


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Equilibrium in Higher Defence Organisation and the Need for Restructuring

*Rajneesh Singh**

The article deals with the issue of the necessity of identifying and maintaining equilibrium between the two key constituents of the higher defence organisation (HDO) of the country, namely, the civil bureaucrats and the service officers. In India, the military and the bureaucracy share a very delicate relationship. Though the protocol issues between the various appointments have been defined by the government, there is a requirement of greater clarity in the working relationship between them. Lack of clarity on this has become a source for the undercurrent of hostility between the appointments, which is unhealthy for the system. The article seeks to highlight the imbalance in relationship between these two key constituents, which is largely a result of flawed structure of the HDO and its systems and processes, and if left unchecked may result in undesirable consequences for the country.

A generation which ignores history has no past and no future.

– Robert Heinlein

There is no common understanding of the term ‘civil–military relations’ in the government organisations and non-government agencies, and it has been defined variously. Civil–military relations, as is generally understood, is the relationship between the general public, through their elected representatives, and the military. Many tend to use the terms ‘civil–military relations’ and the ‘higher defence management’ (HDM)

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interchangeably. For the purpose of this article, the two terms refer 'to the relationship existing between the armed forces and the lawfully constituted public authorities of the state'.¹ In India, in addition to the elected representatives and the service officers, the civil bureaucracy is an inalienable constituent of the Indian HDO and HDM since it has an important role in the administration of the country. The supremacy of the legislature and the elected representatives, over the other two constituents of the HDO, is an issue which is not a subject of debate in India; however, service officers and civil bureaucracy share a delicate working relationship. This article studies the need for identifying and maintaining equilibrium in the relationship between the civil bureaucracy and the military.

The Indian HDM has been so conceptualised that the civil bureaucracy and the service officers form two distinct, yet essential constituents of the HDO. The synergised functioning of the two 'cogs of the HDO' is a prerequisite for the security of the country. In order to make certain that the two constituents achieve synergy, it is necessary for them to function in an environment of stable equilibrium. Equilibrium in the HDO, in the context of this article, is the state which is aimed to be achieved by vesting in appointments authority and responsibility proportional to accountability and is a function of the position they hold in the warrant of precedence. In addition, the state of equilibrium is a function of selection of 'best service and person for the job'. Equilibrium between civil bureaucracy and service officers is also a function of the nature of their professional interaction, as a result of their respective positions in the organisational structure. It is distinct from 'equality', which is unidimensional and represents the sense of being equal. History has been a mute testimony to the fact that whenever this equilibrium has been disturbed, irrespective of the direction of the tilt, the country has had to face adverse consequences.

In this article, an endeavour has been made to analyse relational dynamics amongst the key components of the HDO of the country. In doing so, an attempt has been made to find an answer to the question: is the current hierarchal structure of the HDO an appropriate relationship between the civilian bureaucracy of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the service headquarters?

The article begins with a study of the much-reported Curzon–Kitchener dispute, which saw the balance of power shift in the favour of the military, resulting in a flawed defence organisation and its attendant

problems. Independent India opted for parliamentary democracy and the military was placed subordinate to the legislature and the elected representatives. The article then attempts to analyse the balance of power between the political representatives, bureaucrats and the military in post-independent India.

The analysis of the issue is significant in view of the fact that the government may undertake some reforms in the HDO, sometime in the future. The analysis will also assist to set the record straight with regard to the rumblings in the services, the manifestations of which have been the subject of intense public debates in the past.

CURZON–KITCHENER CONTROVERSY: A CASE FOR UNDERSTANDING EQUILIBRIUM

The controversy is being studied outside its historical context. How did the dispute play on the civil–military equilibrium, and what lessons it holds for us while designing the security architecture, is the underlying theme of this part of the article. The thrust of the article is to study the causes of dispute and the consequential tilt in the equilibrium in the favour of the military. The presence of two advisors in the Viceroy's Council, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) and the Military Member,² was the heart of the Curzon–Kitchener controversy.

There were differing opinions with regard to the necessity of having two appointments in the council. Some officials were of the view that the presence of the C-in-C in the council was uncalled for, while there were others who thought the 'Military Department and the Military Member as superfluous and obscurantist'.³ Also, 'the existence of two members in the Executive Council, one the executive head of the fighting forces and the other to scrutinise the proposals of the Commander-in-Chief and to communicate the orders of the Government thereon, was not altogether a satisfactory arrangement...'⁴ This matter came to a head in 1905 when Kitchener, the C-in-C, raised serious objections to the continued retention of the appointment of Military Member and recommended that the appointment and the department be done away with. The fact that the Military Member, 'who was usually junior in rank to the Commander-in-Chief had the right of direct access to the Viceroy, had control over much of the military's organizational branch, and was able to criticize the Commander's proposals before they reached the Viceroy',⁵ was one of the main causes of resentment by the services. Curzon, the Viceroy, on the other hand, was cognizant of the importance

of the alternate source of advice from the Military Member⁶ and as such, disagreed with the C-in-C. He felt that the Military Member had a very precise role and it would be inappropriate for the C-in-C to take on the additional responsibility of the Military Member. Curzon was also of the opinion that the C-in-C had an advisory role to the government and the final responsibility of the security of the country was with the government, which it was supposed to discharge taking all issues into consideration.⁷

When the issue was being deliberated upon by the viceroy's staff, Kitchener proposed changes to the HDO of India. Curzon was quite critical of the proposal, as is evident from his observations.⁸ Curzon claimed that by destroying the position of the Military Member without substituting a civilian in its place, Kitchener's plan was, in reality, '...not one to disestablish an individual or even a department, but to subvert the military authority of the Government of India as a whole, and to substitute for it a military autocracy in the person of the Commander-in-Chief'.⁹

Even Lord Roberts, who was Kitchener's close friend, sensed the importance of this aspect of the dispute when he cautioned Kitchener on assuming that the Indian political system was similar to the Egyptian system. In fact, he warned, it was closer to the British system in the separation of civilian and military, and in the need for civilian control over fiscal aspects of military administration.¹⁰

The matter was referred to the secretary of state in London, who after due deliberations conveyed that it was undesirable to have two officers in the Viceroy's Council for the purpose of giving expert opinion on military issues. Consequently, the role and responsibility of the Military Department was divided between the office of the C-in-C and the newly formed Department of Military Supply. The Military Department, which prior to reorganisation 'dealt with original work within the limits of its own authority but also carried out independent examination of all proposals which came from the Army Headquarters or directly from the four commands',¹¹ in its truncated form was made responsible only for 'supply and manufacture'.¹² The balance of the duties was passed on to the C-in-C. This was not an ideal solution as was confirmed by subsequent events.

To begin with, in order to provide relief to the C-in-C from his ever-increasing workload, an additional appointment and a branch

were created in 1906, namely, the Chief of Staff and the General Staff Branch.¹³ This was a direct indictment of the C-in-C of bringing to bear in his appointment more responsibility than he could handle. Also, the corollary inference of the arrangement was that it was not possible for the C-in-C to carry out his charter of responsibilities with due diligence. With regard to the scope of the work of the newly created Military Supply Member, Curzon felt that ‘...the Military Supply Department would be reduced to impotence, that the creation of the Military Supply Member would be an unpardonable waste of public money and that it would be better to dispense with the Department and the Member altogether.’¹⁴

The apprehensions of Lord Curzon proved true. Lord Morley, Secretary of State for India, is later reported to have stated that the arrangement ‘proved good neither for administration nor economy and the Department of Military Supply was abolished in 1909 and additional responsibilities were passed on to the Commander-in-Chief’.¹⁵ The system, besides being an administrative failure, proved to be an operational failure as well. Events in Mesopotamian campaign later proved this:

Kitchener went on to set up an over-centralised administration which failed at its first test, the disastrous Mesopotamian campaign of 1915, where the Indian Army was doomed by the inefficiency of his system. He lived to see the disaster, but not the royal commission which condemned his reorganisation as the cause of it.¹⁶

The arrangement of having the C-in-C as a single-point advisor for both operational and administrative matters to the viceroy was implemented and it continued till independence. This aberrant tilt in equilibrium in the favour of the C-in-C resulted in an uneconomical administrative setup and operational failure. This arrangement is perhaps possible in countries with an authoritarian system of governance or a colony, as was India. In a democratic system, the duties of administration and command functions are normally divested in more than one appointment. This gives the chief executive officer (CEO) of the country the benefit of advice from more than one source, including the advantage of advice from experts. Curzon’s proposal to have Military Member replaced by a civilian officer perhaps had merit; however, just by itself it was not a workable plan. In order to make his recommendation workable, there was a requirement of having ‘experts’ to assist the civilian

officer in discharge of his duties—experts in the form of service officers. This important lesson from history continues to be ignored till date. The defence secretary, chief advisor to the Defence Minister, on a large number of administrative and policy issues does not have the benefit of experts on his staff.

POST INDEPENDENCE: SHIFTING EQUILIBRIUM

The process of Indianisation of the various departments of the Government of India had begun long before independence, except for the defence department, where it was slow to the extent of remaining the exclusive domain of the British.¹⁷ In the services, this process had started somewhat earlier. However, here also the process was deliberate and there were very few Indian officers in the middle to senior ranks at the time of independence. The British deliberately kept defence as their exclusive domain and not many Indians formed part of this organisation. Because of lack of experience, the politicians, bureaucrats and service officers learnt the nuances of higher-level defence management mainly through ‘trial and error’. It was but natural that many of the decisions taken in the early years of independence, related to the HDO, were probably not in the long-term interest of the defence of the country and later, when the bureaucracy got entrenched in the corridors of power of MoD, they were loathe to let go of it.

At independence, the country was grappling with challenges of enormous proportions. Alleviation of endemic poverty and measures to assuage human cost because of partition were the primary concerns. As regards existential threat to the country, with the exception of Pakistan, India did not envisage threat from any other quarter, either external or internal. Also, the leaders had a vision: India had to champion the cause of peace. All this had a direct bearing in defining the role of the military. In the redefined role of the various departments of the government, the military gradually receded in the background from its place of pre-eminence that it held prior to 1947. From being an active participant in the decision-making process, the voice of the military became gradually muted. Lord Ismay had conceptualised the structure of HDM at independence for the country and his recommendation ‘was accepted by a national leadership unfamiliar with the intricacies of national security management’.¹⁸ Ismay’s structure of the HDO, which was conceived to allow for a healthy interaction amongst the three pivots of the HDO, namely, political leaders, civil bureaucrats and the military

officers, got subverted over the period of time. Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) S.K. Sinha (Retd), former Vice Chief of the Army Staff, is quite categorical in his views that the committees recommended by Ismay have continued to this day, with some modifications, and some new committees have been added. However, the spirit behind the HDO for providing direct interaction between the political executive and the defence services and minimising bureaucratic control has largely got subverted. The defence services have increasingly got isolated from the process of decision making. Thus, while retaining the form, the spirit of the HDO has got undermined.¹⁹

Post independence, there was a realignment of relational dynamics amongst the three pivots of the HDO. The appointment of the military C-in-C, who was the de facto defence minister, was abolished and a civilian defence minister took charge of the MoD. Supremacy of the political leadership was accepted by the bureaucracy and the military. In the relational equations, the bureaucracy and the military got advisory role to the defence minister to assist him in taking decisions. There was now a requirement to redefine relationship between the military and the bureaucracy. The civil–military relations were never adversarial in the sense of the word; however, there was a natural movement to fill in the void created when the appointment of military C-in-C was abolished. A number of factors played their part in defining this relationship in the early years of the independence:

1. *Lack of experience of military matters:* As brought out earlier, the Indian political leadership, bureaucracy and the military were inexperienced in matters concerning HDM. Important lessons of World War II were never studied or understood. Amongst the lessons, the one concerning the HDM was that the activities of defence are best conducted at two levels: the policy formulation and oversight functions by a central organisation at the highest level of the HDO, where civilian and military components work in integrated organisations; and the conduct of operations has to be a joint endeavour of the three services. This important lesson was never studied, and hence never implemented.
2. *Personal equation between political leaders and military officers:* At the time of independence, many of the military officers were probably too anglicised in their grooming for the comfort of some of the political leaders. They did not elicit the kind of confidence and faith which a leader requires in the advisors. This

probably played on the minds of the decision makers when the rules of business of the defence ministry were being drafted and as a result, the military lost the manoeuvring space in decision-making process to the civil bureaucracy.²⁰

3. *Military coups*: The coups in the neighbourhood also did not help the military; rather the decision makers probably felt the requirement of keeping the military under check.²¹

Stephen Cohen, in his authoritative account of the Indian Army, mentions that 'the administrative and organisational changes introduced after independence indicate a fairly effective alliance between the civil service and politicians, an alliance created for the purpose of reducing the role of the military in the decision making process.'²² The appointment of the C-in-C, who was the sole military advisor to the Government of India, was abolished on the day of independence and simultaneously, the naval and the air chiefs, who were earlier his subordinates, were made his equal. They were collectively made responsible as advisors to the government. Cohen attributes 'unofficial reasons' for this step. 'The only challenge to civilian authority could come from the numerically dominant army; reducing the authority of its chief to the point where he is not even first among equals made it easier to balance off the army with the other two services.'²³ Much has also been said and written about lowering of the status of the service officers,²⁴ which had a negative impact on civil–military relations. All this negatively influenced the manner in which the military proffered advice to the defence minister and the prime minister and the manner in which the advice was acted upon by the government.

In any country, war provides impetus for reforming the HDO. The Indian HDO assumed a very peculiar characteristic as a direct consequence of 1962 debacle. The catastrophic events of 1962 have largely been attributed to the failure of the HDO and more specifically, to the mishandling of the situation by the political leaders, Nehru and Menon.²⁵ Due to the legacy of the disastrous 1962 border war, which has been blamed on political interference, politicians rarely intervene.²⁶ Sunil Dasgupta, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, however, adds a caveat in this relationship:

[T]he politicians did not really leave the military alone even as they stepped back from publicly intervening in military matters. Instead, they installed a thick layer of bureaucracy to exercise proxy civilian control. There is now consensus outside Indian government circles

that the bureaucratic insulation between the politicians and the generals does not serve India well.²⁷

This 'bureaucratic insulation' in post-independent India has disturbed the equilibrium in the HDO and has made it into a hierarchal organisation in which services are at the very bottom of its systems and processes. This is perceived by many in the military, and in the strategic community, as the *raison d'être* for the imbalance in the civil–military relations and for many of the ills plaguing the services.

The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War and the 1999 Kargil War are two events which have lessons for the future. The HDO obtaining during both the wars was largely in the shape it had acquired post-1962 Indo-China War. Fortunately, during 1971, the commanding personalities in the form of Indira Gandhi and Sam Manekshaw were at the helm of affairs and the relationship they shared was instrumental for the outcome of the war. Many of the ills of an imperfect organisation get ironed out if the people who matter are professionally competent and share a healthy professional respect and relation. But this should not be a reason for a country to deny itself as suitable a HDO structure as is possible. In fact, the design structure of the HDO and its systems and processes should be insulated from the influences of personalities, although it may not always be possible. Ideally, a structure should function irrespective of the personalities tenanting the various appointments.

The Kargil War, on the other hand, changed the manner in which the defence and security issues were being deliberated in the country. Various issues, including the HDO, were openly debated on television and print media. The strategic community and the citizens could air their concerns and the government acted on those concerns. Compare this to the events post-1962 war! Post-Kargil War, the government 'instituted a comprehensive review of the National Security System in its entirety for the first time in the history of independent India'.²⁸ The recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee, the follow-on Group of Ministers Report and the report of the task forces were not a day too soon for implementation. A large number of the recommendations have been implemented. The two critical recommendations which are perhaps most needed, namely, creation of the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and actual integration of the service headquarters with the MoD, have yet to be implemented. The recommendations which have been accepted and implemented have, to some extent, increased participative style of functioning between the

various stakeholders, but much ground needs to be covered before the country has a functional structure which can withstand the challenges of present-day geostrategic environment and modern method of war fighting.

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

The Curzon–Kitchener dispute resulted in the appointment of C-in-C becoming all too powerful, a situation which persisted till August 1947. Post independence, every effort was made to reassert civilian supremacy in consonance with the democratic norms. The British had made the appointment of the C-in-C unduly influential, while in independent India, this was reversed.

Over a period of time, the powers of the service chiefs have got diluted to an extent that the services find themselves constrained, at times, even to convey their views on issues concerning their area of expertise and their establishment.²⁹ The political leadership, service chiefs and the defence secretary are the key components of the Indian HDO. The stability of the HDO largely depends on the interplay between these key appointments. The primacy of our civilian leadership (read political representatives) over the military and the bureaucracy is a given and no one, either in the bureaucracy or the military, questions this fundamental principle. The civil bureaucracy and the military are the prime movers of the defence establishment, and the defence secretary and the chiefs are the pivots of their respective departments. Any reason of instability either to the prime movers or the pivots will unhinge the defence establishment and the organisations which they represent and support.

The stability of the HDO should be a function of its structure and should not be overly affected by the personalities involved. The government has, in the past, given its tacit concurrence to the system of ‘line of succession’ in the appointment of the chiefs. As regards the criteria for the appointment of the defence secretary, there are no declared policy guidelines. In all probability, personality traits are not a major consideration for the selection for both these appointments. It, therefore, boils down to the system to ensure its equilibrium. A system attains and maintains equilibrium in two ways: first, the organisational structure ensures relative stability; and second, good interpersonal relations between the appointments makes necessity of having equilibrium redundant. Since selection of persons who

would have good interpersonal relation is largely a matter of chance and circumstances, designing an appropriate HDO is of critical importance.

The lessons from pre-independence military history substantiate the argument made earlier in the article that military is comfortable in an environment where issues of seniority are well defined and adhered to. One of the reasons stated by Lord Kitchener, the C-in-C, for objecting to the appointment of the Military Member in the council was the examination of the proposals forwarded by the C-in-C by an

officer junior to him in military rank and hence in experience. There were also other military officers holding Secretariat appointments in the Military Department who could all comment on the proposals emanating from Army Headquarters. (These officers were later liable to be posted to command or staff appointments under the Commander-in-Chief at the end of their term of three years in the Military Department.)³⁰

There was duality of jurisdiction and oversight functions between the Commander-in-Chief and the Military Member of the Council, with a junior officer sitting in judgement upon proposals made by his senior, and both with an equal voice in the Council. To make things more difficult, the Commander-in-Chief was clearly the senior member in the Council.³¹

The military, in its organisation, is hierarchical and has always been sensitive to the issues related to seniority. The decision makers would be well advised to keep issues of warrant of precedence in mind while redesigning the HDO of the country.

As mentioned earlier, on 15 August 1947, the C-in-C ceased to be the head of the three services. There came about three chiefs of three independent services. The essential task of coordinating and integrating the functions of the three services, which was earlier the responsibility of the C-in-C, now devolved on the defence secretary, who largely wields the 'authority of the MoD'. Coordinating does not always mean piecing together the views of the three services, but on occasion, there is a requirement to adjudicate on issues and give decision. The decision of the defence secretary may not always be to the liking of the three services and this has caused consternation and acrimony in the past. There are two aspects concerning this role and responsibility of the defence secretary which need the attention of the decision makers. First, the present organisation is not an integrated one; hence, the

defence secretary and the civil bureaucracy in general, on many issues, work on the recommendations of a single service. They do not have the benefit of independent advice of experts (service officers) and, as a result, the final decision may not always be in the best interests of the organisation.

Second is the issue of relative seniority. The services are sensitive to hierarchy and seniority. An appointment that has to adjudicate between the three services, which in this case is the defence secretary, should be at least as senior as the chiefs. There lies the flaw in the present system; bureaucrat junior in protocol to the chiefs sits on judgement on the recommendations of military officers senior to him. This certainly is not to the predilection of the military. The personalities involved can screen limited amount of imperfection in the system. Any balancing act, wherein a key appointment of the HDO (read defence secretary) is made artificially superior at the cost of other appointments (read chiefs), leads to instability in the system. This anomaly needs to be rectified. The question before the government and the strategic thinkers in India is not of making the choice as to which appointment should be subordinate to the other: the 'civilian' defence secretary or the 'military' chiefs. The issue is of designing the most appropriate HDO structure and identifying appointments which will cater for our unique system of governance and security environment. The solution to the issue of equilibrium between the chiefs and the defence secretary does not lie in revising the protocol seniority—which has been done in the past, to the detriment of the chiefs—but rather in redesigning the structure for the HDO in a holistic manner which will rectify such flaws and is in consonance with the present security environment and the method of war fighting. A holistic look to redesign the HDO of the country and the protocol seniority would be in order, rather than a piecemeal approach to solving problems which has been the hallmark of independent India.

K. Subrahmanyam, doyen of strategic thinking in independent India and a bureaucrat, in many of his writings highlighted the issues concerning the HDO, the ills and the possible solutions to those problems. He once described Indian HDO as one where 'politicians enjoy power without any responsibility, bureaucrats wield power without any accountability and the military assumes responsibility without any direction'.³² It is this wielding of power without accountability that has disturbed the equilibrium of the Indian HDO. As stated earlier,

equilibrium in an organisation is 'achieved by vesting in appointments authority and responsibility proportional to accountability'. This, perhaps more than any other reason, is the cause for aberrant tilt in equilibrium in the favour of bureaucracy and a reason for many of the ills afflicting the HDO. This situation needs rectification at the earliest.

Subrahmanyam has articulated his views on defence reforms on many occasions. Besides him and few others, there is a notable silence from the bureaucratic community on this very important subject. An absence of debate from this very important constituent of the HDO only increases the sense of having one-sided conversation for many military thinkers. In most of the matured democracies of the world, there has been a very public debate on the subject. In India, it has been mostly military thinkers and a handful of bureaucrats who have contributed to the debate on this subject. Virtually, no politician or political party has ever made its stand public on the issue of defence reforms.

Before deciding on the HDO of the country, it would be worth its while to have a look at the prevalent system of HDO in other countries. Most major democracies follow one of the two models for their HDM. The United States (US) follows the 'Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee' model, while the United Kingdom (UK), France, Canada and Australia follow the 'Chief of Defence Staff' model. Here, it is important to note the salient aspects of these two models. These models had evolved post-World War II, when it became abundantly clear that policy was better formulated in integrated headquarters, where the officers of the three services work in concert with their civilian counterparts, unlike the Indian system where different agencies work in silos. Second has been the institution of a single-point military advisor to the government, to represent the services, rather than each service taking up its respective viewpoint with the government individually, without reference to the other services. The systems which have evolved in these countries do not, in any way, curtail the right of the individual service, through their respective chiefs, to approach the chief executive of the country on matters of importance to them.

The two models have their pros and cons and have served their purpose of providing single-point military advice, as also enhancing jointness among the services and greater coordination between the service officers and the civil bureaucracy. These systems also cater for the civil–military equilibrium which is unique to the system of governance of respective countries. Any country initiating structural reforms of

its HDO has to undertake a holistic review of its needs, resources and security situation. A structure suitable to its political and administrative system has to be considered and then, the various appointments that go into the making of the system have to be thought of. India, as brought out, is still following the Ismay model with minor changes to its original structure. It would be in fitness of things to have a *de novo* look at the organisation of the Indian HDO, and then define the relational dynamics amongst its key components. Creating appointments or redefining relations between the appointments, without creating a new structure, will not be an ideal solution. The appointments are important, but more important is the structure. Designing of the HDO should take precedence over identification of new appointments.

CONCLUSION

It is imperative for India to have a stable and a functional HDO as it moves to take its rightful place in the comity. An HDO for a country is the function of its history, culture, security environment, system of governance and its polity. History is testimony to the fact that to have a purposeful and stable HDO, equilibrium between its key components is an essential prerequisite. Any imbalance in the equilibrium results in undesirable consequences for the country. The current hierarchal structure of the HDO involving the bureaucracy of the MoD and the service headquarters only magnifies the anomalous tilt in the equilibrium between the civilian bureaucracy of the MoD and the service headquarters. The relationship between the civil and the military components of the HDO, which should have found its equilibrium in post-independent India, continues with its aberrant tilt in favour of the bureaucracy. India has now endured the consequences of tilt on both sides of the equilibrium; certainly both are unacceptable state of affairs. The Indian HDO is far from perfect and it is not a day too soon to begin a process to reorganise our security apparatus. The perils of procrastination in reforms in this vital sphere of governance can only be at the cost of national security.

Given here is a summary of recommendations which are the direct fallout of the study of equilibrium between the principal constituents of the HDO:

1. There is a need for holistic defence reforms which will include reorganisation of the structure of the HDO, as also define relational dynamics between the appointments.

2. The structure should be so designed that it is able to overcome personality issues between the various constituents of the HDO.
3. The HDO has to be an integrated structure which will include elected leaders, civil bureaucracy and military officers working together in the various branches.
4. Institution of the appointment of a single-point military advisor to the government—which, in the Indian context, is understood to be either a CDS or a Permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC).
5. Necessity of identifying and maintaining equilibrium between civil bureaucracy and service officers.

NOTES

1. Pradhan has defined civil–military relations as ‘attitudes and behavior, which the general public and the members of the armed forces or society exhibit towards each other. In a narrower and, specifically, a political sense, it refers to the relationship of super ordination and subordination existing between the armed forces and the lawfully constituted public authorities of the state.’ See Sushil Pradhan, ‘Understanding Civil–Military Integration in Higher Defence Organisation’, *Journal of United Service Institution of India*, Vol. CXL, No. 580, April–June 2010, available at <http://usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Journal&pubno=580&ano=730>, accessed on 22 December 2015.
2. ‘The Commander-in-Chief was the executive head of the Army (including the Marine) and was responsible for its organisation and efficiency. His office known as Army Headquarters had two principal staff officers, namely, the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster General, as also the Principal Medical Officer. Secondly, there was the Military Member (also a military officer) who was responsible for the administrative work of the Army and for communicating the orders of the Government to the C-in-C. In addition, he was also responsible for Supply and Transport, Ordnance, Military Works and Military Finance including preparation of the Military Budget.’ See A.L. Venkateswaran, *Defence Organisation in India*, New Delhi: Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1967, p. 5.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
4. *Ibid.*
5. See Stephen P. Cohen, ‘Issue, Role, and Personality: The Kitchener–Curzon Dispute’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 10, No. 3, April 1968, pp. 337–55, available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/177807>, accessed on 4 December 2012.

6. Curzon was not comfortable with the idea of single source of advice and in case the Military Department and Military Member were to be done away with, as was being recommended by Kitchener, he felt, 'the Viceroy would be without any Adviser save the representative of the army who would be more specially interested in pressing proposals involving expenditure or changes in organisation, and the revenues of the country would be at the mercy of the Commander-in-Chief'. See Venkateswaran, *Defence Organisation in India*, n. 3, p. 9.
7. See extract from the report of the Army Organisation Committee (1879). The report relates to the position of the C-in-C as member of the supreme government. 'It is the constant duty of the Commander-in-Chief to be urging on the Government expenditure of money for the improvement of the army, and it is to him that the officers and men of the army must look to press their claims and state their requirements. It is the constant duty of the Government of India, on the other hand, in the interest of the tax payers of India, to refuse demands of expenditure which they consider unreasonable or unnecessary or beyond the power of the country to bear. When the Commander-in-Chief has, as executive head of the army and as subordinate of the government, said all that he can properly urge in support of his views, he has performed his duties as advocate; and it should then rest with those responsible for the government of the country to determine how far they can reconcile it to their sense of duty to accede to his request.' Venkateswaran, *Defence Organisation in India*, n. 3, p. 9.
8. 'The Military Department has now entirely disappeared, and there stands forth as supreme head of the substituted head of the organisation the "Commander-in-Chief and War Member of the Council". Every branch of the Service and every military department of the Government will be subordinate to him: The Advisory Council who are to co-operate with him will be a Council not of colleagues or equals but of subordinates. The Commander-in-Chief will not only be the source of all initiative but the sole instrument of execution. No curb of any sort will exist upon his authority except as is supplied by the check in financial matters of the Financial Department, and the final authority, in cases requiring Government sanction, of the Government of India; and these ostensible safeguards will be of little avail, since the Government will be left without the expert assistance and advice which are essential to render them effective.' *Ibid.*
9. 'Minute of Lord Curzon', *Gazette of India Extraordinary*, 23 June 1905, reproduced in Cohen, 'Issue, Role, and Personality', n. 6, p. 343.
10. Cohen, 'Issue, Role, and Personality', n. 6, p. 343.
11. Venkateswaran, *Defence Organisation in India*, n. 3, p. 6.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

13. Ibid., p. 12.
14. Ibid., p. 14.
15. Ibid., p. 15.
16. Jad Adams, *The Guardian*, Saturday, 24 February 2001, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2001/feb/24/historybooks.biography>, accessed on 4 December 2012. Almost 31,000 Indian and British troops died by the end of this campaign.
17. 'It was not until 1938, a year before World War II, that an Indian was appointed Under Secretary in that Department; and he was allotted work of little consequence. During the war, towards the end of 1941, an Indian, Gurnath Bewoor, was made Additional Secretary for few months. In July 1942, Chandulal Trivedi was appointed Secretary, and he held the post until after the end of the war, while Girija Shankar Bajpai also acted as Additional Secretary for couple of years during the same period. The British took care to reassure themselves of the loyalty of these officials. Even then, none of them were allowed anywhere close to the heart of decision making or in the conduct of affairs concerning defence.' S.S. Khera, *India's Defence Problem*, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1968, p. 293.
18. K. Subrahmanyam, *From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report*, New Delhi: Sage, 2000, p. 252.
19. Lt Gen S.K. Sinha, United Services Institution of India (USI), National Security Lecture delivered at the USI, New Delhi, in 1990. Extract from the script of the lecture has been published as monograph. See S.K. Sinha, *Higher Defence Organisation*, New Delhi: Pratibha Printers Pvt. Ltd, 1991, pp. 21–30.
20. 'It is true that Nehru was not greatly impressed by the majority of senior Indian officers whom, with good reason, he regarded as shallow, westernized and British-aping products of the Raj, who had taken little interest and no part in the freedom movement. Subsequently, as armies of newly independent nations all around him fell prey to military ambitions, he and some of his cabinet colleagues began to view the Indian Army and its leaders with alarm and suspicion. Without any justification, a deep rooted paranoia plagued Indian politicians. A number of mindless measures were taken to down grade the status and influence of the army, and in particular of the generals.' See D.K. Palit, *War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962*, London: C. Hurst & Co (Publishers) Ltd, 1991, p. 21.
21. The decision makers have always refrained from public pronouncements on this subject; in fact, they go out of their way to highlight discipline and patriotism of the services. However, the fact that many senior service officers have felt the need to reiterate integrity and loyalty of the services in their writings and commentaries, as also the unblemished record, highlights

their perception of prejudice in the minds of the decision makers, which perhaps they have sensed in their long careers. Also, see the report by *The Indian Express*, 'The January Night Raisina Hill was Spooked: Two key Army Units Moved towards Delhi Without Notifying Govt', 4 April 2012, wherein it was reported that there was an unusual movement of two key army units towards Delhi without notifying government on the night of 16–17 January, 'presumably for staging a military coup' (my inference from the report, though not said in so many words). See the report at <http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/the-january-night-raisina-hill-was-spooked-two-key-army-units-moved-towards-delhi-without-notifying-govt/932328/>.

22. Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, p. 171.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 171–72.
24. *Ibid.* Stephen P. Cohen has dwelled on the subject at some length in his book, *The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation*. A secretary to the Government of India was ranked lower than a Lieutenant General until 1947; afterwards, he was ranked with a full General. The chief secretary of a state was formerly ranked with Brigadier; after independence, he was ranked with a Major General. In 1951, the chief became junior to the Supreme Court Justices and, in 1963, he became junior to the cabinet secretary. Disparities in the pay also developed. A deputy secretary in the Government of India drew less pay than a Brigadier, who may have had 10 years more service, but was equated with him in warrant of precedence; the relative status of the military even in relation to the police was downgraded.
25. See J.P. Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder*, Bombay: Thacker & Co., 1969; and Palit, *War in High Himalaya*, n. 21. Stephen P. Cohen, in his book, *The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation*, n. 23, presents his frank opinion that 'neither the civilian politicians nor civil servants developed the expertise and skills necessary to understand and meet the Chinese threat which emerged full blown in 1959'. Dalvi, in *Himalayan Blunder*, mentions that the then Defence Minister directly supervised the placement of individual brigades, companies and even platoons.
26. Anit Mukherjee, 'Civil–Military Relations in Crisis', Center for Advanced Study of India, 24 September 2012, available at <http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/iit/mukherjee>, accessed on 3 October 2012.
27. Sunil Dasgupta, 'Why Civil–Military Conflict is GOOD for India', *rediff.com*, 3 April 2012, available at <http://www.rediff.com/news/column/why-civil-military-conflict-is-good-for-india/20>, accessed on 8 October 2012.
28. For greater details regarding reforms post-Kargil War, see MoD website: <http://mod.nic.in/aboutus/welcome.html>, accessed on 20 December 2012.

29. Mukherjee, 'Civil–Military Relations in Crisis', n. 27. Mukherjee argues that the military has been excluded from crucial decision-making process. While the armed forces are consulted before decisions are made on the use of force, they have usually been excluded on crucial inter-agency deliberations. Non-inclusion of representatives of the military, despite a very 'public' recommendation by the services to the contrary, in the panel convened on the orders of the prime minister to look into the anomalies of the Sixth Pay Commission is a case in point.
30. Khera, *India's Defence Problem*, n. 18, pp. 7.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
32. Mukherjee, 'Civil–Military Relations in Crisis', n. 27.

