisms; logistical support and sustainability issues; budgeting procedures and practices vis-à-vis the Indian Armed Forces; military history, especially on wars fought by India and Indian participation in the First and Second World Wars; participation in UN peacekeeping operations; and bilateral/multi-lateral defence cooperation, among others. We hope that along with our growing readership, we would also see more contributions to future issues.

