INDIA AND AFRICA

Enhancing Mutual Engagement

Editor
Ruchita Beri
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A gradual shift in the global power structure is being discerned over the past few decades. This period has witnessed a relative decline of the United States and the rise of other powers such as China, India and Brazil. At the same time, Africa is moving in a new direction. The continent has demonstrated a surge in economic growth and democratic governance. In this period of transition, there are a number of important global issues, on which India and Africa can take united stand for a peaceful world order. India and Africa can show solidarity over issues like climate change, UN reforms and terrorism. Though these are issues over which there has been a lot of politics and the more powerful countries have been exercising their influence, India and Africa inject a note of rationality into the debate.

In the context of peace and security, Africa has witnessed several conflicts over the years. The United Nations has been involved in peacekeeping operations in the continent for a long time. However, over the last decade African countries have developed several mechanisms, at the regional level, to supplement the activities of the UN for conflict resolution in the continent. India has also engaged in peacekeeping operations under the UN mandate in various parts of Africa and also in the training and capacity building of African military personnel. At the same time India has often stressed the importance of addressing the threat posed by piracy off the coast of Somalia in the Indian Ocean region at the United Nations and other multilateral forums. India is a foundermember of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) established in January 2009, and actively coordinates with navies in combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden. There is no doubt that India and African states need to cooperate in combating and eradicating this menace.

India and Africa have shared a close relationship in the past. The
first India Africa forum summit held in New Delhi in 2008 marked the beginning of a robust and contemporary partnership. The second Africa India Forum Summit, held in Addis Ababa in May 2011, emphasized the renewed focus of India to strengthen and enhance its partnership with countries in the African continent. Bilaterally, both India and Africa agree that strong cooperation between the two is necessary to take the relationship ahead. The areas of cooperation are wide-ranging and include, among others, politics, trade and business, culture etc. Greater economic engagement has been seen as crucial to boosting ties between Africa and India. India’s trade with Africa amounted to $68 billion in 2010-11 and is expected to rise substantially in the near future. Mutual efforts to increase trade include initiatives such as Focus Africa (covering 24 countries in Sub-Saharan, Southern and North Africa) and the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement or Team 9 (facilitating concessional credit to eight West African countries). The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), an economic development programme launched by the African Union (AU) to accelerate economic growth of African countries and promote greater participation in the global economy, has attracted Indian investment. While a large proportion of Indian investment has been in the energy sector, significant investments have also been made in the infrastructure, engineering, chemicals, services, banking and finance, health, information technology and telecommunication sectors in Africa. Another significant link with continent is the presence of Indian diaspora in African countries. The greater integration of this community can significantly bolster bilateral relations between African states and India.

This book represents an effort to build on existing partnerships between African countries and India, and to explore new areas of convergence for mutual engagement. It originated from the First India Africa Strategic Dialogue hosted by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi in November 2011. It brings together India and African perspectives on global, regional and bilateral issues of strategic relevance to both sides. It explores the views and perceptions within India and Africa on the various global challenges faced by the world today. It also seeks answers to several bilateral and regional issues, such as: How successful has UN peacekeeping been in resolving conflicts in Africa? What are the causes of the rise of piracy in the Indian Ocean region, and is a regional solution in sight? Since economic engagement has been seen as a crucial driver of relations between Africa and India, how can
this cooperation be enhanced? Does the Indian diaspora play an important role strengthening the bilateral relations?

In Chapter 1, Ambassador M Ganapathi argues that the initial decades of the 21st century would belong to the Indian Ocean Region and Africa. India’s partnership with Africa has been consultative and focussed on capacity building and human resource development.

In Chapter 2, Abednego Edho Ekoko discusses the emerging global challenges. He argues that the world economic meltdown which began in the US as a mortgage blow out and subsequently spiralled into industry and banking sectors is perhaps the most obvious of the emerging challenges of our globalised existence. The economic crisis has definitely caused a growth crisis in African economies. However he suggests, that according to the World Bank, the continent is experiencing transformative growth through ICT development; that investors must look to the continent as an opportunity rather than a risk, and that investment in agriculture, energy, infrastructure and trade can ensure increased growth. Similarly challenges such as climate-change and rise of terrorism are frightening. India and Africa have been victims of terrorist attacks. An emerging global terror-crime nexus poses new challenges to India and Africa. Therefore, he concludes that India and Africa must begin to develop non-traditional warfare strategies and initiate new alignments to confront emerging threats.

In Chapter 3, Dr. Arvind Gupta suggests that India-Africa relations are moving beyond the anti-colonial, anti-apartheid sentiment of the past and are increasingly being driven by mutual interest. Both India and Africa have acquired significant international clout in recent years and can engage with each other without depending on Western munificence. The Addis Ababa meeting of Indo-Africa Forum held in May 2011 has deepened the ties and created an institutional framework for cooperation. It has become an important platform for South-South cooperation. What explains the growing convergence between India and Africa? This paper argues that the rapidly changing geopolitical environment has created conditions for the coming together of Africa and India. This time around Indo-African ties are being cemented by growing economic cooperation, greater people to people contacts and brighter prospects for the future.

In Chapter 4, Kwesi Aning and Festus Kofi Aubyn assess the role of the United Nations (UN) in resolving African conflicts from 1990 to date. The paper argues that the UN will not be able to keep peace
in Africa without collaborating with the African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Such cooperative efforts are crucial because the UN is limited in terms of capacity, expertise and the resources - both human and financial – that are needed to address the numerous security problems facing the continent. As such, the UN’s prospects for conflict resolution in Africa can only be enhanced through its partnerships with these regional bodies.

In Chapter 5, Satish Nambiar argues that though the responsibility for the prevention of conflict rests with states, the maintenance of international peace and security is the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council as mandated by the UN Charter. UN Peacekeeping operations that emerged as the preferred tool of the UN for managing conflicts around the globe have grown in complexity and scope over the last decade or so. A significant portion of this commitment is for deployment in Africa. It would therefore, be appropriate that the international community consider the benefits inherent in transforming the culture of response, into a culture of prevention, that pre-empts the emergence of violent conflict and the consequent incalculable loss of life and societal upheaval. It is in the interests of the international community at large to unite around a set of policies which would see preventive diplomacy employed as a matter of course in crisis situations particularly in Africa.

Richard Barno in Chapter 6, discusses the IGAD inland strategy for countering piracy in Somalia. It examines the rationale for this strategy projecting that ultimately, efforts that improved socio-economic conditions in Somalia will do more to curb piracy linked to Somalia than the law and order and/or naval approaches taken by the international community. It assesses the challenges of the implementation of international response at regional level and in discussing the Somali inland strategy to counter piracy, concludes that this presents the best chance yet at combating piracy linked to Somali pirates.

In Chapter 7, Sarabjeet Parmar suggests that viewing piracy as ‘economic terrorism’ could aid in combating the malaise. He argues that the economic factor has converted piracy into a thriving and lucrative business that could turn pirates into powerful non-state actors capable of dealing with state actors. The world therefore needs to revisit and rethink its strategy for dealing with piracy. The issues are
many and include: nation building to pirate value chain evaluation; stricter prosecution laws; enhanced cooperation between maritime forces etc. Parmar argues that India and Africa need to work together to ensure that these issues are addressed.

In Chapter 8, Elizabeth Sidiropoulos argues that Africa is posited as the next frontier of economic growth, with a number of countries that will become more attractive to companies as their consumer markets and middle class grow over the next decade. These countries included Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Angola, Zambia, South Africa, Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria. Africa’s accelerating urbanisation as well as its youthful population hold great economic promise but equally pose substantial challenges for policy development in African countries. It is against this background that bilateral economic relations between India and key African countries must be placed. For India, its relations with South Africa play out against the broader African background, but also within the context of their membership of the IBSA and the BRICS. South Africa is positioning itself as the ‘gateway’ to Africa for countries like India. This paper explores the opportunities inherent in the relationship between the two countries and how they can be optimised.

In Chapter 9, Sachin Chaturvedi suggests that in the recent past, India has witnessed high economic growth with rapid expansion in trade and outbound investment in developing countries, particularly in Africa. India has launched several important initiatives to deepen linkages across sectors. Partnership between India and Africa has ushered in new areas of economic engagement. It evolves at different levels, government, institutions and private firms covering areas such as agriculture, telecommunications, energy and technology cooperation. He argues that these collaborations have gone beyond manpower training programmes, skill upgradation to more substantive contributions such as the production and export of technology intensive goods and services. This is all set to give a major fillip to the economic growth rates of both the partners. Apart from promoting trade and investment linkages, it is high time that African economies also engage in deliberations related to global economic management and development cooperation policies.

In Chapter 10, Paul Musli Wambua argues that since the end of the cold war, the concept of security has increasingly shifted from the state-centric military strategy and military capability preoccupations of the cold war period to a much broader concept covering any
activity that degrades the quality of life of inhabitants of a state. This is especially so among the developing countries. He argues that for an emerging regional power such as India, the establishment of cross-regional cooperation is invariably seen as a safety net that reduces myriad of security challenges. In this regard, Wambua suggests that India-Africa security cooperation points to the creation of frameworks for international economic, technological, and humanitarian interaction that are aimed less at militarised international relations, and more at enhanced technological innovations and better human life conditions that are both environmentally sustainable and resource efficient. The paper examines the historical evolution of India-Africa security cooperation, the dynamics of such cooperation since the beginning of the 20th century and the concomitant challenges associated with such cooperation.

Ruchita Beri explores the evolving India-Africa Security Cooperation in Chapter 11. Africa is at a pivotal juncture. Since the end of the cold war, the continent has experienced rapid democratisation and steady integration. Nevertheless, despite the African Union and regional organisations’ renewed efforts towards stability and conflict resolution Africa continues to face ever increasing security challenges. The continent has not only witnessed widespread inter-state and intra-state strife, it also faces numerous non-traditional threats such as terrorism, poverty, disease and environmental decay. Beri opines that in recent years the African countries have sought to expand the discourse on security in Africa at the African Union (AU) level. Moreover there is a growing realisation among the African leaders that non-traditional aspects of security are as crucial as the traditional ones. This is epitomised by the adoption of a Common Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) by the AU.

In so far as security cooperation is concerned Beri suggests that India’s ties with African countries have included military training, participation in UN peacekeeping missions, naval goodwill visits, and joint exercises and, to a limited extent, the transfer and sourcing of defence equipment. However, as in Africa, within India too, there is a growing discourse that recognises the multifaceted aspects of security, the traditional as well as the several non-traditional challenges such as, pandemics and terrorism.

In Chapter 12, Philip Nyinguro argues that the role of diaspora in the relations between countries or regions of origin and the host countries cannot be overemphasised. The patterns, direction and
overall dynamics of bilateral engagements between states can be, and usually are, significantly affected by the practical and perceptive relations between the diaspora community and the host state. The diaspora can also be the conduits for exchange of technology, innovation, goods and culture. The diaspora is thus an important cog in the diplomatic, economic and strategic ties between countries or regions. Nyinguro submits that of all foreign diasporas in Africa, none has been so deeply embedded into the economic, political, cultural and social fabric of the continent as the Indian. The Indian community played important roles in colonial economies, especially in the commercial and business sectors. Indians also occupied strategic positions in the nationalist movements and fought for independence alongside the indigenous black communities. Nyinguro posits, that at present members of Indian diaspora can be found in all sectors, including the political leadership in many African countries. His paper examines the role played by the Indian diaspora in African countries, and how it is perceived by Africans with a view to exploring how they can contribute to the growing Indo-African strategic partnership.

In the last chapter Sanjukta Banerji Bhattacharya, examines the term ‘diaspora’ and contextualises the people of Indian origin in Africa as per the expanding definition of the term. She also explores the character of Indian diaspora in other countries and juxt a poses it with the Indian diaspora in Africa and discusses the role that it has played in maintaining/improving India-Africa relations. Bhattacharya also examines the strengths and weaknesses of this diaspora and makes suggestions as to how it can play a significant role in the context of the rapid growth of India-Africa relations in recent years.

This volume could not have come out without the continuous support and encouragement of, Dr Arvind Gupta Director General IDSA. I would also like to thank Ravi Bangar, Additional Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, and Ambassador Gurjit Singh, currently India’s Ambassador to Indonesia for their support and cooperation in the accomplishment of this project. My thanks also go to all the speakers at the conference. Other individuals who provided invaluable assistance include Princy Marin George, Babjee Pothuraju and Sneha Bhura. Finally, I would like to thank Rajan Arya of the Pentagon Press for undertaking the publishing work and bringing out the book on time.

I hope this volume will help to further the reader’s understanding of the growing ties between India and Africa.

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Ms. Ruchita Beri is a Senior Research Associate and Coordinator, Africa, Latin America, Caribbean and United Nations Centre at IDSA, New Delhi, specialising in political and security issues of Sub-Saharan Africa. Her current research focus is on India-Africa relations. She is currently the Vice President of the African Studies Association of India and an alumna of the Women in International Security (WIIS), USA. She is also the member of Africa Committee of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). She has lectured at the National Defence College, College of Naval Warfare and Foreign Service Institute and has participated in various international conferences. She is the editor of Africa Trends and Indian Ocean Watch published by the IDSA. She has co-edited the book Africa and Energy Security and has contributed journal articles and book chapters to over 75 publications. She has an M.Phil in African Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi and a diploma on Conflict Studies from the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden.

Mr. M. Ganapathi was formerly the Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs. Mr. Ganapathi joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1975. In the course of his diplomatic career he has held a wide range of overseas assignments. He has served in Indian Diplomatic Missions in Moscow (USSR: 1977-78); Sofia (1978-82); Singapore (1982-85); London (1988-91) as Counsellor; Belgrade (1991-93) as Counsellor/Charge d’Affaires; Moscow [Russian Federation (1994-98) as Counsellor/Minister/Deputy Chief of Mission]; Sydney (2001-2005) as Consul General of India; Kuwait (2006-Aug. 2008) as Ambassador; and Port Louis as High Commissioner of India.
Prof. Abednego Edho Ekoko has been a Professor of History at Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria since 1991. He graduated from Nigeria’s premier University of Ibadan and obtained a Master’s Degree in International History from the London School of Economics and Political Science, with a mark of Distinction; and PhD, University of Aberdeen, Scotland. He has taught at the University of Ibadan, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria and Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma. He has also served as Commissioner of Boundaries at the National Boundary Commission, the Presidency, Abuja and as a Boundary Scholar to the Delta State Government. A resource person to such institutions as Training & Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Nigerian Army, Minna, Nigeria; Command & Staff College, Jaji, Nigeria and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos & Abuja, Professor Ekoko once headed Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria as Sole Administrator. His publications include many articles, contributions to books and co-edited works including *Nigerian Warfare through the Ages*, (1990), *Nigerian Defence Policy: Issues and Problems* (2001), *Nigeria in International Peace Keeping* (2006).

Dr. Arvind Gupta assumed charge as Director General of IDSA on January 5, 2012. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and M.Sc. in Physics from Delhi University. He was Visiting Member at the Tata Institute for Fundamental Research (1974-76) and served at the Oil & Natural Gas Commission (1976) and at the State Bank of India (1976-79) before joining the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) in 1979. He retired from the IFS in 2013, having worked in the Ministry of External Affairs in different capacities and served in diplomatic missions in Moscow, London and Ankara. He held the Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair on National Security at the IDSA from 2008 to 2011. Prior to joining the IDSA, he was Joint Secretary at the Indian National Security Council Secretariat from 1999 to 2007. During his tenure at the NSCS he dealt with a wide range of international and national security issues and participated in the various working groups and task forces set up by the NSC. He also worked with the Kargil Review Committee. At the IDSA he headed the South Asia and Internal Security Centres and edited the Institute’s flagship bi-monthly journal, Strategic Analysis.

His current interests include the international security issues, India’s foreign policy, energy security, climate change, technology & internal security issues. He has three books, several edited books and
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**Lt Gen Satish Nambiar** was commissioned into the Maratha Light Infantry in December 1957. He was appointed the first Force Commander and Head of the United Nations forces in the former Yugoslavia where he set up and ran the mission from 3rd March 1992 to 2nd March 1993. He retired as the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff on 31st August 1994.He was Director of the United Service Institution of India from 1st July 1996 to 31st December 2008, and is now member of the Governing Council of the Institution. He is on the International Advisory Council of the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sandoverken, Sweden and is now a senior adviser to the Challenges Forum an initiative coordinated by the FBA. He is an inaugural member of the International Advisory Board of the ‘Security Council Report’ and on the Advisory Board of the Geneva based ICT for Peace Foundation. He was Adviser to the Government of Sri Lanka on certain aspects of the peace process in 2002/03 and served from 2nd November 2003 to 30th November 2004 as a member of a High Level Panel appointed
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He has published widely in the areas of piracy, maritime security, corporate governance and civil litigation. His latest major publication is a book titled: *Governance of the Forgotten Province: A Critical Appraisal of the Policy, Legal and Institutional Frameworks for the Control and Management of Marine Resources within Kenya’s Maritime Zones* (2010). Prof. Wambua holds a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) degree from the University of Nairobi; a Master of Laws (LL.M) degree in International Business/Maritime Law from the University of London; Master of Business Administration (MBA) from the United States International University (USIU); and a PhD in Maritime law/Law of the sea from Gent University, Belgium.

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Prof. Sanjukta Bhattacharya is a faculty member at the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University. She has done her Masters from Delhi University and completed her Ph.D from Jawaharlal Nehru University. Her areas of specialization include American Studies (Internal Politics, Foreign Affairs and Black studies), West Asia, Third World Contemporary International Relations, Ethnicity, Religion and Politics, International Terrorism, Gender.

Professor Bhattacharya has several publications to her credit including Deferred Hopes: Blacks in Contemporary America, Radiant, New Delhi, 1986, Perspectives on India’s Northeast, Bibhasha, Calcutta, India at the End of the Twentieth Century: Essays on Politics, Society and the Economy, Lancer’s Books, New Delhi and over 40 articles published in acclaimed journals in the course of her teaching career since 1982. She has been a Senior Research Fellow with the Fullbright Foundation in 1987-88 and a visiting Scholar on the programme, “Direct Access to the Muslim World”, 2004, Fulbright Foundation.
The India-Africa Strategic Dialogue is particularly important. If the period till the 80s of the last century was ruled by the Atlantic Ocean, with the focus shifting towards the Asia-Pacific Region from the mid-70s, then one could confidently foresay that the coming decades of the 21st century will belong to the Indian Ocean Region and Africa. This is an area of great strategic significance drawing the attention of every significant global player. In this context, the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) assumes a particular importance. India assumed the chairmanship of this Association in 2011. This organisation had been dormant thus far. It is our aim and intention to reinvigorate this organisation for the larger good of the countries of the region and particularly Africa, as a significant membership of this Association is drawn from the African continent.

India’s partnership with the countries of Africa rests on a firm historical foundation of a shared colonial past and similarity of post-independence development experience. The Indian struggle for Independence found a greater resonance after Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi went to South Africa and from there returned to India as Mahatma Gandhi. The presence of the Indian Diaspora in Africa could be seen to have commenced from Southern and Eastern Africa over 250 years ago with a larger number of its people moving towards that continent around 200 years ago. Last year, we celebrated the 150th

*This chapter has been adapted from the speech given at the inaugural session of the first India-Africa Strategic Dialogue held at IDSA on 24 November 2011.
Anniversary of the presence of the Indian Diaspora in South Africa. Our identification with issues affecting Africa was evident when India even before it became independent imposed sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa. The AFRICA Fund further closely identified India with Africa’s struggle against colonialism and apartheid as the acronym AFRICA stood for Action for Resisting Imperialism, Colonialism and Apartheid. This Fund, in fact, was crystallised in New Delhi in 1986.

India’s association with Africa is marked by consultation, responsiveness and mutual appreciation of each other’s capabilities and constraints. Today, both India and her African partners realise that they are witnessing an extremely robust phase of their association. Africa is on the move as highlighted in the McKenzie Report last year and as we see in the many data of the Mo Ibrahim Index. The new chapter that has been opened in the relationship between a resurgent Africa and a rapidly growing India is anchored in the fundamental principles of equality, mutual respect and mutual benefit. While India and Africa have come a long way, we both face daunting challenges of poverty, hunger and disease. We have no doubt, however, that by working together, India and Africa can set an example of fruitful cooperation in the developing world and naturally where there are challenges, there are opportunities.

India and the African countries, through a deliberative mechanism spanning across several platforms, have arrived at a model of cooperation where the selection of priority areas are being made in full consultation with the intended beneficiaries. Our vision of a partnership with Africa for the 21st century goes beyond the already strong bilateral relationships and envisages closer cooperation with the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as well as the African Union. This new paradigm of cooperation is premised on Africa’s own aspirations for Pan-African institute and development programmes. The wide ranging cooperation and development partnerships between India and Africa encompasses, amongst others, the fields of human resources and institutional capacity building, science & technology; agricultural productivity and food security; industrial growth; development in the health sector; infrastructure development; and Information and Communication Technology.

This development of a three-tiered cooperation structure between India and Africa, which began with the First India Africa Forum Summit in New Delhi in April 2008 was further reaffirmed at the
Second Africa India Forum Summit in Addis Ababa in May 2011. This new framework takes into account Africa’s own aspirations for pan-African institutions and development programmes. The Delhi Declaration of 2008; the Addis Ababa Declaration of 2011; the Africa India Framework of Cooperation of 2008; and the Africa India Framework of Enhanced Cooperation of 2011 bear testimony to this fact.

India’s partnership with Africa has been consultative, responsive and focused on capacity building and human resource development. Under the rubric IAFS-I and II, India would be establishing more than 100 capacity building institutions in Africa encompassing wide variety of fields. There is also a provision for 22,000 scholarships for African students in various academic courses and training programmes including special scholarships focusing on agriculture sciences and fellowships for science and technology. India is confident that this paradigm of cooperation will continue so that we can contribute to the development of Africa’s own capacities for its progress.

The India-Africa partnership is also geared towards socio-economic transformation. India’s commercial engagement with Africa is primarily driven by the private sector and the recent years have witnessed a surge in Indian investment in Africa along with an impressive growth in our two-way trade. It is also encouraging to witness an increase in African exports to India, and in this regard, the Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme announced by India for the Least Developed Countries has begun to bear fruit.

The development of infrastructure is a priority for Africa. We are happy to be contributing to this end through the concessional lines of credit extended by us. Africa places a strong emphasis on augmentation of regional connectivity. In this context, India is contributing towards establishing a new Ethiopia-Djibouti rail network through a line of credit worth US$ 300 million. The role of the private sector in the operationalisation of some of the letters of credit needs no emphasis. This has acquired prominence through the announcement of Lines of Credit to Africa at the two Forum Summits. Our Prime Minister had announced US$ 5.4 billion as Line of Credit in the First India Africa Forum Summit and an addition US$ 5 billion in this regard during the Second Africa India Forum Summit in Addis Ababa in 2011.

While there have been political engagements with Africa over the years, the emphasis, however, has moved towards economic interaction. There is a felt need for greater engagement between India
and Africa on issues of a geo-strategic nature. India has always been
to cooperate with Africa on issues of global security. An
important example in this regard relates to India being at the forefront
of the global efforts against piracy off the coast of Somalia. During
the second Africa India Forum Summit in Addis Ababa in May this
year, our Prime Minister announced a contribution of US$ 2 million
towards the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The Indian
Navy has been extensively sailing the waters of the Indian Ocean
providing for EEZ Surveillance and anti-piracy patrolling to some of
the countries in Eastern and Southern Africa.

In the area of defence cooperation, the Indian Navy is extensively
involved in the Indian Ocean region. The IBSAMAR was an important
maritime activity involving the three IBSA countries of India, Brazil
and South Africa. India has carried out extensive hydrographic surveys
for countries in the region. These have been beneficial for these
countries helping them in their EEZ claims. Besides piracy, another
common threat facing India and Africa has been that of terrorism. The
countries in Africa and India are naturally concerned about this menace.

One important organisation which has played an important role
between India and Africa has been the IBSA. This association bringing
together India, Brazil and South Africa has a crucial role not only
globally but also in Africa where the IBSA Trust Fund has been used
towards providing in the developmental activities of developing
countries in the region. India fully acknowledges the support received
from our African partners in getting the country elected as the non-
permanent member of the UN Security Council for the period 2011-
12. India has never shied away from assuming roles of responsibility
when it comes to issues related to Africa in the global fora.

Owing to their rising global politico-economic profile, both India
and Africa are justifiably expected to highlight the concerns of the
developing world at various international fora. This shared
responsibility calls for a greater understanding of each other and
synchronisation of our views and response to a variety of global issues
that may have a direct bearing on the development prospects of our
peoples.
Emerging Global Challenges: The African Perspective

Abednego Edho Ekoko

The world has changed remarkably since the end of the Cold War. The Soviet Union has vanished from the world map; 15 new successor states have emerged in Eastern Europe; the U.S.A. remains the only super power; but new big powers like India have also emerged; the international system is more fluid as some third world countries are increasingly asserting themselves in our globalised world. Every epoch of human existence has thrown up its own peculiar challenges that humanity must contend with. In this connection, for over three years now, India and Africa have engaged in Strategic Dialogues which have produced two very important documents: The Addis Ababa Declaration and the Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation that are mutually beneficial for both parties. This initiative deserves the highest level of commendation; I salute the prime-movers of this development in Africa and India and call on all governments, peoples, private sector operatives and NGOs on both sides of the Dialogue to work assiduously for the actualisation of the set objectives—both for the short and long term. In this presentation we will be focussing on the challenges posed by the economic meltdown and the ongoing European financial crisis; climate change and its ancillary challenges; and Terrorism.
Economic Meltdown and the European Financial Crisis

Beginning as a mortgage blow-out in the U.S.A., the economic problem eventually spread to industry, especially the automobile and the banking sectors that led the Obama administration to provide a series of bailouts to stem economic the downturn. This soon became the most obvious emerging challenge of our globalised world. Those who were initially optimistic that the economic meltdown would not have a spill over effect on the African continent very soon realised that their sense of history was obviously flawed as the Great Depression of the 1930s also had a widespread effect. The economic crisis has definitely stemmed growth various sectors of African economies. This was to be expected as almost all African economies are chronically and historically dependent economies. Consequently, in Africa there were large losses of trade tax revenue; declining financial inflows, with remittances showing some degree of resilience; and reserves were running below target. In Nigeria, reserves declined from $61.9 billion in September 2008 to $50 billion in January 2009, due mainly to the fall in oil prices. Across the continent, exporters of minerals and agricultural commodities experienced similar declines in reserves. Consequently, the crisis threatened to undermine Africa’s macro-economic stability. And more significantly, the crisis undermined the reduction of the debt burden that many African countries had achieved. To this must be added the loss in asset values and the impact on the banking sector. The oil sector also was severely hit by the decline in price and demand of oil, resulting in decreasing government revenues, national currency devaluation and cuts in public expenditure. The mining, tourism and agriculture sectors also took their toll. Consequently, unemployment rose by 10 per cent in Africa in 2009, and an estimated 7-10 million were added each year to the already long line of 200 million jobless African youngsters. This constitutes a time bomb for a continent where social upheavals remain a real threat if millions of unemployed youths find it more rewarding to turn to crime or armed rebellion to earn their livelihoods. However, all was not lost; adversity created new opportunities. By April 2010, Africa became “a rising” development star and the crucible of future global markets and wealth. The World Bank vice president for Africa could then proclaim that “Africa’s Golden Moment Has Come”, as Africa was experiencing transformative growth through ICT development, and that investors must look to the continent as one of opportunity rather than risk. “If the global financial crisis proved one thing, it is
that the riskiest markets and business ventures are not necessary only in Africa”. Africa offers some of the highest rates of return on investments. Investment in five key areas would improve prospects for greater growth: expand income-generating opportunities in agriculture; improve education, skill training and empowerment of women and girls; improve infrastructure; expand access to credit and boost intra-African and regional integration.\(^5\) As World Bank Group President, Robert B. Zoellick remarked after an eight-day, three-nation trip to Africa, in February 2010:

I leave Africa impressed by the actions many governments have taken to cope with the global economic crisis but also aware that governments and their partners, like the World Bank Group and others, must work harder to expand opportunities and improve prospects for economic growth. The progress I have seen across the region, but also in fragile and post-conflict countries, has confirmed my belief in Africa’s potentials to become another source of growth for the world economy.\(^6\)

But while Africa is still grappling with these problems, the challenge of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis arose on the horizon. Concern about rising government deficits and debt levels across the globe together with a wave of the downgrading of European government debts created an alarm in the financial markets. Although, it has been said that “the sovereign debt crisis that is unfolding ... is a fiscal crisis of the western world”,\(^7\) it would be safe to assume it would have global, and certainly African repercussions. According to the IMF, the global economy is in a dangerous new phase. Global activity has weakened and become more even, confidence has eroded sharply, and downside risks are growing; and economic turmoil looms large, as Africa’s main trading partner—the Eurozone-faces a crisis. Beginning with Greece, the Euro bloc financial crisis has spread to Ireland, Spain, Portugal, France and Italy due to the utter failure of even the more developed European economies [except Germany] to live within their means. The crisis is still evolving; there are changes of government in Greece and Italy; we may witness more political ripples in some other Eurozone countries.

According to the World Bank,\(^8\) notwithstanding the recent perturbations in the global economy, Africa’s growth prospects remain robust although the downside risks for sub-Saharan economies are significant. Furthermore, this time around African countries will be more constrained in their policy options. Because they undertook
expansionary fiscal policies to offset the impact of the 2008-09 global crises, they have less space for fiscal manoeuvring than they had in 2008. In spite of Africa’s export market diversification, in particular to Asian countries, especially India, the European Union member states still remain the region’s largest trading partners, accounting for some 37 per cent non-oil exports. However, should the Eurozone crisis escalate, Africa’s exports would suffer a serious slowdown; there would be the attendant drop in commodity prices, especially oil and metals, curtailing the growth prospects of oil-exporting sub-Saharan African economies; less fiscal revenue and less infrastructural development and social programmes. Finally, the Eurozone financial crisis would surely exacerbate the problem of foreign direct investment in Africa because it is closely linked with mineral prices.

Meanwhile, ILO, Director-General, Juan Somovia has enunciated six key policy challenges for our deliberation⁹:

(i) The world and African countries need a more efficient, job-intensive growth pattern; this translates into formulating, agreeing and implementing policies to promote productive transformation and diversification, focusing on sectoral strategies and industrial and agricultural policy instruments for job-rich growth;

(ii) Small and Medium Enterprises, SMEs can be power drivers for employment creation; the crisis has shown that SMEs are engines of growth, job creation and sustainable livelihoods;

(iii) Globally, we need to promote productive investment in enterprises of the real economy and reduce the preponderance of unproductive financial products. Consequently, there needs to be balance between policies that promote job creation, production and growth, real demand, basic social security and generate fiscal incomes that would facilitate debt payment;

(iv) Rules, regulations and internationally agreed labour standards must not be compromised;

(v) Policies and programmes that protect the most vulnerable and poorest though social protection must be accorded highest priority; and

(vi) Promoting decent employment opportunities for the youth should become a global priority.
Challenge of Climate Change

Climate change, in the words of Gwynne Dyer, could beget “climate wars” which is the fight for human survival as the world overheats. He simulates scenarios of geopolitical conflicts that may unfold over the next few decades. What are the political, demographic and strategic impacts of foreseeable climate change? Climate change and the environmental problems it generates are transnational, demonstrating our global interdependence. Paradoxically, Africa, though the continent the least responsible for greenhouse gas emission, is almost universally seen as the continent most at risk of climate-induced challenges. The speed and scope of climate change could undermine the economic, social and political stability of large parts of the world, especially Africa because it operates as what has been characterised by various studies as a “threat multiplier”. In other words, climate change makes existing problems more complex and more intractable. There is interconnectivity between environmental degradation and conflicts. Partly because at the heart of many of the conflicts that continue to challenge Africa are: degraded land, depleted water resources, lack of rain, poor soils and desertification. Almost every conflict is either a struggle for control over resources or a scramble to access them whether in Chad, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia or Kenya. For example, although the Dafur Janjaweed militia terror had political and economic reasons, but more fundamentally it constitutes the search for new grazing grounds, in a progressively environmentally unfriendly region.

As the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon had argued

Almost invariably we discuss Darfur in a convenient military and political short-hand an ethnic conflict pitting Arab militias against black rebels and farmers. Look to its roots, though, and you discover a more complex dynamic. Amid the diverse social and political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change.

The Sahara desert is on a quick march southwards and is now on the fringes of northern Nigeria and northern Kenya; Africa has lost millions of acres of forests as Malawi is almost wholly deforested. Lake Chad and other lakes in the continent are almost drying up. The Sahara and the Chad Basin are ecological challenges of the first magnitude. Yet they have not attracted priority attention of the various governments of the impacted regions.
We need to closely address the four main dimensions of the challenge of climate change; viz.: reduced water supply; reduction in crop yield, changes in sea levels and the cumulative impact of all of the above.

**Challenge of Water Security**

Reduced water supply in environmentally fragile regions could lead to increased competition that might turn violent. It has been projected that one-third of all people in Africa live in drought-prone regions and that by the middle of the century between 350 and 600 million Africans will be at the risk of increased water stress. The UN has identified 9 river basins in Africa where conflicts could arise. These include Kunene, Okvango, Zambezi, Limpopo, Orange, and Nile among others. For example, serious inter-state conflict over water in the Nile Basin, shared by 10 countries, has long been predicted. A reduction in annual flow of the Nile of just 20 per cent due to climate change would interrupt normal irrigation, and “such a situation could cause conflict because the current allocation of water, negotiated during periods of higher flow would become untenable.” Sudan had planned to irrigate the Sahel but Ethiopia had insisted that any Sudanese attempt to divert water from the Nile would provoke a military response. Similarly, Egypt has threatened a military clash with Sudan and Ethiopia over any efforts by either to manipulate the waters that flow into the Nile. Nigerians have also expressed serious concerns over purported plans by Cameroons to dam the River Benue at the expense of Nigeria. These examples confirm the fear that in a situation of unmitigated climate change shared river basins would increase the likelihood of conflict between proximate countries.

Furthermore, Oli Brown and Alec Crawford have identified the following other climate change vulnerability in Africa:

- North Atlantic Oscillation, a key factor in international climate vulnerability, with impact on the fishery industry.
- Rainfall variability modulated by vegetation dynamics, surface properties in the Sahel; empirical evidence of species changes.
- High proportion of population concentrated in coastal areas in West Africa cities such as Lagos and Banjul, thus especially vulnerable to sea-level rise.
- Regional climate modelling experiments show deforestation in Central Africa will impact the climate in other places.
• Coastal marine fishery likely to be negatively affected by changes in Bangwuela current.
• Long-lasting impacts of drought on national economies for SADC region.
• Complete loss or displacement of Succulent Karoo biome projected under climate change, and many species losses in other biomes.
• Intensity of extreme events increased significantly over South Africa: biome shifts will favour horticulture over plantation forestry; malaria risk areas projected to expand southward.
• Floods in 1999 severely affected coastal population and infrastructure [in Mozambique], with long-lasting economic and development impacts; adaptation and recovery very costly and beyond the means of African countries.
• East African Great Lakes and reservoirs respond to climate variability with pronounced changes in storage.
• Important commercial agriculture adapted to bimodal rainfall; shifts in rainfall patterns would have far-reaching impacts.
• Horn of Africa heavily affected by recurrent droughts.
• Egypt/Cairo/The Nile: Coastal areas threatened by sea-level rise: Nile river basin sensitive to climate, with regional implications.

Challenge of Food Security

It is has been said that one of the most important impacts of climate change on human civilisation will be an acute and permanent crisis of food supply. Reduction in crop yield could lead to higher prices of food and greater food insecurity; and increases in food prices globally could trigger regional food crises, causing political instability and further undermine the economic performance of weak and unstable states.

Food security is “a situation in which all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active healthy life”. Food security has three aspects; food availability, food access and food adequacy. The root cause of food insecurity in Africa is the inability of people to gain access to food due to poverty; hence the continent continues to lag behind in poverty alleviation. High prevalence of HIV/AIDS, civil wars, conflicts and poor governance, frequent drought and famine; and agricultural dependence on the
climate and environment have contributed to the problem of food insecurity.

The challenges of food security in Africa include an underdeveloped agricultural sector, barriers to market access, effect of globalisation which comes with liberalisation of markets; disease and infection and government policies that emphasise structures and institutions rather than people. How has India met with this challenge in spite of a population of over one billion people? What can Africa learn from India? Angela Mwaniki has advocated what she calls “Food Security Interventions,” such as

• Nutritional interventions;
• Facilitating market access;
• Capacity building;
• Gender sensitive development;
• Building on coping strategies;
• Creating off farm opportunities; and
• Good governance.

How effective would these be in real life situations? What can India offer Africa in this critical area of human survival?

Challenges of Energy Security, Migration and National Hazards
Energy security implies that a state, region and/or continent has secure, sustainable, affordable, and diversified supplies of renewable and non-renewable energy. A lack of energy security can influence economic productivity, and impact the capacity for achieving the MDGs.

Africa is the lowest consumer of energy, the lowest emitter of greenhouse gases, one of the largest exporter of sub-soil natural resources, but faces the greatest security risks and is unequipped to mitigate the effects of energy security. Almost half of the population of sub-Saharan Africa lives without electricity; only four per cent of Africa’s full hydropower potential has been utilised; Africa’s huge solar, wind and geo-thermal resources are severely underused; and 23 of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa are vulnerable to what Vijay Iyer, has described as “energy shocks”. Without energy diversification, efficiency measures and sizeable private investment Africa would live with energy insecurity for decades.

In this connection, Noble Peace Prize Winner, Wangari Maathai has argued that:
Industrialised countries [India inclusive] should accept their moral duty [and I would add, business sense] to assist Africa to find alternative and renewable sources of energy—such as biomass, wind, hydropower, and solar ... so that Africa can develop industries based on renewable energy sources. She noted that foreign investors have ploughed a billion U.S dollars into wind, solar energy etc. in other regions of the world, and “almost none of this investment is coming to Africa despite the continents energy poverty and abundant sun and wind”. Therefore, the energy challenge in Africa is an investment opportunity for the Indian private sector as Africa has the potential to provide high returns on investment for mutual benefit.

Changes in sea levels, increasing national disasters and reduced viability of agricultural land may cause large scale and destabilising population movements. At present, a third of the world’s refugees and internally displaced persons are to be found in African countries. It is predicted that a further 200 million people could be affected. The UN Security Council has recognised such large-scale population displacement constitutes a “threat to international peace and security”.

Furthermore, natural hazards are increasing in number and frequency, and affect most countries in Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most severely affected areas of the world. In 2008, 96 disasters were recorded and they included 44 floods and 9 droughts that affected 16.3 million people and incurred economic losses of an estimated billion dollars. Three of the five regions across the globe that are at risk of flooding in coastal and deltaic areas are located in Africa: North Africa, West Africa, and Southern Africa.

Ultimately, the cumulative impact of all these could reduce the capacity of governments in Africa to meet the basic needs of their people, thereby increasing the fragility of many African states. Climate change can therefore compound the African condition.

**Challenge of Population**

The world population has touched the 7 billion people mark. The UN Secretary-General, Ki-moon termed it “a serious challenge” and “at the same time, an opportunity depending upon how the international community prepares for that challenge.” How prepared are India and Africa to face the population challenge? What demographic dividends can be derived by India and Africa, given that
overpopulation remains one of the major challenges to social and economic development? Furthermore, population growth in this century is expected to occur in developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America while the population of the industrialised nations will remain flat. What does this scenario portent for Africa?

Among the 10 most populous countries in the world, five are in Asia (China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh); while only Nigeria makes the league in Africa. Africa is the second-most-populated continent, with around a billion people, or 15 per cent of the world’s population. Indeed, India alone and all of Africa are almost neck-to-neck in terms of population. Lagos, Nigeria’s megacity is expected to surpass Cairo as the continent’s most populous. Perhaps the grassroots is becoming population-conscious as two young women, both 19 in Lagos and Johannesburg, separately named their new born seven billionth babies “Enough”. In Uttar Pradesh, the most populous state in the world’s second-most populous country, officials say they would designate seven girls born on November 7, 2011 to symbolise the seven billion. And according to Dr Madhu Gupta: “It would be a fitting moment if the 7 billionth baby is a girl born in rural India, as it would help in bringing the global focus back on girls, who are subjected to inequality and bias”.

The population challenge for India and Africa is not a tea party because of its implications for food security, energy security, migration and natural hazards as discussed earlier. As Professor John Bedington, the chief scientist to the UK government has warned: “We head into a perfect storm in 2030, because all these things are operating on the same time frame.” He further added that: If we don’t address this [i.e. combating climate change], we can expect major destabilisation, an increase in rioting and potentially significant international problems.”

India, Africa and the Challenge of Non-traditional Warfare
The world today is characterised by deep religious, ethnic, territorial, ideological and other disputes that have become part of the international environment since the end of the Cold War. If we agree with Charles Darwin that: “It is not the strongest of the species which survives, nor is it the most intelligent, rather it is the one most adaptable to change,” India and Africa must address the issues thrown up by non-traditional warfare (NTW). NTW encompasses unusual forms of conflict, including terrorism and guerrilla action and activities
by international criminal organisations that constitute threats to the security of one or more nations; the employment of various sorts of WMD, including chemical, biological toxins and agents; and nuclear and radiation-based weapons. NTW involves not just new or unusual types of action, but also new types of technology in both attack and defence. In other words, NTW embraces a wide range of threats, operations, technologies and weapons.\(^\text{30}\)

The most clear and visible form of NTW is terrorism. Terrorism is:

“Any action ... that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilian or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, is to intimidate population, or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act.\(^\text{31}\)

Therefore, the main objective of terrorist activities are to provoke over-reaction (by governments or agencies or institutions); polarise communities, mobilise support and compel abandonment of commitments. Terrorism creates uncertainty because it is unpredictable.

**Globalisation and Terrorism**

As globalisation has changed the global landscape, the nature of terrorist organisations is also changing and posing new security challenges. In India and in Africa, terrorism is a threat to the sovereignty, reputation and credibility as well as the safety of their citizens. Globalisation has enabled the transformation of armed and terrorist groups, insurgents and criminal organisations from regional challenges to a major strategic and security threat worldwide. Globalisation has heightened the terrorist’s organisational effectiveness, their lethality and their ability to operate on a world wide scale as they exploit the opportunities inherent in a globalised world in three distinct ways:\(^\text{32}\)

(i) the sheer size of the global economy enables armed groups and terrorists to cover up their trade in legal and illegal goods, move people, evade detection and rake in huge financial benefits;

(ii) their ability to communicate and operate anonymously over vast distances enable them to create linkages with others across the globe; and

(iii) the high world connectivity, through the internet and other
means enables terrorist groups to transmit information and recruitment on international scale.

Thus new terrorist groups emerge where there were none; they form linkages/syndicates with drugs, arms and human traffickers, forming “terror-crime nexus” which India and Africa must contend with.

India and Africa have been victims of terrorist attacks, and have therefore been drawn into the global war on terror. There are terror groups in almost all regions of India and Africa; some of them are internationally linked terrorists while others are internally generated terrorism. The Horn of Africa and, especially Somalia with its constant instability, is a region that is ripe for terrorist infiltration and has become the centrepiece of counterterrorism. Sudan was perhaps the first African country to be impacted by international terrorism. Kenya, as a tourist attraction, and the headquarters of UNEP and UNHP and several booming international businesses, has become a prime target for terrorists as in the case the attack on the US embassy in 1998 and on Israeli facilities in Mombasa, in 2002. There were/are active al-Qaeda cells along the coasts of East African states of Tanzania, Zambia, and the Comoros. South Africa became a terrorist attraction because of its well-developed infrastructure, international linkages and relative freedom of movement.

The Sahel, a vast semi-desert region between North and West Africa is an area with a formidable geography, a limited government presence—the so-called “ungoverned spaces”, with a long history of smuggling, human trafficking and violence. Nigeria is a prime target for terrorism in Africa. It is the most populous country in the continent with over 70 million Muslims and the largest oil producer. There have been endemic religious conflicts between Muslims and Christians over several decades. The most notorious terrorist groups were the Maitatsine, and the Taliban. Recently the Boko Haram Islamic fundamentalists have terrorised large sections of the population in Borno and other states of northern Nigeria, with attacks on the Nigeria Police Force and UN building headquarters in Abuja, the capital city being the most serious. We should also factor in the Niger Delta militias that have been mostly contained and the larger concerns relating to security in the Gulf of Guinea which has one of the highest rates of piracy in Africa. Osama Bin Laden had included Nigeria in his list of countries ripe for Islamic revolution. The latest security concern in Western Africa, but most specifically Nigeria is the fallout of the Arab
spring. First, the Arab revolt is a vote against authoritarianism and medieval models of governance in the 21st century globalised world. Conversely, it is also a vote for democracy. Secondly, it signifies the challenge posed by the ideological indoctrination of dissatisfied groups, religious extremists and Islamic fundamentalists, prompting them to revolt against many unsatisfactory existing governments in Africa. Thirdly, there is the security challenge posed by defeated Gaddafi loyalists fleeing southwards with small arms and light weapons, into Niger and Chad, but whose preferred destination is Nigeria. Indeed, the Nigerian press has already reported their links with the Boko Haram in Borno and Yobe states of the north in the latest bombing spree. In Libya itself, the “freelance anti-Gaddafi fighters” of the National Transition Government accused immigrant black Africans of being Gaddafi’s mercenaries and targeted them for mass killings. If we add the security concerns in Uganda, CAR, DRC to this we come to the gloomy conclusion that Africa has become a major theatre in the war on terror.

Like Africa, India too has been victim of international terrorism. Terrorism in India is primarily attributable to religious communities and the Naxal radical movements. The regions with longstanding terrorist activities are Jammu and Kashmir, Mumbai, Central India and the Seven Sister states of the Northeast. It is said that by 2006, at least 232 of the country’s 608 districts were afflicted, with different intensities, by various insurgent terrorist movements and that now there are as many as 800 terrorist cells operating in the country. Mumbai has become the preferred target of terrorist attack; e.g. the July 2006, seven train bomb attacks killing 209; between November 2008 and November 2009 a coordinated series of attacks that left 172 dead; July 2011 more Mumbai bombings. Thus India and Africa face similar terrorist security challenges that should engage this Strategic Dialogue.

Following the Mumbai November 2008 attack, says Christine Fair:

 India made important and historically unprecedented improve-
ments in its internal security architecture, including the creation
of a coastal command to secure 4,650 miles of shoreline, the
establishment of 20 counterterrorism schools and standing regional
commando units, the creation of a national agency to investigate
suspected terrorist activity, and stronger anti-terrorist laws.

On the other hand, the AU has a continent architecture for peace
and security which includes—the Peace and Security Council; a
continental Early Warning System and the African Standby Force, composed of five multidimensional regional brigades, including standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components for rapid deployment, essentially for conflict management such as peace-keeping.\textsuperscript{36}

But how do you deter the individuals hidden in society and who are seeking martyrdom? How do you deal with those who strongly believe that killing and maiming others is a sure passport to heaven? We should understand that the tactics employed by terrorist organisations have changed the way traditional wars are fought and therefore changed the deterrent equation. In other words, fighting NTW through traditional warfare can be counterproductive. In this connection, we are invited to deliberate on UN Secretary-General’s “Five D Proposal” as the main element of an international counterterrorist strategy,\textsuperscript{37} and see how India and Africa can actualise them for NTW. These five Ds are:

- Dissuading those who are dissatisfied from resorting to terror.
- Denying them the means to act.
- Deterring state supporters.
- Developing the capacity of states to deal with terrorism.
- Defending Human Rights.

**Conclusion**

We have examined the three main emerging global challenges from the African perspective. These are the economic meltdown that began in US in 2008 and the ongoing Eurozone financial crisis. The similarity between the two is that whenever the West sneezes Africa catches varying degrees of cold, depending on the dependency levels of the particular African country. In plain language, Africa is still heavily dependent on the economies of the Western world. For how long shall this continue? Asia, indeed, India is seeking a true partnership with Africa for a development strategy, for the exploitation of our vast natural resources and for Africa’s human capital development for mutual benefit. The current economic meltdown and Eurozone financial crash is the challenge should encourage Africa to turn to Asia in general and India in particular in a strategic reorientation.

In view of the climate change and its attendant problems, population explosion and international insecurity created by terrorism, Africa and India have a great deal to learn from each other, but with
the full understanding that India is ahead of Africa in terms of: political and economic stability; and scientific and technological growth. It can therefore provide real solution for the many problems that plague the African continent from food and energy insecurity, poverty alleviation, human rights record, to transportation, medical, telecommunications and even military technology. However, while this Strategic Dialogue must continue, African leaders must reinvent themselves to become more committed to true democracy, human rights, poverty alleviation and people-oriented policies and combat blatant corruption if the objectives of this intercontinental engagement have to yield meaningful and fruitful results for this generation and generations of unborn Indians and Africans.

NOTES


2. Ibid.


15. Ibid.

16. Brown and Crawford, no. 11, p.11.
18. Mwaniki, no.17, p.5.
20. Ibid.
22. Maathai, no.13, p.256.
23. Ibid.
24. Brown and Crawford, no. 11, p. 44.
28. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
37. Crenshaw, no.31, p. 41.
India was always close to Africa, having fully supported the anti-colonial struggle and anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. There has been regular exchange of people, ideas, trade and commerce between India and Africa for centuries. India’s maritime neighbourhood extends to the eastern part of the African continent. The Indian diaspora in Africa is large and old, though fragmented. But, thanks to globalisation, the world is shrinking. India and Africa are once again coming together.

This time around Indo-African ties are being cemented by growing economic cooperation, greater people to people contacts and brighter prospects for the future. The recent coming together of India and Africa is an outcome of the dramatic geopolitical changes that have taken place since the end of the Cold War. Africa is fast shedding its earlier tag of the ‘dark continent’ and is rapidly occupying an important place in the global geopolitical order. Several African countries have registered good economic growth. India has also sustained high economic growth in recent years. Mutual complementarities exist for further deepening of relations between the two sides. India, after the Cold War, liberalised its economy, acquired nuclear capability and is coming onto the global mainstream after the Indo-US nuclear deal. The rising economy, technological leapfrogging, vast markets, abundant human resources, domestic reforms which are
propelling inclusive growth, has made the world notice India. India’s close and historic ties with the people of Africa forged during the anticolonial, anti-apartheid struggle forms the basis of India-Africa relations.

The India-Africa Forum Summit provides the platform for deeper engagement between India and the countries of the African continent. The new relationship is not based on mere sentiments. The convergence of national interest on both sides propels the new relationship. India is helping the countries of the African continent build new societies. Indian projects in Africa are designed to build capacities and help African people build societies in the way they like. Bilateral trade has grown rapidly in the last few years and has crossed $50 billion. In return, Africa is helping India fulfil some of its energy demands. Indian companies have made large investments in Africa in recent years, helping create jobs.

India and Africa are both affected by global security issues. The Indian Ocean has emerged as a major route for global trade and also as a hotspot of piracy. Africa’s oil and mineral wealth has attracted worldwide attention. China’s insatiable demand for minerals and natural resources is satisfied to a great extent by Africa. Numerous conflicts within Africa invite intervention of outside powers. African countries are also finding their well deserved place in the global power hierarchy. The African Union (AU) has become an important regional organisation. The geopolitical environment is changing rapidly in favour of further deepening of India-Africa ties. Both India and Africa have acquired international clout. They can cooperate with each other without depending upon Western munificence. Global economic imbalances have caused a lot of economic uncertainty. The United States may be tipping into a recession. Euro-zone sovereign debt crisis may spread to other areas. An economic recession in the world will adversely impact Africa and India. Energy, food and health security are the top priority issues in the world today. Both sides are cooperating closely in these areas. Africa is important for India in fulfilling the latter’s energy demands. Over the years India has increased its crude oil imports from Africa. The main suppliers from Africa are Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Egypt and Sudan. India and Africa, home to large, poor populations are affected by food scarcity and high prices of cereal. India can play an important role in the development of agriculture in Africa. Cooperation in fishing is also being explored. At the same time, Piracy in the high seas and
in coastal areas has become a global menace. The Indian navy is involved in patrolling and anti-piracy operations in the Somalian waters. Somalian pirates have been seen near the Indian coast. The key issue is how to deal with state failure in Somalia and engage the unemployed youth gainfully.

Similarly, both sides have similar positions on international terrorism. Terrorist groups have found shelter in some African counties. Some of these have links with Al Qaeda, which is active in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Trafficking of narcotics and drugs is a growing issue of concern. Some mafias and gangs from Africa are regularly apprehended in India for drug trafficking. Similarly, climate change will adversely impact islands in the Indian Ocean and also lead to destruction of coral reefs. India and Africa will both be affected. They can cooperate in dealing with this threat. Growing health issues and pandemics find resonance on both sides. Indian pharmaceutical sector has helped in supplying cheap anti-AIDS drugs to African countries. India has also identified climate change as an important issue of concern and is in the forefront of the global debate on climate change. Now climate change is not one country’s problem, it is a global problem. Domestically, India has a national action plan on climate change and it consists of several major missions which include solar, water, wasteland development, energy efficiency and also building a network of information and scientific knowledge on climate change. So there is whole range of capacity building, training, research and development on climate change happening within India. India and Africa can focus on this issue and see how they can be of help to each other.

India and the African countries are also seeking to cooperate at the multilateral level. Both sides are interested in democratisation of the UNSC. They have similar positions in WTO, on climate change and poverty reduction. India and other emerging powers like South Africa are playing important roles in IBSA and BRICS and in the emergence of a multipolar world. The Indian Diaspora is global. Over three million people of Indian origin are present across the African continent. In many countries Indians have played a critical role in social and economic life. In the new geopolitical scenario, the Diaspora is becoming increasingly important. Therefore, India should take the help of the Indian Diaspora to build closer ties with Africa.

In terms of security cooperation, India can fulfil some of the security needs of the African countries. India has defence cooperation
with some countries. The Indian navy has also provided security at the time of important pan-African events. There is need for both sides to strengthen their strategic dialogue and form a cooperative security relationship amongst themselves. The India-Africa Forum is an important platform and signifies deepening of South-South cooperation. The changing global security scenario provides additional reason for cooperation between the two sides. Both sides have adopted the Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation to supplement the existing framework. There is however a pressing need to go beyond the ritual and rhetoric of summits and install a more concrete and a multi-layered strategic dialogue that covers the whole year in terms of operation. With growing Islamic fundamentalism in some quarters of Africa along with the unrelenting menace of piracy, enhancing security cooperation for combating maritime threats and counter-terrorism operations has become a necessity. True, there is an urgent need to reform the UN Security Council, but Africa and India have to work in tandem and with greater solidarity in order to capitalise on the growing power of non-Western countries and make the prospect of a reformed global world order a closer reality.

It is important to recognise that Africa now has numerous contenders clamouring to partake in the hefty share in the African growth story. Ultimately, it is Africa that will take the final call on whom to collaborate with. India can bank on the legacy of years of anti-colonial South-South solidarity to carve a highly beneficial and a mutually sustaining partnership based on African resources and Indian expertise.
Introduction
This paper assesses the role of the United Nations (UN) in resolving African conflict from 1990 to date. We argue that the UN will not be able to keep peace in Africa without collaborating with the African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and in proving this point, our empirical study focuses on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Thus, the UN’s prospects for conflict resolution in Africa can only be enhanced if its peacekeeping efforts are properly coordinated and well integrated into the conflict management and resolution mechanisms of the AU and the RECs. In that regard, the paper begins with an assessment of UN engagement in Africa conflict resolution processes and its changing dynamics since the end of the Cold War era. Next, we explore some of the peacekeeping collaborative efforts between the UN and ECOWAS as well as the AU to demonstrate the significance of cooperation and partnerships in addressing African conflicts. More significantly, attention is given to the UN/AU collaborative efforts in Darfur-Sudan and UN/ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone and eventually La Cote d’Ivoire. An analysis of the lessons learnt from these peacekeeping partnerships and implications for future policy is the subject of the subsequent section. The paper concludes with some available options for future UN partnerships involving the AU and ECOWAS.
UN Engagement in African Conflict Resolution Processes: Assessing Past Legacies and Changing Dynamics

Peacekeeping operations undertaken by the UN in Africa has historically had mixed results. While there were some noticeable successes, as in Namibia and Mozambique, UN peacekeeping attracted most attention for its bitter setbacks in Rwanda and Somalia in the early 1990’s. Following the decline in Cold War tensions, peacekeeping operations were established in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia. Although these missions were largely perceived to be successful, the subsequent missions in Somalia and Rwanda were deemed as failures.

In Somalia, the UN and the United States had to pull out, leaving the country with no government after lack of progress in peace talks and several military disasters that killed eighteen US soldiers in October 1993. The bitter experience in Somalia highlighted the futility of deploying peacekeeping operations without adequate logistics, resources, inadequate political will and with warring factions that pursue their interest through military means, other than negotiations.

The consequences of the UN’s retreat from Somalia became apparent in Rwanda when it watched from the sidelines as 800,000 people were killed in the 1994 genocide. The debacle in Somalia and Rwanda contributed to a situation where the UN became reluctant to commit international resources and political capital associated with deploying peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s. To be more precise, UN peacekeepers became conspicuously absent in African conflicts such that while in 1993 the number of peacekeepers were about 40,000, by 1999, the number had decreased to less than 16000. Peacekeeping operations also dwindled from seven in 1993 to three in 1999. But it is also imperative to note that the retreat of the major powers in the immediate post-Cold War period from engaging in African conflicts also contributed to this situation.

From the early 1990s and beyond, the security vacuum created by UN disengagement led to a widely held perception that it was neglecting it primary responsibility of ensuring peace and stability on the continent. This perception was particularly reinforced when ECOWAS for example had to bear the burden of peacekeeping responsibility in Liberia and subsequently in Sierra Leone. It became quite axiomatic that the world body was hamstrung in terms of resources, thereby making it incapable of resolving the complex conflicts engulfing the continent. Even more revealing was the fact that the
complex nature of African conflicts necessitated a collective approach premised on effective cooperation and partnerships.\textsuperscript{10}

Meanwhile, the retrenchment of the UN in Africa was accompanied by a rise in the role of regional and sub-regional organisations in peace-making, peacekeeping and enforcement actions.\textsuperscript{11} The consequences of the UN abdication contributed to a sense of African solidarity in finding African solutions to African problems. Thus, there emerged a growing belief in Africa that Africa’s problem could only be effectively addressed by African themselves. This idea led to rapid developments within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now AU, ECOWAS, Southern African Development Community (SADC) and other sub-regional organisations of mechanisms to address conflicts. The OAU created a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution in 1993 whilst SADC adopted an organ on Politics, Defense and Security. ECOWAS on the other hand supported the establishment of a mechanism of conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping and security in 1998.\textsuperscript{12} Important peacekeeping initiatives were undertaken by the OAU in Burundi and Central African Republic whiles ECOWAS through its ECOWAS Ceasefire-Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) deployed the first African led and funded peacekeeping mission to Liberia in 1990 and subsequently in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau.\textsuperscript{13} SADC also deploy to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Lesotho.\textsuperscript{14}

After almost a decade of retrenchment and reassessment of UN operations in Africa, a more positive mood began in mid 1999. But it is instructive to note that at the time the UN sought to re-engage Africa, African states and regional organisations had already demonstrated strong political will and commitment to deal with existing and emerging conflicts.\textsuperscript{15} Although as Adebajo posits, the realities of lack of unity, capacity and resources constraints stymied the aspirations of African leaders as well as the hopes of a self-run security system.\textsuperscript{16} The pivotal role played by regional organisations in peacekeeping efforts especially that of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone focused UN attention on the need for potential partnerships in resolving complex emergencies, as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{17}

Consequently, deliberations in the UN about possible increased cooperation with regional organisations gained momentum with the launch of the Secretary-General’s report in 1998 on “The causes of conflict
and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa.”

In the report, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan specifically mentioned that:

Within the context of United Nations primary responsibility for matters of international peace and security, providing support for regional and sub-regional initiatives in Africa is both necessary and desirable. Such support is necessary because the UN lacks capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa. It is desirable because wherever possible the international community should strive to compliment rather than supplant African efforts to resolve African problems.¹⁸

Subsequently, the Secretary-General launched other reports that emphasised the need for UN cooperation with regional organisations in peacekeeping. These include: the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations in August 2000 known as “Brahimi Report”; the December 2004 report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change; the March 2005 follow-up to the High-Level Panel, In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all; and the April 2008 report on the African Union-United Nations Panel on the modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations, also known as “Prodi Report.” These reports provided important areas for UN collaboration with regional organisations in addressing international peace and security challenges.¹⁹ It was also evident from all these reports that the UN faces particular challenges in Africa and without the necessary collaboration with regional organisations, it was unlikely to succeed in bringing lasting peace to the continent. The complexity of modern peacekeeping operations in particular meant that no single organisation could tackle the challenge on its own.²⁰ Recent and ongoing conflicts in countries such as Somalia, Darfur region of Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and La Cote d’Ivoire are testament of this fact.

Accordingly, a number of UN resolutions to address conflicts in Africa highlighted the vital role regional organisations could play in terms of preventive diplomacy, early warning systems, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding efforts.²¹ With the growth in UN engagement in Africa emerged an important and unique practice where an initial peacekeeping deployment by either the AU or ECOWAS was replaced with a multi-functional UN operation. This cooperation has continued to expand since 1999 with the UN initial takeover of the ECOWAS deployment in Sierra Leone. But as noted by Boulden, this
practice or relationship has remained largely undefined.\textsuperscript{22} Out of the total eight African initiated peacekeeping operations since 1990, four have eventually been succeeded by UN-led peacekeeping missions and one is currently led jointly in Darfur region of Sudan.\textsuperscript{23} Table 1 below illustrates the African-led peacekeeping interventions succeeded by the UN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African Peacekeeping Operation</th>
<th>Succeeding UN Peacekeeping Missions</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. ECOMOG in Liberia, 1990</td>
<td>UN Observer mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, 2008</td>
<td>UN mission in Sierra Leone, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ECOMOG in Cote d’Ivoire, 2003/2004</td>
<td>UN mission in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. AU mission in Burundi (AMIB), 2003/2004</td>
<td>UN operation in Burundi (BONUB), 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. AU mission in Sudan, 2004/2007</td>
<td>UN-AU Hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. ECOMOG in Guinea Bissau, 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. AU mission in Comoros, 2007/2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 2007</td>
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Source: DPKO.

UN Cooperation with AU and ECOWAS in Peacekeeping
The framework for UN collaboration with regional organisations and arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security is provided under the chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Article 52 in particular, calls for regional arrangements or agencies which are organised consistently with purposes and principles of the Charter to help with the resolution of local disputes. However, until the early post-Cold War era, there was no lasting and well-defined relationship between the UN and regional organisations.\textsuperscript{24} It was the launching of the Secretary-General’s report entitled “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping” in 1992 that however, brought to the fore new thoughts concerning how regional organisations could be partnered to advance international peace and security.\textsuperscript{25} Although this did not receive much attention until the latter part of the 1990’s, the aftermath of the Brahimi report in 2000 has witnessed a much deeper collaboration and relationship between the UN and regional organisations in the areas of peace and security. And nowhere is this
more practically demonstrated than the UN’s collaborative efforts with the AU and ECOWAS in Africa. Responding to and collaborating with the AU and ECOWAS has demonstrated beyond doubt that when collaboration between the UN and regional organisations is properly implemented, it goes a long way towards bringing success. Important examples include the UN collective efforts with AU in Burundi and Sudan as well as ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire. The next section will discuss some of these practical experiences both at the continental and regional levels between the UN and regional organisations in Africa. It will specifically focus on the collaborative efforts between the UN and ECOWAS in Liberia and then discuss the UN/AU joint operation in Darfur-Sudan. However, the analysis will be extended to cover other co-deployment interventions in countries such as La Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Burundi.

**ECOWAS and UN in Liberia**

In 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor instigated a rebellion against the Liberian President, Samuel Doe. Citing humanitarian crises and regional instability to justify intervention, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, ECOMOG was deployed to Monrovia despite objections from Taylor’s NPFL. Meanwhile calls on the UN and United States by President Doe to intervene in the conflict failed. The ECOMOG forces were mandated to supervise a ceasefire and established an interim government, which was to organise an election after a year. After several failed peace talks in Bamako, Lome, Yamoussoukro and Monrovia, a peace agreement was finally brokered between the warring factions in Cotonou, Benin (Cotonou Agreement) in 1993 under the aegis of the UN, ECOWAS and the OAU. The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was subsequently established in 1994 to support ECOMOG in ensuring compliance and impartial implementation of the agreement by all parties.

This was the first joint UN and regional peacekeeping mission undertaken by the UN in cooperation with a peacekeeping mission already set up by another organisation thus ECOWAS in this regard. It also reflects the different but complementary roles that regional and international organisations can play in resolving localised conflicts. The lack of progress toward the implementation of the Cotonou agreement as result of resumed fighting among the Liberian factions led to the
negotiation of two additional supplementary agreements: Akosombo Agreement; and Accra Agreement in December 2004. With a ceasefire in force, UNOMIL and ECOWAS successfully supervised the conduct of elections in 1997, leading to the inauguration of Mr. Charles Taylor as the President. UNOMIL’s mandate expired in 1997 and was replaced with the UN Peace-building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) which was tasked to assist the new government in consolidating the peace following the elections.

However, in 2003 the lack of understanding between the government and opposition party leaders over key issues of governance led to the resumption of civil war in Liberia. To facilitate the efficient implementation of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Accra by the Liberian parties following the conflict, a multidimensional operation, UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established. The UNSC resolution 2008 authorises UNMIL until September 2011. UNMIL took over peacekeeping responsibilities from the ECOWAS mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) that was already on the ground who were later ‘re-hatted’ as UN peacekeepers. The continued presence of UNMIL contributed to stabilising the security situation in Liberia, allowing the government to undertake all measures necessary to consolidate the peace. It is useful to note that the deployment of UNMIL like UNOMIL was made possible because of the initial stabilisation interventions of ECOWAS through ECOMOG and ECOMIL. Although ECOWAS interventions has been complicated by geopolitical rivalries, cleavages within ECOWAS itself and debilitating arguments about its legitimacy, its peacekeeping efforts paved the way for the establishment of a more robust UN operation. There is therefore no doubt in suggesting that the cooperation between the UN and ECOWAS since the inception of the Liberian conflict has led to the peace dividends achieved so far in the country.

UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur: A New Paradigm Shift in Peacekeeping Cooperation

In 2003, the Darfur region of Sudan was plague by violent conflict between the government and a pro-government militia, Janjaweed; and two rebel groups namely the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). In the wake of the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the warring factions, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) deployed the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in June 2004. With an initial strength of 60
military observers and 300 soldiers, the deteriorating security situation compelled the AU to gradually expand AMIS strength to over 7000 personnel in 2007, including 5,197 protection force personnel, 946 military observers and 1,360 civilian police.\textsuperscript{36}

AMIS was tasked to monitor and observe compliance with the ceasefire agreement; undertake confidence building initiatives; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; assist internal displaced persons (IDPs); and ensure the overall security in Darfur.\textsuperscript{37} Later the mandate of AMIS was expanded to include the protection of civilians in imminent danger and in the immediate vicinity of the troops. Although the presence of AMIS helped to achieve some semblance of stability in Darfur, the mission came under serious international pressure for failing to respond appropriately to the worsening security situation in the country.\textsuperscript{38} The mission floundered primarily because it was constrained in terms of its limited mandates, inadequate resources and capacity. According to Appiah-Mensah, a former military advisor at the AMIS headquarters, for instance, due to the funding and logistic challenges the mission at one point had to operate about half of its critical force enablers such as vehicles, ICT equipment and other logistical requirements.\textsuperscript{39} But it is also worthwhile to note that the boycott of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) by some factions of the SLA and JEM also contributed to the worsening of the situation.\textsuperscript{40}

As the mission evolved into a complex peacekeeping operation, the uncertainty regarding its financial sustainability led the AU PSC in 2006 to request the UN Security Council (UNSC) to take control of the mission.\textsuperscript{41} Subsequently, the UNSC in a presidential statement (S/PRST/2006/5) and the adoption of resolutions 1663 and 1679 in 2006 called for a joint AU/UN technical assessment mission to the Sudan to assess the requirements for strengthening AMIS and the possible transition to a UN peace operation.\textsuperscript{42} The outcome of this assessment was UNSC resolution 1706 which authorised the expansion of the UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) into Darfur. Resolution 1706 also requested the consent of the Government of Sudan as a pre-condition for the deployment of a multidimensional UN peace operation in Darfur. While the government of Sudan agreed to logistical support for AMIS by the UN, European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), it vehemently resisted any deployment of Blue Helmets in Darfur.\textsuperscript{43}

Upon mounting concerns about the inability and ineffectiveness
of AMIS in addressing the security situation in Darfur, the Secretary-General proposed a three-phased approach to augment AMIS. These included the deployment of a light support package; deployment of a heavy support package; and implementation of a hybrid operation in Darfur, for which back-stopping and command and control structures will be provided by the UN. This recommendation was subsequently endorsed by a high-level consultative meeting of the UN, AU, Sudanese government, Arab League and the European Union in November 2006. Meanwhile the Sudanese government continued to resist the establishment of a hybrid operation in Darfur. Intensive diplomacy by the UN, AU and several actors in the international community in 2007 resulted in the acceptance of the Sudanese government for the deployment of an AU/UN hybrid operation. However, the government of Sudan demanded that the Hybrid operation should have a predominantly African character and the troops should, as far as possible, be sourced from African countries.

Adopting resolution 1769 in July 2007, the Security Council authorised the establishment of the AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) for an initial period of 12 months. UNAMID incorporated AMIS and formally took over peacekeeping responsibilities from AMIS in January 2008. In accordance with the resolution 1769 and the 2007 report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission, UNAMID was mandated to protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers; support early and effective implementation of the DPA, prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks; and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan. This mandate was extended in 2011 with the adoption of UNSC resolution 2003 (2011) for a 12 month period.

The transition from AMIS to UNAMID was not without challenges. The first was the issue of control and command especially at the strategic level between the UN and AU. Mechanisms to guide against disagreement that may arise at the strategic level are lacking in the resolutions. Moreover, the lack of cooperation from the government of Sudan obstructed the initial deployment and operations of the mission. For instance, in spite of the presence of UNAMID, the government of Sudan continued to conduct military offensive that killed many civilians. The movement of contingent owned equipment was also hampered with the high level of insecurity in Darfur. But
since it authorisation UNAMID has undoubtedly played an important role in maintaining peace in Darfur.

**Lessons Learnt**

So what can we learn from the UN cooperation with AU and ECOWAS in peacekeeping? First, the sequencing of operations between the UN and AU as well as ECOWAS has so far worked well. AU and ECOWAS have demonstrated the value of undertaking high-risk stabilisation missions needed for a long-term post-conflict resolution. This is what the Brahimi report termed as the ‘No Peace to keep’ type of missions. However, their ability to effectively implement their respective mandates or sustain a long-term commitment has been constricted due to the lack of logistics, personnel and financial systems needed to sustain the missions. In contrast, while the UN is reluctant to deploy peacekeeping missions in situations where there is ‘no peace to keep’ like Somalia, it has shown the capacity to sustain and backstop peacekeeping missions in terms of funding and providing logistics. It is therefore not unexpected that this trend has emerged where the AU or ECOWAS initially deploys to stabilise a conflict situation, and thereafter the UN takes over. This has been successfully demonstrated in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and recently in Darfur-Sudan.

Secondly, the importance of matching mission objectives with the needed capacity within a specific time frame cannot be underestimated. The UN, AU and ECOWAS, all suffer from this challenge. The examples of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone as well as AMIS and UNAMID are testament to this capacity gap. These missions underscores the significance to ensure that missions are deployed with adequate resources or risked being fraught with serious challenges. Such limitations hinder the efficient implementation of mission mandates and also signal to the conflicting parties of a lack of political will on the part of the UN, AU or ECOWAS. In Sudan for instance, the lack of resources of AMIS troops to even defend themselves led to the killing of ten AU peacekeepers in 2007, when the mission base was attacked outside of Haskanita. UNAMID also faced a related attack in 2008 killing seven peacekeepers and wounding twenty personnel in North Darfur. Similarly in Liberia, although the 2003 comprehensive peace agreement between the Liberian parties in Accra called on ECOMIL to verify compliance with the agreement, the mission lacked the capacity to even deploy beyond the areas immediately surrounding Monrovia. The situation was even worse
in La Côte d’Ivoire during the recent post-electoral violence. Though the UN operation in La Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) had the mandate to protect civilians, its inadequate capabilities hindered its effective operations in the wake of growing humanitarian crises.\textsuperscript{56} Closely related to the above is the issue of ensuring that mission mandates are clear, coherent, flexible and sensitive to the security situation at the theatre of conflict. It is crucial that mandates are realistic with respect to recognising the sustainability of resources and capacity of peacekeepers once they are deployed. This will enable missions to accomplish their mandated task and especially protect civilians as well as to ensure their own safety at the operational zone. Emerging concepts such as ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) for instance, can never be achieved if peacekeeping operations continue to be under-resources with very weak mandates.\textsuperscript{57} In Sierra Leone for example, due to the weak mandate, a number of ECOMOG and UN peacekeepers were killed, taken hostage and stripped of their weapons by the rebel groups.\textsuperscript{58}

The fourth lesson is the significance of cooperation at all levels, be it political, economic and military. In Darfur, the lack of consensus between the Government of Sudan with the AU and UN complicated efforts to deploy UNAMID troops and equipments. The implementation of the UNSCR 1706 for instance failed because the Government of Sudan resisted accepting a full-blown UN multi-functional peacekeeping. Disagreements between China and some members of the Security Council also hindered the UN efforts in Sudan.

**Building on the Gains So Far: Options for Future UN Collaboration with AU and ECOWAS**

In fostering a more unified approach, the UN partnership with the AU and ECOWAS must be built on a shared vision and on comparative advantages. While the AU in particular foresaw the need to promote closer cooperation with the UN in article 17 of its 2002 “Protocol on Establishment of the Peace and Security Council”, the UN is yet to develop a clear framework for cooperation.\textsuperscript{59} Although the role of regional organisations is captured in the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, its interpretation remains ambiguous. The UN needs to develop a more structured and formalised relationship, characterised by mutual respect instead of focusing on cooperation on a case by case basis or in a specific context. This will help to maximise the comparative advantage
they all possess in order to ensure appropriate division of labour.\textsuperscript{60} An enhanced partnership under the Chapter VIII of the UN charter will help especially in situations where an AU or ECOWAS mission is envisaged to be taken over by the UN in the longer term.\textsuperscript{61}

The resource and capacity requirements needed to achieve mission success should be given particular attention. The AU and ECOWAS have shown their willingness and demonstrated positive dividends in terms of briskly reacting to conflict situation on the continent. However, they both lack the financial, material, logistics and human resources needed to sustain even relatively small-scale peace operation. The UN, donor agencies and bilateral partners should direct their resources in a coordinated and focused manner towards helping the AU and ECOWAS to enhance their capacity. More significantly, ensuring that the African Standby Force (ASF) of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) becomes genuinely operational should be a matter of necessity. Ideally, external capacity-building initiatives should be demand-driven and respond to identifiable needs of AU or ECOWAS, instead of being externally motivated.

Conclusion

Peacekeeping has been one of the UN’s key instruments in addressing conflict situations in Africa. However, in recent times, the UN has come under severe resource and capacity constraints reducing its reach and operational effectiveness. Although it has made tremendous efforts in resolving conflicts in Africa, it faces an unprecedented demand to deploy and manage multiple and complex peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{62} In this paper we sought to assess the role of UN peacekeeping in resolving African conflict since the demise of the Cold War. The paper argued that the UN’s prospects for conflict resolution in Africa centers on its ability to enhance partnerships and cooperation with the AU or ECOWAS. The UN cannot alone keep peace in Africa without collaborating with these organisations. The experiences of the UN peacekeeping interventions with the AU and ECOWAS in Liberia, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and recently Darfur-Sudan are symptomatic of the importance of these collective efforts. Though these co-deployments and joint operations have yielded some positive dividends, several challenges still remain that need to be effectively tackled to ensure mutually reinforcing relationships. Among these issues is the need for a more structured and formalised relationship, characterised by partnership and mutual respect to maximise the
comparative advantage that both organisations exercise and to ensure appropriate division of labour. Moreover, the resource and capacity requirements needed to achieve mission success should be a matter of priority. The UN must coordinate all international assistance to avoid duplication of efforts and also help build capacity for the APSA and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework.

NOTES


10. Ibid.


12. For more information See the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security; the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, Regulation MSC/REG/. 1/01/08; and Protocol (A/SP/12/01) on Democracy and Good Governance.


15. Aning, no.9.

16. Adehbo, no.7.

17. United Nations, no.11; See also The Charter of the United Nations.

18. UN Secretary-General, no.6, p. 9.


21. For more information on how regional organisation can help in preventive diplomacy, early warning and peacekeeping see The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF).


27. Ibid.


29. See the Decision A/DEC.2/11/90, Relating to the Adoption of an ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia and the Entire West African Sub-Region.


36. The authorised ceiling on AMIS personnel allowed for 10,000 soldiers and 1,500 police officers.

39. Ibid.
40. Murithi, 2009, no.34.
42. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
49. Murithi, no.34.
55. See A/63/666-S/2008/813.
56. For more information see Kwesi Aning and S. Atuobi, 2011, ‘Promoting Peace and Stability in La Cote d’Ivoire: Negotiating the cost of International Inaction and the need for decisive action’ KAIPTC Policy Brief 5.YEAR?
60. See A/63/666-S/2008/813
61. Ibid.

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The Decision A/DEC.2/11/90, Relating to the Adoption of an ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia and the Entire West African Sub-Region.

The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, Regulation MSC/REG/. 1/01/08.


While some academic studies seem to conclude that conflicts have actually been on the decline in recent years, it does not seem that way when one looks around the world. There is no shortage of flashpoints to consume the energies of the international community. Crises and conflicts are not disappearing as much as they are evolving. They are still overtaxing the ability of governments as well as regional and global institutions.

Though the responsibility for conflict prevention rests with the individual states, the maintenance of international peace and security is the primary responsibility of the Security Council as mandated by the UN Charter. In fulfilling this responsibility UN peacekeeping missions have emerged as the preferred tool for managing conflicts. And over the years such missions have grown in complexity and scope. With more blue helmets deployed in the field than at any time in its history, UN peacekeeping has been straining under the burden of trying to contain conflicts. Indeed, while in 2000 only about 20,000 personnel were deployed for UN peacekeeping, today about 120,000 personnel are deployed in 15 UN peacekeeping missions, of which seven are in Africa. The budget for UN peacekeeping now stands at $8.5 billion. The global financial crisis, meanwhile, only adds to the sense of fatigue because of the massive cost of far-away conflicts and their aftermath. Even so, a point that may be made is that India, which has
a tremendous record in UN peacekeeping has the distinction of having participated in every UN peacekeeping operation deployed in Africa commencing with the deployment of two successive brigade strength contingents in the Congo (ONUC) between 1960 and 1964.

The peacekeeping commitment has wider implications for member states, the United Nations secretariat and stakeholders with respect to decision-making, allocation of resources, and management of crisis situations. Faced with the unprecedented rise in the number and scale of such operations, it is time for the international community to explore and fully exploit the benefits inherent in transforming its culture of response after conflict, into a culture of prevention to forestall violent conflicts and incalculable losses. A great deal of good work has been done in this respect, particularly as regards the benefits of mediation, conflict resolution and conflict management. By way of example, in concert with regional actors, the United Nations staged a rapid political intervention in Guinea following the violence of September 2009, thereby averting the threat of civil war and obviating the need for the deployment of peacekeeping troops. Similarly, the involvement of the ECOWAS Special Envoy in the Niger helped in dousing a potentially explosive political crisis with possible violent consequences. Following the 2002 ruling of the International Court of Justice, Secretary-General Kofi Annan successfully mediated the arrangements for the transfer of sovereignty between Nigeria and Cameroon in relation to the Bakassi peninsula. More recently, the continuing support provided by the United Nations for the conduct of elections, for socio-economic recovery programmes and security sector reform are all part of a slew of political solutions for maintaining peace, particularly in Guinea. Notwithstanding success stories like these, the United Nations still lacks a coherent, overarching strategy to ensure that conflict prevention is pursued and achieved in an integrated manner, making the best use of the tools and agencies at its disposal and of those within regional organisations, in a manner that effectively discharges the obligations, under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, for the pacific settlement of disputes.

The conceptual shift in United Nations thinking and action in conflict prevention can be traced to the 1992 report of the Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace, which defined preventive diplomacy as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur”. The 2001 report of the UN Secretary-
General on the prevention of armed conflict (S/2001/574 and Corr.1) went a step further in recognising the critical importance of prevention by acknowledging that “the primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national Governments and other local actors” and “the role of the United Nations is principally to assist national governments and their local counterparts in finding solutions to their problems by offering support for the development of national and regional capacities for early warning, conflict prevention and long-term peace-building”. Emanating from this policy prescription, the role of United Nations support has evolved beyond the confines of conflict management, which had been the traditional purview of the political and peacekeeping departments of the United Nations. It now recognises that a multidisciplinary and integrated approach to contemporary conflicts is required to complement tools such as mediation, negotiation and good offices, with a range of new process-oriented development tools for inter-group confidence-building, dialogue processes, and skills for building and consolidating the mediation capacities of society.

In order to foster peace and fulfil the aims of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, it is imperative that international and regional organisations promote strategies involving early identification and appropriate intervention in conflict situations in order to build confidence, trust, and above all, prevent the onset of violence between opposing parties. This can be done by presenting the peaceful alternative as a more attractive prospect or a less costly way of achieving a given end. Such interventions might range from promoting intercultural dialogue to more coercive techniques like targeted sanctions.

The Security Council and member states in the developing world, African countries in particular, are among the most enthusiastic supporters of such measures. At a special session on preventive diplomacy in Africa held in 2010, Council members were strongly united in calling for the swifter and more frequent use of this tool as a way to save lives and scale back costly military commitments on the continent. Needless to say, it would be prudent to dwell on this concept seriously at the regional level particularly in the context of the emerging phenomenon of the Responsibility to Protect.

African nations have demonstrated their commitment to peace and security as is evident from the work of regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa. The Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) has established a number of conflict prevention mechanisms including early warning systems for conflict prevention in the Gambia, Benin, Liberia and Burkina Faso. As part of its efforts, ECOWAS also established the Mediation and Security Council, the Defence and Security Commission and the Council of Elders. Furthermore, the African Union has put in place several conflict prevention mechanisms, such as the Peace and Security Council and the Panel of the Wise, as part of its overarching peace and security architecture.

Issues of alternative dispute resolution in Africa have come before the Security Council on multiple occasions and the matter has been extensively debated within the Council over the years. Thus, the Council held a high-level meeting on the subject in September 2008 and an open debate on April 21, 2009, both of which strengthened the collective commitment to the use of preventive diplomacy within the Security Council. In January 2010, the Security Council reaffirmed its intention:

...to promote closer and more operational cooperation between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organisations in the fields of conflict early warning, prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building, and to ensure the coherence, synergy and collective effectiveness of their efforts.

While these developments are to be applauded, they do not go so far as to set out a comprehensive policy and strategy to complement to the current peacekeeping model. Peacekeeping is not the only available tool for conflict resolution and management. Depending on settings and opportunities, preventive diplomacy tools, such as conflict prevention, mediation, good offices, fact-finding missions, negotiation, use of special envoys, informal consultations, peace-building and targeted development activities, can be more useful, cost-effective and less risky in delivering desired peace dividends. These strategies can support military activity by addressing discord at the political level, thereby diverting actors from the path of conflict. The development of the United Nations human resource capacity dedicated to mediation and related activities is evidence of a growing commitment to such initiatives.

As a powerful set of tools to facilitate peace-building and to operationalize the obligations of the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter, preventive diplomacy has the potential to unite, foster trust and cooperation, quell rising violence and, by forestalling
armed conflict with its negative consequences, maintain stability and foster peace while preserving the gains of development. The untapped potential therein warrants further investment of resources as the cost savings of such an outcome go well beyond the economic. The practicalities of accepting and implementing such a policy therefore need to be debated. An effective policy in favour of such preventive diplomacy would necessitate a cooperative approach to those regional and sub-regional organisations on the ground, which are implementing preventive diplomacy mechanisms. Accordingly, it is imperative that the directions offered by the Security Council in this respect be implemented with specificity, clarity and in a manner that supports, encourages and respects the role of relevant actors, including national Governments, the African Union, ECOWAS and the interests of neighbouring States.

There are a number of challenges associated with this initiative. It is necessary to identify and secure reliable sources of funding to ensure that the initiative can be operationalised. Efforts must also be made to build up preventive diplomacy capacity and expertise nationally, regionally and within the United Nations machinery, in a manner that harnesses the capacities in the United Nations Development Group, the United Nations Development Programme, the Peace-building Commission, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (including its Security Sector Reform Unit). The process of advancing the current cooperation between the United Nations and the regional and sub-regional actors in this regard must be carefully coordinated in order to integrate preventive diplomacy into the architecture of conflict prevention, peace-building and peacekeeping. Above all, it is necessary to muster the requisite political will to promote preventive diplomacy as a veritable tool for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is in the interests of the international community at large to unitedly follow a set of policies which would see preventive diplomacy employed as a matter of course in crisis situations, particularly in Africa.

The case for more robust political action for peace in the world’s hotspots rests on three simple propositions.

First, at the root of most conflicts that may, or perhaps already have turned violent, are political problems requiring political solutions. Security interventions can provide a breather from the bloodshed, but they rarely settle the underlying differences that drive
conflict, such as ethnic and religious questions or disparities of wealth and power.

Second, we know that distrust among national actors in conflicts often runs so high that they are unable to arrive at necessary compromises without help in the form of international mediation, facilitation or diplomatic encouragement. The UN or a regional arrangement like the African Union bring a special legitimacy, impartiality and, we hope, real competence to the table, as organisations that have no vested interest in these fights. They can also weigh in with their development, human rights and humanitarian machinery for a peace agreement and take the lead in the follow-on peace-building effort.

Third, we know there is place for political action before, during and after a conflict. Ideally we want to prevent violence from erupting in the first place. But even if that fails, robust diplomacy and mediation efforts are still required to end the fighting through negotiations, and then to help countries navigate the difficult politics of reconciliation and rebuilding. Too many nations fail at this last stage, and slide right back into conflict.

Let us now look at some of the essentials of successful preventive diplomacy. One is getting to the action quickly when trouble appears. Another key to success is being out there, close to the action and the players, with a finger on the pulse. Anyone who has worked for conflict resolution knows that proximity to the countries and deep knowledge of the actors is one of the most important assets. A political presence or active involvement in troubled countries is therefore critical to be able to make a difference. And this is feasible under AU mechanisms.

Effective diplomacy and mediation is not only about being there and being fast. It is also about being good at what is being attempted. Success requires more than simply naming a top flight envoy and starting up the plane. To the contrary, mediation is a complex and increasingly professionalised field. Envoys need more than their own wisdom, experience and guile to guide them. They need strong, well-trained staff support, and adequate funding and logistics. And they could benefit from well considered strategic advice. They must have at their fingertips the lessons learned from past and comparative experiences, as they take on a new mediation challenge. This is the unglamorous reality behind the scenes of a mediation effort, but it can make or break the operation. To that end
AU should consider setting up a small team of world-class experts on issues such as power-sharing, constitutions, and cease-fires who can be deployed “on call” to help envoys in the field.

It may also be useful to develop standard guidance and training for mediators and their staff, distilling the best lessons from others’ experiences and debriefing all envoys at the completion of their assignments to identify what works and what does not. Finally, it would be appropriate to remind ourselves that the issue of sovereignty often looms larger whenever outsiders, be they regional organisations or the UN, become involved in trying to prevent conflict. It is therefore imperative that the various players are sensitive to this aspect and carefully calibrate the efforts being made.
Evolution of Somali Piracy

Piracy is said to be as old as man’s sea faring history, with piratical acts first recorded in the 13th century. Annual global annual losses from piracy range between $5 to 8.3 billion, approximately 0.3 per cent of the world’s shipping trade of approximately $8 trillion. Since 1995, there has been a worldwide growth in piracy with the largest increase being off the Somali coast, notably since early 1990’s.

Somali pirates are primarily interested in the ransom paid for the return of hijacked ships. It is viewed in Somalia as a lucrative business and something to aspire to. According to a Garowe resident, “they have money, they have power, they wed the most beautiful girls, they are building big homes, have new cars” Recent reports indicate that the pirates are now evolving a secondary objective for holding the crews of hijacked ships for exchanging them with arrested pirates. The pirates project themselves as being the unofficial Somali navy, protecting Somalia’s territorial water from illegal unregulated unlicensed fishing. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that fishing stocks along the east African coast have gone up as a result of the increased in piracy.
The pirates are organised in cells consisting of 20-35 year olds divided into those with maritime navigation skills (mainly former fishermen and naval officers); those with military skills (mainly ex militia or soldiers) and those with technical skills for operating geographical, navigational and communication equipment. A security blog\(^4\) states that there are four main groups operating off the Somali coast. These include the National Volunteer Coast Guard, based around Kismayo, the Marka group operating around the town of Marka, the Puntland groups and the self-styled “Somali marines”. Other reports dismiss the existence of identifiable groups but point to the existence of warlords who raise funds and organise piracy expeditions to the sea. The pirates are armed with sophisticated small arms. It should be noted that the pirates are not necessarily organised in a homogenous manner, some groups consist of pirates from multiple clans and villages. It is noteworthy that no two pirate attacks are the same and that there is evidence of use of captured “mother ships” to lure target ships or lull them into a false sense of security. Reports further suggest that weapons used by the pirates include AK-47’s, RPGs and launchers, hand grenades and pistols, currency counting machines and counterfeit detectors. A distinguishing factor of Somali piracy is the focus on the ransom, and not the value of the goods in the hijacked ships. Security analysts have concluded that the pirates have been successful because of inland support networks in Somalia and elsewhere including a network of informers in foreign ports.

Ransom is paid in US dollars and with the actual pirates getting only 30 per cent of the loot and the balance going the financiers and cost of the expedition. Between 2007 and 2010, the ransom amounts rose from $68 million to $238 million, according to the International Maritime Bureau, which keep tracks of piracy incidents and the ransom amount paid. These sums, it must be noted, are just estimates as shipping companies do not disclose the amounts paid. These figures are corroborated by the research conducted by Geopolicy\(^5\) which projects that Somali pirates will earn between $200 and 400 million by 2015 per annum. That piracy is a booming business is evidenced by the positive impact it has had on the Somali economy, ranking second to remittances in sources of money flowing to Somalia. The SWOT analysis below illustrates why piracy will continue to be a growing industry in Somalia.
### Piracy SWOT Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Increasing success has resulted in increasing ransom.</td>
<td>• The continuing willingness by shipping companies to pay increasingly higher sums in ransoms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Continuing insecurity provides a conducive environment for growth of piracy-easy availability of arms and human resource.</td>
<td>• The ability to invest in neighbouring states creates alternative livelihoods for “retiring” pirates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rational choice—piracy offers better opportunities compared to risks of boat migration and life as a militia</td>
<td>• Proximity to busy sea routes—Gulf of Aden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Community acceptance—styled as “coast guard” and as “raiding”</td>
<td>• Long coastline, Somalia coastline is 3898km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Victim complex—perception of international neglect of Somalia</td>
<td>• Easy availability of men with sea faring skills and trained ex-militia personnel.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Absence of law enforcement institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>• IUU fishing, earning approximately 400 million US$^6</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Allegations of toxic dumping off the coast of Somalia^7</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Threats</th>
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<td>• Moral decadence introduced by piracy money in “pirate towns” undermines societal cohesiveness.</td>
<td>• Increasing capacity of the Puntland and Somaliland anti-piracy operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Piracy is controlled by warlords who take most of the money while the majority get limited amounts.</td>
<td>• Increasing aggressiveness of the Naval powers</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• Links with al-Shabaab, a designated terrorist group.</td>
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In mid-November 2011, reports\(^8\) indicated that there had been 397 piracy attacks worldwide in 2011, with 39 being successful. The same report indicates that of these 223 and 26 respectively were linked to Somalia. 450 hostages were taken through the year, with 15 deaths. In November, IMB’s piracy reporting centre recorded Somali hostages as holding 11 ships and 194 hostages. The statistics and records kept by IMB indicate a rise in attacks, greater violence and more sophisticated techniques used by Somali pirates and the concerns regarding the over exposure of large tankers carrying oil and other flammable chemicals to firearm attacks. Concerns are also growing over the copycat piracy attacks in West Africa.\(^9\)
In mid-2011, the earlier trend of extending the theatre of operations continues. Most of the attacks in 2007 were confined to areas around southern Somalia. In 2008, the area of operation expanded to cover the entire Gulf of Aden, increasing in 2009 to 600 nautical miles, as far as the coast of Seychelles. Indeed, the designation of this phenomenon as piracy off the coast of Somalia is now inaccurate and should be replaced by either piracy in the Indian Ocean or piracy linked to Somali pirates. Concomitant with the expanded theatre of operation is the deployment by the pirates of sophisticated equipment including GPS and satellite phones, the change from opportunistic attacks to targeted attacks\textsuperscript{10} and increasing belligerence.\textsuperscript{11}

**Impact of Piracy on the Region and on Somalia**

Globally, piracy in general and that linked to the Somali pirates is stated to have had multiple consequences on shipping. These include: higher insurance premiums; increased transportation costs as ships tend to avoid the Gulf of Aden and take the longer Cape of Good Hope route;\textsuperscript{12} higher spends on self defence mechanisms and on-board security. On a positive note, piracy has led to global re-engagement with Somalia, resulting in an unprecedented support for the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia; partly because of the yet unsubstantiated fear, of al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda affiliate, infiltrating and using piracy to raise funds for terrorism.

The phenomenon has had a negative impact on coastal tourism in East Africa, affected infrastructural developments including causing a 200 km diversion of the off-shore fibre optic cable, undermined the credibility of the TFG and Puntland administrations, reduced the port and customs revenue of the region and has been an impediment to the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia. However, proceeds from piracy have created opportunities for development in towns such as Haradhere, Galkayo, Garowe and Bosasso; though with these opportunities has come increased inflation, drug abuse and a general breakdown of societal values and systems—akin to the effect of drug money in an economy. Some reports have suggested that proceeds from piracy have indeed been the mainstay of the Puntland economy, with the piracy income of $30 million being more than the $20 million budget of Puntland in 2008.

**International vs. Regional Response**

The international response to piracy linked to Somalia has been
prompted by the need to protect shipping lanes for purposes of facilitating global trade and to protect oil shipments as in the Gulf of Aden, the main link to the Middle East which is the epicentre of global energy resources.\textsuperscript{13} Other reasons for international action were: the need to protect humanitarian aid flows to Somalia,\textsuperscript{14} to protect seafarers, fishermen and passengers on ships sailing off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden and to reduce/eliminate criminal activity, such as illegal migration, and arms trafficking; and to disrupt terrorist logistics.\textsuperscript{15}

Numerous interventions to address the issue have been made at the global level. High Level meetings for improving international cooperation and coordination have been held and the establishment of the international contact group on piracy is the most significant outcome of this effort. Other global diplomatic efforts include the passing of UNSC resolutions and the creation of a database of pirates and piracy trends by Interpol\textsuperscript{16} which has been made available to law enforcement agents. The most controversial has been the military response, whereby global naval powers from over 25 countries have deployed ships off the coast of Somalia in an effort to prevent piracy.

Other measures: These responses have largely taken the form of legal instruments (international, regional and national) to counter international piracy, creating partnerships for information sharing and intelligence sharing and policing of the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden by using International Naval powers. As stated, more than 25 Naval powers have a presence off the coast of Somalia. These countries include Australia, Bahrain, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, Russia, Seychelles, Spain, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Turkey, Yemen and the US. These powers are either grouped under the US led CTF 151, the EU led EUNAV for Somalia or the NATO led Standing Maritime group. While other powers, such as, China, Japan, India and Russia, operate independently.

The UNSC in its various resolutions has sought to provide a legal basis for naval powers to enter Somalia’s territorial waters and to oblige member states to create legal regimes to counter international piracy. Some of the key UNSCRs include 1814 of 2008 which gives the authority for protection of Maritime Humanitarian Aid to Somalia following the numerous attacks on WFP convoys off the coast of Mogadishu. UNSCR 1816 of 2008 allows anti-piracy activities on Somali waters “upon request of the TFG and with notification of the UNSC”
in additional to calling for increasing cooperation and assistance to regional coastal states. Resolutions 1838 and 1846 both authorise increased naval deployments while UNSCR 1851 has approved land based operations against pirates and called for “ship rider” agreements, regional coordination centres and special prosecutorial arrangements. In April 2011, the UNSC adopted resolution 1976 which, riding on previous endorsements of naval cooperation fight piracy, recognised poverty as a contributing factor to Somali piracy and urged states to investigate allegations of illegal fishing and dumping, including that of toxic substances, in order to prosecute such offences. It is also considering the establishment of specialised Somali courts to try suspected pirates in Somalia in the region, including an extraterritorial, Somali, specialised anti-piracy court.

The UNODC has been engaged in creating the necessary legal capacities in the East Africa region.\(^{17}\) The establishment of the Contact Group on Piracy, with four working groups on military/operation issues, judicial issues, shipping awareness and public awareness is part of the international partnership arrangements. The contact group workings strengthen the international response on legal instruments, international cooperation and the protection of international trade. Recently as part of the law and order approach, INTERPOL took on the mandate to create and disseminate a database on pirates and piracy trends. The UNODC has also been engaged in a study regarding the proceeds of piracy, creating a new money laundering approach to containing the lords of piracy.

**Response to International Pressure?**
At the onset of the international effort to rein in Somali piracy, the UN convention on the law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which has universal jurisdiction over the crime of international piracy (*piracy jure gentium*), has been ratified by all IGAD countries except Eritrea and Ethiopia which have signed but not ratified. Further, all IGAD countries (save Eritrea and Somalia) had domestic laws criminalising piracy (no information on Sudan) but only Kenya and Uganda had provided universal jurisdiction in their laws relating to international piracy. This position was recently been challenged in Kenya and the High Court ruled that Kenya actually had no jurisdiction over *piracy jure gentium*. The Somalian Parliament also rejected an anti piracy bill. Thus in spite of concerted efforts to improve the legal framework to counter piracy and cooperation in the region, there is no evidence of any positive
change. There are no regional information exchange centres outside the Gulf and no reports of any anti-piracy naval deployment from the region. In any event, as has been aptly noted, “There is no naval force worth its name between Egypt and South Africa”.  

This lacklustre implementation of the international counter piracy agenda is attributable to many factors among them: the low of appreciation of the threat; capacity issues; and the low priority accorded to the strategy adopted by the International community. The first factor is easily is deemed untenable because of the negative impact of piracy on the region. The second factor is confirmed by the numerous UNSC resolutions urging support to states in the region and the capacity building engagements of agencies such as the UNODC. The third factor is slightly more complex. The IGAD region has been attempting to bring about stability in Somalia for over 20 years. This effort has been marked by a feeling, in the region, of the marked indifference of the international community after the failures of the UNOSOM I and II missions and the “black hawk down” incident. The region shares the view, with Somali, that the piracy menace put the Somali situation back on the global agenda. It is then not inconceivable that the region should want that the curse of piracy be used to save Somalia and bring stability to its people. The region’s focus is thus on securing and stabilising Somalia as a long term measure to counter piracy and not on efforts that largely deal with the symptoms, leaving the disease intact. This view of the region is borne out by various communications and statements.  

There is an assumption, in the region, sometimes borne out in the interviews with the pirates that Somali pirates largely lack the criminal intent, the mens rea, and many are just seeking to earn a day’s honest work. Additionally, the focus on stabilising Somalia is driven by the fear of possible linkages between Somali pirates and the region’s Al-Qaeda affiliate the Al-Shabaab. It is important to note here that the recent intervention by Kenya in Somalia is attributed to the kidnappings of tourists allegedly by Al-Shabaab elements. It has however been suggested that the kidnappings were in fact undertaken by pirates and not by the Al-Shabaab.

The Regional Response
The regional response has thus gone beyond creating partnerships and legal tools. The Djibouti Code of Conduct, adopted in January 2009 calls for partnerships that lead to closer cooperation and coordination.
It seeks the establishment of national focal points for information exchange and supports the establishment of piracy information exchange centres in Dar es Salaam, Mombasa and Sanaa as well as a training centre of excellence in Djibouti. In concomitance with international thought, it seeks the domestication of piracy laws. Importantly, the Djibouti Code of Conduct offers avenues for joint operations in keeping with the international views on countering piracy off the coast of Somalia.

In December 2008, Kenya jointly with the UNODC hosted a regional ministerial meeting on piracy discussed the need for addressing the factors conducive to piracy, essentially the insecurity and state collapse in Somalia. This meeting, inter alia called for the strengthening of the Transitional Federal Government as a means of stemming piracy off the Somali coast.

Member states in the region have also pushed for the criminalising of ransom, the rationale being that if ransom was not paid, the economic incentive for pirates would decline. *Geopolity* projects that “A pirate can expect to earn between US 168,630 and US 394,200 over a five year career (compared to between) US 14,500 over an entire working life”. The income incentive is linked to the ransom paid, hence the initiative by the African Union to criminalise payment of ransom. This move has not been supported by the international community, even when the ransom is linked to financing of terrorism, as in the case of kidnappings for ransom by AQIM in North Africa. This difference of opinion is perceived in the region as the reluctance of the West to do the heavy lifting when it comes to countering piracy. The heavy lifting includes accepting that piracy is a symptom of the situation in Somalia. The region is clear that the solution to piracy must be land based. However, despite the statements and resolutions agreeing to this, the international community has largely not engaged in undertaking commitments on land in Somalia. The most ambitious inland programme has been crafted by the IGAD Capacity Building programme Against Terrorism (ICPAT) in its *Somali Inland Strategy and Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter Piracy 2010-2015*. This strategy is currently the cornerstone of IGAD’s support to the counter piracy effort and complements the Djibouti code of Conduct.

**Somali Inland Strategy to Counter Piracy**
The IGAD Somali Inland Strategy to counter piracy is the result of the field research undertaken in the South-Central Somalia, Somaliland
and Puntland regions and in Djibouti. It reflects the experiences of grass root counter piracy operations in these regions, particularly in Puntland and Somaliland and borrows from their successes and challenges

Taking a proactive approach to piracy, the strategy is founded on the thought that inland solutions are required to address piracy. The rationale behind this inland solutions mantra is reflects the reality that acts of piracy start from land where the pirates live and have families and from where all logistical operations, the planning, the fundraising and the recruitment are conducted. Pirates also return to land to invest, re-charge, and remobilise and to raise funds for future operations. That hijacked ships with hostages dock on shore gives further reason to focus on inland solutions. The thinking is that inland solutions that target vulnerable groups and stop them from becoming pirates, that exploit community systems for intelligence gathering, public awareness and social re-engineering, that target and expose the financiers of piracy and make landing bays unavailable to pirates would substantially inhibit the operations of pirates.

The inland solutions strategy builds on the current environment in Somalia. Somalia is currently in the midst of a decisive war of attrition, with the TFG and allies on the one side and the Al-Shabaab and other religious extremist on the other. In the last six months of 2011, the Al-Shabaab has taken a beating and more than 11 districts have been “liberated” from Al-Shabaab control. The TFG plan is to provide alternative livelihoods for youth in the liberated areas, as some sort of peace dividend, to legitimize itself and consolidate its authority, and to prevent the return of Al-Shabaab. This stabilising of Somalia by the TFG is the cornerstone of the inland strategy. The strategy is underpinned by the following principles and values:

a. Building trust and confidence between local authorities and regional and international actors.

b. Prioritising and encouraging genuinely home-grown solutions

c. Focussing on avoiding or minimising the factors conducive to piracy while addressing the aggravating factors in a sustainable manner.

d. Applying an integrated, coordinated and holistic approach to the problems, channelling resources in an organised manner; prevention and enforcement, punishment and rehabilitation, tougher legal sanctions and problem solving through awareness raising schemes etc.
e. Ensuring effective, efficient and continuous intelligence and information sharing among states, actors and stakeholders.

f. Encouraging and motivating the relatively peaceful regions of Somalia in Somaliland and Puntland in their counter piracy efforts.

g. Embedding and aligning the strategy with ongoing programmes, projects and strategies.

h. Advocating a multi-sectoral and multi-pronged strategy.

i. Ensuring local ownership and commitment to the strategy.

Key Elements of the Strategy
The IGAD Somali inland strategy to counter piracy rests on three key pillars: Community engagement, Capacity Building and Coordination and Cooperation.

Community Engagement
Community engagement reflects the truism that the most effective agents of Somali piracy are the coastal communities of Somalia and therefore it seeks to expand the community and grassroots awareness of the dangers of piracy to the community and seeks to provide alternative livelihoods for vulnerable communities. In this attempt at social engineering, clan elders, spiritual leaders and traditional community engagement systems come into play.

On the one hand therefore, this strategy proposes to exploit Somali cultural values and security systems to turn the tide against piracy and pirates by employing traditional justice systems and community organisations to own and spread the counter piracy message. This includes highlighting the moral decay caused by piracy money and by enhancing the awareness of local leaders, spiritual leaders, vulnerable groups and the community at large—through specially designed communication and mass media strategies. It is hoped that such awareness may eventually deprive the pirates of safe havens and even the exalted status they hold in society.

The second part of the strategy relates to creation of alternative livelihoods. In this regard, one proposal is to support the revival of artisanal fishing, which according to FAO, constitutes most of the marine fishing in Somalia, at 60 per cent of the landings. Pirates, as previously indicated, consist of three main categories with local fishermen being a key category. It is clear that most fishermen and the local fishery support industry saw piracy as a way out of the
competition and confrontation with foreign fishing vessels. It is no wonder that the traditional fishing villages of Eyl, Harardhere and Kismayu are now considered pirate dens. Similarly, recruitment into militias including extremist groups like Al-Shabaab is encouraged by the lack economic opportunities for young people, including in the fishing industry. The revival of the fishing industry is envisaged by supporting fishing communities to form associations or cooperatives with access to financing and bulk marketing.

A second proposal is to initiate schemes that create alternative livelihoods for ex-pirates and vulnerable groups (including militia) by providing demand driven vocational skills, networking with actual and potential employers to link skills with job opportunities and by providing micro-finance to those with feasible proposals.

**Capacity Building**

The second pillar of the strategy focuses on enhancing the institutional and human capacity of the three institutions in Somalia to handle piracy; the TFG, the Puntland Administration and the Somaliland Administration. All three administrations have ill-equipped and ill trained coast guards, all have tried and jailed the single largest group of convicted Somali pirates and some have engaged in combat with pirates.

This pillar seeks to build up the capacities of the coast guards through establishment of multiple observation or patrol bases, the equipping and training of coast guards with both preventive and investigative (including forensics and data management) skills. As a priority, the proposal is to start with the Puntland Administration.

The second ambit of the capacity building pillar is the creation of legal instruments for countering piracy and money laundering; equipping of the law enforcement bodies, primarily the police, to use these legal tools. The training of law enforcement officials will include data collection, link analysis and forensics. Prisons are also due for support in this project.

**Coordination and Cooperation**

The third pillar recognises the need for a concerted multi-pronged multi agency approach for countering piracy in Somalia. It thus calls for the coordination of all efforts at the community, national, regional and international levels. This requires an alignment of Somali perceptions and realities regarding piracy with those held by the
international community. This thus brings to the fore of the international counter piracy agenda what Somalia sees as the root causes of terrorism; exploitation of fish in Somali waters by international fishing companies, the dumping of toxic waste by international actors in Somali waters and the general neglect of the Somali people by the international community. This pillar seeks a common ground between the Somali community and the international counter piracy actors and requires that international actors recognise the overall need to focus on security and stability in Somalia as a core element of the counter piracy initiatives. It requires that the naval powers be willing to take action against illegal fishing trawlers and ships dumping toxic waste on Somali waters and have the mandate to do so from the UNSC. This pillar seeks the alignment of the multiple efforts through the coordination of the local, regional and international counter piracy efforts. The EU supported East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean strategy to counter piracy is an indicator of how this coordination and cooperation can be achieved.

A third ambit of the pillar identifies IGAD as the best suited to lead the coordination and cooperation effort.

**Why an IGAD Led Strategy?**

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was set up in 1986 to coordinate the efforts of the member states for combating desertification and mitigating the effects of drought. The IGAD region stretches over an area of 5.2 million km² comprising the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. The region has a population of over 200 million people. In 1996, the Authority was renamed as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Agreement Establishing IGAD was amended accordingly. The Agreement Establishing IGAD identified some 20 areas of possible cooperation among the member states. Its mission is to assist and complement the efforts of the member states to achieve, through increased cooperation: Food Security and environmental protection; Promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs; and Economic cooperation and integration. Based on an assessment of the security challenges, an IGAD security strategy was formulated to enhance regional cooperation in security-including cooperation in criminal matters through a four pillar approach: Track II diplomacy to deal with inter-state conflicts; Cooperation for Counter Terrorism, Maritime security
(including piracy), Organised Crime (including money laundering, proliferation of SALW and corruption); Cooperation in other areas of transnational crime (including cattle rustling); and Enhancement of capacities of conflict early warning mechanisms.

Over the years, the IGAD has been the principle intervener in all the attempts at bringing stability to Somalia. The current internationally recognised government, the TFG, is a creation of IGAD, as is AMISOM, the African Union’s peace keeping force in Somalia. To that extent, IGAD is the most logical and convenient agent for implementing the Somali inland strategy to counter piracy. However, over and above issues of proximity, the IGAD has several capabilities and is thus best placed and structured to support the strategy.

IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning Mechanism (CEWARN) was established in 2003 to serve as IGAD’s organ for monitoring, analysing and predicting conflicts, and providing response options. The CEWARN mechanism enables it to engage at community, sub-national, national and regional level and it has gained considerable expertise in mitigating pastoral related conflicts in the IGAD region. CEWARN’s methodology for collection of data using field monitors, monitoring, reporting, analysis (using the CEWARN reporter), community engagement and experience in quick impact projects can be easily adapted for use in counter piracy. This would entail, among other activities, the CEWARN like—monitoring, reporting and response focused on piracy in multiple areas of reporting on the Somali coast, necessitating the development of early warning indicators for piracy; the development of areas of reporting, network of community based field monitors, analytical capability and other systems and processed, and undertaking continuous analysis of data from the “piracy reporter” to identify financiers and kingpins in piracy The CEWARN model would also be used in community engagement, using the Local Peace and Resource committees in community campaigns against piracy and in executing quick impact projects for the creation of new livelihoods. The CEWARN local peace committee model has been successful in weaning pastoral communities away from raiding and for using minimal resources to execute community owned projects. Using the same model, various measures such as specific focus on pirate prone landing bays and small ports, implementation of ‘quick-win’ projects targeting the combating of piracy recruitment through key activities identified by consultations with the community by the local peace
committees could be undertaken. The same Local Peace Committees could facilitate the development of local job creation strategies and deliver appropriate demand-driven vocational skills.

The IGAD Office of the Facilitator for Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation is another key organ that is readily available for the implementation of the inland strategy. The Somali Facilitation Office, headed by an IGAD special envoy, has been involved in a broad spectrum of activities for stabilising Somalia. Its latest facilitation of the Kampala accord for dialogue has allowed a united TFG to focus on the violent extremist leading to unprecedented success and routing of Al Shabaab. This office would have a role in all the three pillars of the strategy.

The IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP) is a programme run by the IGAD Peace and Security Division that seeks to support member states of IGAD in countering terrorism, promoting maritime security, combating organised crime and for building the capacity of security institutions. With regard to maritime security, ISSP seeks the development of frameworks at the national and regional level to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea; and seeks to enhance the capacity of institutions and practitioners in the region to enhance maritime security. The ISSP’s maritime mandate includes the implementation of the Djibouti code of conduct and the Somali inland strategy to counter piracy.

**Conclusion**

The inland strategy is a clear attempt by the East Africa/Horn of Africa to play a role in countering piracy menace linked to Somalia. Lacking in naval might and recognising the futility of a sea-borne approach for countering Somali piracy, the strategy uses a three C approach for countering piracy on land; Coordination and cooperation; Capacity building and Community engagement. The three C approach is unique for its placement of the Somali people at the centre of the counter piracy approach, addressing their needs, and for basing itself on land in Somalia. These two factors guarantee that the successful implementation of the strategy offers the best chance, yet, of mitigating piracy linked to Somalia. It is thus in the interest of the international community, including emergent powers such as India, to play their role and support this strategy.
NOTES

1. 2010 figures, See The Economics of Piracy-Pirate Ransoms and Livelihoods off the coast of Somalia, May 2011, Geopolicity.

2. 2009 figures, UNCTAD.


5. The Economics of Piracy-Pirate Ransoms and Livelihoods off the coast of Somalia, May 2011, Geopolicity.


7. Ibid.


10. Interview with Andrew Mwangura, Coordinator, East Africa Seafarers Association.


12. The evidence for this is scanty and is reported here because it is oft repeated.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.


21. The Economics of Piracy-Pirate Ransoms and Livelihoods off the coast of Somalia, May 2011, Geopolicity.


27. http://himilonews.com/somalia-the-kampala-accord (accessed 9 November 2011). The accord, importantly, creates a Political Bureau, with powers to institute sanctions, consisting of IGAD and EAC together with the AU and UN to oversee and monitor compliance of the TFIs with agreed benchmarks and timelines to implement the transitional tasks and to advance the Somali Peace Process.

Rise in Piracy: Case Study Somalia

Sarabjeet Singh Parmar*

“Through the ages and around the world, the varied nature of maritime piracy has been shaped by the social, political, and economic milieu of the region and of the era. The fertile geography of the vast oceans of the planet has served as the backdrop, a perilous expanse of anonymity”.\(^1\) Therefore, the emergence of piracy from Somalia offers a classic example—“a failed state since the government collapsed in 1991 and a subsequent bloody inter-clan conflict that neither outside intervention or any internal attempt at reconciliation has been able to solve”.\(^2\)

The resulting instability compounded by illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste in Somali waters have been the catalysts for resurgence of piracy in the waters surrounding the Horn of Africa. The maritime actions undertaken by nations both combined and individually have not stemmed the threat and has resulted in the easterly spread of piracy in the waters that connect India and the eastern coast of Africa. The lack of political will to address land based instability issues and the slow progress in addressing the legal and economic factors at a combined international level are likely to further raise the costs.

The final solution lies on land and in this respect establishing good governance that would enforce laws to ensure a secure maritime

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environment is of paramount importance. Predating this would be the requirement of nation building to ensure stability. Resolution of Somalian piracy in this manner could therefore set a precedence to be emulated to obviate the rise of piracy.

The paper examines the economic and legal factors and suggests that viewing piracy as ‘economic terrorism’ could aid in combating the malaise.

The Economic Factor

“Pirates are the very essence of rational profit maximising entrepreneurs described in neo-classical economics. Expected profits determine decisions based on the information available. The supply of pirates, therefore, is closely related to the expected benefits of being a pirate and the associated risk adjusted costs”.³

The interest in the economics of piracy has only recently been ignited. The main reason could be the lack of sufficient data and differences between various organisations and authorities over the modalities of working out the cost of piracy. Two recent studies—one by One Earth Future⁴ focuses on the direct and secondary costs, while the study by Geopolicity⁵ focuses on what has been termed as the ‘pirate value chain’ and examines the linkages between the pirates, financiers and sponsors. In the absence of reliable data these studies have relied on the available data to calculate costs with certain conservative assumptions. Therefore, the actual cost of piracy is likely to be much higher than those calculated by the studies.

Direct costs include: expenditure on ransom payments; insurance premiums; cost of deterrent equipment; re-routing costs; deployment of naval forces; costs relating to prosecution of cases in courts of law and piracy deterrence organisations. Secondary costs are the costs that have an impact on the nations in the immediate vicinity of piracy prone areas. These costs could be a resultant variable of the direct costs and cover regional trade, fishing industry, food price inflation and reduced foreign investment. “The pirate value chain analysis provides a systematic approach for examining the sources of competitive advantage; in this case for the pirates of Somalia, their financiers and sponsors and counter piracy bodies”.⁶ Agencies and institutional actors across the chain can be viewed as a complex inter-dependent circle (see diagram at the end of the paper). It is evident that the number of actors adds to the complexity and therefore the increased costs.
The cost of piracy between 2005 to 2009 as per a joint report\(^7\) by the Centre for American Progress and One Earth Foundation was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cost (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1.4 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6.3 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As per the One Earth Future study the total direct and secondary cost in 2010 was $7 to $12 billion\(^8\). These figures could be viewed as a conservative estimate as the actual ransom amounts are not known.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heading</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ransoms (Excess costs. Not including actual ransom value as this is generally covered by insurance costs)</td>
<td>$176 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance Premiums</td>
<td>$460 million to $3.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-routing</td>
<td>$2.4 to $3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Equipment</td>
<td>$363 million to $2.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Forces</td>
<td>$2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecutions</td>
<td>$31 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piracy Deterrent Organisations</td>
<td>$19.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost to Regional Economies</td>
<td>$1.25 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The basic rationale of piracy is to obtain money through ransom and to this effect piracy off Somalia is considered unique. “Under the current model, ransoms are extracted by leveraging the lives of the hijacked crew”.\(^9\) Even in the case of *MV Faina*\(^10\) the pirates were clear that they only wanted money and were not interested in the military hardware onboard. In most other places the ship and cargo is the target and the crew is expendable. In West Africa it is the ‘political terror and criminal opportunism model’ that is prevalent whilst in Southeast Asia it is the ‘kill and sell cargo’ model.\(^11\) In comparison the Somali model is the most dangerous as it recognises the international respect for life. Firstly it enables them to carry out long stand offs. Secondly it thwarts any possible military intervention at sea as navies would refrain from engagement if it endangers the lives of the hijacked crew. Thirdly and most importantly it can be seen as a successful model to be emulated. Leaders in the shipping industry have noticed the spread of the Somali model to other regions.\(^12\) A look at the figures\(^13\) as per the geopolicity report based on data of 2010 makes it evident as to why piracy is a lucrative business:
Heading | Cost
---|---
Low/high pirate income (1500 pirates) | $33,000 to 79,000 per annum
Potential Life Time Earnings (1500 pirates) | $168,000 to 394,000 per annum
Next best alternate at $500 per annum (per capita income as taken by the report) | As per this in an average working life span of 30 years a Somali man will earn approximately $15,000
Pirate income comparative to average income | 67 to 157 times higher
Total Cost of Piracy 2010 | $4.9 to 8.3 billion
Projected increase by 2014 | $13 to 15 billion

These vast amounts of money have to flow through different pipelines so as to reach the intended people. Tracking these transactions and identifying the sponsors and financiers would tremendously aid the fight against piracy. This avenue, however, is still a grey and weak area as it requires international coordination at various levels. It is clear that the pirate groups enjoy a distinct advantage and transfer funds mainly through the Hawala system/Informal Value Transfer System (IVTS).\(^\text{14}\) “Some of these groups are better armed and funded than regional authorities. Million dollar ransoms combined with a lack of accountability have encouraged this growth”.\(^\text{15}\)

The Legal Factor
There are three clear aspects driving the legal factor. Firstly, the internationally accepted definition of piracy. Secondly, the national laws and trans-border legal complexities thereon that govern the prosecution of pirates. Thirdly, the capacity of prisons and imprisonment cost.

As per UNCLOS article 101,\(^\text{16}\) piracy consists of any of the following acts:

- Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
  - On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
  - Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
- Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft.
• Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraphs above.

Article 101 is supplemented by articles 105, 106 and 107. Article 105\textsuperscript{17} clearly states that a pirate ship may be seized on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state. It also states that the courts of the state carrying out the seizure may decide the penalties to be imposed and the action to be taken. Article 107\textsuperscript{18} states that the seizure may be carried out only by warships or by ships clearly marked and identified as being on government service and authorised to that effect. Article 106\textsuperscript{19} on the other hand could be seen as a dampener as it states that in case of seizure on inadequate grounds the state affecting the seizure would be liable for loss and damages. Although Article 100\textsuperscript{20} states that all states shall cooperate towards the repression of piracy, it still limits the boundaries of acts of piracy to the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state.

The formulation of UNCLOS was a tedious process that took over four decades before it could come into force, in 1994. At that point in time piracy was not rampant as it is now and therefore piracy related articles could have been considered appropriate and therefore accepted for maintaining international order at sea. Given the increase in piracy over the years and the fact that piracy is considered only when committed on the high seas these articles could now be considered inhibitive and preventing states from taking effective action. Therefore, it is time to review these articles and revise them to enable nations to address piracy. These amendments, whilst retaining the sanctity of good order at sea, would have to be in tandem with the UN Security Council resolutions allowing nations to operate in waters under the jurisdiction of another nation, as has been the case for Somalia. Proponents and the architects of UNCLOS would argue that this would be a difficult if not an improbable task given the time it took to frame, sign, ratify and bring UNCLOS into force. However, this is a task that requires consideration and immediate attention.

Issues pertaining to the international framework for combating piracy and the practical problems nations face in arresting, prosecuting and incarcerating convicted pirates were discussed during a counter piracy conference held in UAE in April 2011.\textsuperscript{21} The major points that arose were:

• The existing international framework was sufficient.
• Lack of mechanics for implementing judicial processes between nations.
• Lack of political will.
• Lack of national anti piracy laws.

History is repeating itself as these very aspects have plagued the world since piracy first began. “Pirates have long been regarded as hostes humani generis, ‘common enemies of mankind’. States going back to the days of the Roman Empire reserved the right to capture and summarily execute the pirates”. Prior to 1700 in the British Empire, pirates were tried in common law courts. This was ineffective as the pirates would bribe, intimidate and even suborn jurors. This was possible as many locals in the coastal towns where the courts were established were in the business of piracy. The establishment of a special Admiralty court in London also proved ineffective as the pirates, witnesses and evidence had to be shifted to London.

The legal issues today have become more complex as the world has more independent nations and companies with enormous investments in the maritime domain. The issues arising from the laws to be applied, inter-nation judicial procedures, place of prosecution and finally the place of imprisonment are extremely complex as is clear from the following example. A ship carrying the flag of nation ‘A’ registered in nation ‘B’ manned by a crew from nations ‘C to F’ insured by a company from nation ‘G’ carrying cargo from nation ‘H’ for delivery to nation ‘I’ is taken over by pirates in the waters under the jurisdiction of nation ‘K’ and the pirates are apprehended by warship of nation ‘L’.

The prosecution procedure requires evidence that is hard to come by and witnesses who due to the nature of the seafaring profession would not be willing to stand in a court of law because of the long lead time that could result in the possible termination of their employment. “Legal obstacles to effective prosecution have emerged in recent years from international humanitarian law, including the Geneva conventions, a variety of human rights treaties, international refugee law, UNCLOS and other sources”. As a result very few nations are willing to prosecute as the pirates could either request for asylum or claim violation of human rights. Nations that are willing either do not have resources or capacity in their courts or space in their prisons. The cost of imprisoning a pirate would over shadow the cost of prosecution and this is another major obstacle that is being faced.

The issues are more practical in nature than just judicial. These
issues are not insoluble but they require a political will and an international understanding of the magnitude of the problem of piracy. Nations need to bring anti-piracy laws into effect, set up fast track courts and adopt a more cogent approach towards combating piracy.

Changes in law and connected issues will take time and considerable effort. Therefore, the ongoing efforts to address piracy require a boost. In order to elevate piracy to a higher level of international understanding and cooperation it would be prudent to equate piracy to terrorism for a variety of reasons although the objectives are different.

- Instability and poverty are a common root cause.
- The pipelines for acquisition of equipment and weapon are similar if not the same.
- The channels for flow of money are similar if not the same.
- Both transgress a host of commonly accepted international and national laws.
- The end results disrupt the normal mode of living.

Therefore, placing piracy at par with terrorism could obviate the need for new laws and higher levels of cooperation and only require amendments to the existing international order.

**Piracy as Economic Terrorism**

Therefore, piracy could be viewed as ‘economic terrorism’. In 2005 during a round table on economic terrorism the Geneva Centre for Security Policy defined economic terrorism in the following terms:\textsuperscript{25}

Contrary to “economic warfare” which is undertaken by states against other states, “economic terrorism” would be undertaken by transnational or non-state actors. This could entail varied, coordinated and sophisticated or massive destabilising actions in order to disrupt the economic and financial stability of a state, a group of states or a society (such as market oriented western societies) for ideological or religious motives. These actions, if undertaken, may be violent or not. They could have either immediate effects or carry psychological effects which in turn have economic consequences.

Somalia’s disrupted economy coupled with unemployment and poverty, due to piracy, is being further destabilised with no avenue of recovery. Piracy could qualify to be termed as “Economic Terrorism” as its main driver is the huge amount of money received in the form
of ransoms and that too with relative ease. Any religious or ideological motives (as per the statement above) would be either secondary or insignificant. Thus the earning capability mentioned in the earlier section remains the only rational motive.

The economic impact is two-fold—Firstly, on Somalia and secondly, on the world at large. However, a common aspect is the ships crews whose lives are at stake. On Somalia, the impact is twofold. The ease with which large amounts of money can be earned in a short time frame by acts of piracy would continue to lure the unemployed and thereby obviate any attempts for rehabilitation and avenues for honest livelihoods. Attempts to provide aid for nation building via the sea route would have to be undertaken with escorts and this in turn would require committing maritime forces in addition to the assets committed for anti piracy patrols. It is highly unlikely that nations would be willing to commit more assets given the geo strategic, economic and maritime situation the world over. Therefore any attempts at nation building with respect to Somalia can only be considered after the threat of piracy has been either reduced significantly or eradicated completely.

The impact of piracy on the world is increasing slowly. The rising economic costs of maintaining forces, insurance premiums and rerouting leading to a possible increase in the cost of traded items could in time add to the existing strain on the economies of nations. The most important impact would be the availability of ransom money not only for furthering piracy but also for funding acts of terrorism. Therefore, putting piracy at par with terrorism and terming it as “economic terrorism” could obviate the need for new laws and higher levels of cooperation and would only require amendments in the existing international agreements on terrorism.

India and Africa—Future Role

Piracy is a threat that is affecting the maritime interests of India and Africa and is growing in magnitude (see map placed at the end) and is becoming a major concern. Firstly, piracy is taking place in the waters in the immediate vicinity of India and the east coast of Africa. Whilst transit through piracy infested waters can be avoided by other nations by rerouting, the same cannot be done by nations whose maritime trade routes originate and terminate in these waters. Secondly the maritime route through the Gulf of Aden is important, for example, Indian imports through the Gulf have been valued at $50 billion while the exports have been valued at $60 billion. Thirdly, about 24 Indian
flagged ships transit the Gulf of Aden every month accounting for 13 per cent of India’s trade. Fourthly, Indians account for approximately six per cent of the world’s seafaring community, making India one of the highest hostage target nations. Fifthly, it could result in trade imbalances with existing partners as companies may like to avoid piracy areas and start importing from other nations. It has been reported that Indian coal buyers have been buying coal from Australia and Russia and are avoiding buying from South Africa, 30 per cent of South Africa’s coal exports are to India.

The Ministry of Defence has taken cognizance of piracy in its Annual Report 2010-11. The report proposes a strengthening of multilateral cooperation under the UN framework to tackle the complex challenges of maritime security. The report also characterises the IOR as being ‘central’ to India’s maritime interests and concerns and recognises that piracy and terrorism pose a major threat to international trade and safety of the sea lanes of communication. In addition the government had also decided to take steps in the fight against piracy by enacting a new anti-piracy law and stricter Rules of Engagement (RsOE).

The Indian Navy commenced anti piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden in October 2008 and has since then escorted 144 Indian flagged ships and 1037 foreign flagged ships from different countries and thwarted 15 piracy attempts. Due to the easterly spread of piracy India has also started deploying warships and aircraft in the eastern and north eastern Arabian seas and in the EEZ of Seychelles, Mauritius and Maldives. Actions taken by agencies including the Indian Navy, coastguard and the police have resulted in the apprehension of a number of pirates including 61 held in March 2011. This incident highlighted a new facet of the hostage crisis. The pirates have reportedly threatened to target Indian sailors if the arrested pirates are not released. In retaliation seven Indian sailors were not released from the hijacked *MV Asphalt Ventura*. India, a founder member of CGPCS, and the affected African nations are lead players in the maritime arena in the IOR and have an important role to play, especially when international maritime trade has no option but to transit the piracy prone areas. If India and Africa do not take the lead then the fight against piracy will at best continue at a snail’s pace. The actions that can take can be divided into—the short and immediate term and the long term.

The short term measure would be to firstly, introduce effective
national anti piracy laws at the earliest. Secondly, strengthen mutual cooperation by conducting maritime exercises and joint anti-piracy operations. Thirdly, set up a regional anti piracy cooperative group that would operate in the mid ocean areas and cover the SLOCs that are not patrolled as of now. Fourthly and most importantly there should be no appeasement of pirate groups.32

The long term would cover a host of items that cannot be prioritised as all are considered equal in importance.

- Revision of UNCLOS articles on piracy.
- Pursue and assist agendas of the working groups formed under CGPCS.
- Formulate a case for rebuilding Somalia and factor land operations as an integrated part.
- Take up issues for reducing the effects of piracy. Like lobbying with Lloyd’s of London to take back its decision of expanding the area deemed piracy prone after insurance costs surged as much as 300-fold this year.33
- Take up the case to equate piracy to economic terrorism and formulate new laws to cater for the new term or amend existing applicable laws.
- Work out modalities for prosecution, setting up of fast track courts of law and increasing prison capacities.

Conclusion
The root cause of piracy lies in the world ignoring the deteriorating situation in Somalia, the history of piracy and therefore remained blind to the warning signs relating to the rebirth of piracy. It is clearly apparent that the world at large, viewed piracy as ‘nuisance value’ till the time it impacted their maritime trade and citizens were taken as hostage. The economic factor has converted piracy into a thriving and lucrative business that could turn pirates into powerful non state actors capable of dealing with state actors. The world therefore needs to revisit and rethink its strategy for dealing with piracy. The issues are many and cover a vast agenda. Starting from nation building to pirate value chain evaluation, stopping the money flow, identifying financiers and sponsors, stricter prosecution laws and work out solutions for legal issues trans borders, more prison capacity, enhanced cooperation between maritime forces and revision of UNCLOS. India and Africa require to work together to ensure that these issues are addressed.
Diagram—Agencies and Institutional Actors Across the ‘Piracy Value Chain’

Map 1: Expansion of Piracy: 2005 to 2011

Somalian Piracy Threat Map (2005-2011)

NOTES

5. Note 4.
6. Ibid. p. 6.
8. Note 5. Table 13 at p.25.
10. In 2008 a Ukrainian ship, MV Faina, carrying military hardware was hijacked and a ransom of $35 million sought. The money was claimed to be used for cleaning up the dumped waste. Subsequently after 6 months the ship was released for a reported ransom payment of $3 million. This is probably the only reported large claim by the pirates for such remuneration. Although it dilutes the pirates’ moral stand, it however, lends credence to the fact that dumping along with illegal fishing has been the catalyst for the revival of piracy in the region.
13. Cover page of the geopolicity report.
14. The Hawala system is an informal value transfer system in which money is transferred through a network of brokers. A customer gives money to a broker who calls another broker in the recipient’s city, which is usually in another nation, giving instructions for the deposit of money (minus the commission) with a promise to settle the account later. These brokers earn profits by means of commission and by bypassing official exchange rates. The money enters the system in the source country’s currency and exits the system in the recipient country’s currency. As this system is informal and not effectively regulated by governments it aids the people involved in avoiding laws such as tax, currency control, and immigration. In some countries this system is regulated by governments and the brokers have to obtain a license to operate.
15. Note 10 p. 22.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid. p. 106.
27. Ibid.
30. Covered in the speech delivered by the Indian Ambassador to UAE during the counter piracy conference held in UAE in April 2011.
31. Indian Express 18 April 2011, “Navy Deploys warship near Somalia Coast”.
Lions and Tigers: Africa and India

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos

Introduction
The first decade of the 21st century saw an unprecedented global interest, first in the rise of China as a major international player, and subsequently India, Brazil and a few other middle income developing countries. Africa was the object of these countries’ rising global engagement as the supplier of much needed natural resources crucial for the growth of these emerging economies. This relationship initially seemed to replicate the old colonial model—of Africa as a source of raw materials, and at the mercy of the international commodity markets. More recently, however, Africa’s outlook as the ‘hopeless continent’, to quote The Economist from a decade ago, has been replaced by a more upbeat perception of ‘Africa Rising’, or ‘Lions on the Move’.2

This paper aims to explore the opportunities that Africa’s reinvigorated fortunes present for its relations with India. The central question is: ‘How can the growing economic might of India and this African resurgence be leveraged for development and inclusive growth, particularly for the continent’? Can South Africa play a particular role in that as the perceived gateway to the continent? The paper is divided into three sections: the first discusses the concept of ‘Africa on the Move’; the second, explores the concept of South Africa as a gateway, and whether it can be spur more commercial linkages which will also benefit the sub-region; the last section outlines the
economic relations between India and South Africa, and highlights some of the challenges.

The main point is that to build an effective and mutually beneficial economic relationship between India and Africa, each country and regional community must develop its own strategy and list of priorities for engaging with India. To develop such a list of priorities, especially in the economic realm, requires more extensive firm-level impact studies at country level, and a clear alignment of India’s engagement with the regional plans African countries have adopted. While SA and India can create many collaborative opportunities, the issue of competition also needs to be taken into account. Lastly the barriers to investment and trade must also be dealt with in the context of the bilateral relations between India and South Africa.

Africa on the Move
A World Bank report published in March 2011, stated that: ‘Africa could be on the brink of an economic take off, much like China was 30 years ago, and India 20 years ago’. In a survey on the attractiveness of Africa’s economy in 2011, Ernst & Young observed that the ‘interesting difference between developed and emerging market investors’, who were ‘generally more positive about Africa’s attractiveness’. The key difference between developed and emerging market investors was that the latter regarded Africa as critical to sustaining their own growth, whereas the former saw it as a potential future market that needs to develop further. Though the African attractiveness survey claims that ‘Africa still attracts less than 5 percent of global FDI rates”, it argues that the statistic is not an accurate indicator of Africa’s attractiveness and that more could be done for Africa to achieve its full potential (Ernst and Young, 2011). “Africa is the third fastest-growing region in the world, after the Middle East and Asia. But foreign direct investment is currently relatively flat compared to numbers from 2008” (de Jager, 2010), despite the fact that (McKinsey (2010)) indicates that the rate of return of foreign investment in Africa is higher than in any other developing region (nearly 12 per cent).

Despite these figures, the confidence in Africa as the next frontier of growth stems from a number of socio-economic factors that are already beginning to emerge. The first of these is its demographic trajectory. By 2050 one in four people in the world will live in Africa, or just over two billion people (Ernst and Young, 2011 and World
East and West Africa will grow more rapidly, with Southern Africa experiencing slower rates of growth. At the same time as the population growth rate begins to decline a larger share of the population will be of working age. These trends will have a number of impacts: the number of consumers will increase, although this will place a strain on resources. At the same time, unless African economies are able to create environments that encourage productive capacities and thus create jobs, the positive demographic dividend will not be realised. Rather the opposite will emerge—young populations without work, who have lost faith in the system, with the potential for consequences like the ones the world witnessed in North Africa in 2011. Yet, while some countries may not escape the more negative scenario, others will progress on an upward trajectory.

The second major socio-economic trend is that of urbanisation. Urbanisation is on the rise worldwide. By 2025 it is estimated that more than 50 per cent of Africa’s population will be living in cities, as compared to 40 per cent today. McKinsey (2010) estimates that by 2030, Africa’s top 18 cities will have a combined spend of $1.3 trillion. A more urbanised population will mean a more concentrated consumer market—a critical factor for African countries given the vast distances and the poor connectivity and ill maintained infrastructure. According to a study by Accenture, the ‘last mile’ for reaching consumers living in rural areas proves very costly. More concentrated populations will create economies of scale. Projections by McKinsey show that consumer industries such as retail, telecom and banking, and infrastructure development, agriculture and resources, will be worth $2.6 trillion annually by 2020.

The third related factor is the rise of the African middle class. The middle class is characterised as a household with an income of more than $20,000 per year. A study by the African Development Bank in 2011, found that the middle class in Africa comprised some 313 million people (those who spend between $2 and $20 a day), and rivals India’s. However, a more conservative estimate of taking a spending of $4 a day and more would yield a middle class of 120 million. Nevertheless, it is estimated that by 2020 consumer spending will increase to nearly $1 trillion from its current $600 billion. The following nine countries account for three quarters of the total of consumer spending in sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Zambia. (McKinsey)

The final trend that is shaping Africa’s economic growth potential
is the convergence between banking and mobile telephony, which has begun to address the challenge of financial inclusion of the poor. The potential of mobile money services for providing financial services to the unbanked is enormous. Mpesa in East Africa, which has also now taken off in South Africa, enables the financial inclusion of vast numbers of people. The broader economic importance of including the poor in the banking system is in keeping with the G20’s adoption of financial inclusion as a pillar of its development working group.

The four points above highlight the opportunities that exist beyond the stereotypical understanding of Africa. This is not just because of the commodity boom and the rise of China and India, but also the result of some of the difficult macro-economic adjustments made by many countries, as well as greater political stability, following the broadening of the political space.

These trends also underpin many of the regional and continental plans and the momentum that has been generated on the continent in recent years. The appellation the next ‘frontier’ for Africa is very apposite because it signifies huge opportunities but equally that it is still relatively underdeveloped terrain. This frontier concept of Africa has the potential to create many synergies with external players in the economic arena. The paper sets out some opportunities but also highlights a few of the continent’s shortcomings.

The biggest opportunity, but equally one of the continent’s weaknesses is its large infrastructure backlog. Weak linkages between the hinterland and the coast and within regional communities continue to hamper both regional integration initiatives and Africa’s ability to trade globally and its participation in global value chains. This infrastructure backlog (both new developments and maintenance) requires an annual investment of $93 billion, but falls short by nearly half (some $43 billion). The shortfall is more than can be fulfilled by any one African institution or external player. A larger pool of stakeholders—including the BRICS, traditional partners, the Gulf States, South Korea and Turkey—would be required for this. These partners could provide Africa with the means to reduce the funding shortfall, if the projects and the incentives are packaged correctly.

Historically, Africa has had a very low industrial base, which has perpetuated its dependence on raw material exports. Very few countries have any manufacturing sector to boast of, with SA and Kenya being two notable exceptions. Nevertheless, small as this sector may be, it has been adversely affected (especially small businesses)
by the rise of the highly competitive manufacturing sectors in Asia. The truth is that many African manufactures are not price competitive, relying on external sources for intermediate or raw materials. A study undertaken by two academics of the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi, found that in the garment and textile trade between Kenya and India, the latter was the overall beneficiary. India poses a threat to Kenyan clothing manufacturers in third markets, such as the US, which was further exacerbated by the expiry of the Multifibre Agreement in 2005. The ability of Kenyan clothing manufacturers to take advantage of India’s own economic growth is curtailed by two barriers in particular, according to Kamau and McCormick: the high and complicated tariff rates in India on imported clothing; and the lack of company and brand recognition of Kenyan companies in India. This implies the need for a better understanding by African policy makers of the micro-level impact of emerging players such as India in local economies. Micro-level competition with Indian and Chinese players has a deleterious effect not only on the local African sectors’ survival but also on employment levels in already fragile economic systems. Clearly, the responsibility for addressing these problems lies with the respective African states. How can industry competitiveness be improved? What are the supply-side elements that would facilitate this apart from improved access and linkages to regional and global markets and value chains? In what ways can the dialogue between India and Africa be focused on issues that affect the micro-economic level of relations?

Agricultural development and food security are two areas where the potential opportunities for cooperation between Africa and India are substantial. In recent years the challenge of food security and the optimisation of agricultural development to this purpose have assumed importance in the world. This point is extremely important for Africa, which has some 60 per cent of the world’s uncultivated, arable land, yet has a population that in parts of the continent is often exposed to famine. The Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP), a programme of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, seeks to improve agricultural productivity in Africa by increasing public investment by a minimum 10 per cent of the countries’ national budgets and by raising productivity by an annual 6 per cent. African countries are still falling short of these targets. As the
consumption grows in emerging economies and middle classes develop different eating preferences, the African agricultural sector can take advantage of these opportunities. But this requires investment. The CAADP’s targets and strategy were intended to address this challenge, as was the setting up of the CAADP Multi-donor Trust Fund. Africa requires capital and skills to ensure its own food security in the first instance. Investment and know-how from countries such as India, that have experience in this sector, should be a focus of the relationship.

Foreign land investments in Africa have been highly controversial, but need not be. The UN Committee on World Food Security has not as yet completed negotiating the guidelines on land tenure. However, once in place these guidelines will provide a framework for development-friendly land investment. Exporting to rising economies does not necessarily mean denying food security to Africa’s population, provided the way in which farm investments are negotiated incorporate local communities and help improve rural development, rather than only create value for the foreign investors.

Currently, the trade between India and Africa amounts to some $50 billion and is expected to touch $70 billion by 2015. Africa receives about 12 per cent of India’s outwards foreign direct investment. Areas such as food security and agriculture, infrastructure and IT can be the potential focal points for collaboration between India and Africa that could complement the economic plans the continent has developed over the last decade, and enable the relationship to realise its full potential. However, for such collaboration to be meaningful it will be crucial for individual countries in Africa to fully ‘domesticate’ the policies adopted by regional or continental African organisations. This is the greatest challenge facing the African states, which often make ambitious plans for economic integration and development but rarely incorporate them into their national development plans or when they engage with external actors such as India or China. Furthermore, African countries still have much to do to improve their competitiveness to attract investors who can also help to build economies that produce value-added goods. Much has been done to ease the cost of doing business. Rwanda has been a shining example of this, while Tanzania and others too have done much in recent years to improve the overall business environment.

The next section of the paper examines the role of South Africa as a gateway to the continent for increasing both trade and investment between India and Africa.
Gateways

The term gateway is an evolving concept that can be interpreted as more than a geographic determinant (Burghart, 1971: 269). A ‘gateway’ is more than just a physical exit and entrance into a space. The word in essence still implies ‘an opening through some obstruction’ (1971: 269). Burghart (1979) goes on to define gateways as places at the centre of activity, whether economic, social, economic or political. This suggests that in order for South Africa to be a successful gateway into Africa it is necessary for the country to be at the centre of continental activity.

The concept of a gateway can also be less specific and refer ‘to the fact that almost any city can act as a gateway for the transmission of economic, political and cultural globalisation’ (Short, Breitbach, & Buckman, 2000: 2). Short et al (2000) claim that gateway cities have always been the dominant cities in an area, and have consequently always been the logical places from which to move into surrounding areas. Yet there are many places in the world where the dominant city cannot be easily determined and, thus ‘competition for primary gateway status is created’. There is also the possibility that the most globally connected city in a region changes, thus opening up the competition for other cities to become gateways into the area. This highlights the importance of maintaining global connections for gateway cities. South Africa has three of the largest urban agglomerations in Africa (Johannesburg, which is also the financial hub of Africa, Cape Town and Durban, two important port cities). All three are significant entry points for consumer businesses but are also important because of their infrastructure and connectivity into the region.

South Africa as a Gateway

South Africa has marketed itself as a gateway to Africa. In a piece in the Sunday Times Business Times, the SA minister of trade and industry, Dr Rob Davies, stated that there were several factors that made SA a gateway for external actors. Among them was the experience of SA companies in investing in the continent, given that they are among the largest sources of FDI; the developed economy; regulatory frameworks and the vibrant financial sector.\textsuperscript{10} Certainly, South African financial companies have linked up with external actors to operate in Africa as for example, Standard Bank and the Chinese ICBC, or First National and the China Construction Bank. The SA minister of finance
also announced that procedures for cross-border transactions will be simplified and modernised,\(^{11}\) thus making SA more attractive as a financial gateway. Foreign private equity investors who are looking to operate energy, agriculture and financial services in Africa, also choose to partner with SA private companies. China, for example, considers South Africa as being the Hong Kong of Africa.\(^{12}\)

Nevertheless, it is important to understand what this means for SA and how it can be leveraged for its economic engagement with India so as to advance economic development in the continent as a whole. SA is ahead of the other BRICS in the ease of doing business index, as per the World Bank. (In fact, it is easier to do business in seven other African countries than in the BRICS countries.) This should be a magnet for investment, although SA has been slow to attract investment. For example, in 2010 South Africa attracted $1.6 billion worth of investment compared with Nigeria’s $11 billion.\(^{13}\)

Furthermore, SA can be the entry point for the movement of goods, commodities and resources into the continent. As part of global value chains, SA could be a manufacturing hub and the goods can then be exported into its hinterland, but domestic policy constraints make this difficult, especially because of the government’s slow approach to trade liberalisation in the context of the tripartite free trade zone launched in 2008 and the linking of the SADC, the EAC and COMESA.\(^{14}\)

South Africa is already the headquarters of the Africa operations of a number of multinationals. The lifestyle, stable political and economic platform, and the hard and soft infrastructure make the country attractive for expatriates, but also easy for directing business operations. A brief discussion of the economic relations between South Africa and India will show that in some ways India does regard SA as a gateway and as a base for doing business on the continent. Of course, this does not mean that Indian companies carry on their commercial activity in the continent only through South Africa.

**Economic Relations Between South Africa and India**

South Africa is not only the leading and most diversified economy in Africa but it is also a leading investor on the continent. India and South Africa share bilateral, continental and ‘club’ relations. They are both members of the G20, IBSA and the BRICS, apart from the bilateral relations they have cultivated since 1994. (They are also linked by the history of the anti-apartheid struggle.) South Africa has used its
membership of these ‘clubs’ to advance elements of its Africa Agenda, and India’s participation provides further opportunities for identification of mutually beneficial projects.

South Africa does not have a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with India (UNCTAD). India’s FDI outflows to South Africa can be seen in Table 1 below.

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US$ Billions</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share in total world outflows (%)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share in developing economy outflows</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share in Gross Domestic Capital Formation</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Athukorala, 2009.

According to research undertaken by Professor Stephen Gelb at the University of Johannesburg, India’s investments in SA in 2009 amounted to $342 million. However, this calculation is likely to be an underestimate as much of India’s investment into South Africa is via Mauritius. Gelb also estimated that in 2010 there were 93 Indian firms operating in South Africa while there were 45 South African firms in India. Indian Investments in pharmaceuticals and ICT sectors make up a quarter each of India’s FDI in South Africa. Approximately 85 per cent of Indian firms in South Africa are ‘market-seeking’, rather than focused on resources. While India and South Africa are competitors in the generic pharmaceutical trade, Indian companies such as Ranbaxy, have set up manufacturing plants in South Africa. South African Investment in India particularly in banking is on the rise with First Rand’s commercial operations in India, now expanding to include retail.

Trade between the two countries has been growing, although both sides will agree that there is greater potential for growth than what has been achieved to date. According to ITC, total two-way trade amounted to some $6 billion in 2010. Since 2003, South Africa’s most valuable export to India has been ‘Inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound, isotopes’ or more recently ‘mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc.’

From Figure 1 above, it is clear that South Africa’s trade with India has been increasing in recent years, apart from 2009, following the global economic crisis. Trade, however, immediately bounced back and there seems to have been no lasting influence of the crisis. In 2010,
South Africa’s exports to India were valued at about $3 billion while South Africa’s imports from India were slightly lower.

India’s share of South Africa’s world trade has been increasing too, as can be seen in Table 2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculations from ITC’s Trade Map data.

From Figure 2 and 3 above, one can see that in terms of imports and exports, ‘mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc.’ are the most valuable items of trade between South Africa and India. In 2010, ‘Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc.’ accounted for just less than 60 per cent of the total value of South Africa’s exports to India and, accounted for just less than 30 per cent of the total value in South Africa’s imports from India. In terms of South Africa’s exports to India, within the broader ‘Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc. category’, the most valuable item of trade was ‘Coal; briquettes, ovoids & similar solid fuels manufactured from coal’.
Figure 2: Composition of South Africa’s imports from India

Note: Top 10 imported goods presented and sorted according to 2010 trade values.
Source: ITC’s Trade Map.
Figure 3: Composition of South Africa’s exports to India.

Note: Top 10 exported goods presented and sorted according to 2010 trade values.
Source: ITC’s Trade Map.
Challenges
The challenges to SA positing itself as a gateway to the continent in the future are due as much to some of its own weaknesses as well as to the competition posed by other countries in the region and beyond. Its competitiveness has been in overall decline in the last decade; its annual economic growth has been sluggish, not going beyond 5 per cent a year even in the boom years. Foreigners have sensed economic policy uncertainty because of the public debate on nationalisation of the mines. South African companies are leading investors on the continent, but as competition for opportunities in Africa heats up, the country will have to develop a sharper model for doing business. Its economic diplomacy will have to become more focused on how it can provide the requisite support to its companies as they move into the continent. Added to that is the need to upgrade much of the country’s infrastructure (road, rail and ports), if it is to be regarded as a gateway. Lastly, South Africa is now competing with a number of other countries that are also positioning themselves as gateways: Mauritius (which has been the conduit for much Indian investment to SA and the rest of the continent); Kenya, which promotes itself as an East African gateway; Nigeria and Angola. In addition, Dubai is also promoting itself as a gateway to Africa.

There are clearly substantial opportunities for deepening the economic relations between India and the continent, given their development trajectories in the future. SA can be a dynamic pivot in the blossoming of this relationship, but it faces constraints. First, its gateway status to Africa is by no means secure, with African rivals laying claim to their own gateway advantages. Second, while India is an important partner for SA in ‘clubs’ and in global forums, the two countries are as much competitors as they are collaborators in the continent. They both seek markets in Africa for trade and investment, and SA is not always seen as the essential springboard into Africa by Indian companies or others. Thus, while investments are being made in the continent, they do not directly benefit SA. Jacqueline Chimhanzi, the Africa Lead for Deloitte Consulting, argues that many investors:

...as part of an overall market entry strategy, [...] of course also consider other large markets such as East Africa and West Africa to complete their portfolio of investment. However the mistake that most South Africans make is to assume that these investors will choose SA as an entry point for all African investments.17
Furthermore, both countries compete in certain sectors such as the generic pharmaceutical market, while access of SA companies into the Indian market is extremely difficult especially in wines and retail because of the highly regulated nature of those sectors in India.

The paper has tried to outline some of the opportunities that could contribute to Africa’s overall developmental objectives. This is clearly not because SA’s more sophisticated economy is considered to be gateway by Indian players. As the paper has sought to emphasise, there are a number of issues that both SA and other African states have to address in terms of improving their own competitiveness and tackling unemployment and rural poverty. At the same time, an engagement with India, based on Africa’s regional and continental priorities and plans can have a more direct impact on the overriding challenge faced by African populations,—that of sustainable and inclusive growth.

NOTES

1. The author would like to thank Geoffrey Chapman for his work on India-SA trade and investment statistics, and Jocelyn Coldrey for her assistance in drafting of the paper.
2. ‘Africa rising’ was the cover title of the 3rd December 2011 issue of The Economist, while ‘Lions on the Move’ was used by the McKinsey Global Institute in their paper of June 2010.
4. Ernst & Young, It’s Time for Africa: the Africa Attractiveness Survey 2011.
7. Ibid. p. 81.
8. African agricultural output could more than triple, from $280 billion in 2011 to $880 billion by 2030, which could help to feed an additional 1.5 billion people.
13. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011...
15. Athukorala, P.C., ‘Outward Foreign Direct Investment from India’, Asian Development

17. Chimhanzi J., ‘South Africa: The Gateway to Africa....or simply being bypassed?’, 7 February 2012. Deloitte.co.za

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There is a new growth story that is emerging and this is exactly the terminology which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) outlook for 2011 is using to characterise African economies. Inclusive growth is being much talked about and this is again the big challenge being faced by the new growth stories in Africa after the huge boom in commodity prices. How to include the various elements of development in the national strategy is going to be a major challenge for several African economies. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos gives the example of the India-South Africa partnership and it is not just the IBSA and BRICS but the IOR [Indian Ocean Region] which has of late emerged as a very dynamic platform for several facets of engagement.¹ The issues related to global governance that are being addressed at IBSA, and are likely to be addressed in one or the other form in BRICS, could also be discussed at the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation platform.² So these different engagements within the region with Africa and others reiterate the message about resurgence of the South in a major way and their potential contribution to global governance.

India is focussing on three broad areas in its engagement with Africa: First, is capacity and along with capacity, the skill transfer that has been taking place over the years. The second aspect is trade and investment. The third and important dimension is infrastructure development. So within this overarching framework, India has launched several initiatives.
Before going into the details of the initiatives it will be pertinent to recall the whole debate that on the dependence theory that took place in the 1950s and 60s. In the recent Western academic literature, there is a great deal of discussion on Africa’s engagement with India and China, and incidentally one of the issues of South African Journal of International Affairs, had covered the India-Africa relationship and tried to show how the engagement occurs at various levels. The obsession of Western intellectuals that the commodity export from Africa to emerging Asia is exploitative and is having an adverse environmental impact on exporters is not factually correct. An over view of the broad trends in India-China trade, shows that 60 per cent of China’s exports to India are made up of machinery and equipment while primary commodities account for the remaining 40 per cent. Similarly, 78 per cent of India’s exports consist of primary commodities and the rest are manufactured goods. With that kind of composition, there is nothing wrong if primary commodities are part of the export basket. So it is easy to cull out the globally dynamic products. At one stage, manufactured goods or high technology intensive goods were considered as globally dynamic products; but over last ten years, primary commodities such as agriculture commodities have emerged as dynamic products which appear time and again in the trade basket of several countries. The only question is that—in the case of countries who are exporting and earning foreign exchange revenue from this—to what use they are putting that revenue and how it is adding to the capacity within the nation—which is the main point.

The three broad areas of India’s engagement with Africa are—capacity creation, trade and investment (largely in telecommunications, chemicals and mining), and infrastructure development. The second India-Africa Forum summit has gone into the specifics of the nine areas that were identified during the first summit. There is a tendency to link the Africa-India partnership with the wider global challenges that the South is facing, and so, there is a mention of these issues and also how at the bilateral level, things may be improved in terms of addressing the developmental challenges. An analysis of the joint strategy that is being developed, in terms of joint research programmes for developing pharmaceutical products, reveals the focus on developing a shared vision as per the strategy which was evolved at the first summit. The idea is also to broaden the base on the lines of the first summit, and the second summit has tried to identify the eight broad institutional arrangements that exist within Africa to engage
them. So the chairs of the eight regional groups of institutions were invited to the second summit and wide ranging consultations were held. Then through the Team-9 initiative, India has become involved in the techno-economic dimensions in terms of providing credit lines; close to $500 million of credit lines were approved. Institution building is an important dimension and therefore the resources that accrue from export of primary commodities should be put to the right use. And this is where India is trying to establish linkages with various African countries.

In its support and development assistance, India will put more stress on institution building; this has been a dimension of the Indian growth story too which is an important addition to the larger engagement that India is seeking in Africa. And there is also the important dimension of ingenuity that is required in terms of the growth process; so how indigenous is the growth process that Africa is going through? Some countries have a 6 per cent growth rate and in others it is 4 per cent. The IMF outlook for 2011 projects a 4.5 per cent growth rate for the region as a whole and for some countries as high as 6.7 per cent, so that variations at the regional level are there.

India is engaging with a variety of institutions. The government of India approved close to a $30 million line of credit to Angola for setting up of an industrial development park and also approximately $700 million for establishing new training institutions but largely the focus was on IT. But there is more focus on trade but very little attention is being paid to trade facilitation and institutional frameworks are required for this. India at this stage is attaching a lot of importance to trade facilitation. In the context of the ASEAN’s East Asia summit process, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh identified this as one of the aspects to be worked on. Trade facilitation does not only mean customs; it goes far beyond that in terms of establishing Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs), establishing standards and identifying measures which are required to facilitate trade and this, is extremely important if, global value chains have to develop across this region. So even if APIs are exported, the standards would have to be spelt out.

India has take some initiatives as in the case of Ethiopia, where the first step is in terms of capacity creation in the customs department—computerisation of customs and then identifying software packages for exchange of export and import documents. Unfortunately this has not been done within South Asia; as a result
achieving compatibility in trade information becomes extremely challenging, but it is still a work in progress in South Asia. Tanzania requested assistance for handling cyber crime and India has helped establish a separate Police Academy in Tanzania to deal with cyber crime.

Low cost housing is another important area which is being addressed in Zambia, Kenya, Togo, Mauritania and the DRC. The e-connectivity project has been very widely discussed here. It has entered in it’s the second phase now. Telemedicine is an important dimension of this; Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU), which is one of the leading open universities in India, has entered into an arrangement wherein they are offering courses. So education and telemedicine are being dovetailed as a major objective which was also part of the concept.

There is continuing support and engagement for agriculture research and this is another important area in which we need to collaborate in terms of creating capacity. Just two weeks ago, a major conference in Delhi looked into the socio-economic implications of genetically modified crops. This is one hot area of debate for the Members of Parties (MOP) of the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol. India in October 2012 will host the COP-MOP at Hyderabad to finalise some of the issues. At the meeting in Delhi, many African partner countries said that they do not have capacity to make an agronomic assessment of the crops. This is true of many countries—not just in Africa but also in the ASEAN region like Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar, and Vietnam—also have limited agronomic capacities for assessing the socioeconomic impact of whatever hybrids are being approved by their respective governments. In the case of India the capacity was there right from 1960s or even before because of India’s experience with the Green Revolution. In fact when agricultural departments for research were established, agronomic departments were part of the institutional framework. It is in this context, that much more intense capacity building is required across some of the African economies.

Vocational education is an important stream because till the 70s, all the science students would either join the engineering or medical stream. The vocational option within the education spectrum was completely missing, so now it is becoming part of India’s engagement with other developing countries particularly in Africa. Then, within the spectrum of institutions, there are some specific engagements which have come up with different countries. IT, as stated above, is one
important area; foreign trade is another and then there is educational planning and administration which was a specific request made by governments. India is also providing basic skill training through especially designed programmes for which funding for establishment of training centres is approved In this context the Kofi Annan Centre of Excellence in ICT has been set up in two countries.

A glance at the budgetary expenditure by India across various sectors, shows that that health and education have emerged as leading areas of engagement. There is very little discussion about this focus on health and education programmes in these countries and how India is supporting the accomplishment of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), particularly Indian support for health and related sectors (Table 1). The amounts may not be huge as is clear from Table 2 but does help in terms of consolidating the ongoing programmes in the areas of health and education. At the Busan summit in 2011, the OECD agenda on aid effectiveness as discussed. And there is this precondition laid down by the Paris declaration [2005] according to which all the countries which provide development assistance or aid should agree to have budget programme based support rather than project based support.

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (USD Thousands)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>2010-11</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>2008-09</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>2008-09</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zanzibar</td>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report (Various years).

The old annual reports of our ministry of external affairs in the Parliament library reveal that way back in 1956, India, Nepal, and Bhutan signed an agreement whereby India agreed to support the budget programmes of these two countries. The formal agreement was signed in 1960; so, from 1960 to 1965, there was continuous budget
support for the five year plans of Nepal and Bhutan. India still provides budget support, though it was discontinued with Nepal because Nepal was not following the fiscal standards necessary for continuing the assistance which comes in through the budget programme. India entered into another engagement with Nepal in 2003 where a small grants programme came up in a major way and it is such a big success that now India is replicating it in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. So all countries have their forms of governance and their priorities and that diversity has to be respected. There can be no monolithic structure in terms of governance and this is an important dimension of the Indian engagement.

Table 2: Indian Government’s Education and Health Initiatives in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Purpose/Sectors</th>
<th>Amount (USD Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Education and Health</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Education and Health</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Education, Health and Social Sectors</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Education and Health</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Education and Health</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>2008-09</td>
<td>Line of Credit</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>2007-08</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Education and Health</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report (Various years)

At the RIS we have launched an exercise on India’s outgoing assistance programme and as a part of that we have gone through several annual reports of the MEA for the 70s and 80s and tried to analyse how this engagement has evolved since then. An important milestone in India’s outward engagement with other countries was touched upon in the budget speech of the finance minister in 2003 and marked a major departure from several practices that were being followed in terms of India’s outbound aid or development cooperation. This was the year in which the government transferred the responsibility from the finance ministry to the EXIM Bank in terms of providing lines of credit. Under the Indian Development Economic Assistance Scheme (IDEA), Lines of Credit (LOCs) are to be provided by the EXIM Bank which offers them at concessional as well as at commercial rates. This just demonstrates that there is a clear
philosophy in terms of operations and that is the idea of mutual gain—
a fundamental principle of South-South cooperation. The credit lines
also provide support for the other idea of South-South cooperation
and that is the idea of multifaceted engagement in which trade,
investment, technology transfer and development assistance all form
part of one composite growth strategy.

This is what is, much more important than the very narrowly
defined Western concept of aid—because aid makes for dependence.
South-South cooperation provides independence from the volatility or
fragmentation of aid brings and in this respect the South-South
engagement is much more vibrant. Now the development cooperation
minister of Germany is talking about the private sector; the managing
director of DFID [UK Department for International Development] has
issued statement that they look forward to learning from South-South
cooperation because it brings in trade and investment; which is the
way South-South cooperation has evolved all these years. In this
context the multi-dimensional engagement of the India-Africa
partnership is what is resulting in a vibrant bilateral engagement.

As to the trade dimension and figures show that it is important
in terms of the primary product and that has of course been part of
India’s engagement. But India needs to explore how value addition
can be done in terms of strategies. One example is India’s engagement
with Brazil in the pharmaceutical sector since 2008. José Serra, who
was Brazil’s health minister in 1999 and contested the election against
the current President, was the one who found that if they had to
manage AIDS, they would need to the produce drug AIDS drug within
the country. So in 1999, he came up with a legislation that required
companies to have their production base inside Brazil, as they could
not import products from India. As per a survey undertaken in 2008,
21 Indian pharmaceutical companies which set up production bases in
Brazil between 1999 and 2004. This exercise of relocation might have
had short term challenge, however has provided vibrancy to the sector.
They now use Brazil as an export hub for other Latin American
countries; and now Kenya is exploring similar possibilities.

Then of course there is the issue of duty free access in terms of
allowing African countries particularly LDCs to tap into Indian markets
and take advantage of the huge opportunities that the Indian growth
story is offering. India has also supported the new proposals from
LDCs at the WTO in terms of further extending the deadline because
the TRIPS [Agreement] gave some exemption to LDCs. The deadline
expires in 2013. There a proposal from the LDCs to provide an extension till 2016. India along with other countries has supported this demand for extension.

Let me come back to the main message I wanted to give—and this is largely in terms of bringing in the kind of growth experience Africa would have to work for. As the IMF Economic Outlook for 2011 brings out, the volatility that Africa faces with the external environment would have to be addressed on priority. The challenge comes in from the fact that there are still some countries that are specialising in just one or two commodities which occupy major place in their export baskets. Though in the context of terms of trade, this is one area which has improved over the years but this may not be sufficient for them in long term. When India and others were primary exporters of these commodities, the industrialisation in Europe was financed or subsidised by low or adverse terms of trade but now terms of trade are in favour of primary commodity exporters and this is the new era in which the dynamic trade products or the whole dependency theory debate which Samir Amin and Raul Prebisch initiated has to be factored-in by the policy makers from these countries, We now see the countries which were on the periphery as per the spoke and hub theory are now at the centre and are set to take the advantage of this. In conclusion, it is clear that the South and the resurgence of the South has opened up a huge market. The primarily commodity exporters will have to revamp their growth strategy, get the domestic institutions on track and then identify the development priorities they would like to tap into.

NOTES

2. The IOR-ARC, launched in Mauritius in March 1997, is a grouping of 19 Indian Ocean-rim states, whose aims are to facilitate trade and investment in the region. Member states include Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, the Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
India-Africa Security Cooperation: Gains, Challenges and Future Prospects

Paul Musili Wambua

Introduction

Perhaps the starting point for a discourse on “India-Africa Security Cooperation” is a brief examination of the concepts of “security” on the one hand and “cooperation” on the other. A nation’s security is the primary imperative of its foreign policy and conduct of diplomacy.\(^1\) Any military strategist, diplomat or statesman, can only ignore this fact at great peril. The definition of security gets broader all the time as states get less preoccupied with ‘military security’ and more with less overt threats that seem to be a by product of the enhanced interdependence among nations.\(^2\)

Thus, strategic and security issues have slowly acquired a broader definition since the beginning of the 21\(^{st}\) Century.\(^3\) This points to the creation of frameworks for international economic, technological, and humanitarian interaction and co-operation aimed at less militarised international relations, enhanced technological innovation, better human life conditions that are both environmentally sustainable and resource efficient.\(^4\)

Similarly, it is easier to understand the conditions for security cooperation by probing the circumstances in which such cooperation is lacking. As such, conflict between two or more states occurs when such states find themselves pursuing what would appear to be conflicting or incompatible interests. It follows therefore that when
the core security values of a state are threatened, then recourse to war, in order to protect them is imminent. A country’s sovereignty, its territorial integrity, economy, people, its ideological orientation all make up its strategic interests.\(^5\)

It is over such interests that countries either disagree with others or choose to cooperate. However, the degree and conditions for cooperation normally vary over time and space. Cross-regional security cooperation involves linking up sets of neighbouring countries that straddle different regions.\(^6\) This usually hinges on sound bilateral relationships between key countries since bilateral ties are the basic building block for cross-regional cooperation. It is in the backdrop of this premise and context that this paper seeks to examine the gains, challenges and future prospects of India-Africa security cooperation.\(^7\)

**The Historical Background to India-Africa Relations**

India and Africa have had longstanding unique and common historical experiences. Ocean trade between India and Africa dates back several centuries.\(^8\) Perhaps the advent of European colonialism catalysed the interaction between Indians and Africans even further. India was Great Britain’s most valued colonial possession. It was particularly the greatest source of cheap labour for the colonial empire. Indian labourers were used to facilitate colonial expeditions into most of Sub-Saharan Africa. Subsequently, Indian soldiers and their African counterparts found themselves serving the interests of the colonisers during the First and Second World Wars. Thousand lost their lives in these wars.

Soon after the end of the Second World War, India led the decolonisation process.\(^9\) The demonstration effect of the Indian nationalism led by Mahatma Gandhi and subsequent independence in 1947 strongly influenced the rise of African nationalism in the same direction during the 1950s and 1960s. At independence, most African states forged even stronger bilateral ties with India, paving way for enhanced trade, commercial and industrial relations.\(^10\)

It is noteworthy that India remained at the forefront of the United Nations-led campaign against apartheid in South Africa and closely partnered Africa under the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) banner. At the same time India was at the forefront of championing the interests of the Third World right from the Bandung Declarations of 1955, the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).\(^11\) These platforms for South-South cooperation and engagement at the United Nations platform were used not only to agitate for the
recognition of South-South interests and concerns in a Western-dominated international political economy, but also to present a solid stand at the height of the Cold War and its arms race that threatened the world with nuclear annihilation.

These historical common experiences perhaps cleared the way for stronger ties with African countries for more than four decades. At the beginning of the 21st century, Indian investments in Africa ranged from small retail holdings in the remotest parts of Africa, to multinational investments ranging from oil exploration, manufacturing, real estate, banking, insurance, construction works to name but a few. Yet in the past decade or so, the international system has witnessed the emergence of new and complicated security challenges both within and among nation-states that call for enhanced cooperation among regions. These are indeed the factors behind the rise of India-Africa security cooperation.12

A Theoretical Framework for India-Africa Security Cooperation

India-Africa security cooperation can best be examined from a liberal perspective.13 Since the beginning of the 21st century, the term ‘security’ was essentially contested and underwent tremendous redefinition. This redefinition was intended to capture two issues: the broadened concerns of the concept and the particular security perspectives of Third World states.14 This latter concern was prompted by the fact that the traditional (Western) understanding of what constituted security threats seemed not to match up to the security challenges and realities of developing countries. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the international community has also been faced with the consequences of globalisation with all its concomitant aspects.15

Traditionally, security issues were considered to be purely the domain and concern of states. However, that state centric perspective has been changed drastically; it is now not contested that security is not just concerned with states and regimes, but also with individuals-and peoples.16 This emerging dimension of human and societal security has been a central thread in the contemporary discourse on security. The movement away from the traditional concerns and understandings about security has further encouraged security analysis to move beyond the state, and to encompass the wider environment in which the state operates.17 This expansion of analysis has enabled security to be seen within larger, regional contexts. The rationale for
this is furnished by the process of internationalisation (of national affairs, conflicts and politics), and that of interdependence, including contemporary complex interdependence.\textsuperscript{18}

This way, a powerful state like India may easily apprehend a military threat from another major power located at a distance. From time to time it may have the privilege of applying pressure and coercion as a form of “diplomacy” usually practiced by powerful nations against weaker ones. For greater effectiveness, such moves may be often supplemented with incentives and rewards. But chances are that such a state is also faced with increasingly complex military-strategic and economic security concerns that go beyond its region; that emanate from neighbouring countries and arise from situations of instability in other regions which may involve weak and strong states alike. Such is the nature of India’s security challenges. For India and Africa therefore, the establishment of regional cooperation is invariably seen as a safety net that reduces any security threat. This is an underlying, often unstated element in regional cooperation, and a powerful argument in favour of such arrangements that may address issues of security, trade and economic cooperation. The stronger the web of such regional and cross-regional ties, the stronger is the threshold against internal, regional and global security threats.\textsuperscript{19}

**The 21\textsuperscript{st} Century National and International Security: Areas of Confluence for India and Africa**

There is a compelling question which must be posed: what are India’s and Africa’s security concerns both nationally and internationally and where do these concerns converge? Nationally, India like any other state is faced with myriad security challenges that range from felonies, theft, assault, murder, illegal weapons, violent robberies and banditry, fraud and money laundering; to more serious problems of sectarian violence, terrorism and drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{20} External security threats on the other hand are associated with the activities of insurgents along the borders with neighbouring countries. A case in point is the security risk associated with the activities of Maoist insurgents in Nepal.\textsuperscript{21}

Similarly, India regards Afghanistan as a chief external threat to its security; accusing it of doing nothing to stem Al-Qaeda activities in Kashmir with support from Pakistan.\textsuperscript{22} India regards Pakistan as its principal enemy because of the long standing dispute over Kashmir; while also suspecting Pakistan of supporting militancy and fundamentalism in the South Asia region. According to Kapur,\textsuperscript{23} within
this public enmity, there continues to be business, academic and general citizen interaction along with that between some members of the political establishment of the two states—a state of affairs that suggests the possibility of future friendship between the two states.\textsuperscript{24}

At the same time, India regards China as its principal enemy owing to past boundary disputes and China seems to support Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute. Nonetheless, this external threat seems to have waned following the cooling of China’s relationship with Pakistan in the recent past, although the border issue remains unresolved.\textsuperscript{25} China on its part has accused India of supporting Tibetan separatism. Although there are some boundary disputes between India and Bangladesh over Muhurichar; India does not regard Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri-Lanka as presenting any conventional military threat to her.\textsuperscript{26}

As far as Africa is concerned, perhaps its security concerns are far more complicated than India’s. Nonetheless, internal security threats in Africa while they involve different structures, actors and processes share many similarities with those in India. They range from felony, theft, assault, murder, illegal weapons, violent robberies and banditry, fraud and money laundering; to the more serious problems of sectarian violence, terrorism and drug trafficking. Although, every African state has its own unique external threats; an analogy could easily be drawn between these and those of India. For instance, most Eastern Africa, Great Lakes, Western Africa and Southern Africa states are concerned about the repercussions of war in neighbouring countries, which lead to regional instability especially due to the activities of rebel and/or belligerent groups in addition to cross-border crimes resulting from the movement of displaced human populations.\textsuperscript{27} Kenya has shouldered the burden of refugees since the collapse of the Somali state and has in the recent past been attacked by the Al Shabaab militia which forced it to send troops inside Somalia as a pre-emptive measure to protect its territorial integrity.

Today Africa consists of some 54 countries. About a third of these countries have been experiencing large-scale political violence or war since they gained independence. It is true that not all of Africa is afflicted to the same degree. The levels of violence differ greatly. Africa is an immense continent, richly varied in its culture and peoples, and so large and complex an area that no one can easily predict where violence will occur, yet the overall pattern of violence on the African continent is disturbing.\textsuperscript{28}
Compared with other parts of the world, Africa is wracked by violent conflict and wars that continue to exact a heavy toll on already fragile economies and societies. Since the end of the Cold War, sub-Saharan Africa has seen only one regular war (Ethiopia-Eritrea) but no less than 17 civil wars and major armed intra-state conflicts, even though several of them have been cyclical. Several million people have been killed in these violent struggles, not counting the indirect effects of armed struggles on the environment, infrastructure and economic resources. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the late 1990s is thus estimated to have had a death toll of two million people, mostly indirect victims. In other cases as in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Rwanda the state virtually collapsed at different points in recent history.

An assessment of the nature of these sources of instability and insecurity in Africa and India, reveals that despite the different contexts, the underlying human security issues are quite similar. These include: rampant rural poverty and urban destitution; food insecurity; the challenges of disease outbreaks and affordable health care; environmental degradation in the face of global climate change, pollution and depletion of natural resources as well as personal insecurity; survival of traditional cultures and minorities; and the protection of civil, political and economic rights of peoples.

In essence, the nature and dynamics of 21st century security threats have made it clear that no state can act unilaterally and succeed fully in addressing these issues. In fact, the complicated structure of international terrorist organisations, narcotics and arms trade, human trafficking syndicates as well as international economic crimes that includes, but is not limited to, money laundering as well as piracy, provide the greatest rationale for cross-regional security cooperation. Yet the international system in which these vices thrive is both anarchical and unpredictable. No state would approach these issues blindly. It takes well informed and strategic cooperation to meet the rising demands of a country’s populace, while meeting the foreign policy need of friendly states in an increasingly globalised and highly competitive world.

India-Africa Security Cooperation: Gains, Gaps and Challenges

Gains
India’s entry into the nuclear and missile clubs challenged the non-proliferation and the missile control regimes. But it showed its
determination to stay the course in its nuclear and missile policies in the face of international sanctions and pressures; while at the same time avoiding drifting into a nuclear war with other powers in the region.\textsuperscript{32} This took critics in the developed world by the surprise because they thought that the South Asia natives were not capable of pursuing coercive diplomacy with restraint. Strategically, India stood out as an autonomous player and not as a client state or proxy of the international powers. India has therefore been able to project its power with solidity among the states of the Indian Ocean Rim (IOM) and beyond.\textsuperscript{33}

In a discussion on India’s foreign policy towards Africa, Yoshioka\textsuperscript{34} observed that despite the absence of a comprehensive strategy, India’s strategic interests in Africa revolve around the urge to assume a leading role and responsibility in Africa as a major development and investment partner especially in the energy sector and the security of the Indian Ocean. It is therefore not surprising that India is a formal contender for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council with many African countries supporting this move.\textsuperscript{35}

In this regard, India has sought to forge strategic partnerships with leading sub-regional powers in Africa. For instance, in 1997 India and South Africa agreed to establish a strategic partnership based on a relationship beyond bilateral and regional interests. It encompassed issues of South-South cooperation, United Nations reform and regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean Rim area.\textsuperscript{36} As a result, India and South Africa spearheaded the establishment of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). Further, India went on to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on cooperation, and the two have since worked together for organising joint forums since 2006.\textsuperscript{37} Similarly, India continued to strengthen ties with Nigeria, a leading sub-regional power in Western Africa. It is noteworthy that India is a leading importer of Nigerian oil.

By the same token, over the past 10 years, India has sought to enhance bilateral military ties with littoral states along the Eastern and Southern Africa Indian Ocean SLOC (Strategic Line of Communication). India’s world class military institutions particularly the National Defence College provides training to officers from countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania, Seychelles, Botswana and Lesotho. These countries particularly Mozambique held joint military (naval) exercises between 2003 and 2004.\textsuperscript{38} During the same period, South Africa and
India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on defence cooperation and defence supplies for India. It is noteworthy that India’s defence industry has made inroads into the African market and several African countries have bought several air and naval assets including defence boats and light helicopters from India.\(^\text{39}\)

Similarly India continues to build military relations with Africa under the banner of United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs).\(^\text{40}\) The immediate aftermath of the post-Cold War witnessed a rise in intra-state conflicts in Africa in Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda, Mozambique and Angola among others. Close to 8,000 Indian troops and military observers served in UN Peacekeeping Missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for enforcing the Ethiopia-Eritrea Agreement and in the Ivory Coast and Sudan. Also India has shown an increased interest in supporting African Union (AU) cooperation as well as security initiatives by regularly sending high ranking representatives to AU Summits.\(^\text{41}\)

Most recently at the Africa-India Forum held in Addis Ababa, in May 2011; India and Africa further pledged to strengthen their cooperation in regional and global security, as well as in the economic and trade spheres. The two sides resolved to cooperate in combating international terrorism and to eradicate the menace of piracy and safeguarding shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean through the Addis Ababa Declaration and the Framework for Cooperation.\(^\text{42}\) On the economic front, the two sides sought to enhance cooperation through stable and long-term investments and capital flows especially in the area of infrastructural development. These developments are significant steps in a positive direction.\(^\text{43}\)

As far as human security is concerned, it is noteworthy that India’s pharmaceutical industry continues to provide sustainable solutions to problems of healthcare in Africa. The HIV/AIDS scourge coupled with many tropical and non-communicable diseases proved difficult to control and/or contain for most of Sub-Saharan Africa. The patented drugs were too expensive to purchase especially from dominant Western drug manufacturing multinationals.\(^\text{44}\) The production of safe and affordable generic drugs by the Indian pharmaceutical companies proved to be a formidable solution to these challenges. Indeed in January 2011, at a Conference on South-South cooperation, held at the Mumbai University, the central theme was “India, Africa and Food Security”.\(^\text{45}\) It is also noteworthy that India’s economic diplomacy effected the debt cancellation of five highly
indebted poor countries in Africa namely Ghana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Mozambique. These developments point to healthy gains in as far as India-Africa security cooperation in the past decade is concerned.  

Gaps and Challenges  
Despite these gains in India-Africa security cooperation critics have raised several concerns concerning factors informing the sudden rise of Indian interest in Africa. On a critical note Pham \(^{47}\) observes that India’s sudden interest in Africa is driven purely by its projected energy insecurity. He observes thus:

> India’s economy is projected to grow at a rate of between 8%-10% annually in the next two decades, and is the only major economy predicted to record growth rates significantly above 3% by 2050...The country’s population of 1.1 billion accounts for one sixth of humanity [with most of its population being] under 29 years. Despite the dynamism that this data imply...India faces a potentially serious energy crisis. Currently, the country is the fifth largest consumer of energy in the world...India is expected to double its energy consumption by 2030, overtaking Japan and Russia to become the world’s third largest consumer after the United States and China.

This highlights the fact that India-Africa cooperation may not necessarily be informed by the drive for mutual gain and/or benefits. Other critics see these moves as driven by India’s sudden awakening to the growing influence of China around Africa in recent years. \(^{48}\) Nonetheless it is not enough to say that the growing trend of India-Africa security cooperation is informed solely by the tensions associated with Sino-Indian relations. In fact it could be a misrepresentation of fact and logic of international intercourse for one to argue that states interact with others for purely philanthropic or humanitarian reasons. \(^{49}\) All such interaction is informed by the urge for every county to meet its national goals and to project its national power to its own advantage. India’s conduct of international relations in Africa and vice-versa is warranted and expected. \(^{50}\)

Nonetheless, several gaps remain in the India-Africa cooperation. First, it is important that security cooperation be enhanced and strengthened to address the various security concerns that plague both India and Africa. The war on narcotics and international drug cartels and syndicates needs to be stepped-up. Several countries in Africa,
including Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria and Tanzania are transit points for heroin and hashish, bound for Europe and North America mostly from South West Asia. A joint security arrangements or institutions to address these threats seem to be lacking. Similarly, piracy and maritime terrorism continue despite the recent onslaught on the Al-Shabaab movement in Somalia led by Kenya both on land and at sea. On the other hand, the challenges posed by maritime pollution and human trafficking are not very well addressed in these cross-regional arrangements. There is therefore urgent need for security intelligence cooperation and joint-training on these issues. But perhaps the greatest challenge for Africa at this point in time is to seek a greater involvement in India’s nuclear gains purely for economic and industrial reasons. As it is many African countries are naturally endowed with the basic ingredients necessary the exploitation of nuclear power for economic proposes. This opportunity remains unexplored, yet it may open up more industrial and economic opportunities for both parties.

At the same time, the greatest challenge to Indian-African security cooperation is the lack of coordination. Some countries in Africa particularly may feel that only such regional hegemonies such as Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya are bound to gain from such arrangements. As such there are likely to be divided loyalties among various African states vis-à-vis the interests of other great powers such as the United States and China. As such the entire process needs to be better coordinated, focused and institutionalised.

**Conclusion: Future Prospects for India-Africa Security Cooperation**

A keen observer could easily argue that India’s historical ties and diplomatic relations with Africa provided the best chance for Afro-Indian security cooperation at the beginning of the 21st century. Similarly, the Post-Cold War multi-polar international system brought with it myriad military-strategic and human security challenges that call for a more liberal, cooperative and rational approach. Perhaps some countries recognised these facts in sooner compared to others. Yet the stark realities of piracy, drug trafficking, international terrorism, climate change and environmental depletion as well as the human security issues of poverty, unemployment and communicable diseases continue to plague India and Africa alike. To overcome these challenges and to materialise the gains made so far therefore the two parties must coordinate, focus and institutionalise their security cooperation arrangements/frameworks.
NOTES


42. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Pham J. Peter, “India’s Expanding Relations with Africa and Their Implications for U.S Interests” in American Foreign Policy Interests (29), 2007:ISSN1080-3920, pp. 341-352.
49. C. Raja Mohan, ‘Rethinking India’s Grand Strategy’ in N. Sisodia and C. Bharskar Emerging India: Security and Foreign Perspectives (New Delhi, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2005).
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Peace and security have become a priority issue for the Africans. While it is true that this issue, has in the past been accepted as one of the important challenges, in the recent years this has gained ascendance to become a political priority, both within and outside the continent. Sub-Saharan Africa continues to be the region that is hardest hit by violent conflict and war. The creation of the African Union (AU) is viewed as a crucial step towards developing a new African security architecture. The AU envisions a more responsible role for itself for resolving the conflicts in the region that include the right to intervene in member states in grave circumstances. African countries through the AU have also adopted a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). These developments within the continent have been matched by the heightened interest of external actors notably the EU, US and China. The US announced the creation of a new Unified Combatant Command (COCOM) in February 2007. The Africa Command’s mission is to work with the African states and regional organisations to strengthen security and stability in the region. Similarly the EU and China have also begun to strengthen their defence links with the African countries.

The two India-Africa Forum summits held in New Delhi (2008) and Addis Ababa (2011) are an indication of India’s growing interest in the region. India and Africa have historically been close allies. Over the years India-Africa cooperation has extended to encompass political, economic, cultural, science and technology and security issues. In the
light of these happenings it will be appropriate to examine the case for a closer security engagement between India and Africa.

The main hypothesis of the study is that in the light of the high priority given to peace and security issues in Africa, India needs to re-examine its security dialogue with African countries. Further, increasing the US, Chinese and European military footprints in Africa may challenge India’s engagement with the countries of the continent. The study will thus address a number of questions. It will analyse the prominent features of Africa’s evolving security architecture. It will also examine India’s strategic interests in the continent and also the broad parameters of India’s security cooperation with Africa in past. Finally, it will examine the possible areas for a fresh dialogue on security and the future prospects while India engages Africa in the security framework.

**Africa’s Security Architecture**

It was in the Libyan coastal city of Sire in March 2001, that the heads of state and governments of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) formally proclaimed establishment of the African Union to forge a new peace and security architecture for Africa. The need to develop a pan African institutional mechanism to address the security needs of the continent can be traced back to the early 1990s. A number of factors were responsible for this change. First and foremost there was a growing realisation among the African leaders that the development of the continent will be held back as long as lasting peace and stability did not prevail in Africa. Second, with the end of the cold war, the Africans perceived a lack of interest and indifference among external actors towards African problems. Therefore for many African leaders it became absolutely clear that adopting the philosophy of “African solutions for African problems” was the only way out. Third, the pioneering endeavours of African leaders, former Nigerian President Obasanjo’s in particular—primarily to further Nigeria’s historic role as the “big brother”—for providing the blue print for this cooperation.¹

Indeed the genesis of Nigerian president’s proposal can be traced to the 1990 meeting of the Nigeria led, African Leadership Forum (ALF) and the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). One of the recommendations made at this meeting was to develop an institutional mechanism similar to the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to deal with post-cold war challenges in Africa.² The revised version of these recommendations for a pan African security architecture were termed
the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). In May 1991 the OAU meeting adopted the proposal for a CSSDCA, which led to the Kampala Declaration. Subsequently after continuous efforts the basic principles of the proposed CSSDCA were adopted by African leaders at the Durban summit of the AU in July 2002.

The advent of the AU has visibly transformed the peace and security architecture of the continent. As the report by UN Secretary General Points out, “the nature, scope and orientation of the activities of the African Union are vastly different from those of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity.” One of the most distinctive features of this new African peace and security architecture is a reappraisal of the hitherto sacrosanct principle of non-interference in internal matters. In sharp contrast to the charter of the OAU, which was predicated on non-interference and non-intervention, the Constitutive Act of the AU grants the continental organisation the power to intervene in order to resolve conflicts. Indeed the article 4(h) of the CA states that the AU has the right to intervene without consent, in the member states in order to “restore peace and stability” to prevent war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” and in response to a serious threat to legitimate order.”

The other remarkable feature is the broadening of the state centric view to include human and collective security. This is epitomised by the adoption of a Common Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Sierre on February 28, 2003.

Common Security and Defence Policy (CADSP)
The CADSP provides an African perspective to the defence and security challenges faced by them along with a set of measures to respond to these challenges. The CADSP rests on the three notions of defence, security and common threats. It defines defence broadly to encompass the traditional right of the state to protect its national and territorial integrity as well as the less traditional non-military modes of protecting people’s political cultural social and economic rights, values and way of life. Similarly security is defined to cover both the state centric notions of survival of state and its protection by military means from external aggressions well as the non-military notion. It involves the act and process of protecting individual, families,
communities and the national way of life in its economic, political and social dimensions.

The CADSP outlines two major sets of common threats faced by the African countries—internal and external. Common internal threats to the continent include: interstate conflicts, intrastate conflicts, unstable post conflict situations as well as non-traditional issues like refugees, proliferation of light weapons and small arms, drug trafficking pandemics like HIV/AIDS, environmental degradation, organised crime and human trafficking. While the list of common external challenges includes external aggression against an African country, international conflicts with adverse effect on African regional security, terrorism, globalisation, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, unfair trade regimes, and narcotics trafficking. The notion of common threats is based primarily on the principle that the “security of each African country is inseparably linked to that of the other African countries and the African continent as a whole.” This principle apparently draws inspiration from the NATO doctrine as per which an attack on one NATO member will lead to the mobilisation of the whole alliance. The other principles informing the CADSP include sovereign equality and interdependence among African states, respect for borders inherited at independence, peaceful resolution of conflicts and most importantly the right of the AU to intervene in a member state in event of grave circumstances like war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

The main objective of formulating the Common African Defence and Security policy is to ensure a collective response to the internal and external threats facing the continent. Other objectives of the policy include enhancement of defence cooperation among African states, eliminating suspicion and rivalry, enhancement of the AU’s capacity for coordination of early action for conflict prevention, containment and management, facilitate the establishment of threat deterrence and containment capacity and encourage the conclusion of non-aggression pacts. The immediate responsibility for the implementation of the CADSP lies with the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union. The PSC is the primary forum to promote “peace security and stability in Africa.” The council is composed of 15 members, five of whom are elected for a period of three years, while the remaining ten shall serve for two years. The protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC also calls for the formation of three key bodies to assist
India-Africa Security Engagement

The AU protocol stipulates that the PSC shall assist in conflict management, the restoration of rule of law, the establishment and development of democratic institutions, and the election process in member states, post conflict peace building etc. To date the PSC has held a number of meetings on matters related to conflict. While the African countries have embarked on the idealistic path of collective security, there are a number of roadblocks in their way. The main problem lies in the implementation of the policy. Indeed the CADSP does not provide a roadmap for intervention in a crisis involving member states. Further while the ASF has been designed to reduce the African countries dependence on UN sponsored missions there are concerns that they may not be able to perform their function effectively. It has been argued that it will be extremely difficult for an ASF brigade to intervene neutrally. Moreover some African conflicts have proven lastingly tractable, for example Somalia, Ethiopia-Eritrea and Congo. This situation presents the danger of the ASF being mired in conflicts that the international community at large has been unable resolve, and thereby risking draining the resources of already financially stretched African states. In fact one of the major pitfalls in the implementation of CADSP is the financial weakness of the African countries. While many of the PSC’s efforts have been laudable it remains constrained by a severe lack of human and financial resources. Furthermore, the diversity of military cultures and administrative traditions in Africa also means that the African Union will have to work towards harmonising the doctrines and traditions. More specifically, in case of multinational peace operations there is a dire need to develop standard operating procedures and doctrines.

In this backdrop it will be interesting to analyse India’s strategic interests in Africa and current security cooperation with African countries.

India’s Strategic Interests in Africa

From the geo strategic perspective there has been a perceptible rise in the importance of Africa for New Delhi. First, India’s growing energy needs have forced it to diversify its oil imports. In the past, India has been dependent on West Asia for its oil imports. In the recent years, India like the US and the other major powers has recognised the energy potential of African countries. Currently, around 24 per cent
of India’s crude oil imports are sourced from Africa (including the North African countries). The Indian national oil companies like the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Vies Limited (OVL) has invested

In equity assets in the Sudan, Ivory Coast Libya, Egypt, and Nigeria, Nigeria-Sao Tome Principe Joint Development Area and Gabon. Private sector companies like Reliance have also invested in equity oil in Sudan. While Assar has procured exploration and production blocks in Madagascar and Nigeria. India has recently completed a 200 million dollar pipeline project from Khartoum to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

Second, there is a growing recognition of the fact that the countries on the eastern coast of Africa abutting the Indian Ocean—from South Africa to Somalia—fall under India’s maritime strategic neighbourhood. It has been acknowledged that insecurity in the Indian Ocean region, is increasing, because of the rise of fundamentalist, terrorist, and militant, separatist or extremist organisations, and criminal syndicates involved in the trafficking of drugs, arms and humans, and piracy.

As Pranab Mukherjee pointed out:

India is located at the centre of an arc of fundamentalist activism, terrorism and political instability between North and East Africa and South-east Asia that has witnessed some of the most dramatic acts of terrorism over the last decade, from the US embassy bombings of Nairobi and Mombasa, through incidents in Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Bali and Jakarta, not to forget the Bombay blasts of 1992.6

The rise in the incidents of piracy in the Somali waters in particular threatens the security of the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs). The Indian navy has been active in its diplomacy in the Indian Ocean, providing maritime security cover during the African Union summit in 2003 and World Economic Forum in 2004 at Mozambique.

Fourth, Indian industry has realised the strategic importance of Africa, specifically in commercial terms. This is supported by the government’s fresh look at Africa with the initiatives of Focus Africa and Team 9. The new economic initiatives launched by the African governments like the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) have also attracted the Indian investor’s interest. There is a growing realisation that African economies are at a stage of development when India could offer the most appropriate
technology and products at competitive prices. A recent study by the Federation of Indian Industry and Commerce (FICCI) points out that its “high time India took a pragmatic assessment of the business opportunities offered by Africa”. The success of the four India-Africa project partnership conclaves held in New Delhi since 2005, is an indication of industry’s growing interest in Africa.

**Existing Defence/Security Cooperation with Africa**

India has a long history of bilateral defence cooperation with African countries. The Indian ministry of defence (MOD) defines defence cooperation as those activities “covered by training exchanges, combined exercises, sourcing, development, production and marketing of defence equipment and other forms of cooperation.” India has been involved in a wide range of defence cooperation engagements with the African countries. These include training cooperation and assistance; participation in UN peacekeeping missions; defence cooperation agreements/MOUs; visits by heads of government/defence ministers/defence secretaries/chiefs of defence staff and services; exchange of military delegations; naval goodwill visits; naval assistance and joint exercises; defence equipment transfers and sourcing.

Right from the mid-sixties India has been involved in providing training and infrastructure development assistance to different countries in Africa such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mauritius, Zambia, Ghana, Sudan, Botswana, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Egypt and Lesotho. It has providing training to African officers and staff at various defence academies in India. As part of its anti-apartheid policy India trained over 300 African National Congress (ANC) cadres in India. Indian military training teams have been posted to Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and Zambia. It has the distinction of providing assistance for establishing defence academies in Ethiopia and Nigeria. Currently India is involved in setting up computer labs for the Nigerian Defence Academy.

India has played a major role in keeping peace in Africa through its contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations in the continent. India’s contributions are unique in the context of their professionalism, humanitarian concern and gender sensitivity. As one of the leading Troop Contributor Countries (TCC) India has deployed over 160,000 peacekeepers to virtually every United Nations peacekeeping mission in the last six decades. In Africa they have been deployed in Congo, Namibia, Somalia, Mozambique, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Ethiopia-Eritrea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Ivory Coast and Sudan.

South Africa is the one country in Africa with whom India has substantive cooperation in defence field—the comprehensive defence cooperation agreement was signed in 2000. A defence cooperation agreement with Nigeria was signed in 2007, during the visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Earlier during Tanzanian defence minister’s visit to India in 2003, India signed an MOU on defence cooperation. A similar MOU was signed with Seychelles, during the Indian vice president Bhairon Singh Shekhawat’s visit in September 2003. An MOU with Sudan and Algeria are under consideration.

Over the years Indian naval ships have been deployed on goodwill visits to various African ports—Port Victoria, Seychelles, Port Louis, Madagascar, Massava, Ethiopia, Dar-e-Salaam, Tanzania, Mombassa, Kenya, Port Sudan, Sudan, Mozambique, Algeria and South Africa. The Indian navy has assisted African countries on various occasions to conduct hydrographic surveys, for technical support and also to provide maritime surveillance cover on request. In 2001, the Indian navy undertook the longest towing operation covering 2,700 nautical miles, when INS Matanga towed a Mauritian coast guard ship MCGS Vigilant from Mauritius to Mumbai. Two Indian Naval ships Ranjit and Suvarna were deployed in Mozambique from June 23-July 2003 at the request of the Mozambique government to provide coastal & maritime security during the African Union Summit. Similarly in June 2004, INS Sujata and Savitri were deployed in Maputo, Mozambique to provide security cover during the World Economic Forum Summit and the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Heads of State Summit, held in Maputo. Moreover, Indian navy has been in the forefront of the anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, off Somalia coast since October 2008.

The importance given to India by the African countries in the past is evident as India was the only country from outside the region to be invited for ‘Exercise Blue Crane’ in 1999. In the same year a delegation from Mauritius participated in the “Milan (West)” interaction with the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea littoral navies at Kochi. In 2004, the Indian Air force participated with the South African Air force in an Air Defence Exercise Golden Eagle. Moreover two tri-nation naval exercise under the IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) have been conducted till date giving India an exposure to the South African and Brazilian navies.
South Africa has been an important supplier of defence equipment. This includes ammunition for the 155 mm Bofors guns, avionics and night vision and Casspir mine protected armoured personnel carriers.\textsuperscript{16} Given its arms export policy constraints, India has transferred limited defence equipment to African countries in past. This includes trainer aircraft to Ghana, light helicopters to Namibia, patrol craft to Mauritius and Seychelles.\textsuperscript{17}

**India and Africa: Restructuring the Framework of Cooperation**

As far as India is concerned we have till date looked at security cooperation in Africa from the traditional security perspective which involved three tiers of cooperation—training, arms transfers, exchange of visits, and joint exercises. However in the current context when Africans have redefined security to include traditional and human and collective security aspects, a cooperation framework that is solely concentrated on military security would be all too limiting and myopic. There is thus a need to enlarge the spheres of cooperation.

**Challenges of Conflict**

Conflict is a never ending feature of African landscape. While peace has made some progress in the last few years, the continent it still continues to account for a large number of conflicts.\textsuperscript{18} The recent events in Mali, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan certainly confirm this hypotheses. However Scott Straus argues that despite the rise in conflicts in the last couple of years there are far fewer wars in the 2000s as compared to the early and mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{19} Addressing the root causes of these conflicts could pave the way towards greater security. It is quite clear that most of the African conflicts are related to internal grievances against the regimes on issues related to resources, revenue sharing, identity and greater autonomy rather than some external factors.\textsuperscript{20} Though one cannot rule out inter state conflicts as tensions continue to simmer on the Eritrea-Ethiopia, Chad-Sudan, Rwanda-DRC borders.

Another important factor for the endemic conflicts is the fact that the state’s capacity to regulate weapons in society is weak and there are multiple non-state actors that are increasingly able to challenge and threaten the authority of the state. In the absence of effective administration and the application of any rule of law, the nexus between the legitimate and illegitimate activities of business,
government and criminals is often difficult to distinguish. Thus insecurity in Africa is linked to the nature and capability of African states. While there are a few collapsed or failed states in Africa, most African states are weak as governance has contracted rather than expanded in the recent years. According to estimates one third of Sub-Saharan African states are unable to exercise control over their rural regions or to extend control to their borders.

The erosion of state power in African is linked to the weakening of the national security apparatuses across the continent. As a result their security apparatuses, particularly the police and intelligence services are in a dismal shape. They lack funding, have large cadres of untrained personnel, rely on outdated methods, are tasked with repression and are more interested in extortion than detection. In fact “most African police forces are extremely weak and cannot combat day-to-day crime, much less be front line forces in tackling instability.” Similarly intelligence collection in most of the countries is often primitive, reducing the ability of the leaders to assess the changing threat environment.

Thus for African countries, building effective institutions that promote respect for democracy and rule of law is a crucial part of changing any country’s security dynamics. Arguably the most important of these, at least in the medium term, is the African Union’s PSC. However as discussed above, the PSC is handicapped in fulfilling the tasks assigned to it, due to the financial and manpower constraints. Moreover PSC faces a dilemma in dealing with human security issues, given the fact that its current structure is state centric. This leaves India with the task of searching for useful instruments to assist the African countries and PSC in building capacities. As a first step India’s long track record in conflict resolution and peacekeeping can be shared with the AU. Second, India can share its experiences in decentralisation of governance.

**Health Challenges**

Another important threat that the Africans face is the lack of facilities to deal with huge onslaught of infectious diseases, mainly HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. No one can deny, that the most catastrophic of the lot is the HIV/AIDS pandemic. According to recent estimates Africa continues to remain the continent most affected by HIV. In 2010, about 68 per cent of all people living with HIV resided in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The region also accounted for 70 per cent of all new HIV infections worldwide.\textsuperscript{24}

The disease is especially intense in Southern Africa with five million in South Africa alone infected with the virus apart from a quarter of the total population of Botswana. According to a report of the US National Intelligence Council diseases such as HIV/AIDS “will add to political instability and slow democratic development in Sub Saharan Africa.”\textsuperscript{25} HIV/AIDS is expected to slow economic growth and also have a disruptive social impact in Africa. Although in recent years African countries have strengthened their interventions for dealing with the malaise of malaria, HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases they still continue to face constraints due to the lack of financial, material, technical and human resources.

What is extremely perturbing is that the disease hits the active sections of the population, more acutely especially the armed forces. However statistics of the spread of the disease in army are difficult to obtain as they are considered a national security issue. The rate of infection in African armies is very high—particularly among the Southern African Development Community. However these estimates vary.

The general consensus is that African armed forces have a higher prevalence rate than civilian populations.\textsuperscript{26} However there is some confusion about the prevalence rates within the armed forces. For example in the case of South African Defence Forces some estimates suggest that the rate is between 50 per cent and 70 per cent, while according to official figures it is 23 per cent. Similarly in case of Angola’s defence forces, initial estimates suggest that around 55 per cent, is afflicted by the disease while according to official reports it is not more than 11 per cent.\textsuperscript{27} Obviously high HIV-AIDS prevalence rates will have adverse impact on the on the capabilities of the armed forces.

Thus India and African Union need to share experiences and information on healthcare development; enhance cooperation in controlling HIV/AIDS, TB, Malaria and other communicable diseases; work towards assisting in developing indigenous capacities in Africa for manufacture of pharmaceuticals. However, whether the PSC is equipped to handle this issue remains to be seen.

\textbf{Terrorism}

In recent years there has been a rise in terrorism in Africa and there is an arc of instability, extending from Nigeria in West to Somalia in
the Horn of Africa. In the last few years the Boko Haram group has unleashed a wave of violence in northern Nigeria, and is responsible for thousands of deaths in the country. Similarly Mali has been in turmoil for more than a year with Islamists and separatist groups such as Al Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM), Ansari Dine, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) and the Movement for Tawheed and Jihad in Africa (MUJAO) controlling the northern region. On the other side of Africa, Somalia has been in turmoil for the last two and half decades. There is no doubt that the militants continue to remain a major threat to peace and security of Somalia and neighbouring countries like Uganda and Kenya.

In the past, the terrorist attacks by Al Qaida on US embassies in Dar as Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya in 1998 and on an Israeli owned hotel in Mombassa, Kenya and simultaneously on Israeli commercial airliner in 2002 have underscored the deadly reality of the terrorist threat in Africa. Moreover there have been reports the parts of Africa have become the recruiting grounds for terrorists. In the past there have been reports that terrorists having links with Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan were spending time in South Africa. Elsewhere in Uganda, Pakistan is reported to have trained and supported the Allied Democratic Force rebels.28

In Nigeria Boko Haram linked terror attacks have continued in the northern states.29 In the past the Nigerian authorities have arrested suspects with links to terrorist networks based in Pakistan-Afghanistan region that were planning terror attacks in the country.30 Finally, some evidence has emerged of contact between Al Qaida and the Somali extremist groups.31 While intervention by neighbouring Ethiopia and the African Union forces combined has dislodged the Islamists, nevertheless Somalia, by and large, remains without effective government since 1991. This situation has raised the concerns regarding ungoverned spaces like Somalia becoming the breeding grounds of terrorist activities. While there is no direct linkage between terrorist incidents in Africa and the recurrent onslaught of terrorism in India, both AU and India can share their experiences in fighting this scourge.

Future Prospects

India faces two significant challenges as it sets forth to forge security ties with the African countries. First, India is not alone in courting the Africans, they are being wooed by all the major powers. The United
States recently announced the establishment of a US Africa Command (AFRICOM) primarily “to enhance the efforts to bring peace and security to people of Africa.” Similarly the European Union (EU) has made significant contribution in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping and peace building. It has in past undertaken military operations—Operation Artemis and EUFOR in DRC—to support the UN peacekeeping operation. One of its most important undertaking is the setting up the African Peace Facility in 2003. The APF provides around Euro 300 million for building up of African capacities, including military and civilian for the prevention of conflict and support of peace operations.

China has been quite visible in Africa and in 2012 it hosted the fifth China-Africa summit in Beijing. Chinese military presence in the region has risen considerably in the recent years. There has been a rise in Chinese military interactions with Africa, such as Central African Republic, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Cameroon, Uganda and Sudan. The focus has been on training programmes, providing basic equipment and arms sales. The Congressional Research Service reports that China’s arms sales to Africa made up 10 per cent of all conventional arms transfers to the continent between 1996 and 2003. According to the Overseas Development Institute, China has delivered at least 13 covert shipments of weapons labelled as agricultural equipment to Dar-es-Salaam. Zimbabwe ordered twelve FC-1 fighter jets and 100 military vehicles from China in late 2004 in a deal worth $200 million. In August 2006 it is reported to have acquired six more aircrafts from China. Of late, like India, China too has started sending peacekeepers to various UN peacekeeping missions in Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Burundi, DRC, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia-Eritrea and Sudan. Thus the crucial dilemma facing policy makers in India is: what can India offer that has not been offered before to the Africans.

Second, the African countries have been quite vocal in their criticism of plans to locate AFRICOM in Africa. South Africa, Nigeria, Libya, Algeria and Morocco have all made policy statements that AFRICOM will not be welcome on their soil. Perhaps the most important concern of many African governments is that the AFRICOM may be used by the Americans to overthrow unsuitable regimes. They feel that AFRICOM is not about Africa or helping Africans, it is all about what the United States wants, that is, control over Africa’s strategic resources. On the other hand Chinese initiatives have evoked
a mixed response in Africa—while the governments have welcomed them; the civil society has launched strong protests.

Hence the lesson for India is that any effort aimed at enhancing security engagement with African countries and its peoples must therefore specifically address the security challenges confronting the continent. Moreover these initiatives should be undertaken with mutual consent. Clearly, the hallmark of India’s engagement with African countries is based on the principle of mutual cooperation and consent, which was quite evident in the Delhi Declaration signed by the representatives from the African countries at the first India-Africa Forum Summit in April 2008. Hence India needs to build on the good will that exists for it in Africa, and forge an enduring partnership that fosters South-South cooperation.

NOTES

2. Ibid p.258.
14. Ibid.
18. Cited in Paul D Williams, Thinking about security in Africa International Affairs 83(6), pp.1021-1038.
27. Ibid.
Introduction
The role played by Diasporas in inter-state relations cannot be overemphasised. The patterns, directions and other dynamics of bilateral engagements between states can be, and usually are, significantly affected by the practical and perceptive relations between the diaspora community and their home. Depending on the depth of links between the diaspora and their home, they may influence the political, economic, social, diplomatic and even cultural ties between their home and host countries. They may, for instance “mediate” between the two countries in times of frosty relations. They can also play a key role in bilateral diplomacy even if informally. The diasporas can also be conduits of transmission of technology, innovations, goods and culture.

Of all foreign diasporas in Africa, none has been so deeply incorporated into the economic, political, cultural and social fabric of the continent as the Indian. Historically symbolised by the iconic Mahatma Gandhi’s sojourn in South Africa, and the participation of indentured Indians in the construction of the Kenya-Uganda railway in East Africa, Indian diaspora has for long been an integral part of all facets of development in many African countries. The Indian community played important roles in colonial African economies, especially in the commercial and business sectors. In other countries
some Indians occupied strategic positions in the nationalist movements and fought for independence alongside the indigenous black communities. In the post-colonial era, members of the Indian diaspora have penetrated political leadership and are members of parliament and even cabinets in some countries.

This paper examines the role Indian diaspora plays in Africa and how their role is perceived by Africans with a view to exploring areas in which and how they can contribute to the growing Indo-African strategic partnership in areas of mutual interest to both India and Africa. Six major questions are addressed. These are: (a) what is the general spread of the Indian diaspora in Africa? (b) in which sectors of society are they deeply entrenched? (c) what is their relationship with both local communities and the state in their host countries? (d) what are India’s key interests in Africa and how can the diaspora contribute to their realisation? (e) what are the existing channels and mechanisms of interaction between the diaspora and the Indian government? how can they be strengthened to make them even more relevant to the emerging Indo-African strategic partnership? , and (f) how can the Indian diaspora play their role for the mutual benefit to both Africa and India?

However, before directly delving into these questions, it is important that we contextualise the focus of this inquiry within the larger question of the role diasporas can, and do play globally. To this we briefly turn.

**Diaspora: The Concept, Origins and Role in International Relations**

The concept “diaspora” is Jewish in origin. “Diaspora” originally meant the dispersion of Jews living amongst Gentiles. (High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora Report, 2000.) Recent literature on diaspora has, however, reconceptualised the phenomenon beyond the plight of the Jews. The term is now broadly used to refer to all immigrants from various countries who take up residence, on a more or less permanent basis, in the countries they have migrated to but continue to relate to their “home; countries. (UNESCO, 1965; Lake 1956). A diaspora is said to exist “when those people, living far from home, forge some form of community with each other and maintain relationship, real or otherwise, with their homeland.” (High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora Report, 2000). In other words, the community referred to as diaspora, however much they may have been acculturised in their
“host” countries, will usually “think of their ancestral geographical place of origin to be the only home they know.” (Lake 1995).

It is true that many of the members of a diaspora may view themselves much more as part of the host country, but they will also almost certainly identify themselves with the community back “home.” Hence diaspora Indians are likely to view themselves as Indians as well as diaspora Indians. This is why many in the diaspora are willing to acquire dual citizenship. In the context of this paper, the almost automatic “nostalgic” attachment to the ancestral home makes the diaspora more likely to play a crucial role in the relations between their home and host countries. In the era of globalisation, the ease of staying in touch with those at home has made the diaspora matter even the more in international relations. (*Economist*, November 17, 2011)

Diasporas have been an integral part of the world community since time immemorial. Indeed, global interactions and integration have been shaped over the years by the “diaspora” phenomenon. Granted, sometimes diasporas have been the source of conflict between the host and home countries, but their contributions to the world have been more positive than they have been negative (Handlin and Handlin 1965; Isaac, 1965; *Economist* November 17, 2011). The United States and the United Kingdom are classic examples of countries that have benefited from the positive contributions of immigrants towards science, technology and industrialisation (UNESCO, 1965). Even more intrinsic is the role diasporas have played in the process of globalisation to the extent that immigration is “a symbol that the nation is not an island in itself but inextricably bound up in its fate with the rest of the world.” (Handling, 1965). The diaspora phenomenon has no doubt been an important force in global interdependence. Through diasporas, various countries have become increasingly integrated into the “global village.”

It is estimated that there are about 215 million first-generation migrants (Diasporas) around the world today.

Much of the literature on the role of diasporas has focused more on their contributions in the host country than on their influence on the relations between home and host countries. However, inferences may be made in terms of how their contributions in the host countries shape the perceptions of the home countries in the host countries. In their study of the United States, Handlin and Handlin (1995) have emphasised the diaspora’s founding role in industrialisation, observing that many of the immigrants possess useful skills. In the United
Kingdom, the diasporas have been credited with immense contributions in the fields of science, arts, entrepreneurship and management. Another major trajectory through which diasporas make contributions to host countries is cultural interpenetration. Through acculturation (which is a two-way change process, anyway) diasporas may contribute positive ideas to the culture of their adopted country. Thrift and entrepreneurship, for instance, have been associated with immigrants in many countries. Immigrants are making outstanding contributions to research in science and technology thus influencing national economies in tremendous ways.

In recognition of the positive contributions by diasporas, host countries are likely to make foreign policies that are friendlier to the home countries of the immigrants. The decision by the United States to offer the “Most Favored Nation” status to China despite tensions between them with regard to human rights issues may have been, to some extent, influenced by the Chinese diaspora. In certain cases, diaspora communities may form very powerful lobbies and interest groups that effectively influence host countries’ policies towards their countries of origin. The role played by the Jewish lobby in the United States in shaping the ever—friendlier US policy towards Israel is a case in point. All in all, Diasporas create mutual interests between their adopted countries and their home countries to the advantage of both.

Diasporas also make direct contributions to their home countries by “spreading money” and transferring technology. (www.economist.com). They do this by remitting cash to their kith and kin at home as well as by sometimes assisting companies in their host countries to open business in their home countries. Both countries thus benefit: ‘host’ by promoting its investments abroad, and “home” by attracting foreign direct investments with positive multiplier effects of reduction of unemployment and the broadening of industrial base. More over, the diaspora networks of kinship and languages make it easier to do business across borders by speeding the flow of information. (www.sscnet.ucla.edu)

The Indian Diaspora in Africa: Origins and the Geographical Spread

The Indian diaspora worldwide is estimated at over 25 million spread across the continents. 11 countries are home to over 1 million Indian immigrants each while 22 countries have at least 1000 ethnic Indians each (High level Committee on Indian Diaspora Report, 2000).
According to the government of India, Indian diaspora refers to those who migrated from territories that are currently within the borders of the Republic of India and their descendants. Pan-Indianists, however, sometimes expand the geographical context by including those from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

Indian diaspora comprises both the Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs). The NRIs are Indian citizens who have migrated to another country, those of Indian origins who are born outside India, or people of Indian origin who reside outside India, and have taken citizenship of other countries. PIOs are persons of Indian origin who are not citizens of India. PIO cards are issued to those the Indian government considers to be of Indian origin up to the fourth generations. According to the United Nations Development Program, the Indian Diasporas comes second only to the Chinese in term of numbers (UNDP, 2010). Of the 25 million Indians “overseas” community, Africa accounts for about 2.8 million distributed among countries as shown in table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>PIOs</th>
<th>NRIs</th>
<th>Stateless</th>
<th>% of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>30,200,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>12,000,000</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>4,590,000</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>15,863,000</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>437,5000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>7,068,300</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’ ivoire</td>
<td>16,000,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>460,000</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>3,317,611</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1,723</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>63,500,000</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>19,400,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G’ Bissau</td>
<td>1,315,822</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>28,600,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>14,800,00</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>10,109,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1,186,000</td>
<td>704,640</td>
<td>11,116</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>60.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>16,500,00</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>125,000,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reunion</td>
<td>709,468</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>31.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>9,00,00</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>81,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>6.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>29,00,000</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As may be deciphered from the table above, the largest concentration of the Indian Diaspora in Africa are found in South Africa (1500,000), Mauritius (855,000), Reunion (220,000), Kenya (100,000), Uganda (90,000) and Tanzania (100,000). As percentage of the local population, Indian diaspora constitutes a significant portion in only eight countries. Mauritius leads with 60.35 percent followed by Reunion at 31.00 percent, Seychelles (6.1 percent), Botswana (0.66 percent), Kenya (0.3 percent), Tanzania (0.28 percent), Mozambique (0.13 percent) and Zimbabwe (0.1 percent). In all the other countries with PIOs and NRIs, the percentage of local population is more or less insignificant.

The history of Indian immigration into Africa goes far back before the 19th century which is usually regarded as the “watershed” period. In East Africa, for instance, contacts with Indian traders started long before the building of the Kenya-Uganda Railway in the late 1890’s (Bhatia, 1973). Indians are said to have had contacts with the Arabs involved in the East African slave trade. In South Africa, Indians had arrived as early as 1653, albeit as slaves. In fact, by early 19th century, 36.45 percent of the slave population in the Dutch Cape colony were of Indian origin. (HLCD, 2000). Even after the abolition of slave trade, more Indians continued to arrive as part of the labor force in the sugar cane and sisal plantations owned by British settlers in South Africa. Indian immigration into South Africa continued well into the first decade of the 20th century.

However, the watershed in modern Indian immigration into South Africa was the arrival of Mahatma Gandhi, a lawyer, in 1893. Gandhi initiated activities that soon saw the Indian factor assume greater significance in the political life of South Africa during the colonial, apartheid and, now, the post-apartheid era. Preaching the philosophy of non-violence as a strategy for confronting the colonial racist policies that discriminated against Indians and blacks, he launched the first

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>PIOs</th>
<th>NRIs</th>
<th>Stateless</th>
<th>% of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>32,000,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>9,200,000</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>21,500,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>10,200,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3,00</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>11,900,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

organised anti-racist movement among Indians. Later, the movement incorporated blacks into their struggle for racial equality. In 1955, Indian community leaders joined blacks and the coloured to form the “freedom charter” proclaiming South Africa to be “home to all those who lived in it, regardless of race or colour.” Attempts by the apartheid government to weaken anti-racist movements by according Indians preferential treatment didn’t bear fruit as Indians continued to support the anti-apartheid movement. Indeed, Mr. Ahmed Kathrada, an Indian, was incarcerated together with the icon of anti-apartheid struggle, Nelson Mandela.

The role played by the Indian diaspora in the anti-apartheid struggle has paid dividends in the post-Apartheid dispensation as Indians have exacted for themselves a niche in the political, social and economic fabric of the Republic. Mandela’s first cabinet when he included Indians. Mr. Abdula Mohamed, for instance, was named minister for justice. The sympathetic attitude towards the Indian diaspora in post-apartheid South Africa has continued to date. Indeed, Ms. Ela Gandhi, Mahatma’s grand daughter is a member of parliament. It is instructive that this positive attitude towards the Indians is not only in recognition of their steadfast support in the anti-apartheid struggle but also due to the role India, as an Independent nation, had played in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s as a supporter of the struggle against the white supremacist rule.

In East Africa, another region with a concentration of the Indian diaspora, the pattern of integration of the Indians into the political, social and economic fabric was more or less the same as that in South Africa. As has been observed above, even though Indian emigration began before 19th century, it was the colonial era that witnessed a more massive influx of Indian into East Africa. After the British established sovereignty over Uganda and Kenya, they imported labour from India to construct a railway line linking Mombasa at the Kenyan coast and Uganda. Several Indians (commonly known as “coolies”) were imported from Punjab. Even though most of the “coolies” returned after the expiry of their contracts and after the completion of the railway line, some remained behind. Other Indians had small businesses and trading activities in markets and towns along the railway line. Those who remained were mainly traders and artisans. By 1950s, the east African territories of Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar were each teeming with a significant number of Indians. (Morris, 1956).
British colonial political, economic and social policies in the three colonies were generally similar. Race defined these policies especially those related to relations and roles of blacks, Europeans, Indians and even, Arabs. Each category occupied a distinct position in society. The resultant scenario was that where the white Europeans dominated politically, Indians dominated the commercial sector while Africans constituted the working class and the peasantry.

Like their kin in South Africa, Indians in East Africa did not shun politics. As early as 1900, Indians in Kenya had formed the Mombasa Indian Association to fight for the rights of Indians in Kenya. This marked the beginning of political activity by Indian diaspora in Kenya and East Africa as a whole. After the First World War, wealthy and educated Indians including Allidina Visram, Tayabali Jeevanjee, Manilal Ambalal, Desai and L.M. Salve formed other political associations. These associations sought to coordinate their efforts with those formed by Africans emerging such as the Kikuyu Central Association. Indian leaders were also at the center of trade unionism, another front of the decolonisation struggle. Names such as Makhan Singh and Pio Gama Pinto became only too familiar in trade union circles in Kenya. The latter was even later elected to Kenya’s first post-colonial parliament. Progressive Indians also started pro-independence newspapers. The journalist “front” was led by Pranlal Sheth, Ghanan Singh, Fitzual de Souza and Pio Gama Pinto. The Indians’ input was crucial in the founding of the first Kiswahili paper, “Sauti ya KANU” (HLCTD, 2000).

By the time the three East African territories got independence in the early 1960s, the Indian Diaspora had secured for themselves important positions in their host countries’ economies and politics. The Madhvani and Mehta families dominated business and manufacturing sectors in Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika. Narendra Patel became speaker of the Ugandan national Assembly. Sir Anwar Nath Maini was elected speaker of the joint parliament of the East African Community when the community was formed in 1967. In Tanzania, the founding president Julius Nyerere maintained close relations with the Indian diaspora there, appointing several Indians to important positions in government.

Relations between the Indian Diaspora and the political establishment in the three east African countries have not always been smooth, however, especially in the first decade of independence. In Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta’s government took measures to restrict Indian
participation in business by confining them to major towns such as Nakuru, Kisumu and Nairobi, (Bhatia, 1972). In Uganda, after Idi Amin replaced Miltone Obote as president in a military coup, he expelled all Asians in 1972 leading to an exodus of many of the Indian diaspora from Uganda. However, the current president, Yoweri Museveni, has asked those expelled in 1972 to return. A few have done so. Be it as May, the over 360,000-strong Indian diaspora in East Africa continue to play important roles in the three countries. In Kenya, at least one Indian has been elected to Parliament in each general election. The largest retail chain, NAKUMAT, is owned by Indians. In fact, Indians constitute a large part of Kenya’s middle class. In Tanzania, many thriving businesses are those owned by Indians.

The economic and political positions Indians occupy in South Africa and East Africa have put them at vantage points in influencing policy in their host countries. Their entrepreneurship and wealth are sources of leverage they can use to bargain with governments. It is common knowledge that many politicians, especially those from ruling parties in South Africa, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania have always received substantial campaign money from Indian businessmen. In the context of this paper, the Indian government and Indian businessmen could benefit by maintaining strong links with their diasporas in these countries for they could easily influence governments of their host countries to adopt friendly policies towards India.

**India’s Interests in Africa and the Role of the Diaspora in their Realisation**

India has recently intensified efforts to revamp relations with Africa. The flurry of activity include the holding of two Indian-Africa forum Summits in 2008 (New Delhi) and May 2011(Addis Ababa). The Addis Ababa meting produced a declaration and the “Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Co-operation.” Specific Initiatives to boost economic cooperation include “Focus Africa” and the “Techno-Economic Approach for African Countries. (IDSA, concept note, October 2011). These initiatives reflect India’s renewed interest in Africa. This interest can be disaggregated into various components, namely, economic, strategic, political, cultural, social, science and technology. (IDSA, concept Note, October, 2011.) In this section, India’s interest in various countries and regions in Africa are examined and the role the Indian diaspora in their fulfillment assessed.

In keeping with the current realities of globalisation, India’s
interest in Africa is essentially economic. That India has become one of the major players in the global economy since the 1990s is undisputable. The exponential increase in GDP growth rate and the expansion of the manufacturing and service sectors have pushed India to venture abroad in search of raw materials for its industries and markets for its goods. Africa is home to strategic minerals and oil. South Africa, host to the largest concentration of Indian diaspora in Africa possesses abundant quantities of gold, diamond and other minerals. Botswana, next door neighbour to South Africa and also with some fair presence of Indian immigrants also possesses diamonds. In East Africa, Uganda is just about to start producing oil after recent discoveries of oil deposits. Tanzania is known to be rich in several minerals, especially tin, phosphates, iron ore, limestone, gold and uranium. Kenya is also said to possess substantial amounts of fluorspar, soda ash, limestone, salt and gemstones. Other African countries which may not have a significant number of Indian immigrants but possess minerals and other raw materials needed by India include Nigeria, Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo. India could use companies owned by the Indian diaspora in Africa to access these raw materials. The export processing zones established by many African countries, especially since the 1990s may be another avenue for this purpose.

India also needs markets for its goods. As hinted above, many Indian immigrants in Africa dominate the service industry, especially in the commercial sector in their host countries. Indian owned companies in Africa often import goods from India. The NAKUMAT Chain in East Africa is a case in point. India may also need to attract foreign investment to create jobs and to other opportunities for its large population. The Indian diaspora in Africa could be encouraged to invest in India. This would require the creation of an enabling environment by the government of India specifically targeting the diaspora.

In the contemporary world, economic interests have become inseparable from strategic, security and diplomatic interests. The tight intersection between the geo-strategic and the geo-economic variables in the post-Cold War world requires that India pursue other interests. Security interests in Africa include combating terrorism, piracy, drug-trafficking among other security threats on the continent.

India’s diplomatic interests in Africa includes courting African countries, individually and collectively, to support its position on the global stage.
South Africa is one of the most important African countries and there is no doubt that its regional clout has also earned it recognition globally. It is thus a member of the exclusive clubs, the great 20 (or G20). It is also a diplomatic powerhouse not only in Africa but also in the world. India is also a member of the G20. It is the member of the outfit, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), which bring together what has been termed “emerging economies”. South Africa thus occupies a special position in India’s relations in Africa. South Africa is a potential guarantor for Indian interest in Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Indian Population in African Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Voire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G’ Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The Role of the Indian Diaspora in Africa

Sanjukta Banerji Bhattacharya

I

The Indian diaspora in Africa goes back many centuries; in fact, some of the early migrants may have got absorbed into the many tribes of Sudan and Somalia and do not retain any separate identity.¹ There are others who went later, some as indentured labour, others to trade and do business, and they are as much African now as the natives of Africa although they do preserve some kind of memory of the home they left behind, diluted and passed on from generation to generation. A fitting way, therefore, to begin this paper would be to quote a few lines from Amitav Ghosh’s novel, River of Smoke, which actually focuses on the opium trade between India and China during British colonial rule, but begins with Indian migrants to Mauritius, sent on a ship by British colonialists to serve the labour needs of European settlers on that island. The family of Deetiji, a first generation migrant to Mauritius, had been taken on an outing to the ‘Memory Temple’—Deetiji-ka-smriti-mandir—where Deeti and her fellow migrants from the ship had painted their memories on the walls of a cave. Ghosh writes:

Every child in the Fami knew the story of how Deeti had learnt to paint: she had been taught by her grandmother when she was a chutki of a child, Back There, in Innustan, in the gaon where she was born...The houses were nothing like you would find on the island—no tin roofs, and hardly any metal or wood anywhere to be seen. They lived in mud huts Back There, thatched with straw and plastered with cow-dung.²
I am quoting Amitav Ghosh’s novel in the absence of any writing of this genre by people of Indian origin (PIO) in Africa unlike their counterparts in the United States (US) or the United Kingdom (UK), where authors like Bharati Mukherjee or Salman Rushdie or even second generation PIOs like Jhumpa Lahiri write about the immigrant experience. People who migrate to a new land, voluntarily or otherwise, often write about their experiences and their longing for the home they left behind and their hopes or despair. Even those who were illiterate have left behind rich stories that speak of their relationship with their new environment as in the case of the Brer Rabbit tales of the African slaves in America as well as the ‘blues’ tradition of music. However, one finds little literature in this genre among what we today term as the ‘Indian Diaspora’ in Africa—little that is, that harks back to ‘Back There’ even as an oral tradition. Which brings me to a basic question: what then is the attitude of this diaspora to India?

Before attempting any kind of answer to this question, it is important to first examine the word ‘Diaspora’. The etymological meaning of the word goes back to two Greek words, ‘dia’ meaning ‘through’, and ‘speiro’, meaning ‘scatter’. The word was used specifically to describe the experience of the Jews who were exiled to Babylon after Nebuchadnezzar’s conquest of Jerusalem in 587 B.C. Later definitions by writers like William Safran and Rasmik Panossian appeared to have the Jewish, Palestinian or Armenian diasporas in mind when they tried to classify the concept. Panossian explained it as the “...forced dispersion of a clearly identified group of people from their homeland with a distinctive collective memory and a ‘myth of return’.” According to Safran, the diasporic people maintain “a memory or myth about their original homeland; they believe that they are not, and perhaps cannot, be fully accepted by their host country; and they see the ancestral home as a place of eventual return and a place to maintain and restore”. Walker Connor, another expert on the subject, however, defines diaspora as simply “...that segment of people living outside the homeland”. This is a broader and more appropriate definition of a diaspora in today’s world where the mass “forced dispersion of a clearly identified group” will raise human rights concerns internationally. Moreover, this describes the position of the Indian diaspora in Africa better than the other definitions. People of Indian origin settled in the African continent of their own volition though the decision may have been taken for reasons of
extreme poverty in their own homeland; although many who settled there over the past 160 years have maintained a degree of cultural and religious identity that is Indian and retain a cultural and political interest in their country of origin, there is perhaps no desire to return to India. The report of an Indian government appointed High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (2002) is quite telling in this context—it used the concept of ‘Diaspora’ in a generic sense for “...communities of migrants living or settled permanently in other countries, aware of its origin and identity and maintaining varying degrees of linkages with [the] mother country”. An even better description of what the Indian diaspora in Africa is, can be found in Judith M Brown’s 2006 book, *Global South Asians: Introducing the Modern Diaspora*, which explains the complexities of the South Asian diaspora. According to her, this diaspora consists of:

Groups of people with a common ethnicity; who have left their original homelands for long periods of time and often permanently; who retain a particular sense of cultural identity and often close kinship links with other scattered members of their group, thus acknowledging their shared physical and cultural origins and who maintain links with the homeland and a sense of its role in their present identity.

This definition appears apt for describing the Indian diaspora in Africa. They preserve a sense of cultural identity manifested in their religion-based festivals and beliefs as well as in their group distinctiveness, and many still have kinship ties with ‘other scattered members of their group’ in Africa; further, they retain a sense of India’s role—the ‘Back There’ thing—in their present identity, but there is no apparent desire to return to India. On the other side of the coin, how has India viewed its diaspora in Africa in the past, and how does it regard it now, particularly in the context of India’s growing interest in, and engagement with, Africa? The present paper, after a brief introduction of the Indian diaspora in Africa, examines it in the perspective of certain pertinent questions that arise in the backdrop of the strategic engagement between India and Africa in the past few years: Why has India become interested in its African diaspora after decades of neglect? What is the response of this diaspora to India’s overtures? And finally, how can the diaspora be leveraged both by India and the country of settlement to improve India-Africa relations?
II

It is however, important to first contextualise the Indian diaspora in Africa before one can attempt to answer these questions. About 8 per cent of the global Indian diaspora is located in Africa. In terms of numbers, there are about 2.5 million people of Indian origin in the continent. When compared to other parts of the world, there are fewer Indians in Africa than in North America (3.2 million), the Middle East (3.5 million), the Far East and South East Asia (3.5 million), or in Sri Lanka and Nepal (4.5 million). In Africa, they are mainly spread over South and East Africa, with large concentrations in Mauritius (60.35 per cent of the population), Reunion (31 per cent of the population) and the Seychelles (6.10 per cent of the population, although it is believed that over 80 per cent of the population have some Indian roots). In South Africa, they comprise only 2.5 of the total population, but in numerical terms, at 1.5 million, they are the largest segment of the Indian diaspora in any African country. Although East Africa figures strongly in any diasporic discourse, people of Indian origin comprise only .36 percent (100,000) of the population in Kenya, .28 percent (80-85,000) of the population of Tanzania, and number between 12,000 and 14,000 in Uganda. Although PIOs are now located in every African country, their numbers in most countries are so small that they are not worth mentioning. It should be remembered that even though Indians were taken as slaves to the Dutch Cape Colony by Dutch merchants as early as 1653, and constituted 36.40 per cent of the slave population of the country by the time that slavery was abolished all over the British empire in 1833 (by which time the Cape Colony had come under British rule), the real Indian migration to the African continent began when Indians started being taken to Africa as indentured or contract labour from the middle of the nineteenth century to meet the labour needs of the European colonies following the end of slavery. This was followed/accompanied by the migration of ‘free’ passengers, ‘free’ emigrants, traders, construction workers, professionals and businessmen. Induction of Indian labour into non-British African colonies began only after the respective metropolitan countries negotiated agreements with the British regarding the acquisition of such workers. However, the non-indentured people of Indian origin settled mainly in British colonies, partly because of language affinities and the colonial connection, but also because the east coast, where British colonies were located, was closer to India than where the French (except for some) and Portuguese colonies were
mainly situated. The status of the immigrants, the fact that they settled mainly in British colonies, and that they were, for the most part, a minority in the countries that they settled in, had certain consequences, which are explained below.

First, while most Indian immigrants, particularly indentured labour or construction workers, were penniless when they left India, over time, through dint of hard work and entrepreneurship, they were able to gain control over retail and wholesale trade, cotton ginning, sugar processing and other segments of commerce in East Africa, and over market gardening and retail trade in certain regions of South Africa. In East Africa particularly, they began investing in education quite early and as a result quite a few of the children and grandchildren of the original immigrants received professional and other educational degrees even before their respective countries of domicile became independent. In South Africa too, particularly in the later stages of apartheid, people of Indian origin must have invested in education since many of them hold important university and government posts today, an outstanding example being the present UN Human Rights Commissioner, Ms Navarathan Pillai. The point here is, that having invested in education, they were able to reap its benefits later in the post-independence period, often gaining an edge in the professional/service and business sectors over a large majority of the indigenous population.

Second, the apparent success of the Indian immigrants particularly in the economic arena was the cause of tension between them and the indigenous population. Some of the blame for this can be attributed to the policies adopted by European colonisers during colonial times to remain in power by creating friction between different ethnic and other groups in the countries they ruled over. Here, they often treated people of Indian origin as the ‘significant other’ vis-à-vis the native population, privileging them over the indigenous people, while at the same time, obstructing their potential growth through restrictive policies in matters relating to land ownership. In Uganda, for instance, trade and the processing of cash crops came to be concentrated in the hands of Asians. Attempts by Africans to break into these sectors later proved virtually unsuccessful. Uganda’s later history demonstrated the resentment caused by the economic disparities which developed over time. However, it should also be asserted that people of Indian origin, despite hardships and negative policies followed by both colonial powers and some independent African states, through sheer hard
work and determination, carved out their own niche in their adopted countries, as is evidenced by the number of Indian millionaires that can be found in contemporary South Africa and the countries of East Africa.

Third, there were religious and cultural differences between the Asian immigrants and the local Africans. These were kept alive by Indians who continued to maintain their separate cultural values and generally refrained from racial inter-mixing. This led to a kind of dual identity for the Indians that is best exemplified in South Africa. During the apartheid regime, many Indians (Asians) sympathised with the movement launched by the African National Congress (ANC) and developed a strong ‘struggle/liberation’ consciousness, resulting in what has been termed a ‘collective black identity’ in the public sphere. However, in the private sphere, the Indian identity manifested itself in many forms predicated on religion, rituals, communal and linguistic specificities, which in some measure resulted in a kind of ‘split consciousness’.

Fourth, when the states of East Africa gained independence, many Indians who were unsure of what their minority status would imply in their respective African dominated host countries in the post-independence period, chose to retain their British citizenships rather than take up the citizenship of the specific African country where they lived. This sometimes raised questions among the African leadership regarding the loyalty of Indians to their adopted homelands. While the transition from colonial status to an independent black-majority state was relatively peaceful for PIOs in Tanzania under the able leadership of veteran African statesman, Julius Nyrere, the policy of Africanisation and Kenyanisation in neighbouring Kenya meant that non-Africans, that is, PIOs, faced the cancellation or non-renewal of their trade licences as new affirmative action policies were approved that favoured African blacks in trade, in the award of contracts and appointments to government jobs etc.¹³ President Kenyatta, at public meetings, even exhorted the Indians to “pack up and go”.¹⁴ This policy was carried to the extreme in Uganda; within eight months of coming to power, President Idi Amin expelled all Asians, including some 12,000 who had applied and were waiting for citizenship of the country. In fact, 15,000 Ugandan passport holders too had their passports revoked and had to leave, forfeiting their property and other assets in Uganda.¹⁵ Although the next President, Yoweri Museveni, made overtures to Indians who had left, requesting them to return, and some
have done so, there is a degree of wariness among these Indians. On the one hand, many of them retain their affiliation to the country of their second migration apparently out of a sense of insecurity (in case they have to leave again); on the other hand, they obviously do not wish to provoke African authorities into thinking that they are disloyal or unpatriotic. This feeling is not exclusive to Kenya or Uganda—people of Indian origin in Zambia or Malawi\textsuperscript{16} or even South Africa, while retaining the essentials of their ‘Indian-ness’, speak of being African and mention that too much of a connection with India may prove detrimental to their interests in their permanent homes. The fact is that while PIOs in Africa may have a ‘split consciousness’ as mentioned earlier, Africans too may have problems with accepting them as fully African because of this ‘split consciousness’ and the lingering sense of ‘Indian-ness’ despite their long presence in Africa.

In this connection, it will be interesting to mention the case of South African Indians, where a sense of duality appears to persist among PIOs, something that is not overlooked by the majority community. As noted, PIOs in general were sympathetic to the anti-apartheid movement, particularly since Asians were themselves subjected to similar privations. In fact, some prominent persons like Dr. YM Dadoo of the Transvaal Indian Congress and Dr GM (Monty) Naicker of the Natal Indian Congress\textsuperscript{17} made common cause with AB Xuma of the African National Congress (ANC) in the ‘Defiance Campaign’ and ‘Freedom Charter’ movement of 1955,\textsuperscript{18} and later too, people like Jay Naidoo and others played a significant role in the ANC’s bid to end apartheid. However, some analysts believe that many PIOs voted for de Klerk’s ruling (and racist) National Party in the first non-racial universal franchise based elections in 1994.\textsuperscript{19} In 1999 too, quite a few PIO votes were cast in favour of the newly formed white dominated Democratic Alliance.\textsuperscript{20} As such, while President Mandela’s wise leadership took all this in stride and his cabinet had many Indian faces like Abdullah Omar, Mac Maharaj, Kadar Asmal, Jay Naidoo, Essop Pahad and Vali Moosa, President Mbeki’s cabinet registered a subtle change and only two Indians, Kadar Asmal and Vali Moosa, found a place in it.\textsuperscript{21} The black perception of PIOs can also be gauged from a comment made by Julius Malema, the then President of the ANC Youth League, in 2009, expressing his mistrust of President Zuma’s government because there were too many ‘minorities’ in key economic positions in the Cabinet.\textsuperscript{22} Although Malema was later discredited (for reasons not relevant to this paper),
his suspicion of ‘minorities’, which evidently refers to PIOs, was not restricted to him. In 2011, Manyi, a government spokesperson, proposed amendments to the recently suggested Transformation policies in South Africa, mentioning that there is an over-population of Indians and Coloureds in certain areas, that is, Durban and Cape Town respectively.\textsuperscript{23} The new proposal implied that Indians and Coloureds would have to relocate to areas where they were under-represented from areas where they were over-represented. This actually signifies a weakening of the collective anti-apartheid identity and does not bode well for people of Indian origin in the long run. In fact, Nelson Mandela is reported to have once said that Indians in South Africa should be “part of a solution and not themselves become the problem”.\textsuperscript{24}

What is being implied here is that although Indians have settled in Africa over the last 150 years at least, and many families have been there for five or six generations if not more, yet, to some degree, they occupy a gray area because they are not black Africans. They have not fully assimilated with the indigenous population and retain their race (to a large extent) as well as their religion and culture and have a better economic status in general than the majority of the black African population. Moreover, they are a minority in all African countries except one. As such, in many countries where they have a significant economic or political presence, people of Indian origin have to prove their loyalty to the countries of which they are now citizens and cannot afford to have too close a relationship with India. The lesson for India is that these feelings have to be factored into its approach towards its African diaspora.

III

The other side of the narrative relates to India’s approach towards PIOs in Africa till date. Historically, following India’s independence in 1947, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru did not encourage the return of Indians who had settled in Africa, and instead, advised persons of Indian origin to become nationals of the countries of their permanent domicile and make common cause with the indigenous population.\textsuperscript{25} When African countries began to gain independence, as mentioned earlier, some of their policies of Africanisation had an adverse effect on the Indians settled there. India’s response to the Kenyan case is worth mentioning. Following the issue of Kenyanisation in the late 1960s in Kenya, there was a debate in the Lok Sabha in March 1970.
The then deputy minister for external affairs, Surendra Pal Singh, told parliament that India’s responsibility was restricted to only those PIOs who were Indian citizens (that is, only non-resident Indians or NRIs). He further said that it was the responsibility of Nairobi and London, as per international law, to look after the interests of PIOs who were Kenyan or British citizens, and that they should not expect that they would be allowed free entry into India. Singh further noted that India had to tread carefully so as not to appear to be a “nosy Parker or indifferent”, and that Delhi had no quarrel with the Africanisation policy, which was in Kenya’s interest. However, he also mentioned that India had made representations to Kenya to implement its nationalisation policies in a humane manner as people of Indian origin had been in Kenya for generations and had made valuable contributions to the development of that country. Moreover, the Indian High Commission had been authorised to issue visas freely to British PIOs so that they could ‘wait’ in India before their turn came up for admission to the United Kingdom (UK).

A similar stance was taken by India when Idi Amin expelled PIOs from Uganda. The result was that PIOs who wanted to return to India could not do so and had to move to a third country like Canada, the UK or the United States (US). Under the circumstances, there is bound to be a degree of scepticism among the Indian diaspora in Africa regarding the Indian government and its policies vis-à-vis the people of Indian origin, particularly in times when they are in distress.

In fact, it is not till very recent times that India has shown much interest in its diaspora, particularly the one in Africa. The current interest may be due to two triggers: one, consciousness regarding the role played by people of Indian origin in America in improving India-US relations especially in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests when the US imposed sanctions on India; and two, India’s new interest in Africa which is reflected in increased India-Africa trade and other activities, and is epitomised in the India-Africa forum summits that held its first session in 2008 and aims to improve bilateral and multilateral relations at all levels. It is understandable that in the context of the active engagement of the PIOs in America in improving India-US relations, the Indian government may feel that the Indian diaspora in Africa can play a similar role. But here it is important to point out that the two diasporas are very different, and India’s expectations vis-à-vis its African diaspora may not be fully realised. In the first place, the current Indian-American community took root only after the passage
of the 1965 US Immigration and Nationalities Act; this implies that the Indian community in the US goes back only about two generations and has close connections with their families and friends back in India. In fact, many of the older generation studied in some of India’s premier institutions and have links with their batch mates who chose to stay on in India. Even today, many of the thousands who go to study in the US stay on and acquire US citizenship, but quite a few choose to find marriage partners in India and retain close relationships with their home country. Secondly, the new wave of immigrants to the US is made up largely of skilled, educated and urban Indians who enjoy an above average degree of affluence in their adopted country. Their affluence enables them to act as an economic pressure group in the US and even impact policy. In fact, some are also entering politics now and hold decision-making positions. It is not surprising that US presidents from Bill Clinton onwards have mentioned the dynamism of the Indian community in America and their impact on foreign policy. It is also not surprising therefore that recent US presidential delegations to India have always contained a large number of PIOs. On the other hand, the majority of Indians who emigrated to Africa from India (and this emigration goes back over 150 years) were penniless, illiterate and came from a rural background, although much later, more affluent business families also chose to go to Africa. While the ‘pull’ factor was important in the Indian immigration to the US, it was more often the ‘push’ factor that determined the choice of Indians who emigrated to Africa. Although they were able to improve their economic position in their adopted countries, historical circumstances excluded them from participating in politics or holding influential positions. In the economic arena too, they have faced expulsions and restrictions just because they are of Indian origin. As such, in order not to alienate their respective governments, which could lead to fresh privations, they have to weigh the choice to re-connect with India carefully. Thirdly, while Indian-Americans have never been excluded from the country of their origin, the same is not true of African PIOs, many of whom remember India’s stance during the Kenyanisation period and during Idi Amin’s expulsions, and this is not a happy memory. And finally, the US is just one country and PIOs, if they choose to do so, have to lobby only one government; Africa, on the other hand, is a continent with many countries and many governments, each with a different history, different policies and different self-interests. When India reaches out to its diaspora in Africa, it actually reaches out to the diaspora in 54
different countries, in the majority of which the Indian diasporic presence is small and even insignificant. While it may be relatively easy to reach out to the single Indian diaspora in the US, it is a much more difficult task to cultivate a diverse diaspora spread out across 54 countries and which, by and large, has long had little relations with India till recent times.

IV

It must however, be emphasised that India is rethinking its attitude towards its global diaspora, one evidence being the active wooing of people of Indian origin through the Pravasi Bharat Divas, the PIO cards, provision of dual citizenship etc. This may be attributed to its emergence as a middle power with ambitions of becoming a major power. The Indian diaspora is at least 25 to 30 million strong worldwide, second only to the Chinese diaspora, and has good potential to serve India’s soft power needs, thereby extending the country’s reach. The networking of China with the Chinese diaspora is well known. In fact, China has actively engaged with its diaspora for the past 25 to 30 years and is now reaping its benefits. India, of late, has realised the potential role that its well-off and well-placed diaspora can play in furthering its interests in their respective countries, and is now trying to engage with it. One of its first efforts in this direction was the creation of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, very much on the lines of China’s Ministry of Overseas Chinese Affairs. The goal of this ministry is to build a partnership with the Indian diaspora, anchoring all diasporic initiatives in the state of India. The ministry began to sponsor the Pravasi Bharat Divas from 2003 to mark, in its words “the contribution of [the] Overseas Indian community in the development of India”. During the three-day conclave held every year, Pravasi Bharat Samman Awards are given to honour deserving ‘pravasis’ or overseas Indians. Many Africans of Indian origin have been recognised through these awards. Among the prominent African awardees are Fatima Meer, Ahmed Kathrada, Amina Cachalia, Sisupal Rambharos, Billy Nair, Pravin Gordhan and TP Naidoo from South Africa; Aniroot Jugnath and Navinchandra Ramgoolam from Mauritius; Manilal Premchand Chandara, Ramedios Santana DeSouza and Pheroze Nowrojee from Kenya; Rajini Kanabar and JK Chande from Tanzania; V Ramadoss from Seychelles and Moosa Ebrahim from Zimbabwe.

In 2006, the government also introduced the ‘Overseas Citizenship
of India’ (OCI) scheme to allow a limited form of dual citizenship to Indians, non-resident Indians and PIOs. It is expected that the PIO card scheme will be phased out in the future in favour of the OCI scheme. What is worth noting is the emphasis that India is putting on the ‘Indian’ character of those who chose to live outside India for whatever reason—a claim that the country is pursuing in recent years by inviting people of Indian origin to be part of the India-narrative, something that earlier leaders like Nehru and Indira Gandhi had sidestepped in the cases of Kenya and Uganda.

In fact, India is taking its initiative of re-connecting with its African diaspora to Africa itself, and the reason for this engagement was openly stated to be the furtherance of mutual interests with African countries in business, politics etc. The 2010 Pravasi Bharat Divas Africa was held in Durban to mark the 150th year of the arrival of the first immigrant ship, SS Truro. Here, India was quite candid about its current objectives which, it stated, was to engage primarily with the “Indian diaspora and other interested parties in South Africa and the continent of Africa with a view to fostering mutually beneficial relations between India and Africa in business, culture, politics and sustainable development”. The event was expected to improve understanding, and close relations between the Indian diaspora and India, and this is certainly important in the context of the past neglect of the PIO community and the contemporary effort to boost India-Africa relations. However, the change in India’s policy vis-à-vis its African diaspora and the pragmatism of its approach are worth noting.

The fact is that people of Indian origin in Africa are in a position to help India improve its relations with the various countries that they are now citizens of. They have domain knowledge about local business conditions and customs, and many of them are successful businessmen themselves. Apart from business, there are teachers and professionals of Indian origin in virtually every African country. In Ethiopia, for instance, the word ‘teacher’ is said to be almost synonymous with ‘Indian’. In some countries, particularly Mauritius, where the Indians are in a majority, and Reunion, where they comprise 30 per cent of the population, they hold important decision-making positions in government and administration. In other countries too like South Africa and Uganda, they are slowly entering politics and getting further entrenched in administration. In the business arena, while there have been issues with the local population in some countries in the past, Indians in general are held in high esteem for their business acumen.
and enterprise. The Indian diaspora can therefore play an influential role in enhancing investment, accelerating industrial development, boosting trade and improving political relations. It may be pointed out in this context that the India connection has paid off in one country where persons of Indian origin are in a majority and hold decision-making posts, that is, Mauritius: here, India’s exports grew at an annual average of 327.6 per cent in the 1990s, largely as a result of the diasporic connection/influence.

V

The question that arises here is whether India’s overtures have paid off in other African countries where PIOs are not in a majority; in other words, what has been the response of the average African of Indian origin to India’s current initiatives? While individual responses may vary, four categories of responses may be highlighted for the purpose of this paper.

First, the idea of an Indian diaspora in Africa is contested by some influential PIOs. Fatima Meer, a well respected anti-apartheid activist from South Africa, strongly critiqued the view that Indians in South Africa belonged to a larger Indian/South Asian diaspora during a convention of experts from the Indian diaspora, convened by the Indian government in 2006. According to her, Indians had fought too hard and too long to be recognised as South African citizens and therefore could not and should not risk that secure identification by emphasising or highlighting the Indian part of their identity. She is not the sole holder of this view; there are many like her, particularly in countries where Indians are fewer in number and their African identity is often challenged by the local population because they choose to keep their Indian cultural identity intact. At the heart of this strategic denial is the fear of further marginalisation or even expulsion if the PIOs chose to explore their diasporic identity through minority politics. Moreover, there is no denying that India had not come to the help of the PIOs expelled from East Africa a few decades earlier. India’s earlier attitude must also be factored into this response.

The second category of response is quite the opposite of the first: a political analyst, Jordache A. Ellapen, in an article entitled, “From ‘Black’ to ‘Brown’: Situating the Indian ‘Diaspora’ in South Africa”, has suggested that by claiming the politics of the ‘Diaspora’, Indians can enable a new political agency for self-representation and self-determination. In the context of new issues regarding the Indian
minority in post-apartheid South Africa, some young PIOs are thinking of “particularist” rights being promoted through the adoption of a form of ‘Diasporic politics’. There is, however, little actual evidence of PIOs using ‘Diasporic’ politics to leverage ‘particularist’ rights in South Africa or elsewhere. Moreover, the question of India’s response to such politics (if it were to occur) in the current context of mutually beneficial relations with African states and institutions is also very doubtful.

The third category of response is more practical and is promoted by a very pragmatic community: those in trade and business. Mayur Madhvani, senior director of the Madhvani group of industries and joint managing director of the Kakira Sugar Works, Uganda, is of the opinion that India should take advantage of its large diaspora in Africa because of the advantages it provides for Indian business. Other business magnates like NK Somani, CEO, Danote Group, Nigeria, Vinod Shah, CEO, Bidco Oil, Kenya and Manu Chandaria, Chairman, Concroft Group, Kenya, all hold similar views. They are all doing extremely well and wish to take advantage of India’s ‘emerging’ status. However, they also say that the Indian government is not doing enough to engage with Indian PIOs in Africa, while it is reaching out to its diaspora in the West in a much bigger way. According to Nimisha Madhvani, the Ugandan High Commissioner to India:

The Indian government has not really focused on Indians in Africa which is why many of the big Indian business groups of Indian origin in that continent do not look at putting their money in India but instead tap business opportunities in Europe and America. The fourth set of responses is not really that of the PIO community but represents the view of African governments. African countries too are now looking at India as a partner to help them grow and develop, and they too can utilise the Indian diaspora in this effort. This is actually happening as can be seen by the appointment of Nimisha Madhvani, a person of Indian origin, as Uganda’s High Commissioner to India. Such actions can help to foster goodwill and better understanding between the continent and India.

However, it needs to be pointed out here that in its engagement with its diaspora in Africa, the Indian government is a primary actor—and it is in this capacity that it is reaching out to what it perceives as influential groups among the PIOs. This is evident from the kind of people it has been honouring in its Pravasi Bharat Divases. The issue
is does it reach out to the average individual Africans of Indian origin, who may also have much to contribute (in terms of local knowledge etc) by virtue of the fact that they are now African but have an emotional connection with India? This aspect is important because the India-Africa forum summits have been focusing not only on relations between states and institutions but also on small and medium scale industries, agriculture and the food sector. It has also focused on education and health. As mentioned earlier, many Indians had become teachers and have good connections with the local population. The Indian government must find ways to re-connect with its diaspora in a much larger way than it is doing now.

VI

In conclusion it may be said that a beginning has been made but a lot more needs to be done, and that too, done with a great deal of sensitivity. Many in the Indian diaspora have been living in Africa for several generations and have little or no links with their original home country. Having gone as contract or indentured labour or as small businessmen or traders, they have struggled to reach the positions they now occupy after having undergone great privations, facing obstacles not only due to their poverty but also from the indigenous population who considered them as competition for scarce jobs and limited economic opportunities. As such, in many cases, Indians in Africa do not want to be seen as having divided loyalties. At the same time, there is a great deal of interest in Indian education, health care and culture as well as India’s current status as a rising power. The Indian government should factor in the requirements and complaints of the Indian diasporic community in Africa if it wishes to reap any benefits from it. Every stable relationship is a two-way relationship and India has to understand and cater to the needs of the diaspora, something that cannot be done through mere Pravasi Bharat awards or divases, though they are a good step forward. India has so far not been able to fully delve into the goodwill for India that exists within the Indian diaspora in Africa. India has also not tapped into the expertise that exists in the diaspora which could provide up-to-date information about local rules and regulations, business procedures and demands. In this context, it may be worth mentioning that the Indian diaspora in Africa, which had suffered alongside Africans under colonial rule and apartheid and made common cause with them in their struggle, have domain knowledge, whether economic or political, and also have
decades if not centuries invested in Africa. We in India may feel that Africa’s goodwill towards India springs from what India claims to have done for Africa. But it may also be true that the Indian diaspora in Africa has acted as a lubricant for mobilising African opinion about Indians and India, since they have been our ‘ambassadors’ there long before we had diplomatic representation in Africa or, for that matter, African countries were even independent. It may well be true that India is familiar to Africans because of its diaspora on the continent, and they may have helped, perhaps indirectly, to generate goodwill for India. It is therefore very important to engage with the diaspora in a sensitive manner, keeping their interests in mind, if India wishes to benefit from their expertise on Africa and the goodwill they have generated for themselves and for India, in their adopted countries.

NOTES
3. There is an interesting discussion on this issue, i.e., the non-production of ‘diasporic’ literature in Pallavi Rastogi, Afrindian Fictions: Diaspora, Race and National Desire in South Africa, The Ohio State University Press, Columbus 2008, p. 160 ff.
11. Ibid.


16. Ibid.


20. See High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, Chapter 7, n. 12, p. 82.

21. Ibid. Pp. 82-94.

22. Cited in Ellapen, n.9, pp. 3-4. It should be mentioned here that Malema was suspended from the ANC in early 2012, mainly for his extremist views.

23. Ibid. p. 4.

24. High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, Chapter 7, n. 12, p. 87.


32. See Ellapen, n. 9, p. 4 ff.


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