The menace of Left Wing Extremism (LWE), commonly termed as Naxalism and Maoist insurgency, has been categorised as the single biggest challenge to India’s internal security by the Prime Minister. He urged the Centre as well as States, to urgently employ all available resources to cripple the virus of Naxalism.

The Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs has adopted a multi-prong strategy to deal with the Naxal menace, including an effective security response to curb rebel's violence. Due to socio-economic roots of the problem, emphasis is being laid on employing the State Police Forces to tackle the Naxal violence. However, the Government's security response, have been ineffective in most of the States except a few. Inadequate combat capability of police forces in Naxalism-affected States is considered a prime factor for failing security response. Lack of proper training to police forces, due to poor infrastructure, resources and environment, is often attributed to inadequate combat capability of police forces.

This occasional paper attempts to briefly assess the ineffective security response and importance of police training, in Naxalism-affected States in general, and examines Chhattisgarh as a case study; in particular. The paper also discusses the role of the Centre in police training, and briefly assesses the overall police training environment and culture. At the end, the paper identifies some corrective measures and makes relevant policy recommendations.

Commandant Om Shankar Jha, is a serving officer of the Border Security Force (BSF). He has been decorated with “Police Medal for Meritorious Service” by the President of India (2009) and “United Nations Medal for International Peace Keeping” (2001) by the United Nations, and with a Bar (2002). He is also a five-time recipient of “Director General BSF Commendation Roll” for praise-worthy performance in operations and training. Having served in the country’s elite para-military force and the world’s largest border guarding force, he has had varied field experience, including counter-insurgency operations, internal security and border management duty. He has served in Jammu and Kashmir and the North East States in counter-insurgency operations and in Andhra Pradesh in anti-Naxal operations, besides border management along the Indo-Pakistan and Indo-Bangladesh border. He was in active service during the Kargil War serving in the Valley. He also worked as an International Police Officer in the UN Mission in KOSOVO. His instructional experience includes a successful tenure in the BSF Academy, Tekanpur as a member of the training faculty. He is a trained Commando of the BSF. He is presently conducting research on Left-wing Extremism at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi as a Research Fellow.
Combating Left Wing Extremism: Is Police Training Lacking?

Case Study of Chhattisgarh

Om Shankar Jha
Introduction\textsuperscript{1}

(\textit{The more you sweat during peace, the less you bleed during war: - Sun Tzu})

The menace of Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), commonly termed as Naxalism and Maoist insurgency, has been categorised as the single biggest challenge to India’s internal security by the Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{2} He urged the Centre as well as states, to urgently employ all available resources to cripple the virus of Naxalism.\textsuperscript{3} Recently, the Prime Minister reiterated that, from an ideology-driven movement it has been transformed into one in which the military ethos has become predominant. As the movement spreads, and becomes more energised and active, we must ponder deeply, on how best to effectively deal with it.\textsuperscript{4} Also, the second Administrative Reforms Commission, headed by Mr. Veerappa Moily, recommended that Naxalites may be treated as “Terrorists”.

The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has adopted a multi-pronged strategy to deal with the Naxal menace, including an effective security response to curb rebel violence.\textsuperscript{5} However the government’s security responses have been ineffective in most states except a few. Inadequate combat capability of police forces in Naxal-affected states is considered a prime factor for failing security response. Lack of proper training to police

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} This paper is based on the author’s field visit to Chhattisgarh, including to the Counter Terrorism and Jungle Warfare (CTJW) College, Kanker. The author’s field experience in tackling insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir, the North East region, Punjab, and Naxalism has been an advantage in writing this paper. Interactions with senior serving and retired security experts, State police leadership and men has helped this study.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Henceforth, the terms Naxalism, Left Wing Extremism and Maoist insurgency are used interchangeably.
\item \textsuperscript{3} The Prime Minister expressed such views while addressing Chief Ministers of Naxalism affected States on April 13, 2006 and December 20, 2007.
\item \textsuperscript{4} Prime Minister’s opening remarks at the Chief Minister’s Conference on January 06, 2009. Accessible at \url{http://www.pmindia.nic.in} (Accessed on January 07, 2009).
\item \textsuperscript{5} The Ministry of Home Affairs, in its 14-point Naxalite policy, enunciated on March 13, 2006, in its \textit{Status Paper on Naxalism}, tabled in Parliament envisaged that the States will need to further improve police response and pursue effective and sustained police action against Naxalites individually and collectively.
\end{itemize}
forces, due to poor infrastructure, resources and environment, is often attributed to inadequate combat capability of police forces.

Although, a lot has been discussed and written about police capability building, no specific and detailed work has been undertaken so far, on the important aspect of police training. In this light, this paper attempts to briefly assess the ineffective security response and importance of police training, in Naxal-affected states in general, and examines Chhattisgarh as a case study, in particular. Before concluding, the paper also discusses the role of the Centre in police training, and briefly assesses the overall police training environment and culture. At the end, the paper attempts to identify some corrective measures and makes relevant policy recommendations.
In-Effective Security Response and Importance of Police Training

The state police forces (SPF) with the assistance of Central paramilitary forces (CPMF) are fighting the Naxals in most states, but they have not been able to curtail the ongoing violence, barring a few states. Despite increase in deployment of troops, the fatalities and incidents of Naxal violence has been increasing over the years.\(^6\) As per the “Year End Review” released by MHA on December 31, 2008, there has been no decline in Naxal violence. The number of incidents of violence by Naxalites and police/civilian casualties in 2008 was 1591 and 721 as compared to 1565 and 696 for the year 2007.\(^7\) The following Table indicates the ever growing trend of Naxal violence since 2003.

### Table-1: Fatalities in Naxal Violence, 2003-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities in Naxal Violence</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Ministry of Home Affairs*

While the number of Naxal casualties has declined in recent years, the security forces (SFs) have suffered more casualties. The following Table indicates that the Naxals have specifically targeted the SFs and inflicted heavy casualties on them.

\(^6\) See Annexure I.

\(^7\) See Annexure-I.
Table-2: All-India Trends of Naxal Violence, 1999-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No of incidents</td>
<td>1246</td>
<td>1179</td>
<td>1208</td>
<td>1465</td>
<td>1597</td>
<td>1533</td>
<td>1608</td>
<td>1509</td>
<td>1565</td>
<td>1591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF killed</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians killed</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naxalites killed</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Killed</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nax/SF Killed ratio</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Various case studies of Naxal violence-related incidents reveal that, one of the prime reasons for recurring SF casualties has been the inadequacy in training imparted to them. While the CPMF have a well developed, integral infrastructure and resources for training, the police forces in most states generally lack them. The SPF's in most of the Naxal-affected states are generally capacity-deficient to fight their adversaries effectively, and need to be transformed into a combat-oriented force, from a traditional law and

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8 See Annexure-II.
order mode. Besides training, other factors responsible for ineffective police response are lack of political will/policy, lack of effective leadership and inherent drawbacks/limitations of SPF.

The state police are traditionally organised, trained and groomed for maintenance of law and order, crime investigation and community policing in a district administrative set up. The armed police and India Reserve Battalions (IRBs) are also organised, equipped and trained for augmenting the law and order effort of district police. Thus, the police machinery of any state is expected to efficiently tackle the routine law and environment situation. Hence, they have inherent drawbacks/limitations to take on offensive combat operations against Naxal extremists. However, in Naxal-affected states, they are facing militarily organised and well trained opponents who indulge in mass armed violence. The traditional law and order police lacks adequate combat potential to deal with such adversary. The combat capacity-deficient state police machinery, is also unable to provide effective assistance to the Special anti-Naxal Forces and CPMF.

The SPF, employed for tackling Naxal violence, in general, lacks physical and mental courage, tactical know-how, shooting skills and discipline, which is attributable to lack of training and motivation. The state of training of SPF in most of the Naxal-affected states is below the level of satisfaction. In some states, police personnel have not undergone any refresher training during their entire career. Police forces are over-committed and find it difficult to spare manpower for training activities. Lack of infrastructure and resources for organised training is another reason for it being neglected. Some of the states have not even developed basic police training infrastructure. Eight years after Bihar has been bifurcated, no police training college was established in the state till very recently.

The tactical and combat capability of SPF, including defensive and offensive skills, need to be built-up on priority in Naxal-affected states by imparting

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9 Interaction with Shri J N Roy, IPS (Retired), New Delhi, Jan 05, 2008.
10 Interaction with senior CPMF officers deployed in Chhattisgarh, December 03-08, 2008.
11 Views of senior police officers of Chhattisgarh and instructional staff of CTJW gathered during interviews from December 3-8, 2008. Also please see Annexure-II.
12 Interaction with a senior MHA official dealing internal security matters, New Delhi, July17, 2008.
13 The police training college of erstwhile joint Bihar is situated in District Hazaribagh, which is now part of Jharkhand.
appropriate training.\textsuperscript{14} Also, the state governments are conducting special recruitment drives to fill up a large number of vacancies in order to improve the police-to-people ratio.\textsuperscript{15} Besides, Special Police Officers (SPOs) are being appointed to augment the depleted strength of the state police. Also, the Naxal-affected states are raising their own anti-Naxal special forces. The ever increasing strength of the state police, further necessitates proportionate development of police training infrastructure and resources.

Adequate and efficient police training systems, infrastructure and resources are therefore required to be built-up in these states to meet the present requirement of training. The vital question is, whether the present police training facilities, resources and infrastructure available in the Naxal-affected states are adequate enough to meet the requirement of training the police personnel, including new recruits, in a short span of time. Else, the force would be a liability, rather than operationally useful.

In contrast to most of the Naxal-affected states, the success of the Andhra Pradesh (AP) police in fighting the Naxals can largely be attributed to the police capability building, including offensive and defensive potential. Besides overall development of police weaponry, communication, infrastructure, resources, mobility and intelligence, due emphasis has been given to development of a real-time and effective police training system, infrastructure and resources. Their special anti-Naxal force called “Greyhounds” has been raised, equipped, trained and employed for anti-Naxal operations and has delivered the desired result. Also, the whole state police machinery has been trained in similar environment to render effective support to Greyhounds. A synergy has been created among the district police, the intelligence machinery and the Greyhounds by a well formulated training system. All direct recruits, including Indian Police Service officers, undergo special training mandatorily for the Greyhounds, which instils combat orientation in the overall police hierarchy of the state. After three years of service in Greyhounds, a commando has to revert to the district police.

\textsuperscript{14} This assessment is based on the author’s interactions with senior officers of Army, CPMF, and Indian Police Service officers, as well as the author’s professional experience and interactions at various levels over a long period of time.

\textsuperscript{15} See “Status Paper on Internal Security as on September 01, 2008”, pp81,83 MHA, accessible at www.mha.nic.in. The present police-population ratio in India as on September 01, 2008 is 142 per lac of population. There is vacancy of 2099 (24.15\%) of Dy S P, 18654 (20.76\%) of Sub inspectors and 11379 (10.87\%) of constables in Country. The strength of CPMF is 7, 46,878 and State police is 16, 32,651.
reserve. This arrangement automatically creates a pool of tactically trained reserves and has, over the years, generated a fighting reserve, widely dispersed in the state. The successful security response of AP has established that the essence of the successful anti-Naxal operations lies in building adequate combat capability.  

The success of Punjab Police in fighting terrorism in Punjab is another example. A well trained, professionally committed and motivated local police force with the proper assistance of CPMF will have a synergic effect on the operational front and shall yield the desired result. A retired senior Indian Police Service officer and security expert feels that, there is a general mismatch in training capabilities and infrastructure, especially in most of the Naxal-affected states and the police training needs to be prioritised in such states.

Professional forces like the Army and CPMF have a system of imparting adequate pre-induction/orientation training to troops before deploying them in a new theatre, despite their having adequate professional training and experience. Mr. V. K. Joshi, Director-General of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), has stressed on the need for imparting specialised training to security personnel to counter the Naxals. CRPF is raising 10 battalions of a special anti-Naxal force, called Combat Battalion for Resolute Operations (COBRA), which is being especially equipped and trained for anti-Naxal operations on AP’s elite anti-Naxal force, Greyhounds. Likewise, there is a need for imparting specialised training to SPF in all the Naxal-affected states to counter the Naxals.

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16 Author’s own experiences in combating Maoists in Andhra Pradesh as well as interaction with senior police officers of the State.
17 Punjab Police commando battalions were raised and trained under a few CPMF officers and delivered the desired result.
19 Interaction with Shri J N Roy, IPS (Retired), New Delhi, Jan 05, 2008.
20 Pre-induction training to troops of Army and CPMF is mandatory before deployment in any new area for counter-insurgency operations.
Police Training In Chhattisgarh
A Case Study

Chhattisgarh inherited depleted police strength and infrastructure at its formation in November 2000, after it was carved out of Madhya Pradesh. A large number of officers and men from Madhya Pradesh were allotted Chhattisgarh state in spite of their reluctance. Besides, many personnel, trained in instructional duties, managed to remain in Madhya Pradesh. Even as the state inherited severely Naxal-hit areas, the state police force, at the inception itself, was capacity-deficient.\(^{22}\) The strength of the state police force has substantially increased to 46,425 as compared to just 22,592 in November 2000.\(^{23}\) The challenge of combating Naxal violence and growing police strength demands proportionate development of the police training infrastructure and resources, which is apparently a mismatch.

This case study will examine the available police training resources and requirement of the state to ascertain the gaps in police training.

Requirement of Police Capability Building and Training in Chhattisgarh

In order to ascertain the need for police capability building and training in Chhattisgarh, the security environment of the state is briefly discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

The tribal regions of Bastar and Sarguja in Chhattisgarh are the worst hit and account for the maximum number of Naxal-related cases of violence in recent years.\(^{24}\) In spite of deployment of a large number of CPMF battalions, IRBs and state police machinery, Naxal violence has not come under control. This state has partially raised specialist anti-Naxal force called the Special Task Force (STF), carved out from the state police.\(^{25}\) In 2007,

\(^{22}\) Interactions with various ranks of police personnel of Chhattisgarh, December 3-8, 2008, Raipur, Kanker, Borgaon and Kondagaon.

\(^{23}\) See “Anti-terror control rooms in all Chhattisgarh districts”, a wire report by IANS, January 5, 2009.

\(^{24}\) Bastar was once a single district. It has now been divided into five districts — Narayanpur, Kanker, Bijapur, Bastar and Dantewada. Also please see annexure-I.

\(^{25}\) Interview with Colonel R K Sharma (Retired), Deputy Inspector General and head of STF, Chhattisgarh, December 6, 2008.
Chhattisgarh witnessed more than 50 per cent of the total all-India casualties (369 out of 696) in Naxal violence. During 2008, too, the SF suffered heavy casualties (142 out of 721) in this state, next to Jharkhand. A partial decrease in casualty among SF is attributed to a virtual stand-off of anti-Naxal operations in heavily-affected areas of Abujh-Madh. As per a recent assessment by the state’s Director-General of Police, Chhattisgarh needs at least 70 battalions of SFs for proper area domination. Presently 14 battalions of CPMF are deployed in this state, for anti-Naxal operations.

A senior police officer of Chhattisgarh told this author during an interview that approximately 22,000 sq km of remote area in Bastar region, including Abujh-Madh, is virtually under the control of the Naxals. Another senior Intelligence officer feels that the situation in some parts of Bastar has almost reached the fifth stage, i.e., base area of the Maoists’ so called strategy and tactics of the revolution. He further feels that a part of Dandakaranya in Bastar is almost a liberated zone. Complications of conducting polling at Gogunda in Dantewara district during assembly elections in November and December 2008 is a case worth mentioning in this context. Many security analysts and experts also feel that if this area is not sanitised at the earliest, it may have serious internal security implications for adjacent regions, as the Naxals are gradually consolidating their position and strengthening their military capability.

The state police are facing adversaries who are well trained guerrillas. They are trained in explosives and tactics, by a well trained team of instructors. They make full use of information available on the Internet, make case studies of their successes and failures, and show English War movies like “Platoon” to their armed cadres. They also share experience and knowledge...
from other terrorist groups, to train the guerrillas. They carry out reconnaissance, plan meticulously and rehearse very well before launching any attack on SFs. The “Platoon Hand Book” recovered from a Naxal camp is a well prepared document containing important aspects of managing a People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army platoon’s training, discipline, intelligence, propaganda and administration.\textsuperscript{34}

State police personnel lack adequate training to effectively fight with the Naxals. The state of tactical and combat training to them is not commensurate to their job requirement. Interactions with senior police officers revealed that they are well aware of this deficiency and efforts are being made to address the same.

**State of Police Training Resources/Infrastructure in Chhattisgarh**

The state has limited infrastructure for police training. The Police Training College for basic training of Deputy Superintendents and Sub-Inspectors in Chandrakhuri is in its infancy and lacks adequate infrastructure. Police training schools located in Mana and Rajnandgaon train new recruits as constables. Police training centres for training armed police are located in Jagdalpur and Borgaon. All these institutions are in their formative stage. Chhattisgarh has, however, recently taken the unique initiative of establishing the CTJW College in Kanker, which is headed by a retired Army officer. The central government has sanctioned the establishment of another jungle warfare training institution in the state. This is still in the conceptual stage. There is deficiency of manpower and resources for police training in training institutions, including severe deficiency of trainers in the state.\textsuperscript{35}

Narrating his personal experiences, an in-charge of a police station in Bastar district, told this author that, while working in highly Naxal-prone areas, he faces a lot of difficulties in handling the police personnel, as a majority of them lack physical and mental strength, commitment to the job and professional competence, and especially lack combat orientation. They lack

\textsuperscript{34} Interview with an Additional Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh, Raipur, December 7, 2008. Also see Maoist documents like *Platoon Handbook*, *Case studies* and a Maoist training CD recovered from the Maoists.

\textsuperscript{35} Recently, a team of BPR&D had visited Chhattisgarh and they were apprised that the state police needed at least 200 additional instructors.
training and tactical know-how to deal with Naxal guerrillas. However, he was all praise for the combat ability of a few personnel in his police station, who had received six-weeks training at the CTJW College Kanker. This distribution of trained staff is, however, considered counter-productive by some experts, as a sizeable number of them, when deployed as a body of troops, can undertake anti-Naxal operations more effectively.

Lack of coordination between CPMF and the state police forces is evident from the lack of understanding of operational ethos and gap in training. The CPMF deployed in the state feel that, most of the casualties and damage to their personnel during initial stages of deployment in Chhattisgarh is attributable to the lack of tactical assessment ability among the state police’s junior and middle level leadership. CPMF troops were requisitioned and rushed for retaliatory operations by state police, without proper appreciation and planning and fell prey to well laid traps of Naxals and thereby suffered heavy casualties.

It is evident that, while police officers have the enthusiasm and urge to lead from the front, it is the Constabulary – which comprises almost 87 per cent of the force—that needs to be sensitised as they lack knowledge and motivation. Also, young police officers and the junior leadership need to acquire tactical and combat awareness to understand the various dimensions of anti-Naxal operations, as has been done within the cadres of the AP Police, which will help in planning, coordination and execution of operations.

An authority on the Naxalites observes that, training and change of mindset should percolate from top to bottom, to have uniformity in thought in the entire force. Hence, effective police leadership with adequate knowledge of combat operations and tactical aspects is desired. Provision of sophisticated arms and equipment to enhance the combat capability of the police forces and training is of no use until there is a quantum jump in the standard of leadership of the task forces deployed to tackle the Naxalites. Hence, leadership of such combat forces also needs to be well trained and mentally tuned for combat tasks.

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36 Interactions with junior police leadership and personnel in Bastar district, December 5, 2008.
37 Interactions with senior police and CRPF officers in Chhattisgarh. December 3-8, 2008.
38 Interactions with CRPF officers and personnel in Chhattisgarh, December 3-8, 2008.
A senior police officer of Chhattisgarh, who is quite conversant with the requirements of the state police, has identified some key areas and steps to be taken to improve police training. These include:

- **Need of commando training.** Commando training is being imparted in CTJW College, Kanker.

- **Intelligence training.** The police personnel also lack proper training in intelligence which needs to be addressed.

- **Basic induction training.** The existing police vacancies are being filled and the new recruits have to be trained properly. The state is also recruiting a large number of SPOs and they too need to be trained properly.

- **Specialist training.** Specialist training is required to be imparted in handling of explosives, defusing landmines/IEDs, handling electronic gadgets, etc., for which facility is lacking.

- **Limited training facility.** Limited training facility is available in the state to meet the requirement of police training. The CTJW College, Kanker can train on an average, approximately 3,600 persons each year. With the present strength of approximately 33,000 police personnel requiring training, it will take at least 8-10 years to train all of them.

- **Joint training with CPMF.** The police train separately and work jointly with CPMF, which is a major handicap in ensuring coordination at all levels. They have to work hand-in-hand against the Naxals. There is a need to arrange for joint training with CPMF, either in CPMF training institutions or within the state to achieve better coordination at the functional level in operational areas. He advocates opening of joint training centres by the Central Government for such a purpose.

- **Collective training in CPMF institutes.** Although companies of India Reserve Battalions are being sent to Border Security Force units for collective training, similar arrangements need to be made for state armed police and district police personnel also.

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40 Interactions with senior and middle-level leadership and troops of CRPF deployed in Chhattisgarh December 3-8, 2008.

41 Interviews with a senior police officer of Chhattisgarh, December 7, 2008, Raipur.
Finance, infrastructure and resource deficiency. The state lacks resources, infrastructure and adequate funds for training. Huge infrastructure, resources and training capability of the Army and CPMF need to be utilised by the state.

Budgetary Constraints

Finances are a major constraint faced by the state police and are far below the expected norms prescribed by BPR&D, to meet the requirements of manpower, mobility, infrastructure, communication, land, living accommodation, etc. On an average, Chhattisgarh is allocated Rs 50 crore annually under the MPF scheme, which is far less than the actual requirement. For example, during 2008-09, only Rs 15 crore has been allocated for upgradation of police communication equipments against a minimum requirement of Rs 200 crores. The state requires a minimum of Rs 300 crores for vehicles and an additional Rs 2100 crores for housing. Budget allocation for training is meagre and given low priority.

During year 2004-05, the state police expended only Rs 77 lakh for training out of a total allocation of Rs 22 crores under the MPF scheme, accounting for 0.35 per cent of the total budget. Likewise, in 2006-07, only Rs 25 lakh was expended on training out of a total Rs 76 crore under the MPF scheme, which accounts for 0.0328 per cent of the total budget. In fact, an overwhelming part of the amount was spent on creating infrastructure like barracks, buildings, etc., which requires huge capital expenditure.

The realistic expenditure on training is, thus, almost negligible. The regular budgetary allocation related to training is not beyond the pay and allowances. The major portion of police budget goes to pay and allowances, armaments, infrastructure, communication and mobility, etc., which are accorded higher priority compared to training. The state police officers feel that the Centre should allocate full budgetary grant for developing training infrastructure and resources as a pilot project.  

42 Interactions with senior police officers of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, December 3-8, 2008.
Assessment of a Traditional Police Training Centre of Chhattisgarh

The author visited the Police Training Centre, Borgaon, in Bastar district, on December 04 and 05, 2008 and observed first-hand the quality of training, infrastructure and resources available there. Established in 1992 as a Jungle Warfare School by then Madhya Pradesh Police, the Institute remained mostly under-utilised due to its remote location. This Institute can train 150 recruits at a time, but a total of 264 recruits are presently undergoing training since October 01, 2008. Chhattisgarh Armed Force recruits are required to undergo nine months of basic training. Recruits to the District Police are undergoing only six months of basic training as their traditional basic training has been reduced to six months. They are also very frequently taken out from the training schedule and detailed for law and order duties during VVIP visits, election duties, etc.\(^{43}\) (This shows that the police is acutely under-staffed and over-committed and also, the expectations of the administration from the police are unrealistic). Such breaks in training are not compensated for by extending the training period. Together, these factors contribute to the creation of an unprofessional force which cannot fight the Naxals effectively.

This Institute lacks basic infrastructure facilities and manpower resources for imparting proper training. Minimum basic training aids are deficient and training is imparted in an antiquated, stereotypical manner. There is no authorised demonstration staff. Out of two Platoon commanders authorised, no one is posted. Out of 12 Head Constables (General Duty) only four are posted, while seven are attached temporarily from other battalions. Out of 5 tradesmen authorised none is posted. Tradesmen include cobblers, tailors, carpenters, etc. who are essential for such training institutes. Of the total sanctioned strength of 36 persons, only 16 are posted and 20 posts are vacant. However, eight persons have been attached to make up for the deficiency of instructors. For 8 vehicles available, only two drivers are posted. No clerical staff is authorised to manage the office and records. Only 11 acres of land is available with common sports, drill and physical

\(^{43}\) These police training recruits were deployed for security arrangements during visits of VVIPs like Mr Rahul Gandhi, Mr L. K. Advani, and for election duties. Merely after undergoing three weeks-training, even as these recruits had not even learnt putting on their uniform properly, they were sent for election duties in Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan.
training area. Even administrative/logistic support is very poor here. There is no medical facility available which is an essential requirement for any such institute, as recruits are prone to injuries or illnesses. There are only two cooks posted for approximately 300 personnel in the institute.

Most of the staff from top management to lower functionaries is an unhappy lot and perceive posting to this Institute as a punishment. The Commandant and Deputy Commandant of the Institute feel that they have been posted to a training institution as they could not manage a better posting. They could not resist the posting as they were posted on promotion. Surprisingly, they have not undergone any other training course besides their initial training in the police academy. They are not empanelled instructors, as the system of empanelment of potential trainers does not exist. They have no instructional ability, enthusiasm or motivation to train the recruits. The other instructional and supervisory staff also told this author about the lack of basic amenities, including dignified living conditions, residential quarters, recreational facilities, Medicare, etc. There is a meagre monetary incentive of Rs 15 per month for instructional assignments contrary to additional allowance of 50 per cent for personnel of STF and SIB. Persons posted to District Police establishments are jealously considered having lucrative assignments, besides having better living conditions and family life.

An assessment of this Police Training Centre reveals that manpower allocation, training, infrastructure and resources in training institutions of the state police are far below the requirement. These training institutions need an overhaul to nurture and shape up professionally competent police personnel.

**Assessment of Counter Terrorism and Jungle Warfare College, Kanker**

Contrary to the other stereotyped police training institutions, Chhattisgarh can vouch for its model Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare College, Kanker. Having learnt lessons from continued large-scale Naxal violence and casualties of its troops, Chhattisgarh had in 2004 sent some troops to

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44 Interactions with instructional and administrative staff of Police Training Centre, Borgaon, Bastar, December 4-5, 2008.
the Army’s CIJW School, Vairengte (Mizoram) for ‘Jungle Warfare’ training. However, due to the distance involved and their inability to train more companies of state police, the authorities took the initiative of establishing their own premier training institution. This has been established, nurtured and brought to a level of excellence by a professional, highly competent, experienced and committed retired Army officer. He is assisted by a serving Army officer, appointed as Commander, Training Wing. This college has set a positive trend for training in the state and police officers and men of Chhattisgarh and other states have been trained here. Even personnel of some CPMFs like CISF and RPF have been trained and have benefited from the professional ethics set here. Through frequent interactions, field visits and analysing a series of Naxal incidents as case studies, the college has identified grey areas in police training. These include:

- Lack of soldierly and disciplinary traits.
- Lack of physical and mental robustness.
- Lack of knowledge of field craft and tactics.
- Poor firing skills.

The case studies prepared here have established that deficiency of training has been a prime reason for the failure of anti-Naxal operations and casualties to SFs. Lack of physical and mental robustness has resulted in avoiding physically tiring, but tactically viable options, and adopting an easy approach, which has resulted in getting trapped in ambushes and IED blasts. Lack of discipline and tactical understanding often led to regular and stereotyped pattern of duty and administrative tasks, lack of the surprise element and deception, etc. which often resulted in operational failures and led to casualties. Similarly, sentries were found sleeping/drunk on duty. Such a tendency still exists among police personnel in general. Their mindset

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45 Brigadier B K Ponwar, a retired Army officer, has earlier been Commandant of the Army’s prestigious Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School, Vairengte, Mizoram. He has been re-employed as Inspector General of Police in Chhattisgarh and appointed as a Director, CTJW College, Kanker. This college has trained more than 8,000 police personnel, including about 200 women, from seven States for anti-Naxal operations, out of which approximately 6,000 persons are of Chhattisgarh police only.

46 Lt Col Joginder Singh is a serving officer in the Army having wide experience in tackling terrorism and insurgency. He is on deputation with Chhattisgarh Police at CTJW College, Kanker.
needs to be changed by imparting proper training. The grey areas have been taken care of by including the following training inputs:

- Strict enforcement/implementation of discipline in daily routine and making obedience of orders and instructions a habit.
- Physical robustness by realistic physical activities as per age and capability, 5 km run and 20-30 km route-march.
- Mental robustness is developed gradually by placing them in stressful conditions, ensuring spartan life and undertaking 5 days of outdoor exercise.
- Developing tactical knowledge through lectures, demonstrations, practical exercises on all subjects of counter-insurgency.

To make up for the above grey areas, maximum emphasis is given on outdoor training to ensure development of ‘Soldierly Skills’. Brigadier B. K. Ponwar has evolved a 48-point commandment which is commonly called Director’s Artalisa. This is the essence and summary of the whole training at this college. Students, addressed as ‘Commandos’, are put through a hard round-the-clock combat simulated schedule to develop in them high qualities of leadership, devotion to duty and alacrity. The ethos and culture in this institution is military/tactical training-oriented.

Exercises on small team operations and large-scale operations like cordon and search operations, combing at battalion level, through two days outdoor exercise are conducted. Tactical situations are painted; the trainees make a plan, prepare their own briefing for participants, rehearse and go for conduct.
of operation. Feedback on outdoor exercise is obtained through debriefing. Case studies are discussed in detail and successes and failures are analysed.\textsuperscript{50}

This College illustrates that, if adequate support and resources are provided, a Centre of Excellence can be established in any state. However, a dedicated leadership having commitment to training is required. It has the whole-hearted support of senior police leaders. Instructors have been drawn from state armed police only. They have been trained in various institutions of the Army and CPMF. Initially, retired Army personnel were recruited on contract basis, but service conditions and financial incentives did not attract many. However, instructors of the college are demoralised as they are not given any additional financial incentives for their hard work.\textsuperscript{51}

**Training of STF**

Police personnel after undergoing 6 weeks of training in CTJW College are inducted in STF. Thereafter, they regularly undergo refresher and specialist training under their own leadership. The STF personnel, who are considerably better trained than others, are performing better in anti-Naxal operations with least casualty.\textsuperscript{52}

**Training of Police Personnel in Army/CPMF Institutions outside the state**

The state has exploited the possibilities of training its police personnel in the Army and CPMF training institutions to some extent. A few companies of IRB are sent to BSF battalions for annual collective training. During the year 2007-08, more than 200 police personnel were imparted training outside the state, including Army and CPMF institutions.\textsuperscript{53} However, this number is small, as the state police needs to train a substantially large number of personnel for specialised jobs.

\textsuperscript{50} See Annexure-IV.
\textsuperscript{51} Interactions with instructional staff of CTJW College, Kanker, December 4-5, 2008.
\textsuperscript{52} Interview with Colonel R K Sharma, DIG STF, Chhattisgarh, December 5, 2008.
\textsuperscript{53} See Annexure-V.
Centre’s Role in Police Training in States

Police being a state subject, the primary responsibility of building police training system, infrastructure and resources lies with state governments. However, the MHA and Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) have been rendering support to states in the formulation of training policy, research, improvement, standardisation and modernisation through exchange of knowledge, coordination and budgetary allocation.

The BPR&D has been continuously working for standardisation, uniformity and improvement of police training in the country. Traditionally, four types of training courses are organised by police training institutions. These include:

- Basic instruction level courses for fresh recruits.
- Pre-Promotions and in-service courses for those about to be promoted.
- Refresher courses.
- Specialised courses.54

A BPR&D study notes that, the state governments have not been able to spare adequate budget for police training. Total annual expenditure on policing in India, all states combined is Rs 22,700 crore and union policing budget is Rs 22,300 crores, totalling Rs 45,000 crores.55 The percentage of expenditure incurred in training as a ratio of total police expenditure in states ranged from 1.13 per cent to 1.20 per cent, during 2001 and 2006.56 This shows that, the police training has not been given due importance so far. Modernisation of equipment and armaments will have no effect unless human resource is developed and their tactical and technical capability is enhanced, through sustained and realistic training as per job requirement.57

Presently, there are 162 police training institutions in the country — 105 belonging to states and 57 to the Centre. In June 1995 a survey of 100 out

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54 See Annexure-VI.
56 See Annexure-VII.
57 Interaction with Shri Ved Marwah, IPS (Retired), New Delhi, January 09.2009.
of 145 police training institutions in the country done by the BPR&D had revealed the following:\footnote{See a report entitled Police Organisation in India, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, New Delhi, 2008.}

- Methodology of outdoor training is largely modelled on the regimented military style with emphasis on timing, uniformity and adherence to the set ritualistic and ceremonial procedures.
- In case of indoor subjects, training is imparted through the chalk and talk method.
- Very few training institutions have published training material for use by the trainee.
- Quality of trainers is generally poor.
- Out of 100 police training institutions 23 were functioning without classrooms, 18 without blackboards, 16 without overhead projectors, 57 without conference rooms, 76 without seminar or assembly halls, 20 without library, 70 without auditoriums, 93 without simulation facilities, 95 without forensic units, 72 without computers, 4 did not have even lavatory facilities.
- There is invariably a shortage of funds.

In spite of these surveys and recommendations, nothing substantial has been achieved on the ground in improving training, except in a few states. The MHA has recognised that lack of specialised training to state police personnel, is adversely affecting their fight with the Naxals. With a view to capacity building of the state police personnel in jungle warfare and counter-insurgency operations, 20 special Counter-Insurgency & Anti-Terrorism (CIAT) training centres will be set up in Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa (4 centres in each state) with an outlay of Rs.52 crores during the 11th Five-Year Plan. An allocation of Rs.150 crore has been approved for the BPR&D for strengthening of BPR&D during the 11th Five-Year Plan against the previous annual outlay of approximately Rs 4 crores. These include setting up of the Central Academy for Police Training at Bhopal for providing training to the Police Trainers across the country and to the directly recruited Deputy SP and in-service and specialized training to Deputy SP/Additional SP of these states. Several ‘Training Interventions’ have been approved to develop motivational skills,
communication skills, skills for managing stress, assessing strength areas and development of core expertise of police personnel.\textsuperscript{59}

During a recent field visit to Chhattisgarh this author observed that a second Jungle Warfare College of this state was still in a conceptual stage and far from being commissioned. The question also arises as to whether suitable instructors will be available for such an ambitious plan of the MHA.

**Impact of MPF on Police Training**

As per a BPR&D study and subsequent projection on modernisation and up-gradation of police infrastructure, training of police was the single area which needed support in a big way. A BPR&D study in 1995, found that, only 1,105 Head Constables and 9,861 constables were given refresher training out of 13 lakh police personnel in the country. The sanctioned strength is gradually increasing as more forces are being raised and the strength of the police is being augmented. The total sanctioned strength of law and order police, country-wide as on August 31, 2008 is 16,32,651.\textsuperscript{60} The study had projected that it was feasible to give training to police personnel once in 20 years with existing training infrastructure in states. Not much has changed since then, except for more recruitment and increase in police strength by further one lakh. Police strength is expected to further increase in the near future, due to ever-increasing internal security requirements of the country.

The Union Home Secretary in his evidence to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs (2003-04) mentioned that, a lot of emphasis was being laid on training under the MPF scheme. He stated that, states needed to work closely with BPR&D for revising the training curriculum and that there was a need to select the best personnel to work in training institutes. He emphasised that, apart from the induction training, the entire police force should be trained, through in-service/ refresher courses.\textsuperscript{61} However, implementation at the ground level has left a lot to be desired.

The Annual Report 2007-08 of MHA, while discussing the MPF scheme, emphasised its impact on police training. Paragraph 4.72 on the objectives

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\textsuperscript{61} See the 98\textsuperscript{th} Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, Demands for Grants, 2003-04, New Delhi, Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2004, paragraph 28.1.1.
of the scheme says that one of the main objectives of the Centre’s ambitious MPF scheme is to reduce the dependence of the state governments on the Army and CPMF, to control internal security and law and order situations by capacity-building and equipping the SPF adequately and imparting the required training. However, the subsequent paragraph, 4.73, which discusses the impact of the scheme, claims visible impact on police station buildings and outposts, police housing, modern weapons etc. but no impact on police training has been discussed here, which indicates that, the training is lagging behind.

Paragraph 2.70 which specifically deals with the MPF Scheme in Naxal states, envisages that assistance for modern equipment, weaponry, mobility, communications, training and infrastructure is being provided. With reference to the four most affected states, viz. Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa, special plans for equipping and upgrading intelligence capability have been prepared and to begin with, 5 percent of MPF allocation has been earmarked for strengthening of special branches and equipping them with modern security and communication gadgetry in these states. Rs.64 crore has been allocated to 32 Naxal-affected districts in 2008-09 for fortification of police stations. However, training still remains out of priority in this scheme.

A retired senior police officer, who has earlier served as Superintendent of Police of Bastar district, feels that, presently a huge gap exists between requirements and availability of police training infrastructure and resources. The general mismatch exists in requirement of resources, infrastructure, leadership, quality of instructors, and above all giving adequate priority to training. A lot has to be done at all levels, to make up for this gap. The Centre and states have to give adequate importance, to this aspect, and the police training needs to be urgently prioritised in Naxal-affected states.

Training Assistance to SPF from Army and CPMF

While expressing disinclination to deploy the Army against the Naxals, the Defence Minister has said that the Armed Forces would not shy away from fighting the Naxals but direct deployment of the Army needs to be avoided.

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62 In the period 2002-03 to 2006-07, total Central assistance given to Naxal affected States under MPF scheme was Rs.2,140.70 crore and in 2007-08, a provision of Rs 437.53 crore was made. An allocation of Rs. 501.53 crore has been made for Naxal affected States for 2008-09.


64 Interaction with Shri J N Roy, IPS (Retired), New Delhi, Jan 05, 2008.
He further added that, they were already providing logistic support and training to police forces, in the affected states and continues to do so. The Chief of Army Staff, too, has expressed a similar view. Also in June 2008, in a significant development, senior officers of the Indian Army and officials of Jharkhand held a meeting to step up interaction with each other in the fight against Naxal terror. This meeting discussed ways of extending training facilities for police personnel. The MHA is providing assistance to states in training their men outside the state.

A select number of police personnel are being trained in Army, BSF and other CPMF training establishments. Excellent training infrastructure and well trained manpower are available with such organisations. However, these establishments have their own commitments and cannot afford to regularly train the state police personnel unless their infrastructure and resources are enhanced. These can be further enhanced for better police training.

The Army, BSF and some other CPMF have a large number of well trained officers who are experienced in counter-insurgency and their services can be utilised in improving police training setup of the Naxal-affected states. A retired senior Border Security Force officer opines that, large number of Army and BSF officers and men having adequate field and training experiences, can be utilised in Naxal-affected states, especially in armed police battalions and police training institutions on deputation and re-employment basis as is being done in Tripura state Rifle battalions. Similar practice was earlier undertaken in providing suitable training and leadership to Punjab Police’s commando battalions. A retired Army officer and counter-insurgency expert suggests that, a large number of well trained Army personnel including Short Service Commissioned Officers are retiring at the young age and seeking employment outside. Such a well-trained and readily available human resource can be utilised for police training in states, by offering suitable employment to them in the state police.

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65 See a wire report of Press Trust of India (PTI), February 4, 2008, New Delhi.
66 General Deepak Kapoor, COAS while addressing IDSA Scholars, on July 3, 2008.
67 During a review meeting with Chief Ministers of Naxal-affected States on June 7, 2008, the then Union Home Minister spoke about “proper co-ordination with the Army” and assured to take up the case with the Defence Ministry.
69 Interview with Mr K S Sood, DIG (Retired), New Delhi, January 06, 2009.
70 Interview with Major General (Retired) G D Bakshi, SM, VSM, New Delhi, January 09, 2009.
Police Training Environment and Culture

An article in the print media in reaction to the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 26, 2008, raised various issues related to police training. It is evident that, the country has never realised the importance of police training in the past, as it has been at all levels now. Commenting on the recent demand of commando training in police forces the article says; “without a pool of skilled instructors and without well-equipped training facilities, India will get highly-equipped commandos, who do not know how to fight effectively”.71

Many senior police officers believe that, the root cause of deficiency in training lies in the lack of a proper training environment and culture. Manpower resources for administration and training are also deficient. Lot of vacancies exist in the training institutions and deficiencies are made-up by temporary attachments. Police personnel lack proper motivation to work as instructors. There is no incentive like training allowance for instructors. Adequate infrastructure and logistic support too, is lacking. On the contrary, police personnel posted with the district police enjoy lucrative posts and social status as well as the benefits of good family accommodation, recreational facilities, logistic support, Medicare and education, etc. Generally, there is no job satisfaction to trainers in police organisations in most of the states.72

In contrast, the instructors in the Army, BSF and also in other CPMF are respected and regarded as the best. Army and BSF have been more successful in counter-insurgency operations in Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and the North-East. Officers and men who do well during training and have instructional ability are recommended and empanelled as instructors. They are not only the best, but also highly committed and dedicated. Hence, they become role models to trainees. They are also provided adequate incentives like training allowance, accommodation and administrative support. Only a select few are posted to training institutions. Hence,


72 Interview with a senior police officer of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, December 8, 2008.
instructors in the Army and BSF have a great deal of job satisfaction. Posting to a police training institution in the states is generally taboo and avoided. Even a willing trainer avoids being posted there. A senior police officer told this author that, “such instructors cannot motivate others for training, as they themselves feel as a less significant member of the organization.”

Vacancies allotted to SPF in states are generally utilised for the sake of compliance. Seldom, is a suitable person selected and detailed for the course. Many a time, for courses involving strenuous physical activities, persons are selected as a punishment measure. Very few people voluntarily attend training requiring physical rigour. Detailment for training is considered loss of lucrative benefits of field postings. A few armed police personnel are keen to undergo training, but to avoid frequent movements. Unless training is taken seriously, made lucrative and respectful, a positive training culture cannot be created.

Training is not strictly linked with promotion and there are no mandatory career courses. There is no incentive/recognition for good performance in training courses. Pre-promotional training is conducted merely as a formality. On the contrary, promotion in the Army, BSF and other CPMF is strictly linked to mandatory career courses. Additional points are allotted for performance in training for promotion purposes.

Senior police leadership from the Superintendent of Police and above, generally are tuned towards law and order situations and their basic training caters for it. The battle against Maoists, at a level above the tactical operations, requires a different orientation. Senior officers have to constantly think through the prevailing situation to guess what is in the mind of the Maoist leaders and take counter measures. Synergy of intelligence operations with tactical operations, deployment of forces including CPMF and STF etc., using the media to their own advantage, preventing adverse fallout of operations etc. are multiple facets which the senior officers have to apply their minds to. Hence, police leadership needs to be adequately sensitised and trained to handle these vital aspects.

Ibid and author’s experience in CPMF, as well as exposure to, and interactions with, Army officers and training institutions.

Interviews with senior police officers of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, December 3-8, 2008.

Interactions with senior police officers and police training staff in Chhattisgarh, December 03-08,2008.

Army and CPMF have mandatory career courses which are conducted in a strict manner. From constabulary upwards to officers, all have to pass these courses as a pre-requisite for promotion. Hence, promotion is commensurate with enhancement of professional ability. CPMF also have well formulated recruitment and promotion rules.
Conclusion

Police organisation, by its nature, is manpower-oriented and, its real strength lies in valuable human resource. The weapons, equipment, infrastructure and other resources are aids to enhance the police personnel’s capability and efficiency. The human resource can be developed by proper training, which is a tool for imparting knowledge, enhancing skills and change of attitude to perform the organisational tasks.

Police forces in most of the Naxal-affected states are extremely capacity deficient to tackle violence. The wide geographical spread of Naxalism, insurgency in J&K and the North-East has already over-committed the Army and CPMF. Also, security experts discourage frequent deployment of the Army, while dealing with internal disturbances. Experts also feel that the Naxal violence has socio-economic roots, therefore the Army should not be employed for anti-Naxal operations. Experiences of Punjab and Andhra Pradesh in curbing militancy/Naxalism has re-enforced the view that, efficient local police’s response, with adequate assistance from CPMF, can deliver the desired result, provided police capability is properly built. Imparting proper training is therefore important, but still remains neglected.

The police training system, infrastructure, resources, manpower and logistics support are far below the desired level. Training institutes fail to attract good trainers and cannot generate interest among trainees. Making up for the deficiency of training resources, is also a secondary priority, as the limited police budget is mostly exhausted among other heads, and training per force gets neglected. Most importantly, a positive environment and culture for training is generally lacking in the police. There is little commitment for training. Imparting or undergoing training is generally disliked and thrust upon. Posting to training institutions is considered as a punishment and generally avoided.

The police personnel policy also does not encourage training. Institutions are generally headed by a junior level officer. There is acute shortage of quality trainers in police training institutions. Disinterested and incapable officers and men are posted to training institutes, who have no commitment. Detailment on many in-service or specialised training is done merely to
utilise the vacancy, with disregard to trainees’ capability and interest. Refresher and pre-promotional courses are generally conducted as a formality. Training is not strictly linked to promotion and not implemented in letter and spirit.

The essence of human resource development lies in training, and the same cannot be neglected any longer. Holistic development of the training system is required in the police set-up. A few states like Andhra Pradesh have, however, taken the lead. The Centre and the states, without further delay, should evolve a proper mechanism to improve the police training system in the country, and especially in Naxal-affected states to effectively curb the ever-spreading tentacles of Left-wing extremism. The police training in Naxal-affected states need to be prioritised as there is general mismatch in capability, infrastructure and need for training. Adequate corrective measures need to be undertaken/initiated by the Centre and the affected states without further loss of time so that the menace of Left-wing extremism does not get out of hand.

The following measures are recommended for holistic development of police training in Naxal-affected states:

**Prioritising police training in Naxal-affected states and addressing budgetary constraints**

- Police training needs to be prioritised in Naxal-affected states and special pilot project with dedicated budgetary provisions need to be launched for holistic training.

- Full financial funding by the Central government under the MPF scheme to Naxal-affected states, for holistic development of training infrastructure and resources need to be given on priority basis.

**Addressing manpower and leadership problems**

- Adequate number of senior officers to be sanctioned to head police training institutions.

- Authorisation of adequate supervisory and administrative support staff, on as required basis, to ensure proper logistic support and effective administration.
• Authorisation of adequate instructional staff to achieve optimum trainee-trainer ratio. The BPR&D should lay down suitable criteria for this and monitor implementation.

• Rotation of training staff with experienced persons from the field and vice-versa to be ensured during posting transfers.

**Development of instructional staff**

• Trainers’ courses may be conducted in premier training institutions of the Army, CPMF and in the states to create a central pool of instructors who can be made available to different states when needed.

• Adequate monetary incentives like training allowance need to be given to instructional staff to attract best talent among SPF. Fifty per cent additional allowances may be given to trainers, as being given to STF and SIB staff. This will be a motivational factor to attract better talent in training.

• Exploring possibilities and modalities of lateral entry of instructors from Army and CPMF in state police training institutions, armed police battalions and IRBs on need basis to provide trained leadership and professional training, till the overall integral system of police training is strengthened. This will help in better understanding of the operational ethos between the CPMF and SPF who have to always work hand-in-hand.

• Services of Army’s Short Service Commissioned officers may be utilised on re-employment basis to provide leadership for police training and combat operations in armed police units.

• Induction of highly motivated, committed and voluntary Army instructors could be explored by tapping the sources i.e., at the Army’s Regimental Training Centres during attachment period for pre-retirement formalities.

• Refresher courses for police trainers to be conducted on a regular basis in designated training institutions.
Developing training infrastructure

- Developing minimum basic training infrastructure in all states with adequate common facilities.

- Establish regional/zonal police training institutions at different locations, with common curriculum, so that, training needs of needy states may be catered for. Responsibility of raising such institutions may be entrusted to select states or CPMF. Requisite number of instructors from the Army and the CPMF may be re-employed, taken on deputation, etc. This can be done on the line of CTJW, Kanker with modifications suiting local conditions.

- Designated Army and CPMF training institutions may be utilised as “Nodal Training Centres” for police combat and tactical training. These institutions may be sanctioned with additional infrastructure and manpower resources to organise large-scale training for SPF.

Developing healthy training culture

- Performance in training courses may be linked with incentives, rewards and promotions including opportunities to attend courses abroad.

- Mandatory career courses must be strictly linked to promotion. Basic parameters fixed for annual physical fitness and firing tests must be ensured in letter and spirit.

- Increased exposure of police instructors in Army and CPMF training institutions to acquaint them with the training ethos/infrastructure, etc., of these organisations.

- Reasonably worked out and fixed percentage of ex-servicemen of Army and CPMF with strict screening for high standard of physical fitness, prior experience in rural counter-insurgency operations and high level of motivation are recommended for induction in the STFs of the Naxal-affected states with fixed tenures and assured financial/career progression incentives. This will give the necessary impetus by way of motivation, moral support and leadership, besides developing a healthy training culture.
Ensuring understanding of Naxalism at all levels

- Understanding of Naxalism and its tactics must be incorporated and ensured in the training of Police officers and leadership at all levels.

- New entrants of all ranks in police, from officers to men, should undergo a well-designed tactical training course, suiting local conditions, on the lines of the Andhra Pradesh police to create uniformity of tactical understanding from leadership to grass-root level.

Improving operational understanding with SPF and CPMF

- Joint training of SPF and CPMF may be conducted in designated training institutions.

- SPF officers should be actively involved in pre-induction training of CPMF before deployment.

- Police leadership to acquire basic tactical knowledge, to understand the working ethos of CPMF.

Miscellaneous

- Use of audio visual aids, video conferencing, etc., for training should be encouraged. Training CDs and propaganda material recovered from the Naxals may be shown to all trainees and serving police personnel.
Annexure-I

Incidents and Fatalities of Civilians and SFs in Naxal Violence: 2003 to 2008

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<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karnataka</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haryana</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Nadu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1597</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>1533</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>1608</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>1509</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>1565</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>1591</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Inc.= Incidents, Cas.= Casualty.
# Annexure-II

## Extract of Case Studies of Some Important Naxal Incidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place of Incident</th>
<th>Nature of Incident</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15/03/07</td>
<td>Rani Bodli Police Post, PS Kutur, Distt Bijapur</td>
<td>Camp Attack</td>
<td>55 Civil Police Personal and SPO killed</td>
<td>Had sentry held on till others reached the roof top it would have been different. Lacked discipline and mental robustness due to inadequate training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13/12/07</td>
<td>Vishrampuri PS Distt Bastar</td>
<td>Camp Attack</td>
<td>04 Civil Police Pers. killed</td>
<td>Sentry was not alert and morchas were not tactically sited. Training deficiency was evident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/06/08</td>
<td>Bandagaon, PS Konta, Distt Dantewada</td>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td>04 Civil Police Pers. killed</td>
<td>Police patrol was deployed for security to Electricity staff and trapped by Naxals. No tactical move was undertaken due to lack of training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/10/08</td>
<td>Bodra Nallah near Gulumkodo PS- Benur, Distt N/Pur</td>
<td>IED Blast</td>
<td>17 Civil Police Pers. injured</td>
<td>Moved in MPV and Minibus on same route, avoided foot movement showed lack of discipline, tactical understanding, and field craft, no respect for SOP. Training deficiency was evident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Place of incident</td>
<td>Nature of incident</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/11/08</td>
<td>PS-Mardapal, Distt-Bastar</td>
<td>IED Blast</td>
<td>07 Civil Police killed &amp; 02 civil police injured</td>
<td>Moved in vehicle; Avoided moving on foot. Did not follow SOP. Training deficiency was evident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/09/05</td>
<td>Gangaloor ambush and IED blast, Bijapur</td>
<td>Ambush and IED</td>
<td>24 CRPF and Police/SPO killed.</td>
<td>MPV overcrowded. No surprise and deception. Avoided moving on foot. SOP not followed. Training deficiency was evident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/02/06</td>
<td>Ara, District-Jashpur</td>
<td>Raid on Ara police post</td>
<td>2 police pers killed and 8 injured</td>
<td>Sentries not alert and silenced. Men surrendered after initial resistance. Lack of discipline, mental robustness. Training deficiency was evident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/04/06</td>
<td>Police post Murkinar, Bijapur</td>
<td>Raid on police post</td>
<td>4 police pers and 7 SPOs killed</td>
<td>Post had 18 persons but without weapons as weapons deposited in Kote. SOP not followed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/02/06</td>
<td>Bheji, Distt - Bijapur 0905 hrs</td>
<td>Ambush Naga Bn pers</td>
<td>9 Naga Bn jawans killed</td>
<td>Routine movement in vehicle. Avoided foot movement. SOP not followed. Training deficiency was evident</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Case Studies discussed with Chattisgarh Police, CPMF and CTJW Kanker.
Annexure-III

Naxal Violence in Chhattisgarh, 2004–2008*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of incidents</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians Killed</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPO Killed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF Killed</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naxals Killed</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encounter with police</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naxalites Arrested</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data till December 31, 2008

Source: Police HQ, Raipur, Chhattisgarh

Annexure-IV

Curriculum at CTJW College, Kanker

General Syllabus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Drills</th>
<th>SADO</th>
<th>Combat Firing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ST OPS</td>
<td>RAID</td>
<td>UAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbour</td>
<td>Intelligence Ops</td>
<td>Rappelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicidal attacks</td>
<td>PSY OPS</td>
<td>Slithering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracking</td>
<td>Interrogation</td>
<td>Natural Obstacle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>PR &amp; MEDIA</td>
<td>Combat Conditioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Security</td>
<td>Handling Information</td>
<td>Population &amp; Resource Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrolling</td>
<td>MR-Navigation</td>
<td>Target Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>Room Intervention</td>
<td>Legal Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMBUSH</td>
<td>Bus Intervention</td>
<td>Stress Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASO</td>
<td>Convoy Human Rights</td>
<td>Large Scale Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP &amp; QRT</td>
<td>Civic Action Projects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Outdoor Exercises & Demonstrations

Outdoor Exercises:-
- Harbour in jungles
- Security of posts
- Convoy Protection
- Making of source
- CASO
- MCP, QRT, RAID

- Trekking
- Patrolling
- Civic Action
- SADO
- Room Intervention
- IEDs
- ROP
- Surveillance
- House Clearing.
- Bus Intervention

Demonstrations:-
- Jungle Survival
- Ambush
- Bus Intervention

- IEDs
- CASO
- MCP, Raid
- Convoy Protection
- Room Intervention

Source: CTJW College, Kanker, Chhattisgarh

Annexure-V

Number of Police Personnel Trained Outside Chhattisgarh in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>No. of Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BEG Roorki &amp; CMM, Jabalpur</td>
<td>IED Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry School, Mhow</td>
<td>Weapon Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTC Diphu, Nagaland</td>
<td>Counter Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSWT BSF, Indore</td>
<td>Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J&amp;K RRC</td>
<td>CI Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allahabad, Army</td>
<td>BFNA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Police HQ, Raipur, Chhattisgarh

Annexure-VI

Specialised Training Courses for state Police Personnel

Specialised training courses are also conducted on different subjects. These are recognised both by police and other training institutes. Since the focus
of the Indian Police Service is to train officers to be able administrators and managers, institutes that specialise in management, administration and behavioural sciences are often used for the purpose of imparting specialised training courses. These include:

- Advanced Techniques of Scientific Investigations
- VIP Security
- Detection & Disposal of Bombs/Explosives
- Management/Public Administration
- Vigilance and Anti-Corruption
- Drugs/Narcotics
- Human Rights
- Traffic
- Intelligence
- Cyber Crimes
- Insurgency/Terrorism
- Computer Applications
- Forensic Science
- Dealing with special crimes
- Training of Trainers
- Radio/Wireless
- Commando Training
- Rock Climbing
- Field Craft/Tactics


Annexure-VII

Percentage of Expenditure on Police Training Against Total Expenditure on Police (in Rs Crores)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Police Expenditure</th>
<th>Expenditure on Police</th>
<th>Total Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>15338.47</td>
<td>186.02</td>
<td>1.20 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>16004.06</td>
<td>181.55</td>
<td>1.13 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>19916</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>1.17 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>21070</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>1.17 per cent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>