

# Formation of Reserve Components of the Indonesian Armed Forces SWOT Analysis

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*The current as well as future dynamics of strategic environment are likely to face threats that are multidimensional in nature. Indonesia needs a total state defence system that integrates the capabilities of military and non-military. To actualise this ambition, Law No. 23 of 2019, along with Government Regulation No. 3 of 2021, is presently targeting the interests of the reserve components. This research analyses citizens' role in the formulation of reserve components in land, sea, and air domains using Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis. Literature study methods have been used to compile the descriptive data and to analyse it through integrative approach to politics, economics, society, culture, and geography realms. The results of the research show that the performance of reserve component's formation is determined by combining internal and external elements. In terms of opportunity and legal authority, the implementation of Law No. 23 of 2019 is beneficial to the Indonesian Armed Forces. As a result, a strategy that can be enforced is to promote land, sea, and air reserve component formation policy aggressively (growth-oriented strategy); diversify reserve component products and resources; and minimise the internal issues of the armed forces.*

**Keywords:** *Reserve components, Land, Sea and Air Services, SWOT, Reserve Component Formation Policy, Law No. 23 of 2019*

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## INTRODUCTION

In this age of globalisation, the threats in strategic environment have expanded in multidimensional spheres through illicit networks.<sup>1</sup> These threats tend to be unpredictable due to accelerated interactions among international terrorists, transnational criminals and networked insurgent organisations.<sup>2</sup> It has led to a redefinition of imminent threats,<sup>3</sup> as also defining of threats that have not yet been embodied in the military and non-military realms.

To counter these diverse threats, Indonesia must immediately manifest a solid and total defence and security system by combining military and non-military strength. Military defence resources consist of main components, reserve components, supporting components and national facilities and infrastructure. In order to deal with non-military threats, a non-military defence resource made up of main elements which synergise ministries/agencies outside the defence sector must be put in place.<sup>4</sup> Total defence system implies that all the people, complete national resources, national facilities and infrastructure, as well as the country's entire territory serve as a whole and holistic defence unit. The total defence system integrates military and non-military defence to create a solid and respected national defence force with high deterrence capabilities. In other words, defence planning and preparation of the total defence system requires societal integration.<sup>5</sup>

The reserve component does support the effectiveness and efficiency of the main component's tasks in dealing with non-military threats. Modern types of war that avoid using the military, and use smart power instead, indicate that national defence must not choose only a military way to defend the state. In total defence system, the citizens can participate according to their respective professions as well. Thus, the Republic of Indonesia's defence strategy has been created by synergising the military and non-military defence as a whole and strengthening citizens' function through politics, economy, psychology and information and technology power.<sup>6</sup>

Indonesia's Law No. 3 of 2002 elaborates how the national defence system is supported by main components, reserve components and supporting components to carry out the armed forces' primary mission. Due to the small number of Indonesian National Army troops and the law's mandate, the citizens have an obligation to defend the state from any threat. Corresponding with Law No. 23 of 2019 on the Management of National Resources for National Defense (PSDN Law), the government

needs to prepare and manage Indonesia's human resources to participate in a total national defence system. This also indicates that they have to build and develop the ability of managing the nation state's resources through the reserve component.

As a solution to deal with non-military threats, the formation of reserve component must commence immediately.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, starting from 2020 to 2045, the establishment of land, sea and air reserve components will take place in phases, including planning, preparation, execution and termination. In this regard, a coordination meeting in 2019 between the Ministry of Defense (MoD), Indonesian National Army Headquarters and the Army, Navy, and Air Force Headquarters was held to design future operations (planning stage). The preparatory phase will involve the formulation of central and regional committees and establishment of a training command organisation. Socialisation, enrollment, selection and basic military training will all be a part of the implementation stage. The termination stage will include carrying out evaluation and making activity reports and financial accountability reports.

The 2010–29 State Defense Posture held by Indonesia's MoD mandates the need of minimum essential force (MEF) in order to strengthen the military forces.<sup>8</sup> At this point, one of the requirements of MEF that could be executed is the formation of a reserve component, which aims to strengthen the main component of national defence through the policy of upgrading human resources. Qualitatively, it is to ensure that citizens have basic military capabilities so that they are ready to physically defend the state and support national defence efforts in a total defence system. Quantitatively, it involves the formation of a reserve component of 1,60,000 personnel by 2029.<sup>9</sup>

For the implementation of the programme, Government Regulation No. 3 of 2021 concerning Implementation Regulations of Constitution No. 23 of 2019 has been issued. First, the wide scope of threats regulated by Management of National Resources Constitution, Article 4(2), which includes military, non-military and hybrid threats, has been identified. The extent of the threat poses its own problems, where the reserve component that has been prepared and established by the government can be used to deal with internal security threats, such as the dangers of communism, terrorism and domestic conflicts that have the potential to lead to horizontal conflict in the society.

Second, defending the country can be done by any method; and not always in a military dimension. According to Article 6(2), basic military

training is compulsory as one of the four forms of citizen participation in the efforts to defend the state. Third, the existence of an unclear reserve component—whether military or civilian—creates a potential violation of international humanitarian law, particularly the principle of distinction. This principle clearly distinguishes two categories of people in international armed conflict. Even though Law No. 3 of 2002, concerning the concept of national defence, also adopts the concept of unity, it is appropriate that we make corrections to practices that are contrary to the principle of differentiation—which is an important and inseparable part of Indonesia's international obligations as a party to the Geneva 1949, considering that one of its conventions requires the state to protect civilians.<sup>10</sup>


The use of military law for the reserve component, as regulated in Article 46 of the Management of National Resources Constitution, gives rise to a complex debate. The Management of National Resources Constitution actually obliges the reserve components to comply with military law, whereas the obligation to submit to the general justice system for military personnel is an order of Article 3(4), TAP MPR VII/2000 and Article 652 of Constitution No. 34 of 2004. The disobedience to general courts has the potential to perpetuate impunity and hinder reform of military justice.<sup>11</sup>

This article emphasises on the formation of the reserve components in the Indonesian Armed Forces using the methodology of SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis, following up the issuance of Government Regulation No. 3 of 2021 concerning Implementation Regulations of Constitution No. 23 of 2019.

#### METHODOLOGY

As mentioned earlier, we are using the SWOT research method. Also, we will take into account internal factors (strengths, weaknesses) and external factors (opportunities, threats) as tools used for strategic planning and strategic management in the organisation (see Figure 1).

The process of SWOT analysis includes internal and external sphere analysis.<sup>13</sup> The internal analysis gives insight about strengths and weaknesses, while the external analysis elaborates on opportunities and threats. Both internal and external data are compiled to help identify key strategic issues, which further assist in evaluation of options and selection of strategy. The implementation and management of the chosen strategy



**Figure 1** The Process of SWOT

Source: Neil Riston, *Strategic Management*<sup>12</sup>

can give continual feedback for both internal and external analysis for further plan.

The SWOT methodology is the main tool to formulate a strategic plan,<sup>14</sup> with the matrix consisting of following four strategic questions:


1. How strength is used to take advantage of opportunities?
2. How weaknesses are reduced by taking advantage of opportunities?
3. How force is used to reduce the impact of threats?
4. How the weaknesses that would potentially realise this threat are handled?

This study uses descriptive analytical methods based on both quantitative and qualitative data from various writings and library sources, including books, scientific papers in journals and magazines and official websites. To be more comprehensive, the research uses an integrative approach to politics, economics, society, culture and geography. This means that these problems will be analysed as a whole, and not separately, in the framework of the SWOT analysis. The analysis of strengths and weaknesses looks at several aspects that include, among others, the juridical and geographic potential of Indonesia, the population, as well as potential and social relations between them.

The statistics have been obtained from internal data gathered from the Indonesian National Army and MoD, such as: strategic environmental analysis; analysis of the military observer community and national endurance; supplier analysis; other institutional analysis; analysis of specific interest groups (non-governmental organizations [NGOs] and critical group to the Indonesian Armed Forces and MoD); sources of budget; supporting infrastructure for reserve component education, publication and socialisation; and human resources supporting reserve component recruitment. All of these have been compiled from Internal Audit Capability Model, Indonesian MoD (2020).<sup>15</sup>

### SWOT Factors

The SWOT analysis aims for Indonesia's defence systems analysis to create a universal total defence system for facing diverse threats. It is composed through the aspect of threats and opportunities and also covers the analysis both from internal strengths and internal weaknesses, which can be seen in 4 quadrants shown in Figure 2. Also see Table 1 for strengths, weaknesses, threats and several opportunities realm.



**Figure 2** SWOT Analysis Diagram

*Source:* Authors' own.

1. *Quadrant 1:* This is a very favourable situation. The Indonesian National Army and MoD have the opportunity and strength so that it can take advantage of existing opportunities. The strategy that must be applied in this condition is to support the policy for forming land, sea and air reserve components aggressively (growth-oriented strategy).
2. *Quadrant 2:* Despite facing various threats, the Indonesian National Army and MoD have strength from an internal

**Table I** SWOT Analysis

<i>SWOT</i>	<i>Results</i>
1	2
Strengths	1. Legality aspect of the formation of the reserve component by the issuing of: (i) Law No. 23 of 2019 concerning defence resource management. (ii) Government Regulation No. 3 of 2021 concerning Implementation Regulations of Law No. 23 of 2019 is the binding force for the formation of the reserve component.
	2. Adequate quality of MoD and Indonesian National Army human resources in reserve components' recruitment.
	3. The facilities and infrastructure for reserve component development owned by the MoD and Indonesian National Army are very adequate.
	4. Support and trust from the wider community.
Weaknesses	1. Reserve components' recruitment and coaching has not been tested and also its standard operational procedure and guideline procedure (which is supposed to be derived from the Indonesian Constitution/Government Regulation/Ministry Regulation).
	2. Limited funds.
	3. Ineffective coordination between institutions.
	4. The future status of reserve components.
	5. Political resistance against the chosen policy of Indonesian Reserve Component.
Opportunities	1. Indonesia's abundance of human resources.
	2. Reserve components' formation can be done in any local government—synergy with any local government.
	3. The role of the local government in supporting the formation of the national reserve component.
Threats	1. Reserve component is used by certain anti-government organisations or groups.
	2. Foreign propaganda about the dangers of reserve component (using NGOs to oppose).
	3. The demands of the reserve components when they are not active (when the reserve components return to the community or are not mobilised).

Source: Authors' own.

perspective. The strategy that must be applied uses strength to take advantage of long-term opportunities by means of a diversification strategy (reserve components product and reserve components human resource).

3. *Quadrant 3*: The Indonesian National Army and MoD face a huge opportunity in forming land, sea and air reserve components. On the other hand, the Indonesian National Army and MoD also face some internal weaknesses. The MoD and Indonesian National Army's strategy is to minimise internal problems so that they can seize the opportunities better.
4. *Quadrant 4*: This is a very unfavourable situation, when the MoD and Indonesian National Army face various threats and internal weaknesses.

#### ANALYSIS

The Preamble of the Republic of Indonesia's Constitution of 1945 represents the government's aim to protect the nation. To embody the goal, state defence becomes an essential factor in guaranteeing a nation-state life sustainability by applying a total defence strategy. The total defence strategy is a part of the defence system which involves all citizens according to their roles and functions, driven by nationalism and oriented towards shared ideals to manifest national interests.<sup>16</sup>

Research shows that the formation performance of the land, sea and air reserve components can be determined by a combination of internal and external factors. Both of these factors must be considered in a SWOT analysis. The SWOT stands for the internal strengths and weaknesses environment as well as the external opportunities and threats that the MoD faces in the formation performance of the land, sea and air reserve components. This analysis compares the external factors with the internal ones.

#### SWOT Analysis

As mentioned earlier, universality in the total defence system implies that all the people, along with all national resources, national facilities and infrastructure, and the country's entire territory serve as a whole, comprehensive defence unit. Such a defence system integrates military and non-military defence to create a respected national defence force with high deterrence capabilities.

Indonesian total defence strategy, which manifests in the universal defence system, is a requirement laid down by Indonesian Law No. 3 of 2002, which elaborates how the national defence system is supported by main components to help the Indonesian Armed Forces to carry out its main mission. However, conforming to Indonesian Law No. 23 of 2019, the government has to prepare and manage Indonesia's human resources to participate in a national total defence system by building and developing the ability through the reserve component.

First and foremost, for dealing with military threats, the management of the reserve and supporting components is carried out through the stages of creation, its development and its use through the preparation of national resources and infrastructure. This is to ensure that they have a high initial ability to defend the state and are prepared to be deployed through mobilisation in order to enlarge and strengthen the main components. Second, the reserve components can also support the local government to enlarge and reinforce the national defence system in Indonesia. The involvement of all citizens in the national defence effort for its position as a reserve component is a concrete type in the sense of the Total People's Defense and Security System.

The people who have the opportunity to become members of the reserve component of the MoD are those who currently form the productive workforce (over the age of 15 years) in the country. According to the data held by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics<sup>17</sup>, it is 130 million people; and this includes those who work in both private and government sectors. It is evident that Indonesia has great power that can be seconded for the formation of strategic reserve components to strengthen the main components in Indonesia's defence strategy. Indonesia, thus, needs to manage strategic planning, programming, budgeting and development of each requirement for reserve components for the land, sea and air dimensions.

Based on Indonesian MoD's plan for 2020–45, the establishment of land, sea and air reserve components will take place in several phases. This plan includes—but is not limited to—land, sea and air reserve components coordination meeting between MoD, Indonesian National Army, Navy and Air Force headquarters to design their necessities of Reserve Component. Unfortunately, until publication of this article, we did not have the exact plan, specifically resources allocation within the Reserve Component. This is crucial for the enactment of Indonesian Reserve Component. The 2010–29 State Defense Posture mandates

the formation of a reserve component, through the policy of upgrading human resources, with the aim to strengthen the key components of national defence. In addition, the second phase has two reserve companies, while the third stage has just one reserve battalion. It is organised with the assumption that each Military District Command will have one battalion, which can be used as a multiplying force. The Regional Military Command must plan infrastructure and facilities to carry out the formation of a reserve component due to a large number of defense regulatory targets that must be achieved. In order to achieve the specified target amount, it is necessary to have a gradual acceleration of the programme.

Just like the army, the Indonesian Navy is also tasked with implementing empowerment of the sea defence area by providing a reserve component and supporting components for state defence at sea. Regarding the programme, Indonesian Navy has implemented potential maritime activities towards regional resilience, development initiatives, social communication and service of the navy. It requires a strategy to mobilise reserve and supporting components in facing military threats, such as aggression, transgression of territory, espionage, sabotage, armed acts of terror, armed rebellion and civil war. As mobilisation is a political and governmental action, the statement of mobilisation—to simultaneously mobilise and use national resources and national infrastructure as a defence force in order to face any threats that endanger the unity and integrity of the nation and the survival of the Republic of Indonesia—rests in the hands of the president, with the approval of the Indonesian Parliament. The most important part is that the navy has not yet come out with the required number of targeted Indonesian reserve component members.

We would like to emphasise here the importance of merging and operationalising between dimensions/across dimensions (land, sea and air) which will facilitate the operationalisation/interoperability, both in terms of main components and reserve components. These two things are also important to look at for ensuring interoperability of each component of the reserve in each sector, both private and government (across ministries).

The government has definitely made a major breakthrough by making the Reserve Components a part of Indonesian laws and regulations since the state defence law was enacted in 2002. There are no Indonesian laws imposed in Defense Policy since 2002. Indeed, this

is the first time Indonesia has a new regulation on reserve components (Part of Indonesian Defense Policy).

However, there are several weaknesses in the implementation of these new laws and government regulations. First, there are no rules and guidelines related to their implementation, organisational operational standards and so on. This gap needs to be corrected immediately. Second, there is no universal standardisation of the need for implementation of reserve components in Indonesia as one of the supporting components of national defense.

Explicitly, the reserve component is made and prepared to maintain national defence. However, defending the state does not always have to be based on a military dimension. Article 6(2) states that military training is an obligation that must be carried out for reserve component participants. Hence, though the initial formation was to assist universal defence, namely, military or non-military defence, the basic question is whether the reserve component is a military component or not.

The presence of a reserve component to deal with hybrid threats is considered inappropriate. It needs involvement of various sectors (military and non-military) due to its complex dimensions. There has also been no optimal coordination between ministers and further institutions, both in terms of programme design and implementation of the formation of reserve components. The presence of optimal coordination can support various needs of reserve components so that they are more prepared to face today's threats because, society lives in a complex global environment with various forms of threats and challenges.<sup>18</sup>

Coordination between sectors is needed to support the arrangement of reserve components covering various fields, namely, human resources, natural resources, artificial resources, facilities and infrastructure.<sup>19</sup> The areas in the reserve component contained in the PSDN Law should be regulated in various government institutions so that the division of tasks becomes more clear and optimal in its implementation.<sup>20</sup> Such a statement also leads to the management and recruitment of reserve components which have not been tested and evaluated thoroughly. So, a further analysis of the impacts is necessary, as well as there is a need to assess if reserve component is really needed in facing state threats.

According to Tubagus Hasanuddin, the 1 trillion rupiah budget plan for the formation of reserve components should be prioritised for increasing the quality and quantity of the Indonesian Armed Forces' defence equipment and the welfare of its soldiers. He also feels that in

the current state of global Covid-19 pandemic, the formation of reserve components should not be the government's top priority.<sup>21</sup> In fact, in terms of programme design, the budget of 1 trillion rupiah is considered rather limited to conduct training for reserve component candidates.<sup>22</sup>

Political resistance to the policy of forming a reserve component has come from the Commissioner of the National Human Rights Commission regarding the potential for human rights violations. According to her, the citizens who join the reserve component still bear the title of civilians, not that of the military. Further, she said that what is defined as the scope of threats in the PSDN Law is too broad. The PSDN Law should focus on national defence, not on national security or criminal acts, so there needs to be a change in the law. There has been no further elaboration on the status of the reserve component (defined by Indonesian Law and its derivative), so it is not clear how the Reserve Component Members and Candidate of Reserve Component will be structured within the reserve component formation programme.<sup>23</sup>

Law No. 23 of 2019, concerning Management of National Resources for National Defense, delegates further arrangements in government regulations regarding the implementation of state defence awareness development; guidance and cooperation in the implementation of service in accordance with the profession; arrangement and development of supporting components; formation of reserve components; service period of reserve components; dismissal of reserve components; determination of natural resources, artificial resources and national facilities and infrastructure as reserve components; and development of reserve components, including mobilisation and demobilisation. One of the forums and forms of participation in state defense is to become a supporting component, which can directly or indirectly be used to increase the strength and capability of the main components and reserve components in facing military threats and hybrid threats. Management of supporting components includes structuring and coaching activities. The arrangement of the supporting components is to be carried out by the MoD, in collaboration with ministries/agencies and local governments. Availability of each component/reserve components will also be equipped with the local government Civil Servants of Indonesia (provincial and regency). Here is the biggest opportunity for Indonesian government for enhancing the reserve component of Indonesian defence force system.

However, there is an interesting issue that we can address at this point, namely, the financial centralisation of the defence budget. In the

Management of National Resources Constitution, Articles 75(b) and 75(c), it is stated that the financing of national resource management will be through the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD) and other legal and non-binding sources, apart from the National Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBN). This violates the principle of centralism in financing the national defence budget. Article 25(1) of Constitution No. 3/2002 on national defence affirms: 'National defense is financed from the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget.' Meanwhile, Article 25(2) states: 'State defense financing is aimed at building, maintaining, developing and using the Indonesia National Army and other defense components.'

The first threat that we can identify is if the reserve components are misused for purposes other than defending the country, for example, when the Reserve Component is being used in a certain interest beside the function for Indonesian State Defense, such as electoral purpose, political action for certain political party, illegal mobilisation and others. Second, the reserve component can be exposed to propaganda from outside Indonesia, through the NGOs and other non-state actors, that can threaten state security. Third, there is a large cost burden when the reserve component is in an inactive condition.

#### CONCLUSION

The multidimensional threats present in strategic environment have prompted Indonesia to form a total state defence system which integrates the capabilities of military and non-military components. With the intention of facing non-military threats, a non-military defence resource is made up through the formation of reserve components corresponding with Law No. 23 of 2019 on the Management of National Resources for National Defense (PSDN Law). The enactment of PSDN Law has brought about a favourable situation to imply several strategic ways for national defence through the lens of SWOT analysis whether from external or internal realms. The MoD and Indonesian National Army have the opportunity and strength. The strategy that must be applied is supporting the policy of forming land, sea, and reserve components aggressively (growth-oriented strategy). Based on internal perspective, the MoD and Indonesian National Army have strength by applying diversification strategy of reserve component product and its human resources. Various threats and internal weaknesses are inevitable as a threat, but it could be minimised through internal work to seize the

main opportunities. This strategy through SWOT analysis, therefore, shows the universality of total defence system of Indonesia with high deterrence capabilities.

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