



IDSA EMINENT PERSONS' LECTURE SERIES

The Political Transition in Pakistan and Future of India-Pakistan Relations

by Professor Sumit Ganguly, Indiana University

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(This is an edited transcript of the Lecture delivered by Prof. Ganguly)

Thank you very much for that extraordinarily kind and generous introduction. I am going to take a somewhat unusual view when talking about this critical issue of the political transition in Pakistan and its implications for India. Instead of simply talking about the present situation, I am going to provide a bit of historical context. Some of this historical context will be fairly obvious to a number of people in this room because many of you have dealt with Pakistan either in a professional capacity or are scholars and have worked on Pakistan and are not unfamiliar with the tortured history of Indo-Pakistani relations. So, first, I will adopt somewhat of a historical perspective but also since I am a scholar and an academic I am also going to try and bring a theoretical perspective which might help us understand why the relationship with Pakistan particularly at times of political transition within Pakistan have been so deeply fraught. What does the international relations theory tell us about the dangers of this kind of political transition, particularly for bilateral relations and I will try and bring this perspective to bear on three distinct cases. First, I will talk about the political transition in Pakistan from the early '60s which culminated in the 1965 war, then I will talk a little bit about Pakistan in 1970-71 which culminated in the third Indo-Pakistani conflict, and then thirdly I will talk about the present situation, and fourth and finally I will directly turn my attention to the kinds of questions that Mr. Sisodia so clearly spelt out – what implications does this transition have for Indo-Pakistani relations, where do particular dangers lie and what might India do to respond to the kinds of challenges that are currently emerging; and I plan to do all of this in the next half an hour some how.

First of all, there is the body of literature emerging in the United States, it is not a fairly established body of literature, that suggests that democratic states do not go to war with other democratic states. There is a certain amount of statistical evidence that suggests that this is indeed true, though this literature has come under increasing criticism in recent years suggesting that the definitions of democracy sometimes are flawed, that sometimes this puts the cart before the horse, that peace already had been achieved in a region and then democracy came about, so, consequently, this is a spurious correlation and this is not a terribly useful theoretical handle in terms of the study of international relations and war. Now there is a new body of literature which is a spin-off from that theory of democratic peace which suggests that countries in the early phases of democratisation with incomplete democratisation, weak political institutions are actually very war prone. Countries in the middle of political transitions from authoritarian rule to democratic rule but with incomplete democratization, weak political institutions are very very dangerous entities. Two political scientists, both of whom are friends of mine, Jack Snyder at Columbia University and Edward Mansfield at the University of Pennsylvania have pioneered this body of research. They both include case studies and longitudinal statistical evidence. The central argument is the following: that you have a rapid transition to democracy but you have very few democratic institutions worth the name, you have a press that is free for the most part but also a press that does not adhere to certain established norms of reporting and conduct. A free

press does not mean necessarily a press that can write anything it pleases. To give you a concrete example, on a couple of occasions I have given lectures in Pakistan and in the morning I have had the Urdu press translated to me, I can follow Urdu but I can't read it, and I have discovered that the talk must have been given by someone else other than myself. This is not what I consider to be a free press because a free press has certain norms of reportage that it must adhere to. It must faithfully record events, not put in words in the mouth of the speaker which were never spoken in the first place. So you have incomplete democratisation, a free press but not a press that adheres to certain norms upon that, you have a judiciary which works sometimes and within this context you have the possibility of populist mobilisation usually in the form of hypernationalist propaganda and this is particularly directed either against minorities within the country or to external enemies largely because there are very few constraints on politicians. In a democratic state there are constraints on behaviour because you have a well developed legislature, you have a well developed judiciary.

[break in recording]

This should not sound terribly unfamiliar to Indian audiences but this is the crux of the theory. Now what I am going to do is try and apply this theory to the two previous cases to see how well the theory predicts behaviour and then talk about the present situation. So, let me start out with Pakistan in the early 1960s. The incident that triggers the momentum towards war is the theft of the hair of the Prophet from the Hazratbal Mosque in Srinagar. It is ultimately recovered by Indian intelligence agencies, restored to its proper place, authenticated by religious authorities, but in the meanwhile that December in the Valley there is an uproar comparable to what is going on right now and I would argue even worse than what is going on. This is something that afflicted the entire Valley, paralysed life in the Valley and the first slogans for *azadi* were raised at the time. From this, the Pakistani authorities construe that there must be widespread support for Pakistan in the Valley, even though there is no evidence of support for Pakistan amongst the protesters; they are largely unhappy with the Indian state and just like the issue of land transfer it galvanised around the theft of the Prophet's Hair. Pakistan already is in a state of transition but it has very incomplete democratic institutions which have been initiated by none other than Ayub Khan with the creation of this basic democracy system and he also has a highly populist prime minister [foreign minister?] who is absolutely driven by ambition, who wants to unseat Ayub at all costs, use democratic rhetoric and populist rhetoric to somehow manage to ultimately obtain power and he is the one who encourages Ayub and he also gives all manner of speeches as the foreign minister saying look at the oppression of the Kashmiris, look at how terrible conditions are and if we do not act now India which is ostensibly arming itself against China after the 1962 war really will use these weapons against us. So, we have a brief window of opportunity and he whips up a kind of a frenzy within Pakistan about the need to resort to war to "liberate" the Kashmiris from the yoke of Indian rule. This obviously generates a kind of support within Pakistan particularly in the context of a press that will faithfully report sentiments against India and will then of course add lots of editorial comment further fuelling the process. But bear in mind, this is a very quasi-democratic set of institutions. The normal restraints that exist on the press simply were not present. Consequently, the Pakistani press continues to whip up this kind of war frenzy and the government then encourages certain completely foolish notions including one for which I actually have evidence, I have direct quotes from mid-level officers who say, well, in any case one Muslim soldier is the equivalent of 5 to 10 Hindus depending on who you talk to and all you need to do is slap them around a little bit and they will come to their senses. Of course, this sentiment is reinforced in the wake of the Rann of Kutch episode where the

Pakistanis make a limited probe, India decides to send this issue to the International Court of Justice, which again leads them to make a completely false interpretation, namely, this just proves the Indians lack stomach for battle. It further feeds this kind of nationalist frenzy, it reinforces their belief in their inherent martial superiority – a notion by the way which actually can be traced to deeply flawed colonial anthropology of the 19th century when certain racial and ethnic groups were anointed as martial races and people like myself was considered to be inherently non-martial and incapable of bearing arms. I should only remind this audience that two particularly violent movements, one, the violent strand of the nationalist movement had its origins in Bengal with Shri Aurobindo Ghosh, and then subsequently the naxalite agitation, neither of which I would consider to be particularly non-violent and retiring types, but that is another matter. All of this contributes to a kind of war hysteria within Pakistan and ultimately leads to Operation Gibraltar and then of course much to the dismay of the Pakistanis India does demonstrate some martial mettle and a very diminutive prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri rises appropriately to the occasion and says that we will defend our borders at all costs. Even though the war ends in a stalemate, this is hardly the resounding victory that Pakistan was expecting. So in many ways the theory did predict fairly well a war outcome.

There is remarkable similarity to 1971 in terms of the same sorts of changes within Pakistan and the culmination in war. You get elections for the first time, the first free and fair elections in Pakistan ever, which leads obviously to the emergence of a large majority in East Pakistan which given the demographic composition of the two wings it is clear that in any fair form of representation East Pakistan will be dominant. This is obviously unacceptable to the same individual who was the principal initiator of the 1965 war. Yes, the military was formally in power but there is ample evidence now of Bhutto's role in pushing Ayub into war and also Ayub becoming increasingly concerned that if he did not demonstrate a certain amount of vigour people like Bhutto would simply continue to steel his thunder and already the great development decade of Ayub in the early '60s is beginning to wane, it was showing the first signs of starting to [unclear]. It certainly did by the time of his departure in 1969. Again, political institutions by 1970 in Pakistan have virtually been decimated. There are hardly any institutions left. These are institutions in name only with the obvious exception of a very loaded military and an all powerful military, though in comparison to present day they look rather anaemic. The military's appetite has grown with the eating and it has expanded its tentacles quite dramatically in the recent past first under General Zia and under Musharraf which now we have witnessed almost a complete militarization of Pakistani society well beyond the traditional *primus inter pares* roles, first amongst equals, of the Pakistani military. So political institutions remained exceedingly weak, there are widespread disparities that have long characterised the two wings of Pakistan and there is abject contempt for the Bengalis of East Pakistan. But now for once Bengalis are coming to the fore in terms of political representation. The writing is on the wall. The contempt for the Bengalis perhaps is best captured in Ayub Khan's book *Friends, not Masters*. Of course, my Pakistani friends of a more liberal persuasion changed the comma – they say "Friends not, Masters" changing the emphasis ever so slightly. Ayub Khan was claiming that the military were the friends of the Pakistanis not their masters. Liberal Pakistanis tend to think otherwise. In this book he talks about the Bengalis, that these people are not real Muslims because they have lived in far too closer proximity with Hindus and they probably belong to the original races of the sub-continent (but from where did the rest of West Pakistan happen to come from!). They belong to the original races of the sub-continent and they are deferential by nature; Bengalis might be many things, but deferential is not a characteristic I would associate with them – there is a fairly contentious lot and being one I can say that. They are deferential by nature and we need to bring them up to ... , and in due course if we do treat them kindly they will integrate

themselves into Pakistan. It clearly shows the complete lack of understanding on the part of the West Pakistani elite of their brethren in East Pakistan. But this contempt for these Pakistanis ultimately resulted of course in the tragedy of March 26th when even based upon American sources what happened was genocide. Archer Blood who was the American Consul General in Dhaka wrote a dissent telegram which is now in the public domain where he said, “the much overused word genocide is precisely applicable in this case.” Bear in mind he was a foreign service officer who obviously was serving a regime which was not unsympathetically inclined towards Pakistan. So, one can consider some one like Archer Blood to be a fairly dispassionate source. So, not only is Bhutto who has engaged in all manner of hyper-nationalistic propaganda both in the past and now is faced with the possibility of sharing power, he is unalterably opposed to sharing power, the whole notion that drives a democracy – negotiation, compromise, willingness to live and let live and to fight another day – is anathema to Bhutto. Bhutto is a master of populist rhetoric but incapable, almost congenitally incapable, of power sharing. That is precisely what he has to do. In the meanwhile anger in East Pakistan continues to develop and then of course as I said ultimately results in Operation Search Light on March 26th, with all the brutal consequences that one is well aware of. Faced with this not only Bhutto but Yahya also joins the fray and now starts accusing India of all manner of machinations, this is well before India becomes deeply involved with Mukti Bahini which does take place in the course of the summer, that is well established. But even before that happens, there is this hatred and animosity and hostility towards India that is steadily whipped up within Pakistan, and especially with mostly state controlled media or media heavily dependent upon the state this is not difficult to do. So, even when you have this limited transition to democracy, the institutions of democracy are still not at work and once you develop this kind of war hysteria and you have a military which is war prone any way war becomes all but inevitable with India and it does start in early December 1971 and of course we well know the consequences thereof only too well and I need not dwell on the situation. Again, this is a reasonably good test of the theory. The theory and the facts seem to conform reasonably well, not perfectly but then no theory is perfect. This theory again gets some degree of support from the conditions that obtained and then the ultimate culmination in war.

This then brings me to the third portion – the present situation. Once again we have incomplete democratisation. Neither Nawaz nor Asif Ali Zardari has the first clue about how to run a coalition government. They have no experience and at a time when the economy in Pakistan is going completely into a tailspin – not entirely as a consequence of anything they have done or not done, it is in large part the result of exogenous shocks – dramatic rise in global food prices, dramatic rise in oil prices and the vulnerability and the openness of the Pakistani economy to these kinds of exogenous shocks. Of course, it also reflects Pakistan’s distorted economic priorities. While the stock market boomed under General Musharraf, there were mostly external causes of that stock market boom. Lots of Pakistanis abroad believing in this kind of seeming stability in Pakistan were pouring in money into the stock exchange, substantial American assistance over the last several years to the tune of 11 billion dollars, all the multilateral debts being written off in the wake of September 11 – about 40 billion dollars worth of debt, all of this created a kind of artificial boom in Pakistan. That artificial boom also ran its course. So at a time when the economy is in a complete tailspin, Zardari and Sharif seem to be congenitally incapable of reaching any kind of common platform, more interested in protecting personal turf and interests. So, again the normal expectations that in a democratic state a coalition government would zero-in on the most compelling issues facing the country and not engage in personal squabbles, is just not there.

Yes, the Pakistani higher judiciary in recent months has demonstrated exemplary courage and has been one of the principal reasons for the dismissal of Musharraf. But ... try not to get too excited about this, curb your enthusiasm, because bear in mind this judiciary has a tragic history. This is the same judiciary or their forefathers, what did they do? They blessed the first military coup in Pakistan in 1958 under the most convoluted legal logic referred to as the doctrine of necessity. There is a certain judicial culture that exists and while the actions of Iftikhar Chaudhary are certainly laudable and worthy of admiration and those of his colleagues who faced rubber bullets and tear gas are all exemplary, do not readily assume that all is suddenly well with the Pakistani judiciary. There is a history that is hardly exemplary and remnants of that still permeate, and bear in mind that this judiciary also sent Bhutto to the gallows after basically what could be construed as a monkey trial. Bhutto probably was guilty but even the guilty deserve a fair trial. They deserve their day in court. A particular judge with whom I have had some dealings, not entirely pleasant ones, gleefully sent Bhutto to the gallows on evidence that was certainly, I would say, incomplete, and that is using a polite word. So, you have leaders who are not really streaked in democratic politics, political parties which are largely woven around personalities, a judiciary with a uneven record, the press which is free but again of enormously varying quality – yes the elite press is excellent and there are half a dozen journalists in Pakistan who are world class and have taken on extraordinary risks to their personal lives to report with care, report with courage and with verve but that is still you can count really on your fingers – it is not exactly a huge coalition. Many of them, by the way, also had quite nicely accommodated themselves with the military arguing – well, the military for all its sins is still secular and that is important for us and they constitute that finger in the dike against the Islamists. It shows a certain kind of blindness because yes the military might like its scotch and its manicured golf courses, but that did not mean – and I have no access to classified information – but that did not mean that the military did not flirt or actively encourage the Islamists both in Afghanistan, Kashmir and elsewhere. So the notion of the military being this wonderful secular edifice standing between Pakistani civil society and the Islamist dike, I think, is somewhat of a mischaracterisation, and again I am trying to use polite language.

Amidst all this, quite fortunately and perhaps because of the myriad problems that Pakistan is faced with, you have not seen the resort to the kind of populist rhetoric that had characterised 1970, or '63, '64 and then ultimately '65. I don't know how much longer this will last. Already Musharraf quite predictably in his January 14 speech invariably fell back on the old cliché about Kashmir running in our blood. But I suppose, given the extraordinary domestic problems that Pakistan is consumed with, Zardari, Sharif and others have not tried as much as they might like to make hay with the situation in Kashmir, which tragically on this occasion is really one of India's own making. This is not a conspiracy that was hatched carefully outside GHQ in Rawalpindi. Obviously, will ISI take advantage of this volatile and potentially volcanic situation, there is no question in my mind that they will and will try and maintain plausible deniability. But because of the evidence pointing now of ISI's involvement in the Kabul bombings, particularly the bombing of the Indian embassy, a normally reticent CIA even said yes there is evidence displayed on the front pages of the New York Times and the preoccupation with a whole series of domestic problems might inhibit Pakistan from again whipping up this kind of nationalist frenzy that existed in the past which had ultimately culminated in war. Also, given the rather harsh memories of 1999 which have not been lost on the Pakistani military, they are probably not in a mood to be adventurous with India, not to mention the fact that they have other compelling problems at home. So, for once, we also see that the theory may have certain limitations because other particular factors might inhibit a state with all the other characteristics that the theory asks for from embarking upon war, and I think there are important domestic and external constraints that are

restraining Pakistan and Pakistani leaders from whipping up this kind of war frenzy and directing its problems right into the Valley of Kashmir. However, that said, I am not entirely persuaded that this restraint will last forever. If the regime finds itself truly besieged, before long it will seek an external scapegoat and what better scapegoat than the one that India has provided so handsomely to Islamabad, which then leads me to the final section of my talk. As any typical garrulous academic, not to mention Bengali academic, I will probably violate the half an hour rule just by a few minutes, I will not totally breach it.

What is India to do? I think the strategy is really three fold. The first and the most important thing is, and it is easy to say this and it is much more difficult for policy makers in this room and elsewhere in the city, the first general principle that one must bear in mind is that domestic tensions must be curbed. Some semblance of order, some semblance of normalcy at all costs without the resort to widespread use of force which I think would actually have a rather counterproductive effect at this stage, has to be obtained both in the Valley and Jammu. The particulars of how this is accomplished obviously are not easy to spell out but it is something we can talk about of what kinds of strategies might be adopted but the basic principle that both communities, the sentiments of both communities, have to be seriously addressed by the regime in New Delhi and some semblance of normalcy restored because as long as this particular pot is on the boil the mischievousness of others, particularly a certain organization in GHQ, the capacity for mischief is virtually boundless and that mischief will occur, there will then be a harsher Indian response which will then raise questions about human rights violations and then before long the whole issue will assume an international character. Consequently, it is in India's vital interest, regardless of any rights and wrongs of any particular side, to defuse the situation. Second, to maintain vigilance along the borders, because efforts will probably be made to stir up trouble along the LoC at this stage. Small skirmishes, little probings in various places just to test the temperature, just to test the mettle, the awareness, the readiness of Indian forces and attempts at border crossing, so that the pot can be stirred a little bit further and international attention then sustained on Kashmir.

Finally, I think India needs to work with the nascent civilian regime particularly now that General Musharraf is no longer in the picture. This does not mean a happy embrace of the regime but also saying that because certain unpleasant things have happened, the breach of the ceasefire, the brazen attack on the embassy in Kabul, we are not going to deal with it. Nothing could be more counterproductive. Ultimately, the basic principle in international relations – you have to talk to your adversaries. It is easy to talk to friends, it is much more difficult to talk to adversaries. This is an adversary for reasons of its own and because of history is a particularly insecure and intractable adversary. Nevertheless it is vital to talk to the civilian regime and to grant this civilian regime, their sins notwithstanding, some element of international legitimacy because therein, I think, lies the hope of slowly trying to invoke a process which will not happen tomorrow which will not happen next year but over the long haul of trying to return the Pakistani military to its proper place in the barracks, to reduce its disproportionate influence in Pakistani politics and to reduce its ability to basically dictate terms on which any Pakistani civilian regime is to negotiate with India. Short of this, I am afraid, the military will continue to remain first amongst equals, will exercise a disproportionate influence on questions pertaining to Afghanistan and particularly Kashmir and India and the spiral of hostility that has characterised the Indo-Pakistani relations from the very genesis of these two states will continue to dog our footsteps for the foreseeable future leading to a rather unhappy scenario of not war this year or next year but war inevitably down the road. Thank you very much.

Q&A

Speaker: On Kargil, and on peace parleys in the 1960s and again in the 1980s.

Prof. Ganguly: These are all very helpful questions. On Kargil, actually I had a note over here Kargil being the exception. But I also noticed I was running out of time. No, you are absolutely right. Kargil is an important counter-case. It is a case that does not fit the theory because Nawaz was actually making peace or at least giving the semblance thereof in the February Summit, the Lahore Declaration, and the like but we still don't have a good sense of internal Pakistani decision making. This still does not get me out of my bind because my theory, not mine the theory of my friends, completely fails to predict the Kargil case. The Kargil case to the best extent that I have been able to reconstruct this – I have worked quite a bit on Kargil based upon careful interviews from Pakistanis, reading the Pakistani press, reading tea leaves – that in large part Nawaz had been informed about Kargil but the dimensions of it and the scope of it he had neither probed nor had he asked for a real briefing. He was too distracted in many ways and Musharraf used this as an opportunity to see how far he could probe and when there was no immediate reaction he expanded the scope of the conflict. The Indians as we well know now based upon the Kargil Committee Report, General Bammi's excellent book, there is ample evidence about intelligence failure. There has been enormous discussion in this country about it. They just simply expanded the scope of the operations. But you are right, there was a note over here but I did not get to it.

I did not say a populist PM, I said foreign minister, I am well aware that Bhutto had aspirations to be the PM but basically he was the foreign minister but he played a vital role in egging Ayub Khan on. Ayub Khan was trying to protect his flanks because this growing civil society was getting increasingly restive and Bhutto even though in the regime was actually pandering to them because he had his own ambitions.

On parleys for peace, yes there were definitely parleys for peace. We accomplished zero. In terms of more people to people exchange, our hearts beat together, so we should have greater cultural exchanges, more cricket games, minor agreements along the LoC but substantively did they change anything? No. In part, particularly with Zia – he was the master of public relations – he wanted to build a constituency in the United States, saying, look I am the reasonable one here, it is the Indians who are in the lap of the Soviets. Unfortunately, there were Indians who were taken in by him; because of his seemingly gracious manners they tended to forget that the gracious manners concealed one of the most vicious military dictatorships on the face of the earth.

Next Speaker: The fragility of the Pakistani state, its economic travails, etc. and whether this hinders efforts to crack down on Islamic militants.

Prof. Ganguly: You are right, the Pakistani state is more fragile today than it was a decade ago. The significant economic downturn, spate of suicide bombings within Pakistan itself, the political paralysis that you speak of, the troubles in the North West Frontier Province – all that is absolutely true, and clearly Afghanistan, who could disagree with you on that! Two things, however, despite this fragility: has it stopped Pakistan from providing assistance to people who want to undermine the Karzai government? No. There is a certain kind of fecklessness on the part of key decision makers, and I am not at all certain that by any means, as the rather foolish effort to shift the control of the ISI demonstrated, that within a few hours the ordinance had to be rescinded. It is a colossal folly trying to do that without preparing the ground in any fashion. Despite all this, notice the fact that there is growing American pressure, saying, do more because the policy has not changed. It is sort of a policy of hunting with the hounds and running with the hares, that continues. That is one. So, yes, this state is fragile but the state also seems to be impervious to certain lessons. That is one.

The second is, we tend to forget also that when the chips were really down in Baluchistan, Bhutto carpet bombed it. Use of force on the part of this military when it really wants to – I don't buy for one moment this popular American argument which is gaining considerable attraction: Oh, they can't do more in the NWFP because they won't shoot at fellow Muslims; yes of course I forgot, the Bengalis were not true Muslims so you could slaughter them at will and the Baluchis were different from us so we could carpet bomb them. If this government wants to get serious they will crush the Taliban. I don't buy it for one moment. This is a very convenient ploy to suggest the reason the Rangers are having such a tough time is because they have divided loyalties. No, they don't have divided loyalties. They have not received the full weight of the Pakistani military because the Pakistani military is divided in terms of the strategy it wants to pursue, the trajectory. Unfortunately, as you well know, international relations is not about crystal ball gazing but there are two or three factors that one can identify which will determine the trajectory. One, to what extent can the civilian regime stabilise itself and to what extent can it then start exercising even minimal control over the military. That is number one. Number two, what spontaneous or other events take place in Kashmir which have an impact on the Indo-Pakistani relationship. The third is how the external world reacts to Pakistan's attempts to fish in troubled waters. The American restraint by the way really has been admirable thus far. I hope this kind of restraint will continue that the US does not make an intemperate statement which then gets passions aroused in New Delhi, something New Delhi makes statements in turn which creates greater repercussions in Pakistan and you get into a spiral of hostilities. So I would say those three factors bear watching very carefully in terms of watching the likely trajectory of how things evolve.

Next Speaker: Does the responsibility for the 1971 War rest with the Pakistani Army or Zulfikar Bhutto? And will the Army relinquish the power it wields?

Prof. Ganguly: These are both tough questions. On the first one, on the 1971 war, I read every scrap of paper that exists in the public domain and I genuinely believe that the real villain of the piece in 1971 is not the Pakistani military – not in terms of their actions, obviously their actions cannot be exculpated in any way shape or fashion. There are Pakistani apologists who refer to the actions of the Mukti Bahini and inflicting pain on the Biharis and the like; and my response is sort of like saying yes, the Jews did, they pick up a couple of rocks and hurled them at Nazi tanks and for that they sinned against the Nazis. That is the kind of moral equivalence we are drawing. Yes, the Mukti Bahini did not read the Biharis particularly well. What did the Biharis do on the night of March 26th? That is my response. So, I genuinely believe, however, if you carefully sift through the evidence you notice the extraordinarily pernicious role of Bhutto. Yahya Khan, we are in polite society but I will be blunt about it because this is history, was a drunkard. The man was really out of his depth. He was a man who was being manipulated by Bhutto, particularly now a lot of information has come out about how decisions were made. Yes, as a corporate entity, would the Pakistani military have permitted power sharing, perhaps not in the way that you and I visualise power sharing, but at least at a nominal level I think they would have countenanced that. Would they have still tried to maintain a disproportionate role, which takes me to the second part of your question, most certainly yes. But they might have allowed for the sake of keeping the two wings together, for the sake of national unity they would have allowed some semblance of power sharing. Would that have lasted more than six months, possibly not. But Yahya was not the problem. People villainise him in this country but he was really a drunkard and a philanderer. The man was clueless half of the time. His drinking buddy was Joseph Farland, a Nixon appointee, a man of absolutely no qualities of head and heart. And the two of them spent most of their time in an alcoholic haze. This is not a careful military decision maker of terrifying proportions. This is a rather pathetic creature.

Will the Pakistani Army ever relinquish the kind of standing that it has? Immediately, not in the short term, but if a process is engaged and if American assistance is increasingly made conditional – one of the great tragedies, I don't believe for one moment that the US was responsible for authoritarianism in Pakistan; I think authoritarianism in Pakistan, contrary to the writings of Ayesha Jalal where I think she is completely wrong, the state of martial rule, it really has to do with certain internal features of the Pakistani polity which can be traced back to the Pakistani nationalist movement. But certainly critical American assistance and acquiescence of military regimes over long periods of time have bolstered the position of the Pakistani military over time and there is a Bill currently in Congress which would dramatically transfer resources to the civil sector and move funds away from the Pakistani military. If a coalition can be built in the United States for this kind of a policy, if support can be obtained for the civilian regime and if the civilian regime by some miracle survives its term and there is a transition. I see long term hope but not in the short term under no circumstances, not in the next five years.

Next Speaker: On Musharraf and on the balance between domestic and foreign policy considerations in Pakistan.

Prof. Ganguly: Okay, first on Musharraf. Unfortunately, you are absolutely right. As early as 2000, I had written an article where I argued that Musharraf is, this is even before 9/11 happened, Musharraf is a slender [unclear] to rest on. After 9/11 happened, I had a rather vigorous debate with some one who will go unnamed, a certain scholar of importance in the United States who works on Pakistan, saying that this faith on Musharraf is utterly misplaced, Pakistani military is blowing smoke in our eyes and if we believe this then there are no bigger fools than ourselves. No, I was told. Musharraf is absolutely serious, he is secular, he sees the real dangers; and I said palpable nonsense. Considerably later, about 8 years later, I think I had been fully vindicated. It is a pity I did not write up my remarks after 9/11, that was a mistake. From now on I will, so I can point to the record.

Balancing domestic and foreign policy considerations: the problem is you don't have a government in Pakistan, you have two governments, there is a civilian government and then there is General Kiyani and his associates. The interests of these two entities may not be coterminous. I don't see Kiyani who was the Head of the ISI at one point completely abandoning the jihadi option. So he will do certain things that are critical; as long as they [don't] threaten the regime and particularly they [don't] threaten the military; he will crack down on the jihadis, but is he going to dismantle the camps near Muzaffarabad, most certainly no. Is he suddenly going to say Hamid Karzai is my best friend and I am going to embrace him, no. The quest for strategic depth is a notion that is a *sine qua non* in the Pakistani military. They want a pliant regime in Afghanistan and ultimately they may get it given Karzai's own ineptitude and the swirling corruption around Karzai. So there is that.

The other problem is that the regime within Pakistan, the coalition regime, has been so preoccupied with the restoration of the judiciary and getting rid of Musharraf, that they have had little or no time to focus on either the economy which is into a rat hole, relations with India beyond pious sentiments of wanting good relations on independence day and beyond saying that we have some reservations about how the war on terror was fought. How are you going to change that? Now that Musharraf has gone they have at least one less excuse for squabble. The next issue will be what happens to the restoration of the judiciary because this is something that Zardari cares about intensely because his own political fortunes are dependent on it. Let us see how things evolve.

Next Speaker: Two small questions. What prospects do you envisage for the PPP-PML coalition? Secondly, what future do you visualise for the retired General Musharraf?

Prof. Ganguly: For General Pervez Musharraf there is a villa awaiting him on the outskirts of Riyadh or perhaps if he is of such a secular inclination, may be Ankara. But I am also told Uganda has a particularly nice climate but the politics are a little more volatile but then he should be used to that. So there are a number of possible options for him. But basically it is a villa for him and his Pomeranians where he can write more fiction like “In the line of Fire” and make a fairly large sum of money and go on the lecture circuit in the United States. There are enough gullible people who are still willing to listen to him about his extraordinary role in the conduct of the war on terror and how he was utterly innocent of Kargil and this was something merely undertaken by the NLI which the dastardly Indians needlessly made into a war and obviously it is the BJP that is to blame, it is a jingoistic party and what do you expect. So he will write more fiction and spend his days out there insisting that what he did for Pakistan and the world is gone unheralded and unheeded, tragic end to such a great man, but the world is cruel.

On the PPP-PML, much depends upon if these individuals can somehow transcend their past. In their prior incarnations they were not, even by some fairly low standards of the sub-continent, these individuals were not the most exemplary politicians. They did not demonstrate leadership, they did not demonstrate any real concern about addressing the critical problems their country faced at the time. If anything they left the country off worse each time which provided the pretext for military intervention on each occasion. I have been told by people who talked to them in the recent past that they have gotten the message that they have now become serious. If you will forgive my scepticism, I have heard this before. I don't think these individuals have changed their spots. The only thing that might concentrate their minds is the fact that the country is now faced perhaps with an existential crisis, and may be some people who are in an advisory capacity to them might get them to concentrate their minds. Short of that I see this coalition unravelling within a year if they continue this kind of squabbling and fail to demonstrate any ability to start tackling the myriad problems. The only hopeful thing in this is, Kiyani quite cannily has shown an unwillingness to step into the fray. I am sure that behind the scenes he is sending out appropriate messages saying remember there are limits past which we won't be pushed. But at least publicly he has maintained this very neutral stand and played a rather helpful role in the last election. How long that restraint will last is an open question. Much depends upon how dire things get and also depends to what degree the United States is willing to exert pressure on the military reminding them categorically – look it is time to stay out, it is not the moment to stay in. The US wields a disproportionate influence in this arena and the question is will a McCain regime or an Obama regime undertake those kinds of things. I am much more sanguine by the way that an Obama regime would do so, a McCain regime will accommodate itself to yet another military dictatorship. But that is my view.

Next Speaker: On recent skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani troops across the LoC.

Prof. Ganguly: I don't fundamentally disagree with you. I don't think there is any imminent policy of war, all I was suggesting is that if continuing skirmishes take place, if there is growing evidence of Pakistani involvement in bombings in India, if the frequency of those bombings continue and Kashmir remains on the boil then you have the makings of a potential crisis. But again, I agree with you that there is no imminent crisis lurking around the corner.

Next Speaker: On China, the China-Pakistan relationship, American policy of de-hyphenating India and Pakistan, and the convergence of Indian and American interests in Afghanistan.

Prof. Ganguly: Let me start with the second question first because on the first question I think there is a great deal where you will find me in agreement with the kinds of suggestions that are implicit in your question. On the PRC, I take a view that I think is hugely unpopular

in significant parts of this city. Let me be just categorically blunt about it. I see the PRC as the biggest long term threat to the stability and order in Asia and the sooner that India recognizes this, the better. The most namby-pamby policies have been pursued both by this regime and the previous regimes in India when it comes to the PRC. It is as if people are still traumatized by 1962. At one point I have written, and I will say this since it is in the public domain, that India's foreign policy towards the PRC has been Finlandized. But there are certain options that are simply beyond the pale of discussion because you might offend the Mandarins in Beijing. Well, if you want to be a great power, learn to offend people. Great powers routinely offend people. They tell even allies, your old Europe, get used to it. That may not have been the smartest thing, but then Rumsfeld did many things which were not especially smart for all his putative intelligence. That is another story. The point is, great powers have to make tough choices and this constant appeasement of the PRC is only simply going to get them to insist that you genuflect even further, and unfortunately New Delhi says how much further do I need to bend. It is time that this genuflection comes to an end. The Chinese are the most adroit practitioners of the utility of force in international politics. A friend of mine Alistair Johnson at Harvard has written probably the definitive book on Chinese strategic culture called Cultural Realism. I recommend that copies be handed out in this city. There is a long tradition that exists in China, it is deeply rooted and this is not about to go away anytime soon. The last thing that the Chinese are going to gleefully accept is Indo-Pakistani rapprochement. Pakistan has served since the 1980s as a strategic surrogate for China in South Asia. The transfer of nuclear weapons technology, the transfer of M-11 missile technology, the consistent support for Pakistan, the veiled threat that we will upset the nuclear deal at the NSG, the suggestion that Pakistan should get a similar deal with China, these are not accidental. So obviously they don't want an unstable Pakistan because that is not in their interest. There are problems with their Uighur minorities, there is increasing restiveness amongst the Uighurs and there are links that have been established with Pakistani radicals but the last thing they are going to do is easily abandon, as you say this is the term that was used in Beijing by the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs dealing with Asia, he said ours is an all-weather relationship. This is a term that he used in a private discussion with a group of us and then he proceeded to rattle out all manner of statistics by which India was so much worse off than China. The contempt dripping from his voice and it is a pity that some people in this city who want to cuddle the PRC were not present in that room because it would have been a nice blast of cold air which would have woken them up. So, since this is a contentious argument, I decided to make it first.

Let me talk about the other issue. The de-hyphenation policy was initiated by someone who I know and admire a great deal, former Ambassador Frank Wisner. It is one thing for an individual however able, however thoughtful, however driven to initiate a policy; it is quite another to jettison the weight of the past. You still have people in state, in defence, in the Central Intelligence Agency, who have a long term animus towards India which was built up largely during the Cold War years. Policies might change and you might get directions from high and despite my differences on a whole host of other issues with the Bush Administration when it comes to India in a rough and ready fashion I think they have done a fairly good job. Someone asked me in United States the other day that how are you an advocate of the Bush Administration when you are so critical of other issues that the Administration has pursued and other policies, and I said well, even a broken clock is right twice a day, and let it go at that. But I think that the possibilities of de-hyphenation quite apart from the policies of any particular administration are perhaps more likely today than ever before. Why? For three reasons I would argue. One, there is a growing and expanding commercial relationship and it is not a commercial relationship which is really detrimental to the United States, on the contrary it is a mutually productive relationship especially if it blossoms. It is not a

relationship that is dependent upon for example the manufacture of all manner of cheap consumer goods which American consumers have become completely dependent upon – in China by American companies then being sold in the American market which only adds to the American trade deficit, but it is a relationship of complementarities of interests in the economic arena. Look at the bundles of investment going into India. They are not in the manufacture of cheap consumer goods and toys but they are in the realms of cutting edge industries. This is what should be encouraged and this constitutes a complete break with the past. That is number one. There is a growing military to military relationship. There are individuals in this room who played a vital role in promoting and sustaining that relationship and expanding the scope of that relationship. I don't think that is going to be overturned anytime soon. And there the relationship is not of a short term duration. It is not about fixing Afghanistan. It is not about killing Osama bin Laden. It is about long term strategic convergence, the protection of sea lanes, the ensuring of free access to oil on the high seas, counter piracy operations, none of these things are going to go away anytime in the foreseeable future. The expansion of joint peacekeeping operations, I can visualize a range of military to military co-operation, the fight against global terror regardless of its religious orientation, there is long term strategic convergence that is emerging and if I may say so going back to my original contentious point, at least a kind of watch and ward function over a certain northern neighbour. India need not become sort of strategic poodle of the United States but you could still have strategic convergence on that critical issue. That does not mean simply following America's bidding in an uncritical fashion but recognising that this is a power if its peaceful rise does not take place could have profoundly destabilising consequences for Asia which would impinge certainly on Indian interests and wider broader American interests in Asia. So, keeping one's powder dry on the PRC and maintaining a certain level of intelligence co-operation and other forms of co-operation without necessarily saying that we will uncritically do your bidding in terms of what you tell us to do with the PRC.

Finally, I come to Afghanistan. On Afghanistan, there is the first glimmer that is emerging in Washington but it is nothing more than a glimmer that there is a convergence of the Indian and American interests in Afghanistan and the first sign thereof was the open American condemnation of the bombing in Kabul and the linking of it to the ISI. It is not as if the Central Intelligence Agency is so utterly inept that it was unaware of Pakistani malfeasance directed against India in Afghanistan, but the evidence on this was so incontrovertible and the action so brazen that finally the decision was made to come down like a ton of bricks. In addition to that, I think there is a recognition, and in public fora certainly where open discussions of a very positive role that India is playing, and occasionally we hear something from a Pakistani apologist of which there are many in Washington, who will argue – well, yes, the Indians are engaged in a lot of developmental activity but you see this is directed against Pakistan. So it does not matter however humane or however positive your actions are, invariably the bogey of R&AW operating from Kandahar and other consulates is brought up by Pakistani apologists. So, that problem remains because Pakistan has apologists and very effective ones in Washington even in civil society but as I say there is a slow incremental, gradual understanding and acceptance that the role that the Indians are playing is not inimical in any way to American interests and arguably a desirable one.

Next Speaker: On congruence between India and the United States at present and past divergences.

Prof. Ganguly: You are right, the tragedy is that this is the issue that has [unclear] Indo-US relations from the very outset. The roots of it now go back to Kashmir and thanks to an excellent book by Ambassador Chandrasekhar Dasgupta which was based upon archival

work, we now know how the American position was shaped. Even Pakistan did not play the critical role, it was the British who played the most, something we had long suspected but his book puts to rest any shadow of doubt and there is even now...there is a book coming out from Cambridge University Press, I was the external reviewer for it, based upon more extensive archival work which simply adumbrates what Dasgupta pointed out. Any shadows that worked have been effectively banished and once that critical issue poisoned the well, it has been so difficult for the United States to re-establish its credentials with India and you are right at some point, and I argued this in an article in Foreign Affairs about two years ago, called "Will Kashmir stop India's rise" where I argued no, it will not and furthermore the US has to recognize the trajectories of these two countries are diverging completely, that Wisner was right, it is meaningless to talk about India and Pakistan in the same breadth. Yes, they may have a common civilisational heritage but lot of water has flowed down the Indus since 1947 and consequently the pathways of the two countries whether it is the embedding of democracy in India with all its flaws, with all due respect to the military in this room the subservient role of the military to civilian authority – some in the military would argue too subservient but that is another debate – the rapid economic growth with some effort is actually sustainable, the robustness of Indian civil society, all of these things make India a markedly different state from Pakistan and this notion of talking about India and Pakistan in the same breadth one may as well talk about India and Senegal in the same breadth.

Next Speaker: On Pakistan being a fledgling democratic state in the '60s and '70s, and the continuing shadow being cast by the Pakistan military on foreign policy.

Prof. Ganguly: Let me try and quickly respond to both your comments. On Pakistan being a fledgling democratic state in 1970-71 and early '60s. In the early '60s the case is much harder to make. All I was suggesting based upon the kind of theoretical apparatus that my two friends provide is that there were elements of a kind of democratic sentiments emerging, a certain tiredness with the military regime, civil society making its first sort of voice known, so there were sentiments in that direction building up, that is the best case that one can make for the theory. In 1971 you have a somewhat stronger case because this was a reasonably fair election. Otherwise you would not have gotten the Bengalis coming to power. So it is a partial test of the theory at best.

On the shadow of the military, I could not agree with you more on this. I am in total agreement on this and the silence on this subject in the United States is almost deafening. It is only a handful of us who have no career aspirations and are content with our miserable professorial lives who speak up about this because nobody can touch us. We are poor, we will remain poor, and we will die unsung. So, why not at least make nuisance of one's [unclear]. At least that gets you some attention. So a small handful of us speak up on this subject. The best way I can respond to you on this is what a very good Pakistani friend of mine – I won't mention his name since this was in a private conference setting and it was an agreement that it would be Chatham House rules, so I won't mention his name – he said that look the foreign office makes foreign policy towards Africa, and he let it go at that. This is no insult to the poor Africans but let us put it bluntly, Pakistan does not have critical strategic or vital interests in Africa. He said, as far as Afghanistan, India and the nuclear weapons programme are concerned, there is one entity, it is called GHQ in Rawalpindi. Make no mistake about it, and he is by the way a Pakistani political scientist saying this. This is not some chauvinistic Indian saying this.

Next Speaker: On Pakistani press coverage of India, India's contribution to the state of its relationship with Pakistan, Kashmir as the core issue, Pakistan's compulsions on Afghanistan during the 1980s, the role of Indian intelligence in NWFP.

Prof. Ganguly: I did not say Rangers, someone else said so, please don't attribute it to me. I did not say Rangers were deployed. Let us be clear about it. It is very important that we get certain facts right. Once again, I hate to interrupt you but that is not a statement that I made, it was made from the floor, I am not responsible for statements from the floor. Okay, let me try and answer all your queries.

First of all, on coverage of India, yes it is very convenient if you carefully look at the Pakistani English language press. Try and start looking at things like Jung. The images of India would make your blood curdle, there is no comparable press in this country. Let us not dissemble on this issue, I read the Pakistani press rigorously. And then you have stories even in as thoughtful a journal as *Newsline* hailing Yaseen Malik as the liberator of Kashmir, that he has not lost his mettle after all the Indian depredations on him. This man cold-bloodedly killed seven Indian Air Force officers with a pistol, hardly my notion of a great beloved liberator, but I am sure there is a different Pakistani perception. Even *Newsline*, this liberal, thoughtful journal had devoted an entire story in the last issue.

Second, the responsibility of India, obviously I never suggested that India's policies have been flawless. There is no country that can claim such perfection. There have been errors on this side too but my talk was explicitly on political transition and the implications for India. This was not a critique of Indian foreign policy and if you are so interested I can send you several articles which are highly critical of Indian foreign policy and not just towards Pakistan.

Third, it is simply palpably false that the only issue that divides India and Pakistan is Kashmir. In any number of Pakistani publications there is discussions of the unfinished business of partition and also there is a certain segment of Pakistani opinion which wants to exact the price for what happened in 1971 and they saw the insurgency that arose, thanks to India's own malfeasances in 1989-1990, which was an indigenous movement which by the late 1990s was hijacked by Pakistan. It is not accidental that the JKLF miraculously got marginalised and the Hizb ul Mujahideen came to the fore. This did not happen by divine intervention. But I do not deny that the Indian state made a complete mess in 1989-90 and there is a string of malfeasances and in fact I have an entire book on the subject, it is remaindered now in Amazon, you can buy it quite cheaply.

Fourth, strategic compulsions in Afghanistan. I was one of the most vociferous critics of Indian policy during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It is a matter of record and I can provide you ample evidence. So I was merely talking about the present. If I were to give a lecture on the Indian policy during the Afghan war years, it was cynical, it had to do with India's relationship with the Soviet Union at the time but once again having said that there is a history that we have to carefully look at. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, it is a matter of record that Minister of External Affairs Narasimha Rao went to Pakistan, gave a talk at the Pakistani Institute of Strategic Studies where he said "We have no intentions of exploiting the situation that you find yourselves in. Please do not internationalise this issue, let us find a way by which we can get the Soviets out." He was completely rebuffed. General Zia cynically exploited the Afghanistan situation. Yes, you did shelter the refugees but you were also the recipients of 3.2 billion dollars of economic and military assistance for six years and then 4.02, not all of which was delivered because the Afghan war ended and Washington rather cynically walked away and then has paid a very high price for its cynicism, not to mention the fact that Pakistan paid a high price, I don't deny that for a moment; but to suggest that it was purely humane sentiments that drove General Zia is a complete distortion of the record. ... I remember his statement about peanuts when President Carter offered 400 million dollars. Zia knew perfectly well, he was very astute, someone I don't particularly

like, but I do not deny his extraordinary astute understanding of international politics and of American politics. The Carter Administration was in the doldrums, it was apparent that Reagan was going to win, and his patience was richly rewarded. The Reagan Administration just batted away India's concerns about the possibility of precipitating an arms race in the sub-continent which did come about and there was an Indian effort at reassurance which was rebuffed. Now you could suggest that given the past history of Indo-Pakistani relations, perhaps that rebuff was inevitable but the point is that we cannot overlook the fact that Narasimha Rao as the minister of external affairs did make a good faith effort at reassuring Pakistan.

Indian involvement in NWFP – by the same token one should make the evidence amply available. If you are suggesting that the Indians should demonstrate evidence, make that evidence available, if R&AW is engaged in malfeasance by all means let the international community critique India and haul India up for its involvement in Pakistan's internal affairs.

On ceasefire violations, I was not relying on Indian sources, I am relying on the BBC and presumably they are not in the pay of the Government of India, at least the last time I checked.

On camps in Muzaffarabad, I really don't think at this particular juncture you want to press that point too hard. Even the United States which has scrupulously avoided public criticism of Pakistan for its involvement in Kashmir, even their patience is running out on this. So the notion that this is merely a concoction made up in New Delhi really does not stand scrutiny and it is in your self interest that you do not find yourself cornered again and faced with a hostile international community when the next crisis comes.

So these are highly contested issues and I can understand that as a representative of your country you have to make the best possible case and you did an admirable job but as a scholar it is also my task to carefully dissect the information and let the chips fall as they might. Many of these are fairly painful, difficult subjects and subjects of contention, but I think it is possible to very carefully sift through the historical record and look at multiple sources of evidence and try and build as accurate a picture as possible. Thank you.

Next Speaker: A reference was made to Indo-Soviet relations on Afghanistan. It is a matter of record that when Gromyko came to Delhi in 1991 he was told by Mrs. Gandhi – withdraw your troops from Afghanistan.

Prof. Ganguly: As a matter of historical record that is right and this was discussed in Bhabhani Sengupta's book "The Afghan Syndrome" that apparently Gromyko got quite a dressing down from Mrs. Gandhi and I can confirm this because I have talked to a certain foreign service officer who will go unnamed who happened to be in the room when Gromyko got the dressing down. So I am not simply referring to the text but also to the physical presence of a certain individual. Also, not only Gromyko but [unclear] also got a dressing down from Mrs. Gandhi. But then Mrs. Gandhi made the calculation that once a substantial amount of military hardware was going to flow into Pakistan she had no choice but to turn to the Soviets to balance capabilities.

Next Speaker: My compliments Prof. Ganguly for an excellent and very well considered, thought out expose, also thankful for taking so many questions. What I would like to pose to you is that you brought out the similarities in the circumstances in 1965 and today and pointing out on the basis of your theory that there is a certain trajectory that Indo-Pak relations would follow. There are similarities and I think there are two other differences which exist and I would like to get your views on whether you see any or both of these differences posing any kind of a restraint on possible Pakistani military misadventures. One is

the presence of nuclear weapons and conventional wisdom would have us believe that nuclear weapons while they cannot obviate war they do cast a constraining influence on military actions of nations. Secondly, the changed international context post 9/11 and as you yourself said the patience of the US is wearing thin on the terrorism that is being spread from that soil. So, do you see these two factors impacting on possible future Pakistani action. Thank you.

Prof. Ganguly: I think that you are absolutely right on the first point that military misadventures will be contained by mutual nuclear deterrence. In fact, if I may use this to shamelessly promote my forthcoming book with a friend of mine Paul Kapoor who teaches at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, he and I have a book coming out late next spring on a debate about nuclear stability in South Asia. Paul is arguing that actually nuclear weapons have destabilised the region even further because this provides important incentives to the Pakistani military knowing that India is fearful of the possibilities of escalation to the nuclear level that gives them the leave to engage in minor provocations. While I don't deny the role of minor provocations, I also think that both decision makers in Pakistan and in India are acutely cognizant of the danger of crossing certain imaginary thresholds that neither side is going to precipitate a nuclear war. At the height of the 2001-02 crisis when most of the foreign correspondents were fleeing this country and most Americans were leaving because of the fatwa from Blackwill, I said there is going to be no war let alone nuclear war and I flew into New Delhi spent two weeks here and I remember talking to the *Economist* correspondent where I said you are rather brave, he said well we decided to keep the bureau open and I said, there is not going to be war, there is not going to be nuclear war, all this talk is rubbish, nuclear deterrence works just as well. Pakistanis are not irrational people, the people who have their hands on the trigger are not stupid. Pakistani military fully understands the nature of nuclear weapons as does the Indian political leadership. So the likelihood of nuclear war is zero and I am living proof it is not going to happen. So Paul and I are writing this book where we are looking at recent crises and I am arguing that nuclear deterrence has arrived. That is my position on the subject.

Second, on the changed international context, you are absolutely right. I think that is an important external constraint but I always worried about the colossal carelessness that allowed the recent developments in J&K to take place. This is a point of conflagration and it is perhaps to the credit of the civilian government that they have not exploited this. Musharraf made a passing reference to it in the independence day speech, but frankly you would have expected that. It was a rather anodyne reference in terms of how much more he could have said given that this time it is squarely rooted in the Indian soil. It is of critical importance to avoid incidents of this nature whether through accident or design. The last thing one needs is the Valley on the boil again because even if a Pakistani decision maker has some goodwill and has some interest in improving relations with India, they become hamstrung by public opinion to some degree because this is an issue that has been so carefully nurtured in Pakistan from textbooks to popular film that it is so much part and parcel of the popular imagination. All you need is an unfortunate incident and then things completely spiral out of control. So not because I think Pakistanis are especially inclined to have their fingers on the nuclear trigger or are particularly reckless, I think they shepherd their nuclear weapons quite well. I never bought this argument that there is an imminent danger of Islamic zealots taking over the Pakistani nuclear weapons complex. This is just hysteria, this gets you published but it is at odds with reality.

Next Speaker: A couple of quick ones because I know we are running out of time. Pakistan's rising anti-Americanism is important because it would have reactions on the rapprochement between India and the United States and where could they turn if not to China and what

would that be like for us. What do we learn from that and I think that is important. Second is the risk escalation dynamics by external constraints. When you talk about external constraints as a limiting factor or inhibiting factor that also can escalate some of the risk and I think we need to explore that part of it ... there is a real sense of danger for India. The third is what is the danger that you have really seen in terms of Indian politics because ... the current preoccupation with foolish and domestic problems of Pakistani leadership all of that actually applies to India and that is why I think we left Srinagar the way it happened, it happened in front of us and we did not know what to say ... we have 50 to 60 years of democracy and yet we make the same mistakes and why are we making these mistakes. What is your thought on that?

Prof. Ganguly: Let me start at that end. I hate quoting Winston Churchill because unlike most Americans I don't share the populist American view that Churchill was a great individual. Yes, he rallied England very nicely to fight against the Nazis but it is a little known fact that Churchill in the 1920s also had eugenicist views. This is a matter of historical record. Also, his dismissal of one of the greatest individuals of the 20th century as a half naked Indian fakir, I would much rather take that half naked Indian fakir any time over this well dressed, over fed racist. But, Winston Churchill did say something. He said, democracy is a terrible form of government except for the alternatives. Even as I say, a broken clock can be right twice a day applies to Churchill very well. Democratic politics is inherently messy. Democratic politics can produce execrable leaders even after 200 years in a certain country of which I am a citizen now. Leaders who have a fourth grade level and an intelligence to match, domestic misadventures, external misadventures, which impose enormous costs on not only your domestic population but on others have been undertaken by leaders from well established democracies. So while I would not live under any other dispensation and would not survive very long either given the nature of my views, I recognise that even a mature democracy will make execrable choices. Look at the quality of political debate in the United States where people have tried to make hay out of Barack Hussain Obama's middle name. This is the level of political discourse in the world's most powerful democracy. After that why should not one lionise a certain railway minister here. If this is what people can stoop to, and what if, God forbid, he is a Muslim. Is he not an American citizen, was not he born, does not he have the same birth right? It pains me that one stoops to this level or the notion that somehow or the other abolishing the gas tags over the summer when Americans drive more would somehow be a panacea for America's long term energy woes. This is what we have sunk to in the presidential debates. I have very low expectations of politicians regardless of the maturity of democracy. It is tragic, it is something we live with and it is ultimately us the electorate who puts these creatures in power. As the great Irish playwright once said –we have seen the enemy and the enemy is us.

On risk escalation, the risk escalation from external factors will arise only if the United States or other major powers make any intemperate statements about the prevailing situation in Kashmir because that could have repercussions within Pakistan or could have repercussions in India. And particularly within India where you can get hypernationalist politics on the issue of Kashmir and particular political parties being ready and willing to exploit any sentiment which is perceived as being anti-Indian or somehow rapping India on the knuckles and here there is a real danger and I am glad that the United States has almost set a standard of completely avoiding comment on this. If they had provided any representation it is through proper diplomatic channels. So that is where I see a potential red light.

Next Speaker: On the issue of places of worship coming in the crossfire between security forces and militants, and the radicalisation of Kashmir in the last 40 years or so.

Prof. Ganguly: Superb question and I do not disagree with you at all about the characterisation of either the shrine or mosque, you are absolutely right. In fact I have a book coming out at the end of this month, the book is called “Treading on Haloed Ground – Military Operations and Sacred Places.” We have a chapter on the Kabbah, we have a chapter on the [unclear] mosque in Southern Thailand, which the Thais completely botched at considerable loss of life, I have a chapter comparing Charar-e-Sharif with the Hazratbal. Hazratbal situation under Wajahat Habibullah was handled with considerable care and dexterity and tragically Charar-e-Sharif went up in flames. We also have chapters on the incident in the Kabbah in 1979, a chapter on the Golden Temple, Blue Star and Black Thunder, I just mentioned that in passing and aware of the distinction between the shrine and the mosque. All I was pointing out is that there was a groundswell of anger against the Indian state when that happened. It had virtually paralysed the Valley for weeks, it was a terrible time. I read detailed accounts and by the way this great Salman Rushdie short story also on this where only Rushdie can describe the Dal lake in the English language with a precision that only he can master in terms of his subtleness of the language, it is a brilliant short story. Of course he makes it mythical about how some Saitan had stolen the hair of the Prophet.

To turn to the second part of the question, you are absolutely right, it is a very different Kashmir. The Sufi tradition for the most part has been marginalised and there is a much greater sense of Islamic orthodoxy within Kashmir, and if truth be told one can talk at length about Pakistan’s proxy war and there is no denying Pakistan’s support for any number of entities – the Jaish-e-Mohammed, the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen – one can draw a list of these characters, but that quite frankly if we are going to be blunt about this we have to recognise that the Indian state made a series of critical errors that go back all the way to the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah. We can’t overlook this, there is history. We can pretend, well when giving a speech to the Rotary Club we can talk about all Pakistani malfeasances but let us be honest with ourselves about this that there is a string of Indian malfeasances of the Indian state regardless of the political coloration of the regime in New Delhi. There is a great line from Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, a man very close to my heart and someone whom I consider to be one of the key founders of modern India and of its institutions, but even someone whom I hold with such admiration – MJ Akbar in his book called “Behind the Veil” points out that Nehru in a candid moment with the New York Times correspondent said when asked about Kashmir and the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah, he said less freedom exists there than other parts of India but more freedom exists there than ever before. He recognised this fundamental dilemma. The need to win the hearts and minds of the Kashmiris, but they resort ultimately to techniques that were not always democratic. There is to some degree one must recognize Indian culpability, the culpability of the Indian state over long periods of time which unfortunately alienated a segment of the citizenry within the state. Not everybody, I don’t think everybody there is raving to join Pakistan, but there is an alienated segment of the Muslim population in the Valley and we cannot simply attribute this to Pakistani machinations because Pakistan engaged in all kinds of machinations prior to Operation Gibraltar; but who was it, it was a shepherd who first alerted the Indian authorities and a Muslim. There were Indian Muslims who fought valiantly in the Indian Army, there was a Hawaldar who was one of the most highly decorated Muslims in the Indian army. So there is a tragic history of a series of errors of both commission and omission but that is another speech.

Next Speaker: On the composite dialogue and soft borders.

Prof. Ganguly: On the composite dialogue, there are two problems with the progress. First of all even though Kashmir is now on the agenda of the composite dialogue, the progress really has been very incremental and really in peripheral areas, the central nettle of Kashmir

remains and that central nettle of Kashmir remains alive and well as demonstrated by the events of the last two weeks. The fact that things could get so badly out of hand shows the fragility of the dialogue and the fragility of the dialogue is also underscored by the fact that the current foreign secretary, an individual I have known for well over 15 years and I consider to be one of the most temperate people in the Indian services, felt compelled to publicly state that there was ISI's hand in the bombing in Kabul. This is not a man given to wild flights of imagination or careless remarks. The fact that he felt compelled to do this and to say that this has placed the composite dialogue at risk tells you the fragility of the dialogue, that how susceptible it is to the impact of external or for that matter domestic events, and the convergence of the bombings in Kabul coupled with the tragedy unfolding in Kashmir frankly places the dialogue at risk. Yes, you can go through the motions like the great joint working group which has made genuine glacial progress with the emphasis on the word glacial, we have now exchanged maps of areas where we have no dispute. That is serious progress, but there is always the lure of "Peaking Duck" for some people, I don't particularly care for it myself.

On soft borders, soft border is a nice idea when you have relative peace but soft borders are rather problematic when one portion of your country is exploding or what you consider to be your country is exploding. This is where I do agree with the Pakistanis that Kashmir is the core issue. The question is how do you come down on the core issue, that is the problem. Any sane individual would be foolish to deny the Pakistani position that this is the core issue and what the Group Captain is saying is not nonsensical. There are other differences which I pointed out but those I think are subject to resolution. But the problem lies in how the Group Captain's side defines the core issue and how it should be resolved and how New Delhi defines the core issue and how it should be resolved, but there is no gainsaying – and this is where he and I did not completely agree – that there is no point saying let, send some more dance troops over, let us make more newspapers available to each of those countries. These are all desirable things but this is simply window dressing and the hope that somehow or other this will naturally create peace constituencies ... and then people give me this example of Germany and France, how they love each other today. I would rather not have India and Pakistan go through the two wars that they did. The Indian and Pakistani wars, which I have studied at some length by the way, they were really minor skirmishes as wars go. There were gentlemen's agreements that were held in the middle of the war not to do certain kinds of things because there were individuals on both sides who could pick up a phone and say look let us not do these kinds of things. God forbid there is a future conflict, but such a thing will be possible so the point remains that we should not make facile comparisons with Germany and France. In fact that comparison is a very dangerous and a mischievous one because it overlooks the kind of extraordinary brutality that took place during those wars, the Indo-Pakistani wars pale into insignificance. As an avid history and World War II buff, I actually know a fair bit about the cruelty and the mindlessness, all you have to read is about the French warfare of World War I – suddenly the Indo-Pakistani wars seem like a squabble amongst two children at a tea party.

Next Speaker: On the economic situation in Pakistan.

Prof. Ganguly: The economic situation in Pakistan is quite dire and in large part it is the result of the global economic turndown and the Pakistani economy for a long time was fairly well integrated into the global economy and their purchases of oil are dollar denominated. So the weakness of the dollar has hurt them disproportionately. They are also like India quite energy deficient and simultaneously the dramatic growth in global food prices, subjects over which they have very little control, and the third is anytime there is political uncertainty in any country, the stock markets which are highly sensitive respond. The Pakistani stock

market is no exception. So it is not like Nawaz Sharif and Zardari have made colossal errors other than their focus on other things instead of the economy and they have been forced by the way to adopt already some fairly harsh measures. They have cut subsidies, they have even reduced I am told the budget of the Pakistani military which was sacrosanct. These are not trivial steps that they have taken. All that said, quite frankly, I think international monetary institutions cannot allow Pakistan to collapse. It is too critical a state. Pakistan's geostrategic location makes it much too important. There are critical members of the World Bank and the IMF who are going to step up to the plate and Pakistan will also appeal to them and there will be a degree of short term pain. And by the way I find the term short term pain very very obfuscating because I as a member of the middle class in the United States am in much greater position to withstand short term pain, it means eating out less, it means driving less, it means cutting back on entertainment; but short term pain in a poor country anywhere in South Asia for the poor means either a meal or the absence of a meal. So the economists' term short term pain really obfuscates much more than it clarifies and I make this point because this is also a very volatile factor. People who are desperate will resort to desperate means and that is why I think it is very important that if there is a structural adjustment programme imposed on Pakistan that it be a humane one, there be some sort of social safety net. Like India, Pakistan has lots of poor people and for them macro economic stability means absolutely zero. My economist friends have a lot of sins to answer for and there are rare ones like Amartya Sen and he is a category of one. So I am afraid that the next several months are really volatile, they are extremely risky but the one thing that I can confidently predict is that key members of the global community cannot allow Pakistan to go into a [unclear], its sheer geostrategic location and its importance currently in terms of regional stability is so great that allowing Pakistan's economy to unravel is not an option. The consequences are too terrifying to contemplate.

Next Question: On the role of civil society in ameliorating India-Pakistan tensions.

Prof Ganguly: Here I will confess to certain intellectual and ideological prejudices to answer your question honestly. Civil society does exist in Pakistan, there is no question about it and it is growing. But there is a problem with civil society. Most of it is upper middle class, it speaks with an upper middle class accent. These are people who cannot fully reach out to the hustings. Many of these people are my friends, I know them, I think their hearts are in the right place, I think they are extremely courageous individuals, I am deliberately not going to mention names, I don't want to put them in any jeopardy but these are individuals who have demonstrated more courage than I probably would be able to muster living in a repressive environment. Sometimes they have risked their careers, sometimes they have certainly risked the possibility of government approval and access to government funding and my heart goes out to them. These are admirable individuals. I recently had an occasion to meet with several of them at a meeting after the Pakistani elections in Washington, DC at the National Endowment for Democracy and one was really heartened to see how hopeful they are about making a transition in Pakistani society towards democracy. I gave them a few cautionary notes but not to dampen their enthusiasm. But to answer your question forthrightly, I don't know of any major international conflict that civil society has helped resolve. International conflicts ultimately tragically are resolved by the men sitting at that side of the room. They are the ones who pay the price and ultimately it is power that resolves international conflicts, terrible thing to say but that is what I believe. Military force is fungible in international politics, ultimately states come to recognise that we lost, let us walk away, let us move on, they are more powerful, they are going to make life miserable for us, they have the resources to do it, let us just accept this and move on. The Cold War did not end because of American Jazz groups going to the Soviet Union or American pianists playing in Moscow. It ended

because one side lost. We may lament it, we may dislike it but the fact is there was a clear winner. I have certain reservations about how it was won, huge human costs on both sides. It is a pity the Cold war took place because if you think of the opportunity costs in terms of the development of huge nuclear weapons establishments well beyond the purposes of nuclear deterrence, which I support but I did not support what a friend of mine Robert Jervis call the madness beyond MAD in a famous article where he wrote the most brilliant critique of American nuclear strategy particularly under the Reagan years, but ultimately it is really the balance of power that resolved the Cold War. So civil society groups certainly can generate goodwill and create people to people contacts but ultimately it is the crude harsh discipline of power that resolves international conflicts and one can only hope that to some degree the post conflict situation will be just and not like a Versailles settlement, the Versailles settlement sowed the seeds of World War II. AGP Taylor has the most brilliant book on the subject. So while I recognise the realities of power, the realities of power must also be tempered by what Sir Michael Howard the great military historian called a strategy of reassurance, it is a strategy that says look I disagree with you, I am going to stop you from coming across our borders but I have no intentions of destroying you. I will also allow you to live. In some ways Admiral Nayar was hinting at that saying that a stable Pakistan ultimately is in India's interest. That is what reassurance is about. The flipside of deterrence is reassurance. There civil society can play a vital role.

Next Question: On the growing nexus between Pakistan and China, possibilities of American withdrawal from Afghanistan, and prospects for an American role in resolving India-Pakistan conflict.

Prof. Ganguly: The Administration has been so focused solely on the war on terror that it really has not looked at the growing Pakistan-China nexus and frankly there is not a whole lot that the administration can do because it is not going to serve as a substitute for China. The only thing I do hope, for that whoever comes as the next American administration and at one point when a decision is made to withdraw from Afghanistan which I hope will take place later than Iraq, I think the sooner we get out of Iraq the better, I am not one of these people who believes that the surge is working. I completely disagree with some very thoughtful people who have a piece in Foreign Affairs, I think they are just fundamentally wrong, here I will make a plea that part of the problem with a number of American strategists is that they are not area specialists and it is us benighted area specialists who combine the knowledge of strategy know something about the ground. These are people who look at body counts and the number of police forces that have been put up and have no understanding of the dynamics of the Iraqi society. The point is that this time when the US withdraws from Afghanistan, at least the military presence, it should never make the mistake of what it did and this is where I fault the United States. When the US withdrew at about 1990 it suddenly and miraculously imposed the Pressler Sanctions on Pakistan. Just one moment Pakistan had crossed this imaginary line, had some how enriched uranium beyond a point and it just happened to coincide with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. That kind of cynicism generates anti-Americanism in Pakistan and I think understandably so because there I agree with the Group Captain that Pakistan was left with a tragic burden of lots of Afghans who did not leave and a thriving drug trade that permeated the veins of Pakistan and Pakistan is still paying a price for that. I have seen it personally in Karachi. There is no gainsaying what he said. That kind of cynicism I hope will never again come to Washington, our purposes have been served, the Pakistanis are useless to us, let us walk away. There has to be an engagement with Pakistan. Those long years that Pakistan was isolated I think in many ways generated large amount of anti-Americanism within Pakistan and a sense of betrayal and I think it is critical that that does not happen again. This is where we go back to the policy of de-hyphenation that you do

not make the policy contingent on relations with India. You do things with India but at some point the US will have to tackle that particular knob of Kashmir, whether New Delhi likes it or not. One should prepare oneself for that eventuality that at some point there is going to be an American role in if not intervening in the Kashmir dispute, I don't think the US has the stomach for it or the strategic interest to do it but playing a role where it serves as a catalyst of brokering something, I don't know what that something is, it is going to require a mind greater than mine.