

IDSA Monograph Series
No. 31 January 2014

arthashastra
arthashastra
arthashastra
arthashastra
arthashastra
arthashastra

Lessons for the
Contemporary Security Environment
with South Asia as a Case Study

Sachin More

IDSa MONOGRAPH SERIES

No. 31 JANUARY 2014

Arthasastra

Lessons for the
Contemporary Security Environment
with South Asia as a Case Study

SACHIN MORE

idsa
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE
STUDIES & ANALYSES

© Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).

ISBN: 978-93-82169-32-1

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Monograph are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute or the Government of India.

First Published: January 2014

Price: Rs. 180/-

Published by: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram
Marg, Delhi Cantt., New Delhi - 110 010
Tel. (91-11) 2671-7983
Fax.(91-11) 2615 4191
E-mail: contactus@idsa.in
Website: <http://www.idsa.in>

Layout &
Cover by: Vaijayanti Patankar

Printed at: M/S A. M. Offsetters
A-57, Sector-10, Noida-201 301 (U.P.)
Mob: 09810888667
E-mail: amoffsetters@gmail.com

CONTENTS

Chapters	Page no
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	5
<i>Chapter I</i>	
INTRODUCTION	7
PART I: UNDERSTANDING ARTHASASTRA	11
<i>Chapter II</i>	
HISTORY, THEMES AND FOUNDATIONAL BLOCKS	13
<i>Chapter III</i>	
CONSTRUCT AND CONCEPTS OF STATECRAFT	21
PART II: CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND APPLICATION OF MODEL TO PAKISTAN'S CHOICES	33
<i>Chapter IV</i>	
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT	35
<i>Chapter V</i>	
PAKISTAN'S POLICY CHOICES THROUGH ARTHASASTRA'S LENS	39
PART III: AN ANALYSIS	49
<i>Chapter VI</i>	
IMBALANCES, INCORRECT PRIORITISATION AND LESSONS	51
<i>Chapter VII</i>	
CONCLUSION	64
<i>Bibliography</i>	66

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project is a tribute to the deep understanding that Indian history and narratives provide on a myriad of issues. I was fortunate to dedicate time to Arthasastra and unravel its complexities from a contemporary lens, as part of the Defence Research paper that I presented towards my post graduate program at King's College London. This monograph is a refined version of the paper. I am grateful to Dr Harsh V Pant for his guidance and his advice that added academic rigour to my project. I am grateful to the scholarly fraternity at IDSA, especially Dr Arvind Gupta and Col PK Gautam, for the encouragement. I thank the team of referees whose valuable critiques helped in making the arguments sound. I acknowledge my friend Adityakiran for his patience and insights in discussions on the topic to clear my thoughts. Lastly I thank my son Ved and wife Sunaina for allowing me to steal their weekends for completing this modest project.

Sachin More
Oct 12, 2013

INTRODUCTION

*Power is (possession of) strength; Success is (obtaining) happiness.*¹

Prime Minister PV Narsimharao

These are words of wisdom from Kautilya's² Arthashastra spoken by the then Indian Prime Minister at the Beijing University in China during an official visit in 1993.³ Spoken at the beginning of the age of modern globalisation in the 21st century, fuelled by the information age and reordering of the world order, post cold war, these words signify the importance attached to happiness flowing through the acquisition of power. The study of inter-state power relationship in an anarchic world has been a challenging discourse since the formation of civilised and functional societies, and continues into the contemporary era. Arthashastra is an Indian scripture written around 300 BC by Kautilya that gives an insight into the kingdom of Chandragupta Maurya, revealing a comprehensive approach to statecraft that addresses the entire spectrum of activities of a state and its relations with power within the comity of states.⁴ Arthashastra literally means "the science of worldly gains".⁵ Kautilya elaborates that, earth, is the source of all

¹ R.P.Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra Part II* (Bombay: Bombay University Press, 1963), 370.

² Kautilya, also known as Vishnugupta or Chanakya was the principle advisor to King Chandragupta Maurya of Mauryan Empire: L.N.Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1987), 16.

³ India Gandhi National Centre for Arts, Ministry of Culture (India), "Across the Himalayan Gap: Indian leader's speeches in Chinese University" http://www.ignca.nic.in/ks_41006.html (accessed 15 May 2012)

⁴ Roger Boesche, "Kautilya's Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India," *The Journal of Military History*, 67:1, January 2003, 10.

⁵ Torkel Brekke, "Wielding the rod of punishment — war and violence in the political science of Kautilya," *Journal of Military Ethics*, 3:1, (2004):41.

livelihoods for people and provides wealth; and it is Arthashastra, the science of politics that allows the people to attain and protect this earth.⁶ Rangarajan explains that within the context of the treatise, Arthashastra's meaning extends to the art of government and the science of politics in its widest sense.⁷

This monograph aims to demonstrate the relevance of Kautilya's Arthashastra in the contemporary security environment with a focus on the policy choices of Pakistan. To analyse this, the research is broadly divided into three parts which argue the case. In the first part, consisting of the second and third chapter, Arthashastra's teachings are outlined and the framework of statecraft is evaluated. The second part, i.e. chapters four and five apply this framework to Pakistan's policy choices in the South Asian context after defining the security environment as it exists today. The third part using chapter six deliberates and analyses Pakistan's policy choices through the lens of this framework and determines the relevance of Arthashastra in the contemporary security environment.

The first part, through the second chapter introduces Arthashastra by understanding the themes and the foundations on which the treatise was formulated. The paper explores the genesis of Arthashastra and the characteristics that make it universal in its application. The emphasis attached to economics and information exploitation in statecraft in Arthashastra, which allows it to be situated as a viable concept in the modern age, is also deliberated upon. Kautilya's views on punishment as a tool of coercive regulation to complement welfare are also then explored. Thus, with the core knowledge of Arthashastra's economic, judicial, social and security construct of the state, its theme and foundation is understood.

Following this initial overview, the third chapter explores Arthashastra's understanding of an ideal state through the study of constituent elements that strengthen the state, and the calamities that can cause decline in the state. Arthashastra's *Mandala* theory is then used to explore the options available for a state to expand its influence. The Kautilyan concept of

⁶ Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra Part II*, 593.

⁷ Rangarajan, *Kautilya, The Arthashastra*, 15.

conflict resolution is explored from the modern perspective, especially in light of the current world conception of coercion, intervention and stabilisation. With the understanding of the state within the *Mandala* and the tools of resolution; the concept of state power as envisaged by Kautilya is discussed. Through these two chapters, the first part develops an understanding of the state described by Kautilya.

The second part uses concepts of Arthashastra to understand the dynamics of the contemporary security challenges in the South Asian context. A timeless treatise like the Arthashastra can truly be explored by bringing it to life through a real world case study. The choice of the case study (Pakistan) is based on the immediate security issues faced by India and is therefore an attempt by the author to use an indigenous frame work of analysis on a regional issue of concern. This part brings out the foreign policy choices of Pakistan with certain key countries and brings into sharp focus the incentivised behaviour shown by the state through the lens of Arthashastra. Kautilya's Arthashastra was written with the aim of addressing the challenges faced in South Asia during its milieu. Even though the present study is restricted to South Asia, keeping in mind Arthashastra's geographic origins, this monograph attempts to prove its universal applicability. In this sense, it should be read as a study of dynamics within an intertwined system rather than a focus on South Asia.

In the second part, chapter four identifies the need to juxtapose the dynamics of Arthashastra to the contemporary world. It then develops an understanding of the contemporary security environment. A permissive environment, identified in the present state of Pakistan and the challenges that this state faces is captured through the lens of Arthashastra. Chapter five situates Pakistan within the *Mandala* model and through the stipulated explanations from Arthashastra attempts to examine the presence or absence of the required behaviour. It clearly brings out the dynamics of state behaviour of the associated countries and reveals the shades of grey in their dealings that can be mapped with the teachings of Arthashastra.

In the third part, the outcome of the state's policy choices and its objectives are analysed. The prioritisation of the state's constituent elements achieved through policy is studied to determine the impact on the state's progress or decline. The health of the constituent elements

affected by the state choices in the case study reveals the challenges that the state of Pakistan faces. In this way, Arthashastra offers a construct that links the macro to micro level issues within a state and the interdependence it has to the world order in general and the state's progress in particular.

This paper makes an attempt to use Arthashastra's concepts in the contemporary affairs using both direct and counterfactual analysis. Thus, while the contemporary evidence may allow a factual analysis of Kautilya's concept, that which is contrary to Kautilyan thought also offers insights through counterfactual analysis. In the analysis, reference is made to issues and events that support the argument. While this monograph uses relative dynamics of security issues to make an argument, a thorough evaluation of each issue and a further reading is recommended to gain a deeper understanding of each argument. The research bases its analysis on the primary source materials, which are, translated versions of the original script available in *Sanskrit*⁸ and secondary source materials, which have analysed and brought out salient aspects of the teachings to contemporary relevance. To illustrate the concepts of Arthashastra, diagrams have been placed in appropriate chapters and where they have not been referenced, they are the author's representations. Considering the breadth of topics that Arthashastra covers and the depth and variety within each topic, this monograph aims to cover only the security issues within Arthashastra that have direct influence on contemporary security issues.

⁸ The original text was found in *grantha* script in 1904, and subsequently translated to Sanskrit and English. Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, 21.

PART I

**UNDERSTANDING
ARTHASASTRA**

HISTORY, THEMES AND FOUNDATIONAL BLOCKS

Kautilya was a visionary who formulated the Arthashastra and enabled the Indian king Chandragupta Maurya to defeat the oligarchy of the Nanda Kings, stop the advance of Alexander the great's successors and unite the Indian subcontinent for the first time.⁹ The intellectual contributions of Arthashastra can be situated in the historical timeline with other contemporary philosophies as given in the figure 1 below.¹⁰




Figure 1

While Arthashastra has been attributed to Kautilya, the very detailed nature of its contents makes it unlikely that any single author could have produced it independently. Various historians attribute the origin of the contributing sources to the period beginning from 650 BC to

⁹ Boesche, "Kautilya's Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India," 10.

¹⁰ Courtesy: Breena Coates, Col. Jeffrey Caton, "The Ultimate Pragmatist: Kautilya's Philosophy on SMART Power in National Security," International Society of Military Ethics <http://www.google.com/url?sa=D&q=http://isme.tamu.edu/ISME10/Coates-Caton10.doc&usg=AFQjCNHKTsjzZSfjkPfr2oGto7Dkfe80g> (accessed 10 May 2012)

500 BC based on ancient strategic discourses incorporated in Vedic and Buddhist scriptures.¹¹ Kautilya makes regular references to earlier sources throughout the text.¹² Ilhan Niaz states that Arthashastra is not a work concerned with India during the Mauryan Imperial peace (300-180 BC), but the period leading to its establishment.¹³ Rangarajan comments that the earlier scripts have possibly disappeared as 'Kautilya's masterly treatise superseded them and made them redundant'.¹⁴ Romila Thapar notes, "The Mauryan period was the culminating epoch of a few centuries of rational inquiry and cultural advance."¹⁵ These evidences prove that Kautilya used a variety of credible sources and his vision to piece together a strategic discourse that achieved a coherent strategy to enable Chandragupta Maurya and his subsequent generations until Emperor Ashoka, to rule over the Indian subcontinent.¹⁶ Boesche comments that with a population of 50 million, it was larger than the Mughal or the British Empire in India 2000 years later.¹⁷ The extent of the Mauryan Empire in the Indian subcontinent is depicted in the map shown in Figure 2.¹⁸

The text is utilitarian and maintains a secular approach to statecraft despite the religious scriptures from which it periodically takes reference.¹⁹ Brekke notes that in the study of wider Indian scriptures, 'there is a tension between deontology and consequentialism in the

¹¹ The timelines vary from 650 BC (D.R. Bhandarkar), 600 BC (K.P. Jayaswal), 500 BC (A.S. Altekar) as discussed in RP Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part III*, 11.

¹² RP Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part III*, 40.

¹³ Ilhan Niaz, "Kautilya's Arthashastra and governance as an element of state power," Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, http://www.issi.org.pk/old-site/ss_Detail.php?dataId=479 (accessed 12 may 12)

¹⁴ Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, 16.


¹⁵ Romila Thapar, *As'oka and the Decline of the Mauryas*. 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, [1961] 1998), 142.

¹⁶ Roger Boesche, *The first Great Political Realist: Kautilya and His Arthashastra*, (Oxford: Lexington, 2002), 11.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁸ Map courtesy: Roger Boesche, "Kautilya's Arthashastra on war and diplomacy in ancient India," *The Journal of Military history*, Vol 67:1 (Jan 2003): 11.

¹⁹ There is a tendency to view Arthashastra as a Hindu text due to its origins, but the utility of this text extends beyond the religious domain as argued in this article by Ian Mabbett, "The Kautilya Arthashastra and the Concept of Secularism," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol 33, No1, (April 2010): 30.



Mauryan Empire at its greatest extent in the reign of Ashoka, middle third century B.C.E.

Figure 2

ideology of war'.²⁰ He comments that Arthashastra is clearly positioned in the consequentialist camp, as opposed to Mahabharata, which follows deontological traditions.²¹ This monograph notes that this consequentialist position strengthens the secular argument and reveals a rational framework within which Arthashastra was conceptualised and utilised. The understanding of religion as it existed in its milieu has minimal impact on the development of an understanding of Arthashastra. With the secular and rational approach, the basic tenets of Arthashastra can to be used for studying the fundamental phenomena of statecraft and the security discourse as observed in the contemporary era.

The Arthashastra contains 15 books, of which the first five deal with the internal administration of the state, the next eight books deal with its relations with neighbouring states and the last two elaborate the methods and science used in the entire text.²² There is a stress on analysis

²⁰ Torkel Brekke, "Wielding the rod of punishment- war and violence in the political science of Kautilya," *Journal of Military Ethics*, 3:1, (2004): 47.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 47.

²² R.PK angle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part III*, 19.

of intelligence, good counsel and judgment, rather than pure might and power. This is based on the evidence that of the 15 books, only two (9 and 10) deal directly with war.²³ Kangle comments that, ‘the contents of this work shows clearly that it deals exhaustively with all topics connected with internal administration and foreign relations, and that it sets before a ruler the goal of conquest of the world and describes ways of attaining that goal.’²⁴

Boesche notes that the stress on economics was the reason that Mauryan Empire prospered and lasted for three generations and achieved recognition by Megasthenes, the Greek ambassador to India.²⁵ In terms of the construct of the Kautilyan state, his work on the Mauryan state resembles a modern organised and planned economy.²⁶ Drekeimer contends that Kautilya linked man’s greatness to his organising abilities and offered a totally new perspective. He writes:

We may surmise that men began to conclude that remaking the world was within the realm of possibility. The ancient belief in the cyclical periodicity of time... was modified or displaced ... by a sense of continuity and development approximating a historical attitude. Accumulated wealth and the military power and administrative efficiency it made possible could now be used for achieving ambitious, long-range political and social goals. The great man is, in fact, the great organiser. He creates the very conditions that make the hero obsolete, for he imposes an order that limits the unpredictable contingencies against which the hero struggles. The hero was made by his age; the organiser is the maker of his age. Men can now do things that earlier could be accomplished only by the Gods.²⁷

While honing the organising ability that expanded man’s role in building a state, Kautilya understood the anarchic world within which the state

²³ Ibid., 19,20.

²⁴ Ibid., 20.

²⁵ Boesche, *The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and His Arthashastra*, 106.

²⁶ In this paper, A Kautilyan state is one, which follows the precepts of Arthashastra.

²⁷ As quoted by Balbir Sihag, “Kautilya on Public goods and taxation,” *History of Political Economy*, 37:4 (2005): 725. From: Drekeimer, Charles, *Kingship and Community in Early India*. (Stanford, California.: Stanford University Press.1962), 290.

needed to survive and face unforeseen events. Many analysts have acknowledged Arthashastra's treatment of relation between states through a realist lens. Behera comments that, "Kautilya is... the forerunner of the modern fathers of the realist traditions in IR as *Arthashastra* predates Hobbes' 'state of nature,' Machiavelli's 'Prince' as well as Kenneth Waltz's anarchic international system and the 'security dilemma' of modern states."²⁸ Sarkar argues that the IR precepts put forth in this text 'are neither exclusively oriental nor exclusively medieval or primitive' as the policies conceived by Indian political philosophers 'could be verified by numerous instances in European and Asian history'.²⁹

In the context of Realism, Behera's analyses prove useful in finely identifying Arthashastra's 'Realist' position. Behera reveals the tension of understanding Arthashastra through Western theoretical framework of traditional IR, which he contends, is dominated 'by a state centric and military dominated notion of power politics'.³⁰ He argues that Arthashastra approximates closer to the important contemporary 'challenge of reordering the world in the economic domain fought with the intellectual tools of a development discourse'.³¹ Therefore, the comprehensive approach that Arthashastra adopts in its state building enterprise deeply influences its external policies. While this work does not discuss the merits of Arthashastra from an IR perspective, it is important from Behera's analyses to understand the context within which Arthashastra differs from the Western IR theories. The uniqueness in the text lies in the way it approaches statecraft based on a utilitarian, secular and rational theme and can therefore be used in universal application even in the complex world today.

STATE'S PRIORITIES IN ARTHASASTRA

Arthashastra's concept of governance was rooted in the Hindu concept of a balance between the triad of '*Artha*' or material well-being, '*Dharma*'

²⁸ N.C. Behara, "Re-imagining IR in India," in *Non Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia*, Eds Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, (London: Routledge, 2010), 102.

²⁹ Ibid., 102. Behara quotes Sarkar in BK Sarkar, "Hindu Theory of International Relations" *The American Political Science Review*, Vol 13,3 (Aug 1919): 407.

³⁰ Ibid., 102.

³¹ Ibid., 103.

or Duty towards society and ‘*Kama*’ or earthly pleasures.³² Kautilya considered the aspect of *Artha* as the most important pursuit.³³ This implies the state needs to adopt policies that maximises economic gains for its citizens, creates conditions to allow its citizens perform their social responsibilities and encourages individual freedom to maximise the happiness quotient.

The King’s duty lay in ensuring the security of the individual and society through the tool of *danda*,³⁴ the legitimate coercive authority. Consequently, the ultimate basis of political society or the state is *danda*, which provides the rule of law. The coercive authority itself is kept under check, as Kautilya warns that improper use of this tool may result in a revolt by the subjects,³⁵ thus setting a balanced framework of just rule by the King. Sihag links Arthashastra’s stress of the importance of the rule of law to economic growth. He elaborates that in the Kautilyan state, ‘laws must be clear, consistent and in a written form’ with genuine administration of justice.³⁶ Clem Tisdell notes that in the Kautilyan economy, the state is obliged to provide social security and welfare to its people. He further comments that in Arthashastra, Kautilya shows knowledge of basic economics, the levels of which were achieved in Western economic thought only with the publication of Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* in 1776.³⁷ Thus, Kautilyan state emerges as one that was conceptualised on just principles where the

³² Apart from these three, the Hindu concept of *Purnshastras* attributes a fourth aspects of Moksha or spiritual enlightenment, which Kautilya does not address in Arthashastra, as he believes that the pursuit of these three can contribute to the attainment of Moksha: Rangarajan, *Kautilya, the Arthashastra*, 13.

³³ Brekke, *Journal of Military Ethics*, 41.

³⁴ RP Kangle, *The Arthashastra Kautilya*, Part III, 119,120.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 120.

³⁶ Balbir S Sihag, “Kautilya on Administration of Justice during the fourth century BC,” in *Journal of the History of Economic thought*, Vol 29, Number 3, September 2007, 360, 361.

³⁷ Tisdell elaborates this : “Chanakya’s work can also be used to illustrate several aspects of economics emphasized in modern economics, such as the principal-and-agent problem, information asymmetry, urban-bias, principles of taxation, the importance of national economic accounting and census data, the importance of property rights for economic activity.” In Clem Tisdell, “A Western Perspective on Kautilya’s ‘Arthashastra’: Does it Provide a Basis for Economic Science,” in *Working Papers on Economic Theory, Applications and Issues*, University of Brisbane, (January 2003) 1,2.

rulers were obliged to provide security and welfare within a framework that promoted economy and progress.

Rangarajan distils Kautilya's concepts on internal administration, 'A ruler's duties in the internal administration of the country are threefold: *rakhsba* or protection of the state from external aggression, *palana* or maintenance of law and order within the state, and *yogakshema* or safeguarding the welfare of the people'.³⁸ Kautilya thus bound the king in an implicit social contract in order to benefit his subjects, while providing protection from external aggression.

ECONOMICS IN ARTHASASTRA

Charles Waldauer contends that Kautilya anticipated the importance of conducting trade in accordance with the principles of comparative advantage. He notes that in Kautilyan economy, imports are as important as exports in promoting a nation's economic development and growth and that, reciprocal demands determine the value of commodities in bilateral and multilateral trade.³⁹

Kautilya realised the significance of markets on a nation's economy. Linking economics to wider issues, he observed that 'market failure was bad, government failure was worse, but moral failure was the worst of all'.⁴⁰ Sihag notes that Kautilya understood that moral failure and poor organisational design were often the root causes of both market and government failures.⁴¹ He contends that Kautilya encouraged ethical behaviour and sound organisational structure to provide an insurance against corruption, to lower the probability of various failures.⁴² The comprehensive approach visible in Arthashastra is expanded by Beni Prasad who says, 'It is complete in its perspective, detailed in its regulation, thorough in its treatment. It makes provisions for all contingencies and for all imaginable possibilities. As a statement of

³⁸ Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, 15.

³⁹ Charles Waldauer, "Kautilya's Arthashastra: A neglected Precursor to Classical Economics," in *Indian Economic Review*, Vol 31:1, (1996): 103.

⁴⁰ Balbir S Sihag, "Kautilya on Moral, Market and Government Failures," In *International Journal of Hindu Studies* 13:1,84.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*,84.

⁴² Balbir S Sihag, "Kautilya on Moral, Market and Government Failures,"98.

Hindu administrative theory, it hardly leaves anything to be desired.⁴³ The strength in the Kautilyan economy therefore lies in both organisational competence and efficiency backed by ethical individual and organisational behaviour.

Sihag contends that Kautilya was acutely aware of the problem now called the problem of time inconsistency or in simple terms, credibility. Kautilya sought to mitigate the problem of credibility by adopting asymmetric information techniques using an elaborate intelligence network and prescribing a number of measures that build credibility into the system.⁴⁴ Sihag also claims that Kautilya ‘was aware of the relevance of both risk and return in making choices under situations involving risk and suggested diversification to mitigate risk’.⁴⁵ Kautilya extended his understanding of risk return trade off beyond the scope of economics to include the choice of allies or waging a war.⁴⁶ The primacy accorded to the conduct of economic affairs had a direct bearing on the policies adopted for external and defence affairs.

This chapter has built a basic understanding of the narratives of Arthashastra’s origins and the themes on which it develops the secular dynamic within a system of anarchic states. While clearly spelling out the king’s implicit contract with the state, the chapter highlights the economic policies that had achieved sophistication to incorporate modern concepts of risk management and information dominance. This sophistication in Arthashastra also percolates into the areas of foreign relations and defence affairs. In this sense, the text and its relevance is closer to the globalised world which lays great emphasis on economic activity, while seeking fair profits in an information rich contemporary world. Thus, having understood the themes and foundations of Arthashastra, we shall understand the construct and concepts of statecraft offered by Kautilya.

⁴³ Ibid.,98.

⁴⁴ Balbir S Sihag, “Kautilya on Time Inconsistency Problem and Asymmetric Information,” in *Indian Economic Review*, Vol 42:1,(2007): 41, 42.

⁴⁵ Balbir S Sihag, “Risk return trade off and diversification,” in *Indian Journal of economics and Business*, Vol 7:2 (2008): 282.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 283.

CONSTRUCT AND CONCEPTS OF STATECRAFT

CONSTITUENTS OF THE KAUTILYAN STATE

Kautilya in his treatise gave a comprehensive framework of the constituents (*prakritis*) that define a state.⁴⁷ There are seven *prakritis*, which constitute the seven pillars on which the state can be considered to stand strong; and which provide a base for attempting expansion. Thus, a weakness in any one would impact adversely on the ability of the state to function effectively and it would make the state fragile.⁴⁸ They are the king (*swamin*) representing the leadership, the group of ministers and officials (*amatya*) who represent the institutions, the natural resources, territory and skilled populace of the state (*janapada*), which comprise the natural and human resources in the modern context, fortified towns and cities (*durg*), that strengthen the state, the treasury (*kosa*), the military forces and law and order (*danda*)⁴⁹ and the allies (*mitra*).⁵⁰ *Primacy resides with the King, followed by the others in descending order of importance.*⁵¹ In other words, each succeeding element is less important than the element before it and the strength of the preceding *prakritis* strengthens the next. These elements will be explained in detail, with explanation of modern analogy during the case study analysis. A pictorial representation of the *prakritis* is as represented in the figure 3.

In this representation, the *prakritis* circle around the king's duties represented by a circle defining the social contract that binds the elements together and prioritises them within the construct. To draw a modern

⁴⁷ For a detailed reading of individual *prakritis*, refer RP Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra* part II, Book 6 364 – 367.

⁴⁸ Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, 117.

⁴⁹ Danda is used by Kautilya to signify the Military, which within the context of 300 BC was an extension of the internal forces providing *Raksha* and *Palana* (Law and Order).

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 119.

⁵¹ RP Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra* Part III, P 129.




Figure 3

analogy, Buzan suggests that there are three components of a state, which are interlinked in myriad ways – ‘the idea of a state, the physical base of a state and the institutional expression of a state’.⁵² He claims that a state without a binding idea might be so disadvantaged as to be unable to sustain its existence in a competitive international system.⁵³ The idea that coalesced the Mauryan Empire was the idea of a balanced state, which sought a balance of the triad of *Artha-Dharma-Kama* and was represented through a capable leadership performing the King’s duty. Buzan says that ‘the physical base of the state comprises its population and territory, including all of its natural resources and man made wealth contained within its borders’.⁵⁴ The *janapada*, *durg* and *kosha* are the manifestations of the physical essence of the Kautilyan state and constitute the physical base of the state. The institutions, which comprise the entire machinery of government form the third pillar in Buzan’s overarching framework, are present as *amatya* in Arthashastra. Buzan and Waltz contend that when the idea and institutions of a state

⁵² Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security studies in the Post Cold War Era*, 2nd Edn, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 65.

⁵³ Ibid., 69.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 90.

are both weak, then the state tends to become weaker.⁵⁵ These arguments resonate with the order of priorities Kautilya puts in *prakritis*, laying emphasis on a strong leadership and institutions.

Kautilya's *prakritis* add to the modern model depicted above to include the military forces and alliances in its comprehensive approach to national power. In particular, the addition of *mitra* or alliances to this equation, allows the Kautilyan state to extend the national power through the capacities and capabilities that the allies offer, and reflects the reality in the world politics as seen today. The viability of alliances in the national conception of power has been an accepted norm in all modern progressive states that understand the need to engage with states in mutually beneficial priorities in order to achieve progress. Modelski comments on *prakritis* within the modern context, 'it is sound and basic and in one form or another... has survived to this very day as a mainstay of reflection and analysis of international politics.'⁵⁶ This evidence proves that Kautilya had comprehensively established the key constituents and relationships that were needed to build a strong state, whose building blocks have survived and shown applicability in the contemporary era.

KAUTILYAN CONCEPT OF POWER

Having seen the elements of a Kautilyan state, it clearly emerges that the right prioritisation and good health of *prakritis* strengthens the state's power and helps the leadership to strive for external engagement to achieve progress. Kautilya advises the king to develop his state by augmenting its resources and power.⁵⁷ He classifies strength and its resultant power into three types⁵⁸:- 'Intellectual strength provides the power of [good] counsel; A prosperous treasury and a strong army provide physical power; Valour is the basis for [morale and] energetic action. The success resulting from each one is correspondingly intellectual, physical and [psychological]'.⁵⁹ In this manner, Kautilya

⁵⁵ Ibid.,97.

⁵⁶ George Modelski, "Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World," in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol LVIII: 3 (September 1964), 551.

⁵⁷ Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, 546.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 559.

⁵⁹ Ibid.,559.

describes power in terms of soft power emanating from good counsel, hard power emanating from economics and military strength; and individual power resulting from morality and personal energy. Coates et al, explains that Kautilya’s expression of power had two sides – an overt one that was friendly and a covert one that used secret methods to achieve goals.⁶⁰ These two, combined with the hard and soft power are represented by the figure 4 given below to illustrate ‘smart’ power given by Joseph Nye.⁶¹ Nye coined the phrase ‘smart power’ to denote the combination of both military and diplomatic tools,⁶² and is clearly reflected in Kautilya’s understanding of the comprehensive national power.




Figure 4

Thus, Kautilya attached a high degree of significance in the pursuit of all levers of power to maximise the power achieved through the *prakritis*. Kautilya attaches maximum significance to soft power, followed by

⁶⁰ Coates, Caton, “The Ultimate Pragmatist: Kautilya’s Philosophy on SMART Power in National Security,” Section II.

⁶¹ Picture courtesy, Ibid., Section II.

⁶² Ibid., Section II

hard power and then the personal energy of the leader.⁶³ Kautilya puts emphasis on the relative power equation with an adversary when he says that the king should be better endowed in these three types of power over his adversary.⁶⁴ However, this advice is tempered with the need to increase the happiness in his state and understand the states of advancement or decline on both sides.⁶⁵ Undoubtedly, Kautilya's sophisticated understanding of comprehensive national power places him well within the contemporary domain to address the discourse of inter-state relations.

FOREIGN POLICY

Within the construct of a state's aspirations, *prakritis* and power dynamic, Kautilya propounded and developed a unique theory of foreign policy aptly called the *Raja Mandala* or the *Circle of Kings*. Kangle notes the importance of *Mandala* when he links peace and activity in a state, which are necessary for its well being, to its relations with the circle of neighbouring states.⁶⁶ He further elaborates that if the policy results in well being it is a good policy and vice versa.⁶⁷ The constituents of the *Raja Mandala* are *vijigishu* (conqueror), *ari* (adversary), *mitra* (ally), *arimitra* (adversary's ally), *mitra-mitra* (ally's ally), *parshnigraha* (adversary in the rear), *aakeranda* (ally in the rear), *madhyama* (Middle King), *udhasina* (Neutral King) and *antardhi* (Weak intervening king).⁶⁸ The Middle King, *madhyama*, is one with territory adjoining both the *vijigishu* and the *ari* and is more powerful than either of them.⁶⁹ The Neutral King, *udhasina*, was one whose borders are farther away but is a far stronger and more powerful than the Middle King.⁷⁰ While the relative power of the constituents other than *madhyama* and *udhasina* are within similar measures, these two are powerful enough to upset the balance of

⁶³ RP Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra*, Part III, 128,129.

⁶⁴ Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, 559.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 559,561.

⁶⁶ Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra*, Part II, 368.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 368.

⁶⁸ Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, 557

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 558.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 558.

power in the circle of kings.⁷¹ This arrangement, the monograph concedes, is Kautilya's method to add an objective and empirical dimension to the otherwise subjective analyses that such discourses tend to steer towards. By situating the enemy between an ally and itself, Kautilya contends that it is easy to exterminate or to harass the enemy,




Fig. 24 The Circle of States

Figure 5

⁷¹ Ibid.,574.

even if strong.⁷² The figure 5 given below represents the graphical representation of the *Mandala*.⁷³

These relationships are based on the principle that two states sharing a common border are intrinsically hostile to each other.⁷⁴ The representation is symbolic signifying that all states in the Mandala system face similar predicament and defines relationship in a dynamic manner, which may create opportunities for some and expose others to danger.⁷⁵ In practice, the number of states under consideration may be smaller or larger than the situation at that time.⁷⁶ It is also evident through the categorisation that the relations are viewed through shades of grey thus permitting the interpretation of the intent in various relationships.

Behera analyses that ‘each kingdom’s aspirations spur a struggle for existence, self-assertion and world domination amongst *vijigishbus* resulting in *matsya nyaya*’.⁷⁷ In discussing *matsya nyaya*,⁷⁸ Behera remarks that the presence of a strong ruler who wields punishment may control the behaviour of other warring states.⁷⁹ This aspect is further substantiated by Rashed, who contends that ‘in the absence of an overriding international body of law that ensures every king’s right to exist, irrespective of size, the *vijigishbu* has to survive in a system that typifies every man for himself’.⁸⁰ Thus, the concept of hegemonic stability⁸¹

⁷² Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra* Part II, 371.

⁷³ Courtesy Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, 557.

⁷⁴ Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, 551.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 552.

⁷⁶ Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra*, Part III, 249.

⁷⁷ N.C. Behara, *Re-imagining IR in India*, 102.

⁷⁸ *Matsya nyaya* is the logic of fish, wherein the weaker fish is devoured by the stronger fish, (akin to survival of the fittest). *Ibid.*, 102.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 102.

⁸⁰ Rashed Uz Zaman, “Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic Culture,” *Comparative Strategy*, 25:3, (2006): 236.

⁸¹ Smith notes that the theory of Hegemonic Stability is central to understanding of the security interdependence within the world order. Hegemony is defined as ‘one state ... powerful enough to maintain the essential rules overrunning interstate relations and *willing to do so*’. Roger K Smith, “Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory”, *International Organization*, Vol 41(2), (1987):263.

was acknowledged in Arthashastra. Rangarajan clarifies that the conqueror is not necessarily ‘a good king’ and, correspondingly, the enemy ‘a bad king’. The advice can be equally applied to both kings.⁸² Kautilya’s use of the word *vijigishu* is for purely theoretical purposes as he gives sufficient advice to a weak king to pursue against a strong king.⁸³ Through this evidence, Arthashastra’s theories can be applied to all states, regardless of their policies and can be a useful tool to model state behaviour and understand motivations, behaviour and outcomes; whether in a stable or an unstable system of states.

OPTIONS TO ACHIEVE SECURITY

For achieving success in the Mandala system, Kautilya offers courses of action called *shadgunya* (six fold) policy for the *vijigishu* to apply to the constituent elements of his circle of states.⁸⁴ Sihag contends that, ‘Kautilya invariably applied cost-benefit analysis to every undertaking, including waging a war. But he was against applying the usual cost-benefit analysis to the provision of national security, which he argued was too fundamental to be decided by such calculations. According to him, a nation had to match or exceed the power of her potential adversary, since national security depended only on relative power.’⁸⁵ Dreikmeier observes:

By the age of empire (and implicit in the *Arthashastra* of Kautilya), war had ceased to be regarded as an aristocratic pastime having as its main objective military glory, and had come to be conceived as an instrument for strengthening the state and enriching its treasury. War is now a serious business, not to be undertaken lightly and without weighing carefully the probabilities of success and defeat.⁸⁶

In this way, this paper notices that Kautilya makes a clear distinction between war as a national necessity for survival, which does not rely

⁸² L. Rangarajan, *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*, 542.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 550.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 563.

⁸⁵ Balbir Sihag, “Kautilya on Public goods and taxation” 725.

⁸⁶ As quoted in *Ibid.*, 733.

on cost-benefit analysis, and the use of war as a matter of choice, where at a certain stage the cost-benefit analysis comes into play. With the analyses that Sihag provides, it emerges that the use of *shadgunya* by a state has to be done within a temporal and calculated framework, where the cost-benefit analysis is applied, depending on the type of threat to national security. Thus, the calibrated and incremental GWOT (Global War on Terror) post 9/11 declared by the US and supported by the west is a ‘war of choice’, that is run more on a cost - benefit model than a national necessity of survival and clearly highlights this case.

The *shadgunya* policy consists of *sandhi*, *vigraha*, *asana*, *yana*, *samsbraya*, and *dvaiddhibhava*.⁸⁷ *Sandhi* means making peace, *vigraha* is war, *asana* doing neither, *yana* is preparing for war, *samsbraya* is seeking protection, *dvaiddhibhava* is dual policy.⁸⁸ These choices are depicted on figure 6 below to show their relative utility.




Figure 6

Kautilya makes a very important contribution when he applies the temporal domain on the *shadgunyas*. Boesche calls this as the ‘Pendulum theory of history’ in which Kautilya depicts the kingdom passing through three phases – decline, stability and advancement.⁸⁹ Kautilya says that when in decline, make peace, when prospering, make war, if equal in strength, remain neutral, depleted in power, seek shelter, with help, seek dual policy and when blessed with excellence, prepare for war.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Rangarajan, *Kautilya the Arthashastra*, 563.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 563.

⁸⁹ Boesche, *The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and His Arthashastra*, 99.

⁹⁰ Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra*, 373.

He then goes on to highlight the importance of the policies adopted by the state on its endeavours and links this to the outcome, which may be progress, stability or decline. He says that *vyasnas* or calamities contribute to decline and they can be attributed to human policies or natural calamities.⁹¹ Boesche comments that Kautilya's science of politics can assist in 'prolonging the state of advancement, but mistakes and natural calamities always occur to transport a kingdom back from advancement to decline'.⁹² While he attributes policy making to good or bad outcomes, he attributes 'divine' intervention for good fortune and misfortune. This evidence reveals that by differentiating between stochastic and deterministic events,⁹³ Kautilya was able to refine Arthashastra and provide reasoned solutions for the dynamic problems in statecraft. Through the pendulum theory, Kautilya juxtaposes the temporal aspect in the courses of actions that are offered through *shadgunya* and therefore adds value to the choices.

On conduct of military operations, Kautilya says that 'there are three types of war – open war (*prakashayuddha*), covert war (*kutayuddha*) and silent war (*gudayuddha*)'.⁹⁴ Boesche notes that, 'Open warfare is traditional warfare, armies arrayed openly against one another and concealed warfare is what we call guerrilla warfare, attacking and fleeing, harassing an enemy with surprise. Silent warfare involves openly praising another king as a friend and ally, all while striking him again and again ... by spies and saboteurs'.⁹⁵ Coates et al, notes that Kautilya advocated the use of all three forms individually or in combination to achieve the state objective.⁹⁶ Through Coates's representation of the three forms of warfare⁹⁷ on a scale of overt to covert action as given in figure 7, it can be inferred that Kautilya proposes conventional war against a weak

⁹¹ Rangarajan, *Kautilya the Arthashastra*, 122.

⁹² Boesche, *The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and His Arthashastra*, 99.

⁹³ In the study of probability, Stochastic events are unpredictable and Deterministic events are predictable.

⁹⁴ Rangarajan, *Kautilya, the Arthashastra*, 676.

⁹⁵ Boesche, *The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and His Arthashastra*, 109.

⁹⁶ Coates, Caton, "The Ultimate Pragmatist: Kautilya's Philosophy on SMART Power in National Security," Section II.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, Section II.

king, but prefers irregular and covert responses against the stronger king.




Figure 7

Kautilya acknowledges the futility of war through a pragmatic lens, when he says, 'If there is equal advancement in peace and war, he [the king] should resort to peace. For, in war, there are losses, expenses, marches away from home and hindrances.'⁹⁸ He attributes peace and activity as the sources of acquisition and security. He says, 'Activity is that which brings about the accomplishment of works undertaken. Peace is that which bring about security of enjoyment of the fruits of work.'⁹⁹ Thus, Kautilya reinforces the precept of happiness while seeking conflict resolution, signifying an objective outlook to war.

This chapter has developed an understanding of the constituents of the state with their prioritisation and clearly highlighted through the modern analogy the comprehensive structure provided by the *Prakritis*. The discourse on the comprehensive national power derived by Kautilya

⁹⁸ Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra*, Vol II, 376.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 368.

and its application in an anarchic world using Mandala theory brings out the deeper understanding of what drives stability in the world order. The stress on a cost – benefit model to evaluate the state’s policy options brings Kautilya’s Arthashastra closer to contemporary understanding of the drivers behind conflicts and conflict resolution.

The first part of this monograph has revealed the sophistication in understanding achieved by Arthashastra within the ecosystem that encompassed the entire spectrum of human undertaking as understood then. This research now attempts to distil a paradigm on the contemporary security environment that draws on the prescriptive arguments that Kautilya poses within the normative construct of *Mandala* theory. Using Arthashastra’s constructs covered thus far, this work then seeks to unravel the deeper imbalances that seep into the *prakritis*, which affect the state once it has decided to pursue a course of action. This examination would reveal that Kautilya’s advice is suitable not only for nation building, stability and advancement, but also to explore how certain policies that are contrary to fundamental laws of statecraft as defined by Kautilya have a resultant outcome of decline.

PART II

**CONTEMPORARY SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT AND
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
TO PAKISTAN'S CHOICES**

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

APPLYING ARTHASASTRA TO CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

The monograph so far has touched upon Kautilya's conception of the state, its themes and foundations. It has gained an understanding of Arthasastra's concepts of state, priorities of state, conduct of its affairs and its approach to security and foreign policy. It has been established through various evidences that the concepts are of contemporary relevance. Modelski reflected that Arthasastra remains 'suitable for use in academic instruction' despite its vintage'.¹⁰⁰ He contends that, to achieve a timeless quality, any piece of work must disassociate itself from its immediate milieu, if it is to endure for long.¹⁰¹ The research reveals a store of valuable paradigms, concepts and generalisations that, due to the abstract form in which they are stated, achieve a timeless quality.¹⁰² As Modelski elaborates, 'The work exhibits form and structure and a high order of intellectual discipline: concepts or propositions in one part are used and expanded in other parts. The whole resembles an assemblage of mathematical equations, some systematically related and others not, some demonstrably of empirical relevance and others not, but all shinningly.'¹⁰³ This paper observes that the level of details and the breadth of issues that Kautilya's Arthasastra touches upon add a certain degree of complexity to his works. This complexity tends to create a barrier which diffuses the essential message contained in the treatise. Modelski's analysis reveals the tension in the apparent worth of Arthasastra's teachings and the complex representation of concepts in it, which preclude in-depth and sufficient research in the contemporary context.

¹⁰⁰ Modelski, *The American Political Science Review*, 550.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 550.

¹⁰² Ibid., 550.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 550.

At this stage, Huntington's thoughts on the efficacy of using paradigms to perceive reality are useful.

Simplified paradigms or maps are indispensable for human thought. On the one hand, we may explicitly formulate theories or models and consciously use them to guide one's behaviour. Alternately, humans may deny the need for such guides and assume that they will act only in terms of specific "objective" facts, dealing with each case "on its merits". If this is assumed, however, people delude themselves. For in the back of human minds are hidden assumptions, biases, and prejudices that determine how they perceive reality, and what facts they look at, and how they judge their importance and merits. People need explicit or implicit models so that they are able to:

- (a) Order and generalise about reality.
- (b) Understand causal relationship among phenomena.
- (c) Anticipate and, if lucky, predict future developments.
- (d) Distinguish what is important from what is unimportant; and
- (e) Show the desired path to achieve the stated goals.

Every road map is an abstraction and will be more useful for some purpose than for others.¹⁰⁴

The understanding provided by Modelski and Huntington in modelling paradigms is useful as the monograph now puts Arthasastra to life through a case study. The complex representations of various models within Arthasastra are simplified through one comprehensive case study (South Asia). The case study more specifically studies the intra and inter-state dynamics of a pivotal state in South Asia's security paradigm: Pakistan; within the construct of the contemporary security environment. This is preferred over multiple case studies involving multiple and possibly unrelated states; as the coherence generated within the singular case study allows the concepts to be tried in completeness.

¹⁰⁴ Huntington, Samuel, *The clash of civilisations and the remaking of world order*, (London: Simon and Schuster:1997), 30.

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The contemporary security environment is marked by transnational terrorism and criminality intertwined within economic and informational domains, which blur the conventionally understood models of security of the cold war era.¹⁰⁵ Commenting on the scale and scope of contemporary security issues, Hanlon contends that in the contemporary environment, a majority of the world's states can be classified as weak, failing, or failed.¹⁰⁶ She notes that, 'more than half of the world's population lives in fragile states, which are likely to be among the preponderant sources of instability, conflict, and war over the next decade or two, at the very least. These states provide the conditions for the incubation and maturation of hundreds of armed groups to include insurgents, terrorists, militias and criminal organisations.'¹⁰⁷ The proliferation of new states has in the latter part of the 20th century raised huge challenges of organisation and governance.¹⁰⁸ In search for a viable political structure, these states show the classic signs of weakening from within and the resultant economic inequity is exacerbated under the prevalent climate of globalisation.

The contemporary security environment in the globalised world today reveals uneven economic progress and the anarchic climate have exposed stable states to security threats that emanate from another state's fragility. The events after 9/11 have brought the new security paradigm of non-state actors on the centre stage. The impact of Pakistan and its policies has been central to this paradigm. The United Kingdom (UK) House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (HCFAC) report of 2008-09 states the following:

It was from the tribal areas in Pakistan that the bomb plots in London, Madrid, Bali, Islamabad, and later Germany and Denmark were planned. The Lashkar e Toiba (LeT) group, which was responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, which

¹⁰⁵ Joseph Nye, David Welch, *Understanding global conflict and cooperation*, 289.

¹⁰⁶ Querine Hanlon, "State Actors in the 21st Century Security Environment", *Adapting America's Security Paradigm and Security Agenda*, 7/2011,1, <http://www.strategycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/State-Actors-21st-Century.pdf> (accessed 15 may 2012)

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 2,3.

targeted Westerners, in particular UK nationals and US [United States] also operates from these tribal areas... On December 14, 2008, the Prime Minister Gordon Brown stated that 75% of the most serious terrorist plots being investigated by UK authorities had links to Pakistan... As Professor Shaun Gregory states, “many analysts believe that if there is a nuclear 9/11 carried out in the West, it will have its origins in Pakistan”.¹⁰⁹

The contemporary security threats highlighted above have been given the highest priority as tier one threat in the UK National Strategy released in 2010.¹¹⁰ This paper situates Pakistan as *vijigishu* (conqueror) and attempts to understand its policy objectives on the basis of the options that Arthashastra prescribes to achieve its stated geopolitical goals, within the contemporary security environment. This work does not claim to be predictive of the state's behaviour in the future. In the context of Pakistan's security policies, this research does not directly analyse the War on Terror and involvement with operations in Afghanistan, though its impact on the state policy will be referred to.

¹⁰⁹ UK, HCFAC 8th report of 2008-09, *Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan*, 60,61. <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmFaff/302/302.pdf> (accessed 15 May 2012)

¹¹⁰ United Kingdom, *A Strong Britain in the Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*, 2010, 27.

PAKISTAN'S POLICY CHOICES THROUGH ARTHASASTRA'S LENS

To apply the Kautilyan model, Rangarajan's analysis is useful, "Kautilya uses four devices to derive practical advice for specific situations from his essential theoretical concepts. These are: relative power, deviations from the ideal, classification of type of motivation, and the influence of the intangible and the unpredictable."¹¹¹ Kautilya places great emphasis on the relative power in a bilateral relation to support a course of action.¹¹² He warns that power is not constant over time and advises a course of action based on deviations by factoring in a temporal time frame.¹¹³ The sub classification of types of neighbours, types of allies and types of vassals permits an analysis of the motives of the actors and allows a reasoned response through the models that Kautilya proposes.¹¹⁴ It brings clarity on intangible factors when he brings out the importance of the power of good command, analysis and judgment; and on unpredictable factors, which are attributed to acts of god outside human control.¹¹⁵

PAKISTAN AS A VIJIGISHU

*The King who understands the interdependence of the six methods of foreign policy, plays as he pleases, with other rulers bound to him by the chains of his intellect.*¹¹⁶

We start the study by analysing Pakistan's strategic and geopolitical choices through the framework of the *Mandala* theory. Kautilya advises that by the use of appropriate policy, progress can be made, which

¹¹¹ Rangarajan, *Kautilya the Arthashastra*, 543.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 543.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 543.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 544.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 544.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 541.

contributes to the increase in power.¹¹⁷ This section aims to study the dynamic relationship between power and progress, mediated by the choices made, executed through the instruments of the states in the *Mandala*.¹¹⁸ The main states that constitute the various elements in Pakistan's *Mandala* i.e. enemy, ally, middle king and neutral king are discussed below, with justification and evidence.

ARI/ ENEMY

Kautilya says, 'Among the kings with contiguous territories, a natural enemy is one who is of the same family or of equally high birth [as the conqueror].'¹¹⁹ India and Pakistan, who were born from the independence movement, with similar cultural roots, same family¹²⁰ and with contiguous territories, fit within this description of 'natural' enemies as prescribed by Kautilya. Synnott contends that Pakistan's identity relies on its distinctness from India.¹²¹ In the context of Pakistan's neighbourhood, the other states with contiguous borders are Iran, Afghanistan and China. Since these countries, on a relative scale do not share the same position as India with Pakistan within the *ari*'s definition, their choice as the *ari* is less distinct. In the case of India-Pakistan, since independence, territorial issues have been the visible cause of conflict and attempts at territorial resolution have not borne fruit due to a variety of underlying causes. The prime cause has been a conflict of identity, which will be deliberated in the next chapter.

The 1971 Indo-Pak war, which resulted in dismemberment of Pakistan, reinforced its insecurity from India, forcing it to search for solutions to reduce this insecurity.¹²² Hilali notes that the scale of India's economic, political and military dominance was indisputable. Pakistan could not

¹¹⁷ Ibid.,552.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.,552.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 555.

¹²⁰ Most Indian and Pakistani people in power have roots in the each other's country – Ex President Musharraf was born in India (Peter Calvocoressi, *World Politics since 1945*, 9th Edn, (Essex : Pearson Education Limited, 2009), 451.) and present Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was born in Pakistan), (Lok Kalyan Shikshan Sanstha, <http://www.lkss.org/manmohan-singh.html> (accessed 15 May 12))

¹²¹ Hilar y Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan: Ways out of instability* (London:Routledge,2009), 129.

¹²² A.Z.Hilali, *US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, (Hants: Aldershot,2005), 36.

match India's spending power and used nuclear weapons to achieve parity.¹²³ This imbalance and hence a hedging behaviour has persisted through the end of the Cold War into the first decade of the 21st century. Therefore, the Pakistani interest now is not in balancing India, but in ensuring Pakistan's strategic autonomy, given an ever more imbalanced bilateral relationship.¹²⁴ These evidences reflect Pakistan's choice of covert policies in its quest for national security through intangibles that avoid direct confrontation. These include policies like acquisition of nuclear capability and achievement of strategic depth. While nuclear capability allows Pakistan to gain leverage over India's conventional might, strategic depth provides an insurance against possible Indian incursion into its territory.

Synnott explains strategic depth theory which was advocated by General Mirza Aslam Beg, Chief of Army Staff after Zia's death, that in case of 'a conflict between Pakistan and India, Afghanistan might be used to give Pakistan strategic depth'.¹²⁵ It is noted that this concept 'seems to derive most of its power from non-military associations, by appealing to the affinity between Pashtuns on either side of the Durand Line' and on a wider scale by attracting the support of the Muslims across Afghanistan and Pakistan.¹²⁶ This choice reflects a military necessity based on the use of resources, which though traditionally outside the military's direct control, were used based on the experience of controlling the Mujahadeen against Soviets in the previous decade.¹²⁷

Pakistan also demonstrated the creative use of *shadgunyas* in its policies against India, when it resorted to a combination of dual policy, covert/irregular war and pause in its attempt to maintain an edge in its relations with India. *Dvaidhibhava* or dual policy is 'the policy of making peace with a neighbouring king in order to pursue, with his help, the policy of hostility towards another'.¹²⁸ Synnott highlights this when he links

¹²³ Ibid.,37.

¹²⁴ Alexander Evan, "Pakistan and shadow of 9/11," *RUSI*, Aug-Sep 2011, 66.

¹²⁵ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 28-29.

¹²⁶ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 28-29.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 29.

¹²⁸ Rangarajan, *Kautilya the Arthashastra*, 549.

the violence in Kashmir at the end of the 1980s with the tacit support provided through Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to the Mujahadeen, who, free from the involvement in Afghanistan were used to spread terrorism in Kashmir.¹²⁹ Covert/Irregular War is reflected in the war in Kargil instigated by General Musharraf using army regulars,¹³⁰ with Pakistan's intent to cause internal disharmony within India, through claims of freedom fighter's¹³¹ involvement in the intrusions. These two choices also show that after the 1971 experience, Pakistan prefers covert and silent wars to open wars, as it would not be able to match the conventional superiority that India enjoys. The policy of pause is carried out through *asana* (staying quiet) and *yana* (preparing for war), wherein Pakistan has used periods of peace to build its military capacity and capability. The Lahore Declaration in February 1999 is a case in point when the conciliatory peace initiatives between the two countries after the 1998 nuclear explosions gave momentary pause, and was used by General Musharraf in preparing for the Kargil operations. The period 2001-12 has seen a continuation of these policies through the attack on Indian Parliament in 2001 by terrorists from Pakistan,¹³² which resulted in the activation of the armed forces of the two countries and the 2008 Mumbai attacks,¹³³ carried out with the support from terrorist organisations in Pakistan. Through the framework of Arthashastra, the dynamics of India-Pakistan relationship and the options that allow it to contain India as an enemy become visible.

MADHYAMA / MIDDLE KING

Kautilya describes the *madhyamaas*, 'A Middle King is one whose territory is contagious to those of the conqueror and the conqueror's enemy, who is powerful enough to help them whether they are united or not or to destroy them individually when they are disunited.'¹³⁴ Within the geopolitical situation of Asia, China fits into the description of *madhyama*

¹²⁹ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 32-33.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 50.

¹³¹ Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 265.

¹³² Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 140

¹³³ Ibid., 140.

¹³⁴ Rangarajan, *Kautilya the Arthashastra*, 558.

as the middle king, who shares borders with Pakistan and India and is powerful enough to help them or overcome them individually or united. In the context of China's *Mandala*, India too occupies the position of a natural enemy. This suits Pakistan as with a common enemy, China can occupy the position of being a friend. This permits Pakistan to use China's power to subdue India in times of requirement and thus achieve through alliance what it could not achieve on its own. China and Pakistan do not share a common culture or a common history. In spite of this, due to the dynamic mentioned above, the two nations were found to naturally gravitate towards each other. Synnott comments on the symbiotic aspect of this relationship, 'For China, Its relationship with Pakistan has served as a hedge against India. Given that China and India have their own disputes over hundreds of miles of border and other issues; it has been convenient for China that Kashmir dispute has tied up so much of India's security forces and attention.'¹³⁵ He contends that Pakistan opens up Chinese access to the Middle East through the strategically important Karakoram highway in the north to the Port of Gwadar in the Arabian Sea.¹³⁶

"If the middle king were to desire to seize his (i.e., the conqueror's) enemy, he should make peace. Thus, his own ends are secured and the middle king is also pleased."¹³⁷ Pakistan's behaviour towards China strengthened after the 1962 Chinese aggression towards India, in an attempt to force an alliance. This was evidenced when Pakistan ceded the Aksai Chin area to China and attempted to draw closer to China.¹³⁸ However, China's response in Pakistan's 1971 conflict with India was neutral.¹³⁹ In fact, in the Kargil war of 1999, China's view was that Pakistan should unilaterally respect the ceasefire line.¹⁴⁰ Thus, in spite of Pakistan's best intentions, China has remained a middle kingdom that has not displayed overt help to Pakistan though China's cooperation in the military sphere and capability development is notable, especially in the last decade.

¹³⁵ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 149.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 149.

¹³⁷ Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra: Part II*, 441.

¹³⁸ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 149.

¹³⁹ Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 163.

¹⁴⁰ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 152.

Anwar notes that Pakistan's decision to cultivate China 'can also be viewed as an attempt to align with a power that shared her disposition towards India and, being a lesser power than her former ally, the US, would be more inclined to treat her as a partner rather than as a satellite.'¹⁴¹ China traditionally does not overtly commit its intentions and is conscious of the image problem that may be associated with its involvement with Pakistan. However, the underlying intention of maintaining a balance of power is visible through the China-Pakistan civil nuclear deal in response to the US-India nuclear deal. As the Chinese economy becomes intertwined with the global economy, its detached status as a middle king as described by Kautilya emerges. As Shahid notes, "It would be unwise for Pakistani policy makers to expect China to give the kind of assistance which it did in the past, in any kind of confrontation with India."¹⁴² The evidences reveal that Pakistan has based its relationship with China on the basis of the power matrix that seeks to contain India within the *Mandala* construct. The evidences also reveal that China as the middle king seeks to follow its independent policies and supports Pakistan only when its ends are met.

MITRA / ALLY

Kautilya describes a natural ally as, "one who is of equally noble birth or... an 'ally by intent' is one who needs [the conqueror's help] for wealth or personal safety."¹⁴³ Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam, and Pakistan, an Islamic state has tremendous affinity to Saudi for religious and ideological reasons.¹⁴⁴ Shahid elucidates that 'Pakistan's involvement in providing security to Saudi Arabia [has] developed on a scale unmatched by any other country.'¹⁴⁵ He notes, 'Saudi Arabia was very forthcoming in extending support to Pakistan during its wars against India... During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia joined the US in extending strong military and other support to Pakistan.'¹⁴⁶ Synnott calls Saudi Arabia as Pakistan's most valued Arab

¹⁴¹ Anwar Hussain Syed, *China & Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1974),185.

¹⁴² Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 163.

¹⁴³ Rangarajan, *Kautilya The Arthashastra*,556.

¹⁴⁴ Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*,132.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 133.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 134.

partner.¹⁴⁷ In 1997, the only other government apart from Pakistan and UAE to officially recognise the Taliban was Saudi Arabia.¹⁴⁸ Saudi Arabia has provided regular financial assistance to Pakistan. The military cooperation between the two countries has been long standing¹⁴⁹ and it is suggested that in return for Saudi assistance, Pakistan is expected to provide a ‘nuclear’ umbrella to Saudi against a nuclear Iran.¹⁵⁰

Kautilya’s advice on the best ally provides further clarity to the choice of allies, when he says, ‘The best ally is one who has the following six qualities: an ally of the family for a long time, constant, amenable to control, powerful in his support, sharing a common interest, able to mobilise [his forces] quickly and not a man who betrays [his friends].’¹⁵¹ The Pakistan – Saudi relationship has seen a marked change since the oil boom, with Saudi occupying a senior position. It can be inferred that Saudi is in a position to control Pakistan’s policies and not the other way around.¹⁵² This is evidenced by the asylum that Saudi Arabia granted at various times to the senior leadership of Pakistan, most prominently Nawaz Sharif in the recent past.¹⁵³ Saudi foreign policy is based on its threat perceptions within the Arab world and Iran. Pakistan was a reluctant partner in the first gulf war against Iraq and may have strong reservations in providing its forces against Iran, which it perceives from the calculus of its strategic depth against India.¹⁵⁴ While Saudi has been powerful in its support where it suited its calculations, like the war against the soviets in Afghanistan, the unofficial Saudi funding of the extremists religious organisations within Pakistan has caused a destabilising effect within Pakistan.¹⁵⁵ Therefore, the closest natural ally of Pakistan does not fit the description of being the best ally that it

¹⁴⁷ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 153.

¹⁴⁸ <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551> (accessed 11 May 12)

¹⁴⁹ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 155.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 154-155.

¹⁵¹ Rangarajan, *Kautilya The Arthashastra*, 606.

¹⁵² Amin, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 135.

¹⁵³ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 51.

¹⁵⁴ Amin, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 136, 137.

¹⁵⁵ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 156.

needs in case of a conflict with its enemy. This strengthens the need for it to look elsewhere to achieve strategic parity with India.

UDASINA/ NEUTRAL KING

Kautilya defines a neutral king as, 'A Neutral king is one (i) whose territory is not contiguous with those of the conqueror, the conqueror's enemy or the Middle king [i.e., totally outside the area of hostilities], (ii) who is stronger than these three and (iii) who is powerful enough to help any of the three, whether they are united or not, or to destroy them individually, when they are disunited'.¹⁵⁶ The US with its remoteness from the area of conflict, stronger and powerful than Pakistan, India and China in all respects fits the description of a neutral king. Kautilya equates the motivations of the middle and neutral king and differentiates them only in terms of relative power.¹⁵⁷ Therefore, the conduct of Pakistan towards the middle king [China] continues in its relationship with the US.

The dynamic of the middle and neutral king is further elucidated by Kautilya, 'two other powerful rulers, the middle king and the neutral king can influence the balance of power between the two groups – the conqueror and his friends on the one hand and the enemy and his friends on the other'.¹⁵⁸ Reflecting on the relationship during the 1980s, Hilali notes that, 'The partnership between the US and Pakistan was one of many contemporary instances of cooperation serving complementary interests. For the US, it served the primary purpose of expanding the scope of the policy of containment [of Soviet Union]; for Pakistan, it served the purpose of increasing its political, military and economic potential vis a vis its neighbour i.e., India and the Soviet backed Kabul Government'.¹⁵⁹ While claiming US alignment, though anti communism was a stated goal, Shahid further elaborates, 'it was the quest of arms and aid to be used against India, rather than any real fear of communist aggression, which was Pakistan's main motive in joining the Western sponsored military pacts'.¹⁶⁰ This cooperation,

¹⁵⁶ Rangarajan, *Kautilya The Arthashastra*, 558.

¹⁵⁷ Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra Part II*, 441.

¹⁵⁸ Rangarajan, *Kautilya The Arthashastra*, 558.

¹⁵⁹ A.Z.Hilali, *US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, (Hants: Aldershot, 2005), 193.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 46.

coupled with Pakistan's cooperation with China highlights the 'balance of power' argument that Kautilya argues about.

By aligning with the *udasina*, and making the *udasina* dependent on it for achieving its own objectives, Pakistan has been able to augment its military power to overcome its insecurities. In the contemporary environment after 9/11, this alliance has continued when Pakistan has been coerced through General Musharaff to join the US in its Global War on Terror.¹⁶¹ By remaining relevant in the US context, Pakistan benefited through funding for its security needs and bolstering of economy through grants and maintained its autonomy from Indian dominance.

ANALYSIS OF PAKISTAN'S MANDALA

Pakistan's policies as seen through the *Mandala* reveals that its approach to its ally, the neutral and middle king have been centred on its insecurities in relation to India, a natural enemy within the considerations given by Kautilya. Pakistan understood the relative power differential and has made complete use of the courses of action offered by Kautilya and has invested in achieving capability that allows it to contain the Indian threat. At this juncture, it is important to analyse Pakistan's perceptions of its prime relationship with the enemy within the construct that Kautilya offers.

Pakistan's typecasting India as an aggressor comes into question when seen from the prism of Arthashastra. Kautilya classifies aggressors into three categories: the righteous aggressor, the greedy aggressor and the monstrous aggressor. He says, 'The righteous aggressor is satisfied with submission...The greedy aggressor is satisfied with seizing land and goods...The monstrous aggressor is satisfied only when he takes the land, goods, wives, sons and [even the] life of the defeated.'¹⁶² The wars that India and Pakistan have fought since independence have resulted in limited human losses by 20th century standards and territorial status quo has resulted at the end of each conflict.¹⁶³ The only exceptions

¹⁶¹ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 129.

¹⁶² Rangarajan, *Kautilya the Arthashastra*, 664.

¹⁶³ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 129.

were the Kashmir dispute in 1947, which was taken to the UNs for resolution and the 1971 war, wherein after the Indian win in the then East Pakistan, sovereignty was handed over to the new state of Bangladesh.¹⁶⁴ The 2006 World Bank report praises India's efforts in sharing its water resources with Pakistan, 'Pakistan's rights to water from the Indus Basin system are unambiguously defined in the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT).'¹⁶⁵

These evidences reveal that India has not attempted to occupy territory or withhold resources from Pakistan. Therefore, from the perspective of Kautilya, India has displayed the attributes of a righteous 'aggressor' within the evidence shown so far. Under the conditions, the course of action available to Pakistan is *sandhi* or peace. Pakistan's failure to gauge India's motivations as seen from the framework of Arthashastra questions Pakistan's fundamental strategic choice of delinking the cost benefit analysis from the security model it has adopted to contain India. This strategy reflects the need to suit the calculations of its authoritarian regimes and bases the need to 'contain' India as a national necessity of survival. The policies have resulted in an incremental increase in Pakistan's military power, which remains central in its policy-making decisions; but the impact on the *prakritis* is enormous, as discussed in the succeeding section.

¹⁶⁴ Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 68,69.

¹⁶⁵ World Bank, "Better Management of Indus Basin Waters: Strategic Issues and Challenges" 2006, 3. <http://siteresourcesworldbank.org/INTPAKISTAN/Data%20and%20Reference/20805819/Brief-Indus-Basin-Water.pdf> (accessed 20 May 2012)

PART III

AN ANALYSIS

IMBALANCES, INCORRECT PRIORITISATION AND LESSONS

*In the interests of the prosperity of the country, a king should be diligent in foreseeing the possibility of calamities, try to avert them before they arise, overcome those which happen, remove all obstructions to economic activity and prevent loss of revenue to the state.*¹⁶⁶

IMPACT OF POLICY CHOICES ON *PRAKRITIS*

Having seen the choices within the *Mandala* made by Pakistan, it emerges that though militarily the state has accumulated power, in the contemporary developmental context it has experienced decline. Through Arthashastra, it can be attributed to the choice of *shadgunyas* and *upayas* within the *Mandala* and its effect on *prakritis*. Kautilya discusses the attributes of a failed state when he delves on the topic of calamities (*vyasanas*) of the constituent elements.¹⁶⁷ This he does not by singular definitions but by exploring a variety of factors that can influence the constituents and their relative balances. These factors can be interpreted in a myriad of ways depending on the circumstances to offer valuable insights. He attributes the lack of good qualities of excellence, addiction and affliction in *prakritis* to calamity.¹⁶⁸

In contrast to Kautilya's aim of *yogakshema* or welfare for its populace, emanating from the power achieved by *vijigishu*, Pakistan's goals do not seem to move towards this under the authoritarian influence in its policies. The choice of hedging itself against an enemy on the basis of misperceptions has come at a cost. As Kautilya advises, the *vijigishu* should ensure that his *prakritis* should not be affected by *vyasnas* before undertaking an expedition.¹⁶⁹ Pakistan's choices of establishing

¹⁶⁶ Rangarajan, *Kautilya the Arthashastra*, 116.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 122.

¹⁶⁸ Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra Part II*, 445.

¹⁶⁹ Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra Part III*, 127.

relationships around security objectives and pursuing *shadgunyas* without prioritising its *prakritis* have resulted in harm to its sub constituents as discussed below.

SWAMIN/ LEADERSHIP

Kautilya saw the king as a role model. He stated, ‘A King endowed with the ideal personal qualities enriches the other elements [prakritis] when they are less than perfect. [On the other hand,] a weak or wicked king without doubt destroys the most prosperous and loyal elements of the kingdom.’¹⁷⁰ As Ishrat noted in 2007, ‘Pakistan has seen 23 governments in the past 60 years, including: 14 elected or appointed prime ministers, five interim governments and 33 years of military rule under four different leaders. Excluding the military and interim governments, the average life span of a politically elected government has been less than two years. If the five-year period of Bhutto is excluded, then the average span falls to 1.6 years.’¹⁷¹ Lack of longevity in rule, coupled with military coups in every decade has brought the military in the forefront of the nation’s governance; while the support of the US for authoritarian regimes has further strengthened it.¹⁷² This evidence points to both insecurity and lack of credibility that the leaders have instilled in its people. Thus, depleted in this primary *prakriti*, the effects that this has on the reliant *prakritis* is enormous. Rais contends that irrespective of civil or military rulers, the essential fabric of leadership has been consistently the same:

Pakistan has over the last 60 years been an authoritarian polity both under the civilian as well as military regimes. ‘Authoritarianism’ involves great reverence and obedience to authority and stands opposite to individualism and freedom that come with it. Both the civilian leaders coming from an agrarian and feudal social background and military leaders from the command and control structure of the armed forces have

¹⁷⁰ Rangarajan, *Kautilya the Arthashastra*, 121.

¹⁷¹ Ishrat Husain, “The role of Politics in Pakistan’s economy,” *Journal Of International Affairs*, 63:1 (Fall/Winter 2009): 9. http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/files/jia/Husain_0.pdf, (accessed 10 May 2012)

¹⁷² Yunas Samad, *The Pakistan-US Conundrum: Jihadist, the Military and the People: the struggle for control*, (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), 235.

demanded absolute loyalty and compliance with their institutions of origin.¹⁷³

The primacy of military within this authoritarian model emerges as noted by Mansfield et al (2002), “Pakistan over time ... [has] developed many of the outward trappings of full democracy, yet the ever-present threat of military intervention prevents democracy from becoming consolidated. In this situation, military elites have an incentive to show that they rule on behalf of the popular will, whereas civilians have an incentive to show that they stand firm on behalf of national security concerns. Consequently, both play the game of populist nationalist politics and become embroiled in military rivalries with neighbouring states.”¹⁷⁴

Though, evidence shows that Pakistan’s economic performance under military rule has been marginally better as compared to civilian rule, Ishrat’s observation on nature of leadership provides an insight:

Economic accomplishments devoid of political legitimacy, however impressive they may be, prove to be short lived. Without the involvement and participation of the people, elegant and technically sound economic solutions developed by authoritarian regimes are quickly replaced once the regime changes, causing irreparable losses to the economy. The recent example whereby good initiatives taken by the Musharraf regime were suspended deprived of funds or abolished completely attests to this phenomenon. Some of these initiatives, such as revitalising higher education and expanding adult literacy and health programmes have been brought to a grinding halt. The Devolution Plan of 2001, which decentralised the delivery of basic services to local levels, is at serious risk of abandonment.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ As quoted by Ishrat Husain in Ibid article, 13. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, “Political Culture and Democracy,” *Friday Times*, 31 August 2007.

¹⁷⁴ Edward Mansfield, Jack Snyder, “Democratic Transition, Institutional Strength and War,” *International Organisation*, 56:2 (2002): 306.

¹⁷⁵ Edward Mansfield, Jack Snyder, “Democratic Transition, Institutional Strength and War”, 12.

The lack of strong and consistent leadership reflects the tension that grows from the 'Idea' of Pakistan. Synnott contends that at partition, Pakistan did not possess the highly developed historical sense of national identity that India possessed, linked to ancient civilisations.¹⁷⁶ Pakistan, in contrast is the only country to be created on the basis of a common Muslim identity.¹⁷⁷ He comments that religion has been an insufficient basis for a common national identity to hold together Pakistan.¹⁷⁸ This search for identity, coupled with perceived existential challenges are a reflection in the weakness of the country's leadership.¹⁷⁹ It can be inferred from this evidence that the Pakistan's misperceptions concerning identity have driven its national security concerns. The inability of Pakistan's leadership to reconcile its identity and affect a strong leadership is reflective of this weakened *prakriti*.

The importance to leadership in contemporary examples is seen in leading powers like the US, UK, China, and Russia. While democracies have an inherent mechanism that promote good leadership, it is without doubt that strong leadership has a profound role in harnessing the *prakritis* of a state and therefore, Hitler and Saddam Hussein stand out as two autocratic leaders who were able to amass power, which eventually collapsed due to the impact of *vyasnas* they imposed on the *prakritis*. It is evident through these analogies that *Arthashastra* addresses the fundamentals of a society that is on the path to achievement, but seeks to temper it with a rational logic that optimises its efforts while allowing the *Yogakshema* to be achieved. The importance of leadership in *prakritis* as given in Arthashastra is therefore reinforced through this evidence.

AMATYA/ MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS

Kautilya says that it is the leader of the state who determines the appointment of ministers. If there is lack of excellence in ministers, it is the leader who holds responsibility. The poor policies flow from the

¹⁷⁶ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 18.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 19. For a detailed reading of the tensions in various tenets of religious society in Pakistan, read page 19.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 19.

¹⁷⁹ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 24.

lack of activity of the ministers and their predisposition to poor governance. He says that all undertakings have their origins in the minister's involvement, which revolves around successful execution of works in the country, bringing about its well being and security from one's own and from enemy's people, taking counter measures against calamities, settlement of new lands and their development, and (bringing in) the benefit of fines and taxes.¹⁸⁰

The weakness in institutional structure is noted by Waseem, 'The civil military relations have incrementally worsened the institutional imbalance in Pakistan.'¹⁸¹ Institutionalised electoral fraud and constitutional amendments to suit the needs of the rulers has impacted the independence of the judiciary and weakened key institutions.¹⁸² Waseem elaborates that the officer cadre of the army and civil bureaucracy represents the permanent institutions of Pakistan; who though socially progressive, are politically conservative;¹⁸³ and this negates efforts of popular activism to revitalise the system. These aspects are exacerbated by lack of strong leadership and have an impact on other *prakritis*. The weakness in the institutions and governance has meant that the ability of Pakistan to harness its latent potential from natural resources and the human capital is compromised.

JANAPADA: NATURAL RESOURCES AND POPULACE

Kautilya contends that, 'the fort, the treasury and the army all depend on the people; so do the water reservoirs. All economic activity has its source in the countryside.'¹⁸⁴ Thus, the health of the economy depends on the well being of the population and the natural resources. One of the important resources Pakistan has is the water available in the Indus River and the arable land, which according to the World Bank report accounts for a fourth of the country's GDP, 2/3 of employment and

¹⁸⁰ Rangarajan, *Kautilya the Arthashastra*, 123

¹⁸¹ Mohammad Waseem, "Pattern of conflict in Pakistan: Implications for Policy," Brooking Working Paper No5 (Jan 2011), 5. http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2011/3/01%20pakistan%20waseem/01_pakistan_waseem.pdf (accessed 10 May 2012)

¹⁸² Ibid., 5, 6.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 4, 5.

¹⁸⁴ Rangarajan, *Kautilya the Arthashastra*, 124

about 80 per cent of exports.¹⁸⁵ The ageing of existing infrastructure and lack of new storage has resulted in overexploitation of the available water reserves.¹⁸⁶ The 2006 World Bank report highlights this:

Poor governance and low trust

Monopoly + Discretion - Accountability = Corruption. The result is inequitable distribution of water, poor technical performance and a pervasive mistrust and conflict, from the provincial off take to the farmer's fields. The water bureaucracy has yet to make the vital mental transition ... from that of builder of assets to that of a good manager of assets.¹⁸⁷

Kautilya contends that, "If the subjects are not happy, they will be discontented with the ruler, which will end his rule."¹⁸⁸ The level of discontentment due to mismanagement of natural resources has risen amongst the population, depleting this *prakriti*. Thus, in spite of availability of water, its poor management has led to poor rationalisation of agriculture and other industries in the country.

The unequal demographic representation in its polity emanating from a model of weak governance has affected the spread of state benefits. The core state of Punjab, home to 60 per cent of its population, is both relatively developed and the power hub, while the rest of the country struggles for better facilities and governance.¹⁸⁹ A 2009 paper by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) of Pakistan highlights the disparity, "The natural gas royalty issue in Balochistan (Western Province of Pakistan) and the water royalty issue in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) have not been granted adequate attention at the federal level in Pakistan leading to what can be called

¹⁸⁵ The World Bank, "Pakistan's Water Economy", <http://go.worldbank.org/WCKW2A5ZA0> (accessed 15 May 12)

¹⁸⁶ The World Bank, "Better Management of Indus Basin Waters: Strategic Issues and Challenges," <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAKISTAN/Data%20and%20Reference/20805819/Brief-Indus-Basin-Water.pdf> (accessed 15 May 12)"

¹⁸⁷ The World Bank, "Better Management of Indus Basin Waters: Strategic Issues and Challenges," (accessed 15 May 2012)

¹⁸⁸ Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra Part III*, 118.

¹⁸⁹ Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, *Afghanistan :How the west lost its way*, 188.

the politics of discontent and the fuelling of separatist nationalist movements gradually resorting to militancy in the provinces from which these natural resources are captured.¹⁹⁰ The dominance of the Punjabis over the army and placement of military officers to run civilian state enterprises has enhanced the military's grip.¹⁹¹ This evidence allows us to understand the inability of a weak institutional and executive structure of the state to *harness* the latent natural resource and human capital.

DURG/ FORTIFICATION THAT ENABLES EXERCISE OVER SOVEREIGNTY

Kautilya explains the relevance of *durg* (fort), 'Dependent on the fort are the treasury, the army, silent war, restraint of one's own party, use of armed forces, receiving allied troops, and warding off enemy troops and forest tribes. And in the absence of a fort, the treasury will fall into the hands of the enemy.'¹⁹² In the context of 300 BC, the fort signified the protection provided to the king, who under the knowledge of his safety, and with the first three *prakritis*, could exercise sovereignty over the state's ability to use its resources, while denying the same to the enemy. While the fort meant was meant to be a stronghold, when interpreted in the modern context, it derives great meaning. It implies the ability of the nation to exercise its sovereignty over its own territory and needs to be seen in the context of the state's ability to exercise *yogakshema* and *palana* without the risk of external aggression. This monograph argues that through *prakritis* Kautilya communicated the implications that a strong or a weak *durg* can have on Sovereignty.

Buzan recognises sovereignty as the 'glue that binds the territorial-polity-society package together.'¹⁹³ He explains that in simple terms, it is self-governance and the ability of a state to provide sufficient capability for sovereignty to be exercised.¹⁹⁴ Buzan also notices that though sovereignty is a contested concept with a problem of interpretation, in

¹⁹⁰ http://www.sdpi.org/publications/publication_details-297-7.html (accessed 15 May 2012)

¹⁹¹ Yunas Samad, *The Pakistan-US Conundrum*, 234.

¹⁹² Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra*, 448,449.

¹⁹³ Buzan, *People States and fear*, 67.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 67.

practice, it is easy to identify by its absence.¹⁹⁵ Clarifying this, he elaborates, ‘social units which claim it [sovereignty] must do so openly, and failure to exercise it, or disputes over the right to do so, will usually be evident.’¹⁹⁶ It can be inferred from the Arthashastra model that modern states will not be able to exercise or claim sovereignty in the absence of all of the preceding *prakritis*, i.e., a strong leader, strong institutions or the harnessed resources to stake the claim. Seen in this context, states like Andorra and Liechtenstein are incapable of mounting defence and foreign relation departments and depend on larger neighbours to exercise sovereignty due to lack of either or all of the first three *prakritis*.¹⁹⁷ In contrast, considering Singapore, which is a state of similar size, but guided by strong leadership in the form of Lee Kuan Yew,¹⁹⁸ has strong institutions and resources, which have been harnessed effectively.¹⁹⁹ Thus, the ability of a state to conduct its affairs effectively without external interference constitutes sovereignty and Kautilya understood this within the priority he lay in *prakritis*.²⁰⁰

Insecurity over India has made Pakistan enter into alliances that permit it to hedge itself against India. This capability was derived at the cost of permitting foreign presence, overt or covert, to operate from its territory and allows these foreign powers to exercise leverage over its policies. The lack of strong leadership and institutions has allowed an incremental loss of sovereignty; which is assisted by the growing Western appetite to engage in upstream engagements. This is especially visible in the contemporary context as the US claims that Pakistan ‘is unable or unwilling to prevent Al Qaeda fighters from hiding and planning future attacks within its borders’; permitting ‘the United States’ use of self-defensive force ... [justified] under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter’.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 67.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 67, 68.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 66.

¹⁹⁸ United Nations, “Importance of Leadership”, ESCAP Virtual Conference, http://www.unescap.org/drrpad/vc/conference/ex_sg_1_iol.htm (accessed 20 May 12)

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 66.

²⁰⁰ Kangle, *The Kautilya Arthashastra*, 448.

²⁰¹ Andrew C Orr, “Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved: The Status of American Drone Strikes in Pakistan Under International Law,” *Cornell International Law Journal*, 732. <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/ILJ/upload/Orr-final.pdf> (accessed 20 May 2012)

The US-Pakistan cooperation today is characterised by its military presence as the US unleashes its ‘technological’ capabilities through the use of ‘drones’ against the ‘Taliban’ and violates the sovereignty of Pakistan with practically no resistance from Pakistan.²⁰²

The presence of US troops on Pakistan’s territory allows a strong element of coercive effect within its own borders, leading to the weakening the first three prakritis discussed earlier. In effect, though the US action against the Taliban constitutes credible action from a tactical perspective, in real politic terms, it raises serious questions about the breach of Pakistan’s sovereignty by the neutral king, an action over which it has limited leverage. This reflects the *vyasana* or the calamity that Pakistan has had to face for entering an alliance it perceived as a necessity for its survival, but which, from the lens of the US, emerges a war of ‘choice’.²⁰³ Thus, *dury* emerges as an important concept within the discourse of statecraft and brings together the previous elements in highlighting the fundamental core of sovereignty.

KOSA/TREASURY

Kautilya says, ‘It [treasury] should be large enough to enable the country to withstand a calamity, even of long duration during which there is no income.’²⁰⁴ Ishrat notes that in 1999, ‘Pakistan’s reserves were barely sufficient to buy three weeks of imports and could not possibly service its short-term debt obligations.’²⁰⁵ Rizvi notes that in the period 2001-06, though the Foreign Exchange (FX) reserves in Pakistan increased more than six times, this was not attributed to government policy’ but the aftermath of 9/11, which resulted in increased remittances and foreign aid.²⁰⁶ This artificial situation led to increased consumption,

²⁰² Shuja Nawaz, “Drone Attacks inside Pakistan: Wayang or Willing suspension of Belief?,” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Summer 2011, 80. <http://journal.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Drone-Attacks-Inside-Pakistan-Wayang-or-Willing-Suspension-of-Disbelief.pdf> (accessed 20 May 2012)

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 81.

²⁰⁴ Rangarajan, *Kautilya The Arthashastra*, 121.

²⁰⁵ Ishrat, *The role of Politics in Pakistan’s Economy*, 8.

²⁰⁶ SKA Rizvi, “Pakistan’s Accumulation of Foreign Exchange Reserves during 2001-2006: Benign or Hostile! Excessive or Moderate! Intent or Fluke!” 2011 Vol. 5 (1), 48,65. <http://www.jespk.net/Publications/Vol%205/3.pdf> (accessed 10 May 2012)

which was unsustainable in the absence of a strong institutional framework. Natural calamity in the form of floods in 2005 and the global economic slump of 2008 have had a serious impact on Pakistan's economy. Thus, by 2008, Pakistan had to pay for wheat in FX reserves and face an inflation of 25 per cent.²⁰⁷ This validates well with Kautilya when he says, 'A King with a depleted treasury eats into the very vitality of the citizens and the country.'²⁰⁸ Kautilya warns of this situation arising from excess expenditure and less profit and advises for a surplus treasury through appropriate policy actions.

Kautilya says, 'Treasury is more important than the army, as army can be raised and maintained with the help of a well filled treasury.'²⁰⁹ This is important, as historically, and more importantly, in the period 2001 onwards, the army was the pretext to raise the treasury and not treasury to raise the army; evidenced by the US aid of \$10 billion, mostly for military purposes in the War on Terror.²¹⁰ The Pakistan treasury has been reliant on foreign support to modernise its forces. However, the aspects of taxation, accountability, and land holding patterns to harness resources have not received the same emphasis that the military forces accrued.²¹¹ The poor state of the treasury is thus a combination of state policies attributable to lack of leadership, effective institutions and natural calamities; combined with an importance attached to military acquisition.

DANDA/MILITARY FORCES

Kautilya describes the military as, 'the army shall consist mostly of men of tested loyalty... They should have no interest other than that of the king and should share their prosperity and adversity.'²¹² As Hilali comments on General Zia, the Pakistan military dictator from 1977-88, 'Zia succeeded in destroying the status of national institutions

²⁰⁷ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 82,83.

²⁰⁸ Rangarajan, *Kautilya The Arthashastra*, 14.

²⁰⁹ Kangle *The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part III*, 189.

²¹⁰ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 81.

²¹¹ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 81.

²¹² Rangarajan, *Kautilya The Arthashastra*, 121.

(parliament, judiciary and media)...Zia's regime through the ISI encouraged ethnic, regional and religious parties, as part of his divide and rule strategy.²¹³ Synnott notes that Pakistan's Army and its intelligence services have been closely involved in its security policy decisions. He attributes the role played by these institutions to be a product of the strategic judgment of the army, which has based its analysis to the advantage of the military institution itself.²¹⁴ The civil- military trust deficit has been a regular part of Pakistan's history. The position of the army has been elevated to the position of leadership within the state, thereby affecting the other *prakritis*. Lack of credible political and governance structure has been an issue under rule by the military.

Kautilya warns against corruption when he says, 'Just as a fish moving inside water cannot be known when drinking water, even so officers appointed for carrying out works [related to valuables] cannot be known when appropriating money.'²¹⁵ Kautilya points out that for proper formulation and an effective implementation of a plan to control corruption, a king must collect as much information through intelligence as possible.²¹⁶ Herein lies a Kautilyan advice that is contraindicated in Pakistan's case. The Kautilian states intelligence was managed and controlled by the King. However, in the case of Pakistan, the ISI is controlled by the Pakistan Army, which allows the army to exert tremendous influence in the policy making of the state. Intelligence has been exercised by Pakistan as a tool of state policy to achieve the strategic options. They [ISI] have taken over the all important intelligence networks, resulting in information dominance over the *amatya*. The military thus controls the *amatya* and treasury, resources and through these, the leadership. This permits them to dictate terms to the leaders. Thus, contrary to Kautilya's stated order of the *prakritis*, in Pakistan these have been realised in the reverse order. This reverse prioritisation of *prakritis* is contrary to Kautilya's advice and thus leads to the decline of the state.

²¹³ Hilali, 208.

²¹⁴ Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan*, 39.

²¹⁵ Boesche, *The First Great Political realist*, 46.

²¹⁶ Rangarajan, *Kautilya, the Arthashastra*, 505.

MITRA / ALLIES

Through Arthashastra's prism, 'the most important characteristic of an alliance is giving help'.²¹⁷ Sihag through his analysis elaborates Kautilya's conception of allies. He contends that Kautilya prefers weaker kings for an alliance since they are controllable in commitments, as compared to an equal or stronger king who may not keep their commitment, as they are not controllable.²¹⁸ Sihag has devised the following matrix to capture Kautilya's ideas regarding potential allies.²¹⁹ This matrix maps the controllability over; and strength of a potential ally to derive his trustworthiness.

	Potential Ally	
	Controllable	Not Controllable
Believe	Weaker or upright	Strong and upright
Not Believe	Weak and Not upright	Equal or Stronger and not upright

Table 1: Selection of an Ally

The above matrix may be used to express Kautilya's classification of possible allies. For example, if the potential ally has the desired qualities of a good ally, or has the reputation to be controllable or is weak, he recommends the strategy (believe, controllable), that is the upper left cell. On the other hand, if the potential ally is an equal, or stronger, Kautilya advises to adopt the choice (not believe, not controllable) that is the lower right cell.²²⁰ Based on this matrix, it emerges that the states that Pakistan chose to align with (US, China, Saudi) for its stated goals were all stronger, upright and not controllable. Therefore, the contribution of these alliances was limited within the context of their ends. Therefore, the other ally that was controllable was the 'Taliban', which though controllable, was weak and not upright²²¹ in this matrix.

²¹⁷ Rangarajan, *Kautilya, the Arthashastra.*, 604.

²¹⁸ Balbir Sihag, "Kautilya on time inconsistency problem and Asymmetric Information," 48.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 48.

²²⁰ Ibid., 48.

²²¹ Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 112.

Taliban's own *prakritis*, it can be argued were sufficiently flawed to permit any meaningful alliance, except the strategic hedging against India within a short temporal context.

From the study of the *prakritis*, it emerges that by following its course of action within the *Mandalait* inhabits, the *prakritis* have been realised in the reverse order in Pakistan, as depicted by the black arrows in figure 8. It has been shown that contrary to the natural order of affairs of the state, the military has reigned supreme in matters of statecraft. This has led to lack of institutional strength, poor resource utilisation, economic downfall and lack of strong leadership. The simultaneous calamities that can afflict a state are commented upon by Kautilya when he says, "The conqueror shall save from misfortune, one by one, the constituents of his state, in the order of importance; for it is better that the ally remains in danger but not the army; likewise the army but not the treasury."²²² This clearly reveals that in the case of Pakistan, the leadership, and institutions, need strengthening to recover the economy and enable the state to come out of its troubles.




Figure 8

²²² Rangarajan, *Kautilya, the Arthashastra*, 126.

CONCLUSION

*'An archer letting off an arrow may or may not kill a single man but a wise man using his intellect can kill even reaching unto the very womb.'*²²³

The paper has situated Arthasastra in the modern world to stimulate interest in the enduring topics it addresses and offers a perspective through an indigenous strategic discourse on matters of global relevance. Arthasastra has invoked serious academic debate in the field of Justice, Economics, Management and Foreign Affairs. However, its treatment on matters concerning contemporary security issues is largely unexplored. The prescriptive teachings of Kautilya are underpinned with his deeper understanding of the factors that promote stability in a state and through this stability, progress in the wider sense. Arthasastra therefore adds value to the state, the society and the individual. Flowing from this fundamental wisdom, Kautilya builds on the state's strengths and provides courses of action that its policy makers can adopt when faced with situations in the security and foreign policy domain.

The study of Pakistan's policies within the current global security environment has allowed Kautilya's teachings to be brought to life. Undoubtedly, within its strategic calculus, Pakistan has been successful in the context of what its policymakers set out to achieve. The effective use of choices within *Mandala* theory and innate choice of *shadgunyas* and *upayas* juxtaposed with intelligent mix of covert and silent wars has allowed it to creatively exercise a variety of options in its bid to achieve parity with India. Arthasastra also provides an insight into the misperception that is generated through weak leadership and institutions, which has come at a heavy cost to its constituent *prakritis*, affected by human policies and natural calamities; which has challenged the cohesion

²²³ Ibid., 625.

of its institutions, its physical structure and finally the very idea of its statehood. The effect of realising the wrong prioritisation of the constituent elements of *prakeritis* through the case study clearly highlights the importance of leadership and institutions over other constituents. His understanding of inter-state alliances reveals the inherent tensions and opportunities that accompany the choices exercised by states. Through this case study, the relevance of Arthashastra is illustrated in the contemporary security environment and highlights the applicability of this text to similar complex issues around the world.

Arthashastra identifies fundamental themes through models and paradigms that have universal validity. The study reveals that it can be used in not only analysing and interpreting the ideal set of state policies, but also the flawed state policies and perceptions. Through the richness of options that Kautilya provides, allows problems to be understood and tackled through human decisions, aided by a wisdom that was understood 2,300 years ago. The secular and logical tone of its delivery accompanied with empirical learnings allow it to be interpreted through paradigms which can be detached from discussions involving religion or ideologies and address the root relationships amongst contending issues without a bias. The treatment of the case study through an indigenous lens paves a way for developing and creating a distinct version of Indian strategic vocabulary.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Books

1. Kangle, R.P. *The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part II*. Bombay University Press, Bombay, 1963.
2. Kangle, R.P. *The Kautilya Arthashastra, Part III A Study*. Bombay University Press, Bombay 1965.
3. Rangarajan, L.N. *Kautilya: The Arthashastra*. Penguin Books, New Delhi, 1992.
4. Shamasastri, R. *Kautilya's Arthashastra*. Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, 1915.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books

5. Amin, Shahid. *Pakistan's Foreign Policy A Reappraisal*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000.
6. Ashdown, Paddy. *Swords and Ploughshares, Bringing Peace to the 21st Century*. , Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 2007.
7. Bird, Tim and Marshall, Alex. *Afghanistan: How the west lost its way*. , Yalepress, Yale, 2011.
8. Boesche, Roger. *The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and His Arthashastra*. Lexington Books, Oxford, 2002.
9. Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear: An agenda For International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. , Wheatsheaf, London, 1991.
10. Calvo-coressi, Peter. *World Politics Since 1945*. Pearson Education Ltd, Essex, 2009.

11. Craig, Gordon and George, Alexander. *Force and Statecraft : Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, 3rd Edition*. Oxford University Press, Oxford,1995.
12. Handel, Michael. *Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini*. Frank Cass, London,1993.
13. Hilali, A.J. *US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*. Ashgate, Hants, 2005.
14. Huntington, Samuel. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon & Schuster, London, 2002.
15. Melton, Stephen. *The Clausewitz Delusion : How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward)*, Zenith Press, US, 2009.
16. Nye, Joseph and Welch, David. *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation.*, Pearson, London, 2011.
17. O'Brien, Robert and Williams Marc. *Global Political Economy.* , Palgrave Macmillan, New York,2004.
18. Samad, Yunas. *The Pakistan-US Conundrum.*, Hurst & Company, London, 2011.
19. Syed Anwar Hussain. *China & Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale.* ,Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1974.
20. Synnott, Hillary. *Transforming Pakistan: Ways out of instability*. Routledge, London, 2009.

ARTICLES

21. Alexander Evan, "Pakistan and shadow of 9/11." *RUSI*, August-September, 2011, p.65-70.
22. Boesche, Roger. "Kautilya's Arthasastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India." *The Journal of Military History*,67(1), January 2003,: p.9-37.

23. Charles Waldauer, "Kautilya's Arthashastra: A neglected Precursor to Classical Economics." in *Indian Economic Review*, 31(1), 1996,p. 101-108.
24. Dellios, Rosita. "Mandalic regionalism in Asia: exploring the relationship between regional governance and economic security," *Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies*, 2008,8(1), Article 4.URL : <http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cm/vol8/iss1/4> (Accessed January 10, 2012)
25. Ian Mabbett, "The Kautilya Arthasastra and the Concept of Secularism." *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, 33(1), April 2010,p. 13-32.
26. Mansfield, Edward and Synder, Jack. "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War." *International Organization*, 56(2), 2002,p. 297-377.
27. Marshall, Alex. "Managing Withdrawal: Afghanistan as the Forgotten Example in Attempting Conflict Resolution and State Reconstruction." *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 18(1),March 2007 p., 68-89.
28. Rashed Uz Zaman. "Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic Culture." *Comparative Strategy*, 25(3), 2006, p.231-247.
29. Rashed Uz Zaman. "Strategic Culture: A 'Cultural' Understanding of War." *Comparative Strategy*, 28(1), 2009,p. 68-88.
30. Sihag, Balbir. "Kautilya on Administration of Justice during the fourth century B.C." *Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, 29(3),September 2007,p. 359-377.
31. Sihag, Balbir. "Kaumilya on Moral, Market, and Government Failures." *International Journal of Hindu Studies*, 13(1), Springer, Netherlands,2009, 83-102.
32. Sihag, Balbir, "Kautilya on Administration of Justice during the fourth century BC." in *Journal of the History of Economic thought*, 29(3), September 2007 p. 359-377.

33. Sihag, Balbir, "Kautilya on Time Inconsistency Problem and Asymmetric Information." in *Indian Economic Review*, 42(1), 2007, 41-55.
34. Sihag, Balbir, "Risk return trade off and diversification." in *Indian Journal of economics and Business*, 7(2) 2008,p. 281-296.
35. Stavridis, James G. "The Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan." *Prism* 2(2). ,National Defence University Press, Washington, March 2011,65-76.
36. Thanawala, K. "Kautilya's Arthasastra: A Neglected Work in the History of Economic Thought." In *Ancient Economic Thought*, 1, ed B. B. Price,1997,43-58.
37. Tisdell, Clem. "A Western Perspective on Kautilya's 'Arthasastra': Does it Provide a Basis for Economic Science." *Economic Theory, Applications and Issues*, Working Paper No.18, January 2003,p. 1-13.
38. Torkel Brekke. "Wielding the rod of punishment — war and violence in the political science of Kautilya." *Journal of Military Ethics*, 3(1),2004, p.40-52.

CHAPTER WITHIN A BOOK

39. Behera N.C. "Re-imagining IR in India." In *Non-Western International Relations Theory*, Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (ed.), Routledge, Oxon, 2010,92-116.
40. Schetter, Conrad. "The 'Bazaar Economy' of Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Approach". *Afghanistan – A Country without a State?* Verlag, Frankfurt,p. 109-128.

NET ARTICLES

41. Andrew C Orr, "Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved: The Status of American Drone Strikes in Pakistan Under International Law," *Cornell International Law Journal*, 732. <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/ILJ/upload/Orr-final.pdf> (Accessed May 20, 2012)

42. Coates, Breena (CSUSB) and Col. Jeffrey Caton. "The Ultimate Pragmatist: Kautilya's Philosophy on SMART Power in National Security" *International Society for Military Ethics*, 2010. URL: <http://www.google.com/url?sa=D&q=http://isme.tamu.edu/ISME10/Coates-Caton10.doc&usg=AFQjCNHKTsjjZSsfqkPftR2oGto7Dkfe80g> (Accessed May 10, 2012)
43. D. Mackenzie Brown, The Premises of Indian Political Thought Author(s): Source: The Western Political Quarterly, 6,(2) June, 1953, pp. 243-249, University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association Stable, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/442160> (Accessed December 20,2011)
44. George Modelski. "Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World". *The American Political Science Review*, 58(3),September, 1964), pp. 549-560,. American Political Science Association,Stable, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1953131>(Accessed November 15, 2011)
45. Ilhan Niaz, "Kautilya's Arthasastra and governance as an element of state power," Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad. http://www.issi.org.pk/old-site/ss_Detail.php?dataId=479 (Accessed May 12, 2012)
46. Ishrat Husain, "The role of Politics in Pakistan's economy," *Journal of International Affairs*, 63(1) 2009, http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/files/jia/Husain_0.pdf, (Accessed May 10, 2012)
47. Mohammad Waseem, "Pattem of conflict in Pakistan: Implications for Policy," Brooking Working Paper No5 (January, 2011),5. http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2011/3/01%20pakistan%20waseem/01_pakistan_waseem.pdf (Accessed May 10, 2012)
48. PV Narsimharao. Indira Gandhi National Centre for Arts, Ministry of Culture (India), "Across the Himalayan Gap: Indian leader's speeches in Chinese University", http://www.ignca.nic.in/ks_41006.htm (Accessed May 15, 2012)
49. Querine Hanlon, "State Actors in the 21st Century Security Environment", *Adapting America's Security Paradigm and Security*

- Agenda*, 7/2011,p.1-17, <http://www.strategycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/State-Actors-21st-Century.pdf> (Accessed May 15, 2012)
50. Sayem Islam. *The Arthashastra Insights on Statecraft and Reflections of Ancient Indian Society*, www.umich.edu/~historyj/docs/2008-winter/islam.pdf (Accessed November 15, 2011)
51. Satya Deva, State and Bureaucracy in Kautilya's "Arthashastra" Source: Economic and Political Weekly, 19(19) May 12, 1984, pp. 811-815 Published by: Economic and Political Weekly Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4373251> (Accessed, December 20, 2011)
52. Shuja Nawaz, "Drone Attacks inside Pakistan: Wayang or Willing suspension of Belief?," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 2011, 80. <http://journal.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Drone-Attacks-Inside-Pakistan-Wayang-or-Willing-Suspension-of-Disbelief.pdf> (Accessed May 20, 2012)
53. SKA Rizvi, "Pakistan's Accumulation of Foreign Exchange Reserves during 2001-06: Benign or Hostile! Excessive or Moderate! Intent or Fluke!?", 2011, 5 (1),48,65. <http://www.jespk.net/Publications/Vol%205/3.pdf> (Accessed May 10, 2012)

OFFICIAL SOURCES

54. United Kingdom, HCFAC 8th report of 2008-09, *Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan*,p.1-189. <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmcaff/302/302.pdf> (Accessed May 15, 2012)
55. United Kingdom, *A Strong Britain in the Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*, 2010.

NET ARTICLES

56. Lok Kalyan Shikshan Sanstha, (Article on Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India) <http://www.lkss.org/manmohan-singh.html> (Accessed May 15, 2012)

57. The World Bank, “Better Management of Indus Basin Waters: Strategic Issues and Challenges,” 2006, 3. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAKISTAN/Data%20and%20Reference/20805819/Brief-Indus-Basin-Water.pdf> (Accessed May 20, 2012)
58. The World Bank, “Better Management of Indus Basin Waters: Strategic Issues and Challenges,” <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAKISTAN/Data%20and%20Reference/20805819/Brief-Indus-Basin-Water.pdf> (Accessed May 15, 2012)”
59. The World Bank, “Pakistan’s Water Economy”, <http://go.worldbank.org/WCKW2A5ZA0> (Accessed May 15, 2012)
60. United Nations, “Importance of Leadership”, ESCAP Virtual Conference, http://www.unescap.org/drrpad/vc/conference/ex_sg_1_iol.htm (Accessed May 20, 2012)

Civilizational discourses have generated fundamental principles which have stood the scrutiny of time and have the potential to provide a guiding light to complex modern issues. Kautilya's *Arthashastra* stands out as a comprehensive discourse that encapsulated the insecurities of warring states and provided prescriptive solutions to the then rulers of the Mauryan Empire. The contemporary security environment in the globalised world today shares a similar tension due to uneven economic progress and an anarchic climate amongst the comity of nations. In this monograph, the *Arthashastra* framework is used for examination of dynamics of fragility in South Asia, with a case study of Pakistan. The insights into human policy choices which can be gleaned from the treatise have a timeless quality that can offer a fresh perspective to today's policy makers. It can be open to further academic investigation and debate for developing and enriching an indigenous strategic vocabulary.



Wg Cdr Sachin More is an alumnus of the National Defence Academy. He is a post graduate in Defence Studies from King's College London and in Geoinformatics from Sikkim Manipal University. He has completed the Advanced Staff and Command Course from the Joint Services Command and Staff College at Shrivenham, UK in 2012.

A serving fighter pilot in the Indian Air Force, he has extensive experience in fighter flying. He is a graduate of the Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment, having served there as a Directing Staff on both Fighter and Helicopter aircraft. An avid reader, his interests include history and economics. In this maiden effort on *Arthashastra*, the author has brought to life the arguments of the *Arthashastra* through a contemporary case study.



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE
STUDIES & ANALYSES

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg,
Delhi Cantt., New Delhi - 110 010
Tel.: (91-11) 2671-7983 Fax: (91-11) 2615 4191
E-mail: contactus@idsa.in Website: <http://www.idsa.in>

