Analysis of Chinese Geographical Renaming Strategy Against India

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Over the past few years, security dynamics along India's northern borders have undergone a gradual shift and the era of relatively stable border management posture has given way to an ambiguous and volatile situation. China has adopted an increasingly aggressive posture with multi-domain coercion aimed to legitimise its territorial claims against India. In this context, Chinese geographical renaming strategy, used with some success in South & East China Sea, is manifesting itself against India as well. It is in this context, the article seeks to analyse the background Chinese strategic thinking behind this campaign and its likely impact in the long run, while also providing a framework for Indian response mechanism.

Keywords: *China, India, Renaming Strategy*

INTRODUCTION

China's campaign of renaming disputed locations has gained prominence in recent years with implications both on the maritime as well as the land boundaries along the Chinese mainland. Renaming of 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh in April 2023 was the latest move in a series of incremental and

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implicit coercive actions that has seen two previous renaming in 2017 and in 2021. While such moves by themselves provide certain advantages to China in its assertion of territorial claims over the disputed areas, they also have a broader agenda in terms of the dividends that China seeks to accrue through such coercive actions.

This article seeks to identify the strategic imperatives guiding China as it pursues the colonial concept of geographical renaming in the contemporary international order. Towards this end, the article would explain Chinese strategic thinking through the tenets of Offensive Realism to gain a theoretical understanding of the Chinese pursuit of power beyond the territorial boundaries.

ANALYSIS

Power Dynamics in Place Naming

The concept of place naming has historical roots in imperial conquests dating back to the late medieval and early modern period. While the immediate imperative for any renaming has been the desire to impose one's own brand of civilisation over a conquered territory, a retrospective understanding of the events highlights the broader impact of such actions that only reveals itself over a prolonged period of time. Nineteenth-century European imperialism was based on toponymy and cartography and was used to consolidate authority and facilitate governance through mapping of places, compilation of lists and census process.[1] The colonial maps were evolved as means of asserting authority over indigenous territory and therefore, in this context, their function has been as ideological weapons that work to delegitimise indigenous groups. This ideological tool along with a biased frame of reference that sees disputed territory as 'Terra Nullius'[2] are the core aspects of place naming strategy that have been adopted by China even today.

Based on the results of cultural studies undertaken in recent times, certain impacts of historical place naming have emerged. This includes marginalisation, erasure and appropriation of indigenous place names and languages and an ensuing contest over naming process that leads to a wider struggle for legitimacy and visibility.[3] Moreover, place names enforced by a dominant power allow linkage of cultural identity with the geographical landscape thereby linking subconscious memory with the corporeal realm that anchors people's perceptions, memories and ideas of place in particular locations.[4]

Place Naming Campaign against India
The first set of new names in Arunachal Pradesh were published by China's Ministry of Civil Affairs through a notification that renamed six locations in Arunachal Pradesh. While the move was defined by China as means towards 'reaffirming its territorial sovereignty to the disputed region'[5], it was clearly seen as a retaliation against the Indian move of permitting the Dalai Lama to visit Tawang monastery. Adding further ambiguity to this action was the fact that the new names were published in Chinese, Tibetan and English scripts without any indication of the original names of the places. An analysis of new names is given in Table 1.

Table 1 Chinese Names of Six Locations in Arunachal Pradesh as Notified by Ministry of Civil Affairs, China on 13 April 2017

Ser No	Chinese Name	Location Coordinates	Remarks
(a)	Wo'gyainling	91° 52' 25"E and 27°34'54"N	Location in nondescript locality in Tawang, 1.70 kms from the monastery and 300 m away from Urgelling Gompa, Urgelling being the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama
(b)	Mila Ri	93° 52' 25"E and 28° 03' 06"N	Location along forested mountain slope
(c)	Mainquka	94° 08' 04"E and 28° 36' 03"N	Location in town of Menchuka located 30 km from LAC[6]
(d)	Bumo La	96° 46' 25"E and 28°06' 55"N	Initially assumed as a reference to the major mountain pass of Bumla, however, coordinates located along slope of mountain in the eastern extremity of Arunachal Pradesh
(e)	Namkapub Ri	95° 06' 05"E and 28° 12' 49"N	Initially assumed to be a reference to Namka Chu[7], however, coordinates located along forest slope with no distinct geographical feature.
(f)	Qoidengarbo Ri	93° 45' 57"E and 28°16' 50"N	Likely reference to Gorsam Chorten[8] as the name roughly translates to 'White Stupa'

Source: M. Joshi, 'China Renaming Places in Arunachal is an Old Ploy to Delegitimise Adversaries', Commentary, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), 19 April 2017; M. Joshi, 'Why is China renaming seemingly unimportant places in Arunachal Pradesh?', Commentary, ORF, 24 April 2017.

The second renaming campaign was undertaken in December 2021 when China's Ministry of Civil Affairs announced standardised names in Chinese characters for 15 places in Zangnan.[9] The move followed another major act towards securing territorial boundaries in form of the Land Border Law that was approved in the closing meeting of a legislative session of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in October 2021. The official response from Chinese think-tanks highlighted a national level effort to standardise names based on historical claims. An analysis of second renaming campaign is given in Table 2.

Table 2 Chinese Names of 15 Locations as Notified by Ministry of Civil Affairs, China in December 2021

Ser No	Chinese Name	Location Coordinates	Remarks
(a)	Sè La (Xi Shankou)	92°06'16" E & 27°30'12" N	Mountain Pass
(b)	Sengkezong	92°07'02" E & 27°27'01" N	Residential location in Shannan Prefecture
(c)	Daglunggzong	92°11'58" E & 27°10'29" N	Residential location in Shannan Prefecture
(d)	Wamo	Ri 92°53'13" E & 27°05'00" N	Mountain location
(e)	Deu Ri	93°16'53" E & 27°49'00" N	Mountain location
(f)	Lhunzhub Ri	93°49'27" E & 27°23'59" N	Mountain location
(g)	Mani'gang	94°16'42" E & 28°47'03" N	Residential location in Medong Conty of Nyingchi
(h)	Xenyogmo He	River	
(i)	Kumingxingze Feng	94°35'28" E & 27°52'07" N	Mountain location
(j)	Duding	94°53'06" E & 28°59'54" N	Residential location in Medong Conty of Nyingchi
(k)	Migpain	95°48'35" E & 28°56'54" N	Residential location in Medong Conty of Nyingchi
(l)	Dulain He	River	
(m)	Goling	96°38'20" E & 28°08'43" N	Residential location in Zayu County of Nyingchi
(n)	Damba	97°00'42" E & 28°16'56" N	Residential location in Zayu County of Nyingchi
(o)	Mejag	93°25'41" E & 28°33'40" N	Residential location in Lhunze County of Shannan Prefecture

Source: Twitter.

The final renaming campaign was undertaken in April 2023 when a communique was released by the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs with 11 new names. The move was undertaken in the backdrop of the Bhutanese King's visit to India and was pointedly aimed at sowing discord between the two nations based on a map released along with the official communique that showcased Sakteng, a Bhutanese territory previously claimed by China, as part of Bhutan—a clear signal of the prospect of package deal between the two states. The details of third renaming are mentioned in Table 3.

Table 3 Table Showing Chinese Names of 11 Locations as Notified by Ministry of Civil Affairs, China in April 2023

Ser No	Chinese Name	Loc Coordinates	Remarks
(a)	Bangqin	91°43'32"E 27°43'58"N	Pangchen village
(b)	Jiangkazong	91951'52"E 27°34'02"N	Gangchar Dzong
(c)	Luosu Ri	92°33°01"E 27°36'12"N	Lozunk Ridge
(d)	Diepu Ri	93°35'54"E 27°17'24"N	Tai Po Ridge
(e)	Dadong	94°2232E 28°31'49"N	Tadhong
(f)	Qiburi He	River*	Chenpori Chu
(g)	Dongzila Feng	95°20'19"E 28°28'51"N	Dung Tsei
(h)	Geduo He		Gaideyu Chu
(i)	Guyutong	97901°05"E 28°17'55"N	Goyul Thang
(j)	Nimagang Feng	97°15'14"E 27°58'08"N	Niyma Gang
(k)	Jiuniuze Gangri	93917'31"E 28°20'27"N	Chakmutse Gangri

Source: C. Arpi, *The Importance of Panchen*, 2023.

Renaming Campaign Analysis

Based on an analysis of the three renaming campaigns undertaken against India in recent years along with an analysis of similar actions undertaken

in South China Sea and East China Sea, it is apparent that the concept of renaming locations has been incorporated as one of the primary tools in execution of Gray Zone warfare by China.

The campaign structure for the renaming process has evolved and while China had earlier undertaken isolated actions for renaming locations against India,[10] 2017 marked the start of a structured campaign that linked Chinese actions to a broader campaign to standardise names as means towards safeguarding national sovereignty and border management.[11] The integrated and structured nature of the campaign reveals itself on analysis of two key parameters—time and stakeholders. While the promulgation of new names after an interval of approximately two to four years ensures sustained pressure on the adversary, the process also involved multiple stakeholders including the government machinery such as State Council and Ministry of Civil Affairs, think tanks such as Academy of Social Sciences and China Tibetology Research Center and a host of media services—both official and unofficial—who bolster the state's narrative through multiple means.

The benign nature of the campaign along with the manner in which it is being conducted precludes any direct retaliation short of diplomatic gestures that primarily serve political purpose. The campaign is targeted against a fictitious region of 'Zangnan' that does not have any defined geographical boundaries in a contemporary sense. The fluid nature of this region has usually been interpreted as a reference to South Tibet and therefore, from an Indian perspective, as a veiled reference to Arunachal Pradesh. However, as the concept of Zangnan has purposefully never been clearly defined, it allows China to undertake actions within Chinese controlled part of Zangnan along Shannan, Nyigchi and Shigatse regions that border India while posing an indirect threat to Indian sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh by delegitimising the very existence of Arunachal Pradesh.

Furthermore, based on an analysis of cumulative Chinese renaming actions to date (Table 4), there emerges an aspect of ambiguity with regards to the nature of locations that are being targeted for renaming. While certain strategically important locations such as Urgelling, Menchuka, Gorsam (Likely reference not confirmed), Sela and Pangchen village have been targeted in the past, a majority of locations have no inherent strategic value. However, they do provide indirect dividends by leveraging the value 'Strategic Implicit Misinformation'. This is being done by using names similar to strategically important locations in India but with different coordinates. Hence, for a large portion of domestic and international audience, who are not expected to undertake detailed study on the exact

coordinates, the dominant view which prevails is that China has renamed key strategic locations within India.

Table 4 Cumulative Chinese Renaming Actions

Ser No	Year	Locations				Remarks
		Residential	Peaks/ Passes	Rivers	Others	
(a)	2017	02	-	-	04*	Including likely reference to Gorsam Chorten
(b)	2021	08*	05@	02	-	*Residential locations within TAR (Tibet Autonomous Region) @ Sela as strategic important feature
(c)	2023	02*	05	02	02	*Including strategically important village of Pangchen

Source: Compiled by Author.

The one aspect that is relatively easy to glean from Chinese actions is an attempt to establish evidence for laying definitive future claims on disputed territory along the border with India. Towards this end, it is imperative to understand the concept of 'geo-body'[12] that persuades China to produce an image of China as a cohesive territorial unit with fixed boundaries and sovereignty by means of cartographic manipulation. This concept prompted China to assert claims over South China Sea (SCS) in retaliation to Japanese guano-mining operations in island of Pratas in 1909 and French annexation of six of the Spratly islands in 1933. The cartographic evidence produced thereafter, was used in the 21st century to assert claim over SCS through the Nine-Dash line.[13] Therefore, Chinese actions to undertake cartographic, cultural, linguistic and historical claims over Arunachal Pradesh could be seen as means towards the establishment of evidentiary support for more definitive future claims over the region.

Finally, the most important aspect of China's renaming strategy lies in the response mechanism of the target state, which by itself presents opportunities for accomplishment of key objectives. In previous cases of renaming locations along Indian border and in SCS, the response of the target state and its implication can be summarised either as Strategic disregard or

diplomatic rebuttal. In the initial instances of Chinese renaming actions in SCS, a few nations chose to disregard the claims as unilateral action with limited academic or diplomatic traction in real world politics. This proved to be counterproductive as China soon escalated its approach from merely renaming to the assertion of sovereignty over disputed islands through actions such as construction of infrastructure and undertaking intensified patrolling. In many cases, including in India, Chinese actions have been met with a refuting statement that denounces Chinese actions as unilateral and meaningless. However, a key shortcoming in this approach is a lack of understanding on the actual target audience for the renaming campaign. In India's case, rebuttals are primarily aimed towards assuaging the domestic audience. In contrast, the Chinese renaming campaign is not only geared towards its domestic audience but also for external actors. Much like the case of the SCS, where claims today are based on evidence and supporting material established in the 1930s, Chinese actions today will allow future generations to believe in Chinese version of events as this evidence will be preserved and propagated by Chinese propaganda machinery.

Theoretical Analysis: Application of Offensive Realism to Chinese Strategic Thinking

While John Mearsheimer has always voiced his opinions against the prospect of a peaceful rise of China, two key aspects of his theory of offensive realism could be utilised to provide the theoretical basis of Chinese actions as part of its renaming strategy First, the bid for hegemony, that Mearsheimer states is a key pre-requisite for maximisation of security, needs to be understood with regards to the regional security architecture within which China must operate. In considering the Chinese bid for regional hegemony, parallels are often drawn with the prevailing hegemon—the United States. However, the fact remains that the US bid for hegemony was facilitated by far more conducive factors in terms of geographical isolation provided by Pacific and Atlantic oceans, peaceful regional players in Canada and Mexico and a lack of any sizable power with sufficient incentives to prevent US expansion, European powers having being consumed by power politics in Europe.[14]

In contrast, the Chinese mainland is located within a region that includes important middle powers—India, Australia, Japan—and a host of other players who are increasingly wary of Chinese aggressive actions. Moreover, despite the prevalent narrative of US decline and lack of focus on China due to its involvement in the Middle East and, more recently, in Ukraine, the

fact remains that US is still the foremost military power. This statement is quantified by the differential in military expenditure, with the US at US$ 877 billion while China remains at US$ 292 billion.[15] Moreover, over US$ 25 billion is proposed to be spent in the Indo-Pacific region as means towards out-competing China.[16]

Taken together, these factors seem to be prompting China to take a far more nuanced and subtle approach in its bid for regional hegemony. While power maximisation still remains the key goal for China, its means and instruments are starkly different from those employed by the US more than a century ago. It relies more on psychological maneuvering and implicit signalling to force a fait accompli in its favour. Chinese renamings, both along the Indian border and the South China Sea, need to be seen in this context.

Recommended Indian Response Strategy

Strategic Imperatives
Based on an analysis of the strategic outlook behind Chinese renaming campaign, along with an understanding of the inadequacies of responses undertaken by various targeted states in Asia, there is a need to evolve an independent and proactive strategy that deters implicit indirect coercive activities by China.

While safeguarding territorial integrity remains the key function of any state, in the case of India, it has not been explicitly articulated in any of our public documents. This is in contrast with China wherein safeguarding national security and territorial integrity along with maintaining primacy of state sovereignty and political legitimacy have been clearly spelt out as 'Core Interests'. In the domain of inter-state relations, vital national interests act as non-negotiable red lines that define a state's foreign policy. In absence of such a framework in the Indian context, other states may resort to testing the Indian resolve by constantly prodding for vulnerabilities in the national resolve.

While pursuing Gray Zone warfare, an important tool that has been used by China is its historical heritage. Chinese civilisation traces its roots to 3000 BC (approx.). This allows the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) today to reimagine contemporary China based on the peak periods of multiple civilisations, thereby providing historical precedents of sovereignty over vast swathes of areas on its maritime and land frontiers. The Indian Harrapan

civilisation had also been established by 2500 BC. It was followed by Vedic and Buddhist periods, reign of Guptas and Harshvardhanas followed by the medieval period of Chalukyas, Pallavas, Pandyas, Rashtrakutas and Cholas. Throughout this period, the frontiers of the empire waxed and waned over large swaths of territory. This vast period of ancient and medieval history, as in the case of China, provides India with the tools for developing our own narrative—that can be shaped to meet strategic ends.

While a lot has been written about Indian vulnerabilities *vis-à-vis* China, opportunities available for doing the vice versa have not been adequately exploited. The 'Two-Front Conundrum' has routinely been used to describe India's disadvantage in facing Sino-Pak collusive threat, but in actuality, this conundrum traces its origin to 1950s Chinese strategic thinking that envisaged a two-front challenge—from east along the Pacific theatre and from southwest along the Himalayan front.[17] This two-front conundrum is a reality that currently threatens Chinese core interests that have been increasingly focused on sovereignty issues in the 21st century—namely Taiwan, Tibet and Xinxiang. Hence, exploitation of this vulnerability would provide India with adequate opportunities to safeguard its own security, especially in the increasingly volatile environment of the 21st century.

The fact that the world is in the midst of a Great Power Competition is the basic premise that needs to guide Indian strategy in contemporary times. While the focus of foreign policy has shifted in the recent years from 'Strategic Autonomy' to 'Balancing' to the current era of 'Energetic Diplomacy', it is still based on a tacit distrust of Western support and therefore remains focused on tapping into multiple poles of power throughout the region.[18] Whatever be the instruments of diplomacy—multilateral, minilateral or bilateral—India needs to leverage opportunities provided by the ongoing power struggle to ensure that China's attention remains focused on the Pacific theatre. The most significant aspect of this power struggle is its temporal nature, as tenets of Power Transition Theory clearly dictate a limited window within which the rising challenger (China) must confront the prevalent hegemon (US) if it has to pursue a new world order.

Immediate Response Framework

Chinese implicit coercive activities, such as renaming of locations, needs to be met with a two-pronged response that primarily targets the psychological realm of the audience.

In order to remove the threat in Chinese renaming actions and turn them into a 'self-defeating argument', the inherent ambiguity of such actions needs

to be exploited. The crux of the matter remains that China has renamed multiple locations within Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and India as a means of establishing its sovereignty claims by exerting psychological pressure as well as for establishing underlying evidence for asserting more definitive claims in future.

To counter this strategic aim, India must identify the renamed locations within its territory and undertake civil–military activities that solidify its sovereignty. These could include developmental activity, infrastructure build-up, promotion of tourism and adventure sports, as well as conduct of surveys. This needs to be backed with widespread dissemination campaigns with locations geotagged in Hindi and Monyul[19] script.

Such actions would allow projection of Indian sovereignty claims while also establishing evidentiary support to counter any future claims by the adversary. Moreover, the narrative needs to be built that while China is seeking to rename locations to create a new territory of Zangnan, Indian effective control over the region nullifies any such claim. Our own military formations along the West Kameng region have already incorporated these guidelines as part of the Information Warfare Plan and have implemented activities that include creation of a tourist selfie point at Gorsam Chorten—a key religious site that has been the target of Chinese renaming campaign, efforts to promote regional linkages through Gorsam Kora—Chorten Kora festival that sees cross-border religious pilgrimages between India and Bhutan, and support for conduct of various Nyingma Buddhist conferences in Arunachal Pradesh.

Most importantly, a comprehensive campaign must be undertaken to shape favourable public opinion. Already, a host of X (Twitter) handles have responded to Chinese renaming actions by responding with memes that make light of the situation, disparaging it and thereby relieving it of its gravitas. Public opinion today is shaped by such social media platforms and therefore, a dedicated information campaign must be built that uses humour to reveal and ridicule the irrational nature of China's unilateral actions.

Mid-Term Response Framework
Within a time period of three to five years, Indian response must focus on securing own vulnerabilities along the territorial boundaries so as to establish psychological ascendency along key sensitive/disputed areas along the LAC.

In line with the Chinese effort to legitimise the concept of 'Zangnan', Indian response must focus on establishing a regional Monyul identity

that showcases stark difference with Tibetan culture and close linkages with mountain tribes along the southern part of Himalayan range along Arunachal Pradesh, Bhutan and Nepal. This distinct Monyul identity, that also has historical mention in Tibetan culture, needs to be projected as a distinct culture with its own history, ethnicity and language. This needs to be reinforced through an information and education campaign.

If the situation in this region deteriorates due to increasing Chinese aggression coupled with a greater resolve on Indian side to pushback against coercion, the territorial dispute issue could be put to the scrutiny of international law. In this scenario, if the case ever moves to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), a key advantage for India would be the fact that this is a land boundary dispute and not a maritime dispute that is much more complex and prone to multiple interpretations based on geology of the continental shelf.

The primary principle that needs to be maintained in the Indian narrative is the control of 'Terra Nullius', and the government's ability to exercise continuous and peaceful authority over it. While this involves a host of ground-level actions that are already being undertaken by the government, it must be supported by academic discourse that builds the necessary narrative.

Long-term Response Framework
In the long term, the only available pathway towards safeguarding our national security posture would be to manifest a credible threat to Chinese vulnerabilities that allow India to play a dominant role in framing the terms of negotiation for resolution. In this context, it is pertinent to understand the mistakes made by other great powers in their strategy towards China, aptly summarised by John Mearsheimer in his book *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

Indian response in the long term must focus on leveraging history by exploiting ancient connections between Indian and Chinese civilisation to highlight inroads of Indian culture through Buddhism and Sanskrit into China. Travels of early Chinese pilgrims such as Fa Hien, Hsuan Tsang and Yijing can be used to build a narrative of Indian influence deep inside Chinese culture and history that would severely damage any claims made by China asserting Chinese influence into Indian territories.

Furthermore, while Pakistan has generally been considered as an all-weather Chinese friend, the fact remains the multiple groups in the region, including Tehrik-e Taliban (TTP), ISIS-K and Al-Qaeda, have denounced Chinese economic activities in their neighbourhood, apart from voicing

solidarity with Muslim Uyghurs and Turkestan Islamic Party. As Chinese economic expansion in Asia is met with increasing violence from such entities, opportunities presented could be exploited for strategic gains by India.

Indian actions in the Indo-Pacific also remain a key threat for China's regional ambitions. Towards this end, India needs to strengthen its linkages with strategic partners and constructs such as Quad, ASEAN and EU. An Indo-Pacific strategy needs to be evolved that would shift the focus onto the Pacific theatre and away from the Himalayan front.

Conclusion

China's renaming campaign remains a significant instrument in its toolkit of Gray Zone warfare and has been used by China with reasonable success in its maritime disputes along South and East China Sea. Its application against India has gained pace in the past decade and if left unaddressed, it has the potential to provide leverage to Chinese claims in the long run, both from psychological and empirical point of view. Therefore, India needs to evolve a coherent response strategy that falls within a larger proactive strategy that seeks to target Chinese vulnerabilities and thereby achieve ascendency in the gray zone.

Notes

1. Catherine Nash, 'Irish Placenames: Post-colonial Locations', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1999, pp. 457–480, available at https://rgs-ibg.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0020-2754.1999.00457.x.
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5. As quoted in 'China Standardizes Names of 11 More Places in Zangnan, Southern Part of Xizang', *Global Times*, 3 April 2023.

6.   'Line of Actual Control' is the demarcation line that separates Indian controlled territory from Chinese controlled territory along the Sino-Indian border.

7.   A river in western part of Arunachal Pradesh that serves as the de-facto working boundary between India and China.

8.   A 13th century Buddhist Stupa in western Arunachal Pradesh.

9.   Chinese name that denotes 'South Tibet' region, referring to present-day Indian controlled state of Arunachal Pradesh, used by China to highlight its claims over the region.

10. Renaming of Barahoti Pass in Garhwal as Wu Je when China wanted to press claims in central sector and renaming of Demchok as Parigas. M. Joshi, 'China Renaming Places in Arunachal is an Old Ploy to Delegitimise Adversaries', Commentary, Observer Research Foundation, 19 April 2017; M. Joshi, 'Why is China Renaming Seemingly Unimportant Places in Arunachal Pradesh?', Commentary, ORF, 24 April 2017.

11. As quoted by Zhang Yongpan, Research Fellow at Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies in Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. See 'China Standardizes Names of 11 More Places in Zangnan, Southern Part of Xizang', *Global Times*, 3 April 2023.

12. Geographically speaking, geo-body of a nation occupies a certain portion of earth's surface which is objectively identifiable, appears concrete and whose existence does not depend on perspective. However, in reality, the geo-body of a nation is merely the effect of modern geographical knowledge whose prime technology is map. T. Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of Geo-Body of Nation*, University of Hawaii Press, 1994.

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15. Data taken from Military Expenditure Report 2022 from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

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17. Amit Kumar, 'China's Two-Front Conundrum: A Perspective on the India- China Border Situation', Occasional Paper, ORF, 7 March 2023.

18. G. Bisaria, 'The Changing Nature of India's Foreign Policy', Asia Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs.

19. Local script of the Monyul people who reside south of Himalayas in regions along belt of Arunachal Pradesh and Bhutan.