


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UNIFIL

The Many Challenges of Successful Peacekeeping

*A.K. Bardalai**

Nations from the developed world have rarely participated in complex and difficult UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) while those from the developing world have rich peacekeeping experience. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is a rare exception among peacekeeping missions as it includes peacekeepers from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), along with Western military involvement. NATO members' involvement in UNIFIL resulted in unusual structures and operational philosophy, and adjusting and adapting to this was difficult for non-Western participants. Despite the differences in training, equipment, culture and tradition amongst the Western and non-Western national contingents, UNIFIL's contribution in maintaining peace in the region is praiseworthy. The combined effects of the political and military muscles of peacekeepers from Western nations and special skills of the non-Western nations was able to provide much-needed stability to Lebanon, which has not seen a major conflict in almost a decade.

Since its inception, the United Nations (UN) has undertaken a total of 69 PKOs, and as on 31 October 2015, 16 UN peacekeeping operations¹ were underway across the world.² A nation's decision to either participate in or support a UN-authorized peace operation is dependent on certain

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concerns such as national interests, service to humanity, commitment to the UN policy and love for global peace. The potential risk to peacekeepers has also been a major factor influencing a country's national policy towards peacekeeping missions. Phyllis Bennis has argued that a government's foreign policy decision (in this case, to participate in a UN PKO) would be guided by the perceived interest of that government.³ David N. Gibbs has added that among other factors, economic and strategic considerations would also be taken into consideration while deciding to participate in PKOs.⁴ Generally, self-interest of the states is the driver of the decision-making process. Yet, commitment to restore global peace is what is likely to be cited as the main reason for participation in PKOs by most of the nations. It is, however, difficult to pinpoint the exact reasons for a nation's decision to participate in PKOs.

After the end of the Cold War in 1989, PKOs have undergone changes in terms of type, concept, mandate and the type of the environment they have to operate in. The contemporary operations are multidimensional, with a mix of military, police and unarmed military observers, stronger mandate and better-equipped and better-trained peacekeepers. These missions can also be identified by high level of violence; casualties to civilians and peacekeepers; and associated day-to-day operational challenges. There has also been a change in the pattern of participation in the UN PKOs. Ambassador Samantha Power, the United States (US) Permanent Representative at the UN, mentioned in her speech in Brussels on 9th March 2015, that 20 years ago, European countries were the leaders in UN peacekeeping, but today European nations contribute less than 7 per cent of UN troops.⁵ Most of the current debates and discourses on PKOs are also generally centred on these complex missions. At the same time, because of prolonged duration of relative calm and peace, first-generation missions, based on inter-state conflicts, do not get similar attention of the international community.

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is one such mission, which has been in place in Lebanon close to four decades. UNIFIL was established in 1978 as a traditional mission to broker peace between Lebanon and Israel. The Mission had three broadly defined purposes: confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces; restoring international peace and security; and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.⁶ In accordance with the original mandate of UNIFIL, after the withdrawal of Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) from Lebanon on 25 May 2000, the

process of downsizing the mission had begun.⁷ However, later, the Israel and Lebanon War of 2006 compelled the UN to deploy an expanded force under UNIFIL. Ever since 2006, the mission deployment numbers have remained around 10,000 personnel based in contingents from three lead nations—Italy, France and Spain, and a few other non-Western nations. Although UNIFIL is based on military contingents from three European nations, the combined strength of these contingents is less than 50 per cent of the total strength of other non-Western contingents of the mission.

India has been one of the main troop-contributing nations in UNIFIL since 1999. It joined UNIFIL at a time when there was hardly any European contribution, and remained even during the Israel–Lebanon War of 2006. Now, UNIFIL is a multinational peacekeeping mission and is unique in its own way. While it is possibly the last of the traditional PKOs, its complexities are far more challenging than many other contemporary missions. Yet, like in all other PKOs, even in Lebanon, peacekeepers from non-Western nations and India have blended well. Since the inception of the first UN peacekeeping mission in 1948, India's armed forces have been participating in peacekeeping missions in the most difficult areas across the world. It is probably the Indian peacekeepers' decades of experience and understanding of the nuances of peacekeeping, selection of the peacekeepers and their preparation prior to deployment in PKOs that makes them acceptable anywhere in the world.

UNIFIL is a rare exception among the peacekeeping missions for a number of reasons. First, in spite of being a traditional peacekeeping mission (inter-state conflict), rather than being deployed in a mutually accepted (both by Israel and Lebanon) neutral zone, it is completely deployed in South Lebanon. Second, UNIFIL has to grapple, almost on daily basis, with some complex situational difficulties, such as the unique political set-up of Lebanon and its impact on the mission. For instance, Hezbollah, which was one of main parties to the war of 2006, is a political party with major say in crucial and important decision-making processes of the government and has a massive following amongst the masses.

Third, even though by way of numbers, currently, troops from the South Asian region dominate the list of nations participating in UN peacekeeping missions, it is the only UN peacekeeping operation where peacekeepers from European nations have maximum participation, with peacekeepers from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

and Western military involvement.⁸ Fourth, as of 30 April 2016, seven troop-contributing countries (TCCs) of UNIFIL are deployed based on operational partnership (when two or more military contingents combine to deploy as part of the PKO). Even in this regard, UNIFIL can take the credit of housing more operational partnership than any other peacekeeping mission since 2004.⁹

Fifth, contingents from European nations have deployed in UNIFIL with some heavy armaments and advanced military equipment, the like of which is an exception in traditional PKOs authorised under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Sixth, unlike any other traditional peacekeeping mission, where peacekeepers generally remain detached from the local population, UNIFIL peacekeepers have a challenging relationship with the populace of South Lebanon. This relationship regularly reflects on the mindsets and methodology of functioning of the military peacekeepers from different parts of the world. To a great extent, it also becomes a kind of enabling factor for the peacekeepers to discharge their responsibilities without hindrance.

Seventh, consent of the parties to the conflict and their political agendas always have a profound effect on the progress of peace. In case of Lebanon, Hezbollah, even though officially not a signatory to the conflict, is the main actor who not only can decide the future course of Israel–Lebanon relationship but also the internal stability of the country. It is well entrenched politically and has its own armed wing (they preferred to be called ‘resistance’). As a result, the complexity of the political environment surrounding UNIFIL is rather peculiar and different from other contemporary missions.

Eighth, since immediately after the war in 2006, when the European nations began their participation, there has not been a major conflict between Israel and Lebanon. However, it cannot be stated definitely if credit for this period of relative calm can be singularly attributed to the mission comprising of well-trained peacekeepers from a few developed nations from Europe. The answer to this will be available only if another war breaks out between Israel and Lebanon and the present structure of the mission remains intact during it.

The professional skills and ability of military contingents from many non-Western nations to withstand the challenges of complex intra-state conflicts have been tested in some contemporary missions like UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).¹⁰

However, this cannot be stated in case of the European nations, because these nations either have not got such an opportunity or have chosen not to participate in such difficult missions. These exceptions also pose some complicated challenges to the mission in fulfilling its mandate.

The UNIFIL is a good mix of military peacekeepers from Western and non-Western nations, with differing operational philosophies, standards of training, equipment profile, culture and traditions. In spite of these differences, contingents from the Western and non-Western countries have been able to create synergy, thereby proving UNIFIL to be an effective peacekeeping mission in the Middle East. This article comments on the challenges faced by UNIFIL despite being a first-generation mission, and the important role of peacekeepers (from both from Western and non-Western nations) in the accomplishment of the mission's mandate. Much of the discussion is informed by the author's participation in PKOs and UNIFIL.

UNIFIL: A ROBUST PEACEKEEPING MISSION

UNIFIL commenced its operation in 1978 with a strength of slightly more than 4,500 peacekeepers.¹¹ According to the initial mandate, that is, to oversee withdrawal of IDF from Lebanon, the mission was rightly deployed in South Lebanon.¹² However, the IDF pulled out, voluntarily, only in May 2000. The strength went up by around an additional 1,500 peacekeepers to oversee this withdrawal. The strength was again reduced once the situation stabilised. However, after the war of 2006, UNIFIL's strength was augmented to more than 14,000 troops. Because of the strength and presence of well-equipped and well-trained contingents from three European nations, UNIFIL is also colloquially known as a 'robust mission'. Strictly going by the dictionary meaning, UNIFIL is indeed a robust mission. However, only time will tell whether it can actually deliver during a crisis.

Out of UNIFIL's present strength of 10,487 peacekeepers, contribution of non-Western nations stands at 5,168 troops (taking into account only those nations with contribution of more than 500). While Indonesia tops the list with 1,288 troops, India, Nepal, Malaysia and Ghana have each contributed more than 800 troops. And if other non-Western nations with contribution of more than 100 troops are bracketed under this category, this figure goes up to 6,352 uniformed peacekeepers. In comparison, the contribution of the major Western TCCs, as of now, stands at little over 3,000 peacekeepers.¹³ This is less than half of the

contribution of the non-Western nations. In spite of this, one could refer to UNIFIL as 'NATO in Blue Helmet' simply because of the combined weight of their political and military power.

At a time when the term 'robust peacekeeping' has found new flavour in the UN fraternity, UNIFIL has been very often cited as the example. UNIFIL is the only UN PKO to employ medium tanks and artillery guns to provide the mission with a combat power that is among the highest in the world for a mission of this size. However, this current strength comprises the staff officers, the Maritime Task Force (MTF) and certain specialised assets like engineering units, a helicopter unit and the logistic unit. In addition, the inbuilt technical units and logistic support units of the sectors and contingents also form part of this strength. This leaves the mission with around 5,000 combat soldiers, which is inadequate to perform its routine military tasks, such as prevention of firing rockets from Lebanon to Israel. UNIFIL's force structure is completely based on the organisation of a NATO force.¹⁴ It was not so earlier, but took its present shape after the war of 2006 when NATO countries pledged their support. The given strength of a standard infantry battalion for a peacekeeping mission is 850 regular troops, with inbuilt capacity to support the internal administrative requirement of the contingent. There are nine TCCs providing the main combat strength in terms of military contingents. Except for a few contingents, organisational structures of the other contingents are different with dissimilar strengths. For instance, all the three lead nations from Europe—Italy, France and Spain—have their contingents structured (including equipment) in different ways based on their own threat perception. Whereas requirement is of a composite battalion comprising three motorised companies and one mechanised company (wheeled armoured personnel carrier), the European contingents, over and above the UN-authorized organisation, include some specialised units such as the technical support unit, logistic unit and civil–military cooperation (CIMIC) unit. As for the equipment profile, while France has its army's main battle tanks and radar as part of its Quick Reaction Force (QRF), Italy has deployed wheeled armoured vehicles fitted with big bore main guns.

This asymmetric organisational structure is akin to a NATO force. It can be argued that it is not possible for the NATO countries to modify their structures, which are actually tailor-made for NATO operations, and adapt to a UN standard for a short period of four months. Combat troops are also employed for protection of the contingent bases. And

number of troops employed for such protection duties vary from contingent to contingent based on their (contingents') perceived asymmetric threat from the belligerents. The cumulative effect is that the boots on ground are less than even one-third of the overall deployed strength. Further, NATO members' involvement has brought unusual structures and operational philosophy, which non-Western participants sometimes find problematic.

UNIFIL AND COMPLEX POLITICS OF LEBANON AND HEZBOLLAH

UN peacekeeping missions are the result of prolonged political processes that involve intense negotiations between parties to a conflict, various multinational players and the international community at large. Therefore, military components in peacekeeping missions are only one of the players in the process of conflict resolution. Their role, however, is indispensable and crucial. This intricate relationship between politics and peacekeeping missions varies from region to region and according to the type of peacekeeping mission, with politics always retaining the upper hand. This picture gets more complicated when other actors having indirect interests also join the conflict. This is the case in the context of Lebanon–Israel conflicts. Hezbollah fought a major war with the IDF in 2006 and today, it is one of the main political parties in Lebanon. Even after almost decade of relative peace, both Hezbollah and IDF still remain at loggerheads, with both sides frequently raising the ante by making accusations and counter accusations. For Israel, the threat from its north (Lebanon) is real and with Hezbollah acquiring more advanced weapons, this threat has become only larger. In the context of the Israel–Lebanon relationship, Israel is more worried of Hezbollah than Lebanon. Hezbollah's survival as an organisation depends on the support from its mentor, Iran, and continuance of Assad regime in Syria. Even though Hezbollah has gone through a difficult phase and lost more than 1,300 fighters in the Syrian war, Israeli intelligence believes that Hezbollah has not become weaker. On the contrary, it is preparing for the next conflict with Israel.¹⁵ It is just that, presently, Hezbollah is not interested in opening another front with Israel. Therefore, future shape of UNIFIL will largely be guided by the trajectory of the security dynamics of the Middle East.

Inter-state relationship of the regional countries, combined with their internal politics, affects the peace process. In case of Lebanon and Israel, this manifests in different forms generally near the Blue Line, at

times almost pushing the region to the brink of a major war.¹⁶ Another factor that affects the functioning of UNIFIL is Lebanon's unique parliamentary system. No peacekeeping mission can deliver unless there is support from the host government and the parties to the conflict. In Lebanon, power is shared on a confessional system. Essentially, it is shared between the Maronite Christians, the Sunnis and the Shias, without any unanimous power or authority in the hands of any party.¹⁷ Therefore, classical support by any one political party, which should have been derived after forming the government at the centre, is not possible in Lebanon. Consequently, any support that might come has to be as a result of a consensus among all three confessions. Hence, unlike other peacekeeping missions, the relationship between peacekeeping and politics is more intertwined and complicated in UNIFIL.

RISE OF NON-WESTERN PEACEKEEPERS

Rise of the non-Western nations' contribution in UN peacekeeping has been gradual over a period of time. Many like to refer to this trend as the result of evolution of global power system, shift in power politics and use of peacekeeping as an important tool for profile enhancement.¹⁸ For India, it matches with its regional profile of wanting to be a regional leader by setting an example in the field of peacekeeping. This, however, should not be misinterpreted as regional hegemony. According to Benjamin de Carvalho and Cedric de Coning of the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, this phenomenon of the rising powers in general, and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) in particular, can be understood as a bloc of countries that seek to counter what they perceive as the unfair advantage that the Western bloc has gained from the current architecture.¹⁹ While it will be difficult to counter this argument, the rising powers, however, share a common perspective to assert as regional emerging powers as well as to make a legitimate claim for permanent seats in the Security Council. The question thus arises: will such emergence significantly shift the landscape of PKOs; and is there a clash of philosophy of peacekeeping within the mission?

UNIFIL is the only PKO where there could be clash of such ideas. For, troops from the developed world barely participate in complex and difficult peacekeeping missions. United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is another such mission where contribution from the Netherland is more than 700.

However, this large contribution, which is a departure from routine, mainly consists of Special Forces personnel, intelligence unit and helicopters and police trainers.²⁰ Except for the Special Forces, technically, actual boots on ground are not yet there. For, these specialised troops are located centrally as quick response teams and not for holding posts for domination of area of operations. Similarly, Lebanon being a hilly terrain and devoid of good road communication network, even though the overall strength of the mission has gone up, the troops' density has not improved.

In UNIFIL, India and Ghana were the two major non-Western TCCs during the 2006 war. When the war ended, the mission's strength was augmented and peacekeepers from three European nations—France, Spain and Italy—were quickly deployed to provide much-needed immediate stability to the mission. Simultaneously, troops from other non-Western nations also started getting deployed, albeit slowly. While there is no misunderstanding amongst the military contingents in UNIFIL, there are certainly functional problems. Competing bilateral interests, combined with strict adherence to military protocols, result in rigidity and inflexible handling of even the smallest of incidents. However, in spite of different ethnicity, religious faith, tradition and culture, there is something common amongst the non-Western national contingents. Social adjustment comes with ease amongst these nations. For instance, hosting peacekeepers from different contingents for a meal without any prior information or invitation is quite common amongst the non-Western contingents.

There is also a distinct difference in the concept of force protection measures amongst the Western and non-Western contingents. While those from European nations appear robust and hence are probably perceived as arrogant (because of peacekeepers moving around in heavily protected armoured vehicles and wearing full battle gears), the other group (the non-Western national contingents) finds better acceptability in the Lebanese society. This probably stems from some kind of Asian tradition of setting aside bilateral differences to work as comrades when it comes to fighting for a common goal. For instance, peacekeepers from India and Pakistan, known to be sworn enemies otherwise, have been regularly fighting side by side in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Peacekeeping operations differ from conventional military operations in many ways, unless it is an intervention by force. Accustomed to

NATO environment in fighting terrorists in places like Afghanistan, peacekeepers from Western nations, who get turned over very frequently, find it difficult to adjust to UN peacekeeping, which is more traditional and bureaucratic in nature. Even the past institutional memory of many Western TCCs, who participated in UN peacekeeping prior to 1996, has been lost.²¹ As a result, there is a tendency to import NATO philosophy to UN PKOs. The well-trained and well-equipped peacekeepers from these countries tend to look at every incident in the mission through a military prism and try to separate the black from the white. But, in reality, there are more greys than combined blacks and whites.

For successful implementation of the peace deals, a clear understanding of the underlying differences between the processes of mediation and verification is very important. For, while assessing the performance of the UN peacekeeping mission in El Salvador, Lise Morje Howard explained that in the process of mediating peace deals, the mediator learns of many politically sensitive acts that should not be subjected to verification standards.²² For example, Hezbollah is officially not a signatory to the peace agreement leading to adoption of SCR 1701. However, unless Hezbollah—considered to be a resistance movement in Lebanon—consented, SCR 1701 would not have been adopted. Moreover, the presence of Hezbollah in South Lebanon is widely known. Yet, removal of either Hezbollah or their arsenals cannot be part of the mandate. Therefore, inability of the UN to disarm Hezbollah cannot be considered as a verification standard. Otherwise, the mission will be doomed even before it starts functioning.

During this author's tenure in UNIFIL, the manner in which a number of incidents related to discovery of unauthorised arms and equipment were handled led to a large section of the local community suspecting the underlying motives of TCCs executing the operations. So much so, the local population obstructed routine investigations of a few incidents by the UN teams. In one such incident on 14 July 2009, a series of explosions took place in a building in the vicinity of a village Khirbat Silim in the UNIFIL area of operation. The explosions were caused by deflagration of ammunition stored in the building. The building was under the control of Hezbollah and was an actively maintained arms and ammunition depot. It was a clear violation of Resolution 1701 (2006). People sympathetic to Hezbollah removed a substantial quantity of remnants from the site, in civilian vehicles, to an unknown location. On 15 July, when the UNIFIL team went to the site for investigation, it

was confronted with stiff public opposition. Along with rude behaviour and not allowing access to the explosion site, some of the civilians even resorted to physical confrontation, resulting in minor injuries to one of the members of the investigating team and destruction of a UN camera. Subsequently, on 18 July, when the UNIFIL team went for further inspection of the suspicious house in the vicinity of the explosion site, UNIFIL personnel were subjected to stone throwing by the agitated civilians, resulting in injuries to 14 UNIFIL personnel and damage to 18 UNIFIL vehicles.²³ It will, however, be wrong to attribute such behaviour of the local population to any particular national contingent. Further, the explosion was a big loss and embarrassing for Hezbollah to let it pass so easily without making it a big issue with the support of the local population. At the same time, such obstructions were rare in the eastern sector of UNIFIL, which was predominantly held by peacekeepers from the non-Western nations. It is probably because the military peacekeepers from the non-Western nations have special skills—that is, the ability to deliver more by their positive attitude and less by use of force—which help to handle complex challenges of UN PKOs more efficiently.

It was a general perception, even if it is wrong, that some of the contingents from Western nations were there more for political reasons and less for peace. Essentially, there was a trust deficit. In this regard, very often the Deputy Force Commander (DFC)—who in some cases was a non-Westerner—had to personally lead some of the very sensitive investigations. One can always attribute such acceptance by the host government to the position of the DFC. But it is also a fact that there were other senior appointments of equivalent military rank in UNIFIL in the past and that time. So much so that once one armoured tank of one of the European nations accidentally rolled backward from its carrier (when the chain securing it suddenly snapped) and crushed the private car following immediately behind. A Lebanese man and his daughter—occupants of the car—died on the spot. Following this event, the DFC was unanimously nominated to visit the mourning family to pay condolence on behalf of UNIFIL. Whether this was because of the official position of the DFC or his nationality, it cannot be stated definitely. Such decisions are best left to the judgement of the senior leaders of the mission that time and the population at large. Even the isolated incidents of obstruction of freedom of movement of the peacekeepers generally took place in areas which were outside the area of operation of the non-Western nations.

Were the military contingents of the non-Western nations soft peddling when it came to implementing the mandate? The answer to this is evident from one of the biggest recovery of illegal arsenals by the then Indian contingent in the eastern sector of UNIFIL in South Lebanon in late 2008.²⁴ There were no repercussions from anywhere whatsoever. It was the result of a professional search of a suspected jungle area and not because of any attempt to enter a suspect's house/premises of local Lebanese citizens in search of illegal arms. Similar parallel examples exhibiting professionalism and unique skills, which are specially suited for PKOs, can be drawn from other contemporary peacekeeping missions. For example, Indian peacekeepers regularly resort to coercive action against the spoilers in DRC.²⁵

The innovative logistic sustenance methods by many non-Western peacekeepers, who are otherwise not used to elaborate administrative support system of the developed world, have helped the contingents of India and Ghana to face the war of 2006. Tales of bravery of these two contingents during the war are still recounted by the local Lebanese people. It is, however, not a judgement on the professional skills, or lack of it, of the military peacekeepers of the Western nations. Uniformed peacekeepers from Western nations in UNIFIL are highly trained professional outfits, with sophisticated communication systems and advanced weaponry like artillery, radars, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs; though never used for lack of permission from the host government) and armoured tanks; and also additional emolument.²⁶ However, it is too early to predict the usefulness of such assets during a full-fledged conflict. Yet, despite these differences, there is a convergence of goals and commitment amongst the Western and non-Western peacekeepers. Political clout and military muscle of the developed world combined with the unique peacekeeping skills of the non-Western nations have helped to delicately balance UNIFIL in South Lebanon to provide the much-needed stability and succour. It has been almost a decade since the last major war of 2006. Undoubtedly, this has been the longest era without a major conflict between Israel and Lebanon.

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to measure the success of any peacekeeping mission. So far, UNIFIL has generally been able to maintain a stable environment in the region. However, it was not successful in preventing the war of 2006. Despite its size and composition, the ability of UNIFIL to prevent

another war by force cannot be stated with certainty because there is no past history of peacekeepers from Western and/or non-Western nations achieving a similar feat. Moreover, let alone ensuring permanent ceasefire, even cessation of hostility cannot be ensured by use of force. Therefore, rather than expecting UNIFIL to prevent another war, it will be safe to assume UNIFIL's ability to create suitable conditions for a cessation of hostility and nothing more. As long as there is hostility between Hezbollah and Israel, there will be a need for some organisation to help cease the hostility. And simply because of necessity of survival, such hostility is not going to go away soon. If at all, it is only going to become more complicated. In this regard, the sheer absence of war is a success that UNIFIL can boast of. For Israel too, it is a security buffer.

As for the international community, UNIFIL provides legitimacy for maintaining at least the status quo. Therefore, the existence and presence of UNIFIL is a necessity in the larger interest of the international community and the Middle East. The present structure of UNIFIL is unique in the sense that it is a multinational organisation comprising well-trained and well-equipped military peacekeepers from the developed world and a good mix of non-Western military contingents (more than half the strength of UNIFIL). Despite the differences in training, equipment, culture and tradition amongst the Western and non-Western national contingents, UNIFIL's contribution in maintaining peace in the region is noteworthy. The Western and non-Western contingents have been able to create synergy, and thus UNIFIL has proved to be an effective peacekeeping mission in the Middle East.

The military peacekeepers from the non-Western nations have their special skills, which are probably more in demand than the other. Despite the economic disparity between the Western and non-Western nations, commitment of the military peacekeepers from the non-Western nations is worth a special mention. Bridging this economic gap will be an additional source of motivation for the non-Western nations to embolden their commitment to the cause of world peace. For UNIFIL to be more effective, the international community at large, and the TCCs in particular, will have to work hand in hand and side by side to face the challenges that are associated with a multinational organisation. Until now, UNIFIL can boast of having saved the region from many more wars in the past 10 years by its mere presence. However, given the current vitiated situation in the Middle East, it will be very difficult to predict the source as well as the trajectory of the next regional war. If

it happens, UNIFIL will probably remain a mute spectator, with many TCCs, barring a few, leaving the mission hastily, as it happened in 2006.

NOTES

1. 'UN peace operations' is a term that includes a host of other activities, including peacekeeping operations (PKOs).
2. United Nations Department of Public Information, in consultation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support and Department of Management, DPI/1634/Rev.174, November 2015, available at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping>, accessed on 21 December 2015.
3. Bennis Phyllis, *Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today's U.N.*, New York: Olive Branch Press, 1996, p. 272.
4. David N. Gibbs, 'Is Peacekeeping New Form of Imperialism?', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 122–28.
5. Samantha Power, 'Come Back to UN Peacekeeping', available at <http://www.undispatch.com>, accessed on 18 October 2015.
6. UN, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, available at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/background.shtml>, accessed on 21 December 2015.
7. UN Security Council Resolutions (SCRs) 425 and 426 of 1978.
8. Trend of rise in participation by countries from South Asian regions can be attributed to the desire of emerging powers to gain prestige and international recognition by participating in peacekeeping missions far away from their homelands even if there is no specific motivation to do so.
9. Donald C.F. Daniel, Paul D. Williams and Adam C. Smith, 'Deploying Combined Teams: Lessons Learned from Operational Partnership in UN Peacekeeping', Providing for Peacekeeping Report No. 12, International Peace Institute, August 2015, available at www.ipinst.org, accessed on 20 November 2015.
10. UNMIS is considered contemporary as it has generally been in the limelight because of the violent conflict resulting in increasing number of civilian casualties.
11. UN SCRs 425 and 426 of 1978.
12. At the time of formulation of the mandate, the drafters of the resolution could not have foreseen the future trajectory of the conflict and its implications on the functioning of the mission—in principle, it is a violation of one of the basic principles of the UN peacekeeping, that is, impartiality. UNIFIL is deployed inside Lebanon. In principle, it should have been located in a neutral area between Israel and Lebanon. Since it is in Lebanon, more often

than not, UNIFIL's actions are perceived as biased by Israel. It is a different matter that Israel will never agree to deploy UNIFIL in a separated zone between both the countries. Hence, partiality has been inbuilt from the beginning.

13. UN, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, available from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>, accessed on 21 December 2015.
14. Organisation of UNIFIL is based on NATO military organisation. Even the non-NATO members have to adapt to this organisation.
15. Ronen Bergman, 'Hezbollah 3.0: How Israel's No. 1 Enemy is Preparing for the Next Lebanon War', 2015, available at <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/>, accessed on 6 February 2016.
16. Blue Line is the withdrawal line of IDF in May 2000, based on certain geographical features between Lebanon and Israel. It is not the boundary between Lebanon and Israel.
17. In the Lebanese political framework, at the very head of government, the President of the Republic is always a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shi'ite Muslim. Christians and Muslims are also granted a 50/50 ratio of representation in the legislature. Further, key positions such as the head of the armed forces, the central bank and the national university are allocated according to sectarian affiliation.
18. Tardy Thierry, 'Emerging Powers and Peacekeeping: An Unlikely Normative Clash', GCSP Policy Paper, 2012–13, available at <http://www.operationspaix.net>, accessed on 17 October 2015.
19. Benjamin de Carvalho and Cedric de Coning, *Rising Power and Future of Peacekeeping and Peace Building*, Norwegian Resource Centre Report, 14 November 2013, available at <http://peacebuilding.no>, accessed on 17 October 2015.
20. John Karlsrud and A.C. Smith, 'Europe's Return to UN Peacekeeping? Lessons from Mali', Providing for Peacekeeping Report No. 11, International Peace Institute, July 2015, available at <http://www.ipinst.org>, accessed on 17 October 2015.
21. Ibid.
22. Lise Morje Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
23. UN, *Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of SCR 1701 (2006)*, S/2009/566, 2 November 2009.
24. Author's personal experience—had they been soft peddling, the contingents would not have been able to recover such big quantity of arms. It means that they were doing their jobs as mandated.

25. Thierry, 'Emerging Powers and Peacekeeping: An Unlikely Normative Clash', n. 18.
26. The UN reimburses the TCCs both for personnel and equipment (number and category of both as agreed in the memorandum of understanding [MoU] before deployment in the mission) based on a fixed standard rate of the UN. No payment is made for any additional deployment of personnel over and above what is agreed to in the MoU. In addition to the UN entitlement, all three European nations (probably a few small European contingents), first, deploy additional manpower as administrative backup, and second, spend substantial amount of their own money to provide a better boarding and lodging for their contingents. This has created an apparent economic disparity, though without any overt/visible impact on the operational efficiency of the contingents of the non-Western nations.