

Introduction

“You must make a close study of human nature, for that is the raw material with which a commander has to achieve his end. If you neglect the human factor, as a leader you will fail.”

– Field Marshal Montgomery

With global commitments and combat duty in sub-conventional warfare, our security forces personnel face life threatening challenges on daily basis. The battlefield environment is now dominated by sub-conventional warfare and our uniformed personnel are combating an enemy that is hidden and undefined. To tackle the situations in this new type of warfare, there is a need to understand the nuances of sub-conventional warfare, its effects on thinking and behaviour of security forces personnel who have been traditionally trained in conventional warfare and its impact on their morale. It is essential to understand stress caused in sub-conventional operations environment, its relationship with performance and devise measures to manage stress among security forces personnel. Finally, there is a need to come out with a human resource development methodology for building human resource capacity for coping stress in sub-conventional warfare.

The new warfare demands a work-force with better educational standards, which is physically fit, mentally robust and of course fully motivated at all times. Importance to training and preparing the security forces for sub-conventional warfare has been repeatedly emphasised by the top army hierarchy.¹ For the past five decades, India has been a victim of ‘proxy war’, ‘insurgency’ and ‘terrorism’ unlike other countries which have begun to grapple with the reality of terrorism only post-

9/11. There are the formidable challenges that the country faces today. For the security forces, the necessity of operating in close contact with the civil population dictates that their efforts to contain violence are based on the doctrine of minimum use of force. The doctrine for sub-conventional warfare issued by army headquarters on December 31, 2006 articulates that army will follow the policy of the 'Iron Fist' for terrorists and the 'Velvet Glove' for the people as people's support and winning their hearts and minds is the key to success. However, it is quite difficult for a soldier operating in sub-conventional warfare environment to know as to who is a terrorist and who is not a terrorist.

The less visible threats impact the mental health of our troops operating in sub-conventional warfare environment by subjecting them to undue stress. The challenges of managing men in sub-conventional warfare environment range from: a difficult and unpredictable life, loneliness, maintaining relationships – marriage, friendships and others – from a distance, resisting temptations and remaining faithful to spouse, meeting the aspirations of the organisation and countrymen, apart from dealing with the threat of injury and death including trauma of mistakenly killing innocent civilians.

The current doctrine and tactics of Indian army have evolved informally over 50 years of hands on experience. In early 1950's the planners borrowed extensively from Malayan model of counter-insurgency exploited with great success by the British. The basic model has hardly undergone any change and is in vogue even today in the Northeast and J&K. The unique feature of Indian army's doctrine on sub-conventional warfare is 'restraint imposed' at all levels in the employment of full range of fire power available to the fourth largest army of the world. This restraint has not come cheap as is clearly reflected in the rising casualty rate of units committed in counter-insurgency operations in valley as well as north-east.

Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) being a campaign of nerves, less military and more psychological, with the constraint of troops invariably fighting with 'hands tied behind their back' leads to combat stress. The mental strain of having to fight one's own people is infinitely greater than fighting the enemy. Environmental stressors which adversely affect a soldier's operating efficiency in LIC are poor living conditions, adverse weather conditions, hostile terrain and extended tenures beyond 18

months accentuating loneliness, monotony and uncertainty of soldier's life. Security forces personnel operating in sub-conventional warfare environments are faced with uncertainty in almost everything – the very purpose of life, of living, of dying or being maimed, the lack of information, the next contact with the militant, of what tomorrow holds for them, the duration of their deployment in a given situation, their role and even their chances of success. Since the concept of enemy can not be applied to one's own people, the contributory factors which increase the stress levels of officers and men operating in such an environment are the product of three elements – the militant, the local population and the soldier. The local population tends to think that the militants have been wronged by the administration. They tend to look at the militants as their 'own boys' fighting for a just cause and the security forces as the 'long and cruel' hands of the administration, particularly when there are human rights violations. Propaganda by neighbouring countries and international agencies may further alienate the local population. In this background, the soldier often from a different cultural milieu, is looked upon as an outsider. The security forces personnel, thus, end up fighting an elusive enemy, in the absence of reliable intelligence and lack of cooperation or even with active resentment of the local population. Ambiguity of aim, lack of visible success and high casualty rates tend to erode the morale of security forces personnel. Several operational factors such as fatigue, unpredictability of threat, extended tenures, domestic worries, absence of recreational avenues, irregular mail, issues related to leave and rail travel without proper reservation increase the level of frustration among security forces personnel deployed in such an environment.

Success in any form of sub-conventional warfare demands high level of motivation, commitment, unit cohesion, dedication to duty, courage, selflessness and a humane approach. At times the requirements and expectations are conflicting. This adds further complexity to the tasks of commanders at various levels. The operational methodology of any form of sub-conventional warfare is at variance with conventional warfare. It is essential that the requirements of this type of warfare, are clearly understood before recommending stress management measures.

Stress is like a 'fire' and is an inescapable part of life. It is the psychological and physiological reaction that occurs when an individual

perceives an imbalance between the demands made on him and his capability to meet them. Stress affects individuals physiologically, emotionally and behaviourally and is linked to responses which in case of stress overloads, often results in rash or irrational behaviour. However, stress at optimum levels also produces a positive dynamic reaction which often aids in tiding over difficult situations.

Security forces personnel are by no means insulated against the phenomenon of stress. In fact, they are exposed to extremely complex situations inherent in today's warfare that are even more stressful. The recent spate of suicides, fragging and fratricides makes it imperative to understand at the earliest, the maladies of stress and its effect on security forces personnel in sub-conventional warfare. Understanding stress and its relationship to performance, therefore, plays an important role in the managing of security forces personnel, both in peace and today's operational environment.

A rigid organisational structure, peculiar environmental factors, extended deployment in counter insurgency operations, low intensity conflict operations and other combat situations often compound stress related problems not only among security forces personnel but also their families. These, if not tackled at an early stage result in cumulative stress effects which often surpass acceptable limits.

The study of sub-conventional warfare, its effect on motivation of security forces personnel, stress – its causes and relationship with performance could help in evaluating and recommending suitable measures for coping high levels of stress among security forces personnel as also their families apart from recommending a workable human resource development strategy for managing stress in sub-conventional warfare.

The purpose of this study is to examine sub-conventional warfare environment, its effect on the motivation of security forces personnel, stress – its effect and relationship with performance, identifying peculiar stressors in such environment and suggest measures for coping stress among security forces personnel apart from recommending human resource development strategy for sub-conventional warfare.

The scope of this work is limited to the following aspects:

- (a) Understanding sub-conventional warfare and its effect on motivation of security forces personnel.

- (b) Suggest measures to sustain motivation in sub-conventional warfare.
- (c) Understanding stress and its effect on performance of security forces personnel deployed in sub-conventional warfare environment.
- (d) Suggest measures to optimise stress in among security forces personnel deployed in sub-conventional warfare environment.
- (e) Recommend human resource development strategy for coping stress in sub-conventional warfare.

This work is based on the study of books, journals, material available through open sources like internet and media reports, interviews with the experts on the subject, interaction with officers and men deployed in counter-insurgency and low intensity conflict operations in J&K, and the Northeast and training centres of various arms and services during field trips.

The book is organised and structured as under:

Introduction

Chapter 1: Understanding Sub-conventional Warfare

Chapter 2: Motivating Army for Sub-Conventional Operations' Environment

Chapter 3: Sub-Conventional Warfare Stress Optimisation

Chapter 4: Managing Stress-Related Issues in Army

Chapter 5: Developing Human Resource for Sub-Conventional Warfare

Conclusion

The first chapter on “Understanding Sub-Conventional Warfare” is an attempt to define sub-conventional warfare, commonly known as unconventional warfare and brings out the salient differences between conventional and sub-conventional warfare before discussing various forms of sub-conventional warfare in which our security forces personnel may get engaged. Finally, this chapter lists out typical requirements and peculiarities of sub-conventional warfare along with impact of such warfare on security forces personnel and, thereafter, suggests a way ahead in order to derive optimum output from our security forces personnel.

The peculiarities of the operating environment, its related effect on the behaviour and mind set of troops and the measures required to be initiated by concerned agencies to sustain and enhance the motivational level of troops, have to be properly understood and applied. Such an understanding will allow the military leaders to utilise most efficiently, the diverse talents among their subordinates. It is essential that military leaders become intelligent consumers of response/ need data, so that they function from a position of strength instead of a position of uncertainty / ignorance.

The second chapter on “Motivating Army for Sub-Conventional Warfare” is an attempt to understand the peculiarities of the operational environment in sub-conventional warfare scenario in Indian context, factors affecting the psychology and motivation of security forces personnel and finally recommends measures which need to be taken at various levels by concerned agencies to sustain and enhance the motivational level of troops.

The third chapter on “Sub-Conventional Warfare Stress Optimisation” identifies the signs, symptoms, causes and effects of stress on performance of troops deployed in sub-conventional warfare environment and finally suggests measures to cope with it. This chapter may be of value to individuals interested in gaining a more detailed understanding of how stressors lead to stress, how stress affects performance and what can be done to mitigate these effects. In particular, army planners and senior officials may find it helpful in developing new training and support programmes that help service members deal with and adapt to stress both in barracks and on deployment.

In the fourth chapter on “Managing Stress-Related Issues in Army”, the author discusses the main causes of stress in army including cases of suicides and fratricides, studies on stress-related incidents, action taken by the organisation/ government to address the issue and finally recommends focus areas.

The fifth chapter on “Developing Human Resource for Sub-Conventional Warfare”, attempts to evolve a suitable human resource development strategy for coping with stress in sub-conventional warfare. This chapter brings out the necessity of human resource development to suit sub-conventional operation requirements, salient aspects of stress

in sub-conventional operations and the existing drawbacks and challenges faced by the organisation during such operations. Finally, in this chapter the author recommends a human resource development strategy for the Indian army.

NOTE

1. During a Conference on 'Holistic Approach to Sub-Conventional Operations' organised at Army War College, MHOW, former COAS, General J.J. Singh emphasised the importance of training and preparations for sub-conventional warfare.

CHAPTER 1

Understanding Sub-Conventional Warfare

Introduction

Most conflicts in future will occur in the form of sub-conventional/unconventional/low intensity conflicts.¹ Security forces will increasingly find themselves employed less and less in traditional roles and more and more in non-traditional roles typically at the low end of the spectrum of conflict. Sub-conventional warfare differs qualitatively from conventional warfare. Therefore, when employed in unconventional roles, it is imperative that personnel fully understand these qualitative differences and how they impact their actions in the operations.

The focus of this chapter is three-fold. It attempts to define sub-conventional warfare, commonly known as unconventional warfare and highlights the salient differences between conventional and sub-conventional warfare before discussing the various forms of sub-conventional warfare in which our security personnel may get engaged. Finally, this chapter lists out the typical requirements and peculiarities of sub-conventional warfare along with impact of such warfare on the security forces and, thereafter, suggests a way ahead in order to derive optimum output from our security forces personnel.

Understanding Sub-Conventional Warfare

Sub-conventional warfare is a generic term encompassing all armed conflicts that are a level above peaceful co-existence and below the threshold of war. It includes militancy, insurgency, proxy war and terrorism employed in an insurrectionist movement or undertaken independently. Border skirmishes also fall within this category. Today, nations are being challenged by new threats in the guise of low intensity conflicts (LIC), which have the inherent and insidious capacity to disrupt national/regional stability. The full scale and devastating impact of these conflicts may not be felt for decades, but they will serve to set the stage for future violent struggles. Figuring at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict and entailing protracted struggle, sub-conventional warfare could also be characterised by an asymmetry of force levels between regular forces and irregulars. The force applied and the violence generated depends on the modus operandi of the weaker side and the laws of the land, which constrain the actions of the security forces. The modus operandi of weaker side is generally characterised by irrationality, indiscrimination, unpredictability and ruthlessly destructive behaviour.

The management and resolution of such conflicts necessitates a multi-pronged thrust by all elements of national power to address the root causes. The deployment of security forces in the initial stages is meant for ensuring a secure environment, wherein various institutions of the government can function without any inimical interference. Having provided this environment, the security forces, thereafter, function in a manner that strengthens the hands of the government.

Sub-conventional warfare is the primary means of undertaking a LIC which in its many forms will continue to plague nations through out the world.² These conflicts are not wars of trenches, frontlines and masses of men in uniform struggling against each other on bloody battlefields. Instead these are wars of subtleties, nuances, intimidation, fear, political mobilisation, terror and revolution – at times bloody but at most times characterised by psychological warfare, political manoeuvring and mobilisation, disinformation, deception, assassination and terrorism.³

Sub-conventional warfare consists of a broad spectrum of military and para-military operations, normally of long duration, predominantly

conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces organised, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external force during conditions of war or peace. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive actions, low visibility, covert or clandestine operations as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities and evasion and escape. Such warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous people, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by external source during all conditions of war and. Such conflicts are political wars in the most literal sense. Thus, in finalising a military reaction to sub-conventional wars, security forces actions must be coordinated with the other instruments of national power in order to provide a synergised solution to the conflict, where goals are simple, targets limited, terrain familiar, results immediate and satisfactions personal.⁴

Unconventional warfare is a form of warfare which is based on the idea that it is possible to destabilise an enemy so much that it gives up even if it has the ability to continue making war. Rather than relying on the brute force tactics of conventional warfare, unconventional warfare relies on creative, innovative and usually stealthy tactics so that the enemy never knows what to expect.⁵ This type of warfare is also referred as 'non-conventional' or 'sub-conventional' or 'asymmetrical' warfare or 'small war' or even 'new war'.⁶

The general objective of this type of warfare is to instil a belief that peace and security are not possible without compromise or concession. Specific objectives include inducement of war-weariness, curtailment of civilians standard of living and civil liberties associated with greater security demands, economic hardship linked to the cost of war, helplessness against assaults, fear, depression and disintegration of morale. The ultimate goal of this type of warfare is to motivate an enemy to stop attacking or resisting even if it has the ability to continue. Failing this, a secondary objective can be to emasculate the enemy before a conventional attack.

How is it Different from Conventional Warfare

In conventional warfare, security forces have a clearly stated objective and a plan for attaining it. However, in sub-conventional warfare, the

goals are usually more nebulous and troops often work independently, in small groups, striking blows at the enemy as and when they see it. Any target is fair game in unconventional warfare, from uniformed troops to civilians, as the idea is essentially to weaken the enemy from the inside out, and forcing them to capitulate and negotiate surrender.

The use of intimidation and coercion is common in unconventional warfare, where anything goes, as long as the greater goal of forcing a concession is eventually achieved. The lack of clear goals and encouragement of subversive tactics sometimes spawns rogue operators, who may have lost sight of the greater mission as they work independently. For example, a guerrilla force may move from active harassment of villagers supporting the enemy to tormenting innocent civilians who have no vested interest in the outcome of the war. Here, battle lines are not clearly drawn, the enemy is not identifiable and thus aggression cannot be unequivocally channelled in his direction. Organisational as well as national goals are unclear and ambiguous and public support is also missing in this type of warfare. The use of firepower by security forces is restricted and application of force is under constant scrutiny by media and human rights organisations. Such restrictions and limitations are not imposed on security forces in conventional warfare.

Some of the distinctive features of a sub-conventional conflict zone vis-à-vis conventional conflict zone are: the blurring of the distinction between front and rear, strategic and tactical actions and combatants and non-combatants. In addition, the environment is suitably manipulated by terrorists to enhance their relevance and credibility by employing 'mass disruptive' or 'mass destructive' methods through direct and indirect measures for psychologically influencing various sections of the environment.

Requirements in Sub-Conventional Warfare

Unconventional warfare is a complex phenomenon. The difficulties of dealing with such conflicts are inherent in its very nature – it defies the logical, geometrical and technological aspects of conventional warfare as well as its principles. It is often difficult to determine whether we are winning or losing, who in the end is the ultimate victor.⁷

Principles of war cannot adequately guide the employment of forces in unconventional conflicts. One of the difficulties encountered with respect to formulating responses to unconventional conflict is that they all differ in some respect or the other. Though generalisations can be made about such conflicts, the circumstances that surround the initiation of a particular conflict are never exactly replicated in other conflicts. Hence each conflict has its own genesis, unique environment, aim and methodology for combating it.⁸ Each insurgency requires a different approach, strategy, training and leadership. All too often, we tend to apply the tactics, techniques and lessons learnt from one conflict to another and while the broad underlying principles can be enunciated, no templates are possible.

In addition, the political and human dimensions of unconventional warfare complicate not only the formulation of an effective response but also the prosecution of it. It requires an integration of all instruments of the national power and coordination of civil and military activities. An extraordinary comprehensive unity of effort is required to conduct successful counter-insurgency operations. Since such operations require unconventional methods and form an element of unconventional warfare, it is necessary that our security forces are suitably prepared and equipped to meet the challenges of future. It must be understood that resolution of such a war is more political and less military in nature.

The principles of unconventional warfare derived from the guerrilla warfare theory are: objective, offensive, manoeuvre, mobility, unity of effort, economy of force, security and deception, speed, surprise, simplicity, knowledge, psychology, dispersion, concentration, flexibility, initiative, unpredictability, mobilisation, legitimacy, perseverance and adaptability. Principles of war – whether conventional or unconventional – are neither like the laws of natural science where the observance of specific conditions produces a predictable result, nor are they like rules of a game, the breach of which entails a prescribed penalty.⁹ Rather they are guides to action or fundamental tenets that form the basis for understanding a situation and planning but their relevance, applicability and relative importance changes with circumstances. These must be adapted to a particular situation and it must be recognised that every insurgency movement has its own peculiarities and nuances.

Observing a set of prescribed principles, whether to be used as a checklist or framework for activity cannot replace good judgment and leadership in any battlefield and understanding the nature of conflict is the first critical step in mission analysis.

Some of the basic requirements which are deemed necessary for successful conducting sub-conventional warfare are listed below:

- Substantial effort must be devoted to promoting the government's legitimacy.
- The government must recognise that the insurgency is not primarily a military problem and it must recognise and address the legitimate grievances of the people.
- Responsibility must rest primarily on civil-police apparatus with the military in support role.
- Sound intelligence is imperative in sub-conventional warfare and the intelligence apparatus must be responsive to all echelons and organisations involved in the counter-insurgency effort.
- Security forces should be deployed on an area basis. Junior officers should be allowed considerable initiative and tactical flexibility must be observed.
- Restraint must be exercised.
- Patience is necessary. Counter-insurgency efforts may take years rather than months.
- Security forces must be able to afford protection to the population and government's instruments of political control and influence. They must also be able to perform non-coercive, quasi-military and military activities to mobilise public support.

Peculiarities of Sub-conventional Warfare

The constant threat of low intensity proxy war and terrorism has become a disturbing feature of national life. This constitutes the new face of war. Insurrectionist movements are likely to continue on account of religious, cultural and socio-economic disparities and state as well as non-state actors will continue to exploit these to further their nefarious designs as also to offset the asymmetry in combat power. Armed cadres of almost all contemporary insurgency movements are increasingly showing scant regard for security of civilians, which the

traditional insurgents of the past displayed. Presently, almost all insurrectionist movements are witnessing a very high levels of criminal terrorist activity that aims to paralyse and create disorder in civil society. This emboldens the perpetrators to shape the asymmetrical battle space to their advantage.

The intensity of threat has inherent capability of moving from one stage to the other based on the popular support base and does not remain compartmentalised. The level of popular support and degree of violence can vary due to success of either the government or the insurgent/terrorist groups. Increasing popular support is crucial for the success of both the insurgency and the counter-insurgency operations and, thus, popular support is the final determinant of any movement or of the success of a counter-insurgency campaign.

The end state sought by a national counter-insurgency campaign is always 'conflict resolution', which generally succeeds 'conflict termination'. This entails demilitarisation of the conflict zone and influencing the environment thus that the residual differences can be resolved without violence. This is effected through a concurrent application of all elements of national power. Since this entails changing the attitudes and mind-sets of people, the process is long drawn and laborious. The various aspects of this process are: the creation of secure and conducive environment, isolation of conflict zone, addressing local aspirations and winning hearts and minds and managing perceptions of all state and non-state players in the domestic, regional and international environment through an effective public information and perception management. Such information operations must also cater to the needs of the security forces personnel so that they view the various developments in the correct perspective and the activities of inimical forces are not able to impact adversely on their morale.

Sub-conventional warfare operations have to be undertaken by the security forces with full respect for human rights in accordance with the laws of land since centre of gravity for such operations is the populace. The application of military power in such operations is so regulated that it enhances the control of civil authorities in the conflict zone besides strengthening their hands. Neutralisation of terrorists and their support base must be in consonance with laws of land so that the civil face of the governance is always visible. Terrorists must be

afforded full opportunity to surrender and only those terrorists, who do not accept the offer and continue to resist, should be neutralised. The handing of over ground workers also has to be as per the laws. The orchestration of the military operations has to be such that they also induce a desired degree of fatigue amongst supporters of the cause. Since this is a double edged weapon, it needs to be imaginatively applied to ensure its efficacy. Otherwise, it may convert even the champions of non-violence into being violence-oriented.

The thrust of military operations in sub-conventional conflict management has to be on executing coordinated operations ranging from border areas to the hinterland. The various operations that may have to be undertaken by the military include: effective sealing of borders to preclude trans-border movement of terrorists and armaments, establishment of a comprehensive counter-terrorist grid in the hinterland to deny access to population centres to terrorists, provide security to military lines of communications and ensure the security of various vulnerable areas and vulnerable points and to undertake civic actions to address the aspirations of the populace and winning their hearts and minds.

The number of terrorists killed in action or captured, alone cannot be used as a scale to gauge the overall success of their operations undertaken by the security forces. This has to be measured by the enthusiasm or groundswell for peace that the operations generate among the populace which includes the general stance of locals towards security forces, number of over-ground workers neutralised, degree of real time intelligence available, local assistance for various civic action projects, protests against the security forces for any alleged human rights violations, number of seditious media reports and functioning of state government's institutions in the conflict zone.

Impact of Sub-Conventional Warfare

Impact on Security Forces Personnel

Soldiers operating in such an environment experience a number of stresses including: operational stressors, domestic stressors, intra-unit hassles, physical and situation attributes of operation zone, and socio-political stressors.¹⁰ Chaudhury reported high psychiatry morbidity,

depression and alcoholism in soldiers in low intensity conflict.¹¹ Nations customarily measure the costs of war in dollars, lost production or the number of soldiers killed or wounded. But rarely do military establishments attempt to measure the costs of war in terms of individual suffering. Psychiatric breakdowns remain one of the most costly items of war when expressed in human terms. Indeed, for the combatants in every major war fought in twentieth century, the possibility of becoming psychiatric casualty is higher than that of being killed by enemy fire. Around the world the price of civilisation is being paid every day by military units in low intensity conflicts/peace-keeping operations and para-military and police forces that are forced to engage in close combat. There have been and will continue to be times and places where combat is unavoidable, but when a society requires its security forces to participate in combat, it is essential to fully comprehend the magnitude of the inevitable psychological toll.¹² Denial of the psychological consequences of combat may be perilous.¹³ The most strategic resource that India has in low intensity conflict is the young officer and soldier of the Indian army. Hence it must be accepted that security forces personnel operating in such conflicts will suffer from numerous stress related problems and these problems need serious addressing at all levels without any delay lest it starts affecting efficiency of troops and their morale adversely.

It is, therefore, important that management of troops is given utmost importance and mechanisms created to identify personnel under stress so that appropriate corrective measures can be instituted in time. An intimate interaction between commanders and all levels of their commands contributes substantially to the creation of necessary organisational climate within units and formations. It is equally important that rest and recoup is factored into the daily routine at sub-unit and unit levels. Arrangements have to be made at all operating bases to enable all ranks to speak to their families on telephone and for timely dispatch and receipt of private mail. In addition, recreational facilities should also be catered for at all bases. Timely grant of leave to personnel needs to be addressed with due sensitivity. Availability of essential medical facilities has to be ensured for troops operating in such an environment. Constant efforts have to be made by commanders at all levels to attend to physical and psychological needs of their troops

apart from keeping them well informed and improving their living conditions and facilitating resolution of their domestic problems and ongoing disputes.

The Indian army draws its strength from its ethos, the traditions and culture that have shaped the organisation's psychology over centuries. The essence of these manifests amongst all ranks in the form of a spirit of self denial, moderation, tolerance, respect for women and elderly members of society and an ability to live in peace and harmony in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious environment. The need for continued reiteration and consideration of these values to the troops is, therefore, of paramount significance.

It will not be out of context to mention here that the training of security forces has to be a balance of conventional warfare as also sub-conventional warfare since possibility of conventional wars can not be ruled out and at the same time the sub-conventional nature of present and future wars cannot be ignored. This implies a need for devising a human resource development strategy to suit the requirements of sub-conventional warfare while keeping conventional warfare capability of the army intact.

Impact on Conventional Battlefield Preparedness

There are suggestions that counter-insurgency provides an excellent opportunity to train our troops under 'near live' battlefield conditions. Such perceptions only expose our approach to training. In counter-insurgency, at best, platoon and column operations are undertaken based on purely patrolling and raids, wherein troops barely operate at platoon and column levels about 5-10 km away from their posts over a period of 48-72 hours. In fact, such activity is totally detrimental to conventional battlefield requirements in the Indian context since battle procedures are hardly practised and tested and physical fitness and endurance standards decline rapidly apart from the increasing indifference to man-machine mix processes. Consequently, overall combat efficiency for a hot war tends to deteriorate. Hence, it is essential that security forces personnel be prepared for both conventional and sub conventional operations in the various training academies and institutes/schools of instruction and formation schools in a balanced manner.

Tackling Insurgency

Military operations must aim at creating a sense of security by preventing depredations by insurgents on the people, and force misguided elements to seek an honourable negotiated settlement. Our conventional training philosophy, based on toughening a man, motivating him with an ardent regimental spirit and patriotism is not ideally suited for carrying out counter-insurgency operations. For this changes in attitudes are mandatory to achieve the primary objective of winning over the hearts and minds of the people. But sudden transitions are always difficult to manage, since it will often mean discarding conventional military wisdom. In fact, military hawks usually term it as appeasement or live and let live approach/tactics. Hence re-orientation training for counter insurgency environment is mandatory both for political masters and the army.

Even at tactical level, there is scope for refinement. It must be remembered that during operations, tactical successes are necessary to retain initiative, to maintain morale and motivational levels of own troops and to force the insurgents to remain always on the run. But, if tactical operations are executed in an uncontrolled manner, they directly reinforce the insurgent strategy of creating an environment of hostility. This creates a contradiction. We must accept that fighting back is a fundamental human instinct, and even soldiers will retaliate in self defence, if their own survival is threatened by insurgents and their supporters. Anyone will retaliate, if their own survival is at stake. Therefore, it must be emphasised during training that security forces are carrying out extremely delicate tasks under serious tactical constraints. Patience and perseverance are the prime requirements in such scenarios. Also security forces must develop consummate, calculative and deft tactical, psychological and political sophistication to face the numerous unforeseen situations that can crop up in an insurgency environment; be it during ambushes, or search operations, or interrogation of hostiles or their supporters, or innocent civilians. Unfortunately, it is unrealistic and impractical to produce templates for such situations.

Employment of army using conventional concepts and infantry tactics but with restrictions on the use of fire power, particularly in the initial stages of insurgency, is the first step and must start with the

identification of the problem and the accurate visualisation of the pattern of insurgent operations and their initial, intermediate and final objectives. Furthermore, their capabilities must be accurately reviewed and tasks should be correctly identified. Of course, the overall aim of all clandestine and subversive activities is to expand their influence among people by guile or coercion with a view to increase their credibility in the minds of masses and to gain the initiative in military terms. Expressed in terms of tasks, all insurgent activities include: guerrilla operations to acquire military capability and ascendancy, recruitment to expand politico-military base, tax and ration collection to sustain expanding capability, selective killings to coerce non-partisans to extend support and political initiatives to gain and widen external and internal support. Perforce, security forces' tactical operations must be designed to combat such insurgent activities with least inconvenience to the people and contain insurgency. Therefore, counter insurgency operations automatically include: population control and denial, psychological operations, civic action programmes and search, ambush and raid missions to isolate and capture insurgents and destroy their camps. In such a complex situation, uncontrolled operations usually result in real and imaginary excesses and loss of credibility. Thus, excessive use of military force by uninitiated commanders and troops will always be counter-productive and must never be attempted.

To amplify further, general cordon and search operations are usually counter-productive and need to be replaced by selective cordon and search operations conducted on the basis of real time actionable intelligence, to prevent avoidable harassment and humiliation to people. Furthermore, excessive employment of road opening parties, convoy escorts and other security measures, particularly curfew restrictions, though defensive by nature, are not only counter-productive but enable insurgents to inflict casualties and achieve their overall strategy. Therefore, tactical operational activity should only be directed at insurgents and their active collaborators/sympathisers with least disturbance caused to neutral and friendly people. Of course, intelligence capability will be key to the conduct of such operations. Logic automatically dictates employment of special forces, operating from designated firm bases, to launch surprise strikes aimed at capturing maximum number of insurgents and arms or destroying their camps,

instead of large scale and un-controlled operations during the initial stages. However, at the later stage of insurgency, guerrilla activity will be widespread and will finally move into open conventional warfare. In both situations, the army will be forced to undertake counter-insurgent activity by adopting conventional tactics with restricted fire power, but once again supported by a psychological warfare effort. The overall object will continue to be the winning of the hearts and mind of the people.

The Way Ahead

We must accept that clear high level directions, strategic and tactical directives are essential for the army and other security forces trained and equipped for conventional warfare to operate in an extremely challenging and hostile sub-conventional warfare environment. Also, it has to be remembered that the army has always been a target of the insurgents, since it represents the greatest obstacle to their designs. But for the common man, it has to represent peace, stability and national integrity. To acquire this image, army has to pay with its blood and sweat – a fact that has to be accepted with sagacity. There are bound to be incidents now and then, particularly after any violent incident involving loss of comrade's life. Even in such incidents, disciplinary aspects must be investigated and defaulters punished expeditiously. However, such incidents must be viewed in the totality of functional and operational requirements. Any such incident merits understanding and a little indulgence, particularly at the higher level. Only then can a correct perspective for the future emerge. Otherwise, one may be promoting the insurgents' strategy, and drawing the established government into a sea of hostility. In all cases, commanders and troops must not only sound genuine but also appear genuine and prove their intention of bringing peace by acts on ground.

Commanders and troops must understand that they are operating in a tricky situation and their overall aim should always remain achievement of a more perfect peace. It simply implies that there is no such thing as a quick military victory. Counter-insurgency campaigns will invariably extend over a number of years. None should attempt to achieve 'quick-end' results, particularly by excessive use of force. Excessive use of force is counter-productive and must be avoided.

Patience, perseverance, warmth and genuineness must be displayed by a totally committed, dedicated and motivated leadership at all levels. Undeniably, counter-insurgency demands a very high order of intellectual acumen unimagined in a conventional setting. Since it is a 'No Win' situation, performance evaluation may not be based on head count of number of insurgents captured/destroyed and weapons captured but by the number of hearts and minds won over. At the same time there is no scope for a 'Zero Error' or 'live and let live' approach to the problem. Such is the nerve-racking complexity of the problem that the need for ensuring the correct mental conditioning at all levels assumes vital significance. Fighting insurgency in this backdrop tends to cause tremendous stress to the minds of security personnel due to contradictory requirements and as such needs to be addressed appropriately at various levels.

The role assigned to the security forces is to assist civil administration in combating insurgency and maintaining law and order. In some states, the role is to provide internal security cover, if required. To facilitate smooth conduct of operations by the army, some state legislatures pass acts and some areas are designated 'disturbed' from time to time. Whereas some states accept the need for giving a better legal standing to security forces in private councils, they are diffident about enacting laws for fear of losing vote banks. At all such places, in our context, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act is in force and takes care of the legal aspects of operating in such circumstances but the frequent media campaigns for the scrapping of such acts puts pressure on the troops and, thus, must be avoided till such time troops are deployed. It is essential that personnel employed to assist in combating insurgency and maintaining law and order at the behest of local state governments should continue to enjoy the powers and legal protection available to them during employment to resolve the situation. The insurgent elements preaching and practicing sedition have to be denied release on bail in order to prevent their rejoining insurgency and pursuing violence. The need is, therefore, to treat insurgents on par with hostile combatants. A suitable act in this regard needs to be framed and passed by the government.

Security forces all over the world operating in such an environment would like to pack up and go home. But this would be considered as

dereliction of duty. Therefore, security forces must learn to live and survive in insurgency situations. Whenever the situation improves and misguided elements rejoin the national mainstream, the deployment of security forces would become irrelevant. Otherwise also, as and when the efficiency and effectiveness of local police force improves and they acquire the effective wherewithal to counter insurgency and maintain law and order, the security forces must be located away from population centres, ever ready and available to guarantee peace and stability against both external and internal threats. The exploitation of technology and modern equipment must be given due weightage while fighting in this type of environment for achieving superiority over insurgents and minimising casualties.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to highlight relevant issues pertaining to future as well as present day warfare commonly known as sub-conventional warfare, which encompasses all types of armed conflicts above the level of peaceful co-existence and below the threshold of war, such as militancy, insurgency, proxy war and terrorism apart from border skirmishes, with a view to promote a better understanding of the hostile and challenging environment in which army is expected to operate.

There is only one option to counter insurgency and that is, to find a political solution. Any talk of exercising military or hard option mercilessly will only reveal the blinkered strategic perceptions of policy decision makers and must be avoided at all costs. Military pressure should invariably be applied only in a deft and calculated manner, deliberately avoiding excesses all the time.

The principle of minimum force needs to be observed, particularly during the initial phases of insurgency to encourage the insurgents to seek an honourable political settlement. For reaching a desirable political settlement, suitable political initiatives and offensives need to be undertaken at critical times. Timing is critical as otherwise opportunities provided by military means may be wasted. It has to be always remembered and reiterated again and again that the basic aim of military in counter- insurgency operations is to win over the hearts and minds of local population.

Considering the importance of managing stress among security forces personnel operating in sub-conventional warfare environment, it will be in the fitness of things to understand relationship that exists between stress and performance in such conditions. The impact on the motivation of troops operating in low intensity conflict environment must be evaluated to suggest remedial measures to prevent undesirable levels of stress will form the next important step towards addressing man-management challenges.

The training methodology of security forces personnel has to strike a right balance in conventional warfare tactics as also sub-conventional warfare training requirements since possibility of conventional wars cannot be ruled out and at the same time the sub-conventional nature of present and future wars can not be ignored. This necessitates a need for devising a human resource development strategy to suit the requirements of sub-conventional warfare while keeping the conventional warfare capability of the army intact.

NOTES

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CHAPTER 2

Motivating Army for Sub-Conventional Warfare

Introduction

Motivation is the most commonly used term to explain why a person responds as he does under different sets of circumstances. Although, the level of understanding regarding motivation has improved considerably in the army in the past few decades, yet there are a significant number of leaders who still hold on to conservative beliefs on how their subordinates want to contribute on a task/role.¹ They still tend to view motivation as a “carrot-and-stick” process.² This does not stand with new generation.

Morale and motivation are closely linked. It is morale that leads to motivation. While morale is the measure of happiness in the work environment, motivation is the measure of the adequacy of incentive for performance of task(s). Typically, a salary is a good motivation but being paid well leads to higher morale. Morale is also defined as the enthusiasm and persistence with which a member of a group engages in the prescribed activities of that group.³ In the military milieu, morale and motivation are frequently used interchangeably. However, morale highlights the condition of the group (or the unit), while motivation is principally the attitude of an individual.⁴

A soldier is a pious concept. A soldier accepts leadership, familiarisation and cohesiveness as his fundamental assets. It is

motivation that drives a soldier to do what his leader wants him to do willingly. Operational fatigue, hardships and danger to own life and limb do not stop or slow down a motivated soldier. Motivation emanates from within the individual but its level depends on many factors which are not always within individual's control. How and when a soldier will behave, would depend on the stimulus provided to him by the environment as well as his inner state.

It is not just the numerical superiority of manpower, weapons or equipment but the motivation of troops commanded by a highly motivated leadership that is bound to bring about the desired results. Sustaining the motivation of personnel is therefore, an important prerequisite in sub-conventional operations.

The most complicated and most ancient machines that operate all the other machines in new wars are the men.⁵ Therefore, a study of factors that affect security personnel operating in a sub-conventional warfare environment is unique since it can contribute towards the enhanced morale of troops at critical junctures, snatching victory from defeat in difficult situations. As sub-conventional warfare requirements are different from conventional warfare, these have to be addressed appropriately with a view to derive optimum performance from security forces personnel in such an environment. Sub conventional operations are often protracted and impose a lot of psychological pressure on men.⁶ Troops trained in conventional warfare experience significant stress in sub-conventional operations like low intensity conflict, counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist operations.⁷ Conventional military training makes a soldier think in clear cut extremes like black and white, friend and foe etc. This does not apply to situations where the concept of enemy can not be applied to one's own people.⁸

The Indian army is primarily structured, equipped and trained to conduct high intensity conventional operations. Strategic policy formulation, planning, force structure, equipment acquisition and training are geared primarily for safe-guarding the territorial integrity of nation against external threat. However, owing to the rapidly changing security environment, the role assignment of Indian troops has undergone substantial changes. The ever increasing requirement of troops in low intensity conflict operations has become a regular feature, resulting in constant and prolonged deployments. Low intensity conflict

operations and proxy war have put tremendous professional and psychological pressures on military leaders and troops.⁹ Therefore, the importance of sustaining the motivation level and morale of troops in these circumstances, assumes added significance, which if not addressed in right earnest, can well manifest in the form of stress, tension, frustration, anger and cumulatively result in below par performance as a combat outfit.

Indian army has kept insurgencies under control. The on going proxy war in J & K, insurgency in the Northeast and the activities of Pakistan's ISI have kept India politically embroiled, economically burdened and militarily committed. The situation poses operational and attitudinal challenges for an army organised and equipped to ward off external threats. Emergence of India as an economic power in the global arena has led to additional responsibility for the army. Army as an effective instrument of national power can live up to the aspirations of nation, if and only if, its soldiers continue to remain highly motivated to carry out assigned tasks.

In this backdrop, it is imperative that the peculiarities of the operating environment, its related effect on the behaviour and thinking of troops and measures required to be initiated by concerned agencies to sustain and enhance the motivational level of troops, are well understood and applied. Such an understanding will allow the military leaders to utilise most efficiently, the diverse talents of their subordinates. It is essential that military leaders become intelligent consumers of response/need data, so that they function from a position of strength instead of a position of uncertainty/ignorance.

This chapter is an attempt to understand the peculiarities of the operational environment in sub-conventional warfare scenario in Indian context, factors affecting the psychology and motivation of security forces personnel and finally recommends measures which need to be taken at various levels by concerned agencies to sustain and enhance the motivational level of troops.

Peculiarities of Operational Environment

The environmental factors which have a direct bearing on thinking and behaviour of troops deployed in sub-conventional warfare environment and ultimately affect their motivation, are the product of a complex

interplay of three elements viz the populace, the militant/insurgent and the soldier.¹⁰

A general sense of insecurity among the public exists in the insurgency/militancy affected areas. The anti-social/anti-national elements resort to variety of ways and means to coerce, intimidate and scare the public, which in many cases leads to silent sufferings, unwilling obedience and migration. Unless the sense of security is ensured by the government, the populace is likely to fall prey to the designs of the insurgents/militants.¹¹ The local population tends to think that they have been wronged by the administration and tend to look at militant as their own boy fighting for a just cause, and security forces as the long and cruel hands of the administration, particularly when there are human rights violations. Propaganda by neighbouring countries and international agencies may further alienate the local population. In such circumstances, troops often from a different cultural milieu, who are looked upon as outsiders, are called upon to restore the deteriorating situations. Deliberate actions have to be taken by the military leadership to maintain their troops at desired levels of motivation in such an environment.

There is an overpowering cult of the gun and defiance of authority. The insurgents/militants having acquired sophisticated and lethal weapons, by establishing nexus with powers inimical to the state, commit unimaginable inhuman crimes to intimidate the populace and undermine the authority of the government. In the absence of concrete intelligence about militants' modus operandi, knowledge of own concepts/plans and necessary training to counter militants actions, the troops morale is bound to get adversely affected.

The security forces personnel end up fighting an elusive enemy, in the absence of any reliable intelligence and lack of cooperation of local population. Ambiguity of aim, lack of visible success and disproportionately high casualty rates tend to erode morale among security forces.¹² It is an important function of command to restore confidence of troops by keeping them well informed, and clearing all foreseeable doubts at the earliest available opportunity, in order to retain their fighting/sustaining capacity in the battlefield environment of the present and foreseeable future.

Insurgents/militants aim at inducing fear in the minds of police and

para military personnel through intimidation, lynching and other forms of retribution. This coupled with inadequate equipment and training of these forces, has adverse effect on their morale and efficiency. The traditional law and order police force lacks adequate combat potential to deal with such adversary.¹³ Besides training, other factors responsible for ineffective police response are lack of political will/policy, lack of effective leadership and inherent drawback/limitations of state police forces.¹⁴ As a result of these inadequacies, their credibility gets eroded, leading to loss of trust and confidence of the populace in their capabilities. Own forces need to understand these weaknesses and utilise their expertise and experience suitably.

Print and electronics media play a vital role in low intensity conflict and counter insurgency operations. The media explosion of recent times is not just a theoretical factor any more. The very fact that a few million pairs of eyes all over the country and many more abroad are observing each and every action of the security forces, whether under duress or otherwise, can be unsettling.¹⁵ Though certain actions are not unusual in an insurgency environment; the media seems to highlight such incidents with consequent adverse effect on the morale of the soldiers and the image of the army. More often than not, the army's point of view fails to attract same attention and publicity vis-à-vis a damaging report in the media even if it is yet to be proved. Truthful coverage of events is necessity to prevent panic or distortion of facts. Therefore, the local media being a potent weapon in the hands of militants to discredit the army tends to impose undue caution on operations by the troops and thus affects the morale of troops adversely.

The politicians have a big role to play in militancy prone areas as they are capable of moulding the public opinion to a great extent. The political system has a direct bearing on the growth of insurgency. If the bulk of the people feel that they can live as decent human beings, can have land and homes, and will be protected by a strong and just government, they will have no reason to cooperate with insurgents.¹⁶ Political masters must understand that employment of army, at best, can only contain insurgency, but can never resolve it.

The growth of insurgency is directly attributable to the incapability of the established political system to meet the aspirations of the people which can be exploited by a few disgruntled as viewed from one side

of the hill, or, patriotic leaders as viewed from other side of the hill. The general socio-economic conditions prevailing in such areas need greater attention of the civil administration of the state. At no stage, should the authority of the government be eroded, to prevent the writ of the militants becoming supreme. However, established governments fail to deliver due to lack or absence of cooperation amongst various agencies. Security forces employed in containing insurgency can not remain silent spectators to socio-economic developments, particularly in the under-developed areas. Regular efforts by the civil administration for development of the society are essential to ensure bolstering of their morale and maintenance of law and order by the security forces personnel.

Upholding and maintaining the laws of the land have to be the uppermost priority of security forces operating in sub-conventional warfare environment. The militants, who survive by virtue of the local population, have to be isolated/weaned away. The government enacts special laws, giving essential authority to the armed forces who are engaged in tackling the militancy situation. Even after deployment of the armed forces, the civil power continues to function, thereby implying that while upholding the above principle, all actions of the armed forces must contribute to strengthening of the hands of the state government.¹⁷ At the same time, government has to be strong enough not to fall prey to the subversive designs of the local press and other vested interests exerting constant pressures to dilute authorities given to security forces.

The concept of operations hinges on occupation of sensitive areas based on intelligence inputs. Maintaining adequate reserves at the sub-unit/unit levels for quick reaction is vital for success. In a low intensity conflict scenario, there is a disproportionate requirement of resources in terms of troops, equipment and finance as compared to that of the insurgents. The areas where such operations are conducted usually lack the requisite infrastructure to absorb the increasing number of security forces personnel likely to be deployed.¹⁸

Factors Affecting Motivation in Sub-conventional Warfare

A soldier's motivation is a combination of desire and energy directed

at achieving a goal. Influencing a soldier's motivation means getting him to do what must be done. Like any one else, a soldier's motivation also depends on the satisfaction of certain needs and the perception that taking a certain action will help satisfy those needs. The soldiers can also be motivated by beliefs, values, interests, fear and worthy causes. Some of these are internal, such as needs, interests and beliefs. Others are external, such as danger, the environment or pressure. There is no simple formula for motivation – you must have an open view on human nature. There is a complex array of forces steering the direction of each soldier and these forces can not always be perceived or studied. In addition, if same forces are driving two different people, each one may act differently.¹⁹ Knowing that each person may react differently will guide the leader's decisions and actions in certain situations, since it is the leader who has the power to influence motivation.

The factors which impact the motivation of troops deployed in low intensity conflict and counter insurgency operations have been derived from an analysis of the responses to a questionnaire consisting of 38 questions. I conducted this study during a field trip, with a sample size of 1085 consisting of 60 officers, 145 junior commissioned officers (JCOs) and 880 other uniformed soldiers deployed in counter-insurgency and high altitude areas in J&K. The questionnaire along with the responses is attached as Annexure I. These factors emerge from the peculiarities of such warfare and are therefore, considered relevant and important. These factors have also been reconfirmed by sending the same questionnaire to 30 randomly picked up army officers separately. The confirmatory questionnaire along with responses is attached as Annexure II. The responses of officers to the confirmatory questionnaire have corroborated the findings. Let us analyse these factors in the light of responses to the questionnaire.

Commitment

The Indian soldier's commitment to the nation is 100 per cent. This is clear from the negative response of all 1085 respondents with regard to their willingness to compromise territory to bargain for peace with our hostile neighbours.²⁰ The response to 'who is your ideal motivator?' was a mixed one. While 42 per cent felt that their friend was their ideal

motivator, 38 per cent voted in favour of their family.²¹ Of the remaining, 12 per cent felt their leader to be the ideal motivator and 8 per cent voted in favour of their own pride. When questioned about maximum strength provider in a difficult situation, 84 per cent responded in favour of God, 12 per cent for their leader, 2 per cent for their family and 2 per cent for their friend.²² The response to 'who makes them risk their life in operations the most' was the unit's pride by 78 per cent and 4 per cent voted in favour of their own pride. Nine per cent responded equally in favour of their leader and family.²³ This is a reconfirms the fact that the Indian army is ethos-based and its soldiers take pride in the name and reputation of their unit, the dignity of their family and have faith in God and respect for their leaders and fellow soldiers. However, material needs due to comparison with civilian counterparts with similar or less stringent service conditions are affecting the attitude of soldiers. This is evident from the response that 77 per cent of them joined army either to earn their livelihood or for pay/pension and only 23 per cent said that they joined the army either to live a life of honour or to serve motherland.²⁴

Cooperation from Civil Authority

The absence of clear cut political direction in such warfare makes the task of the army more difficult, leaving it to them to determine their own path, concept and plans to achieve the desired results. Most of the junior leaders said that commanders at each level must understand these critical issues and keep the troops fully informed. The response as to the adequacy of cooperation from civil administration/civil police/local politicians and local population was far from encouraging. Ninety-two per cent of the respondents felt that adequate cooperation from local public, bureaucracy, local politicians and even from local police was not forthcoming in the initial stages of deployment.²⁵

Media Effect

Media is a potent weapon in the hands of militants to discredit the army, thereby imposing great constraints on operations. Therefore, there is a need to give military leaders media training and adopting an aggressive and pro-active approach. All factual achievements must be reported truthfully.²⁶ Nearly 74 per cent respondents felt that the local

press is pro-militants while 11 per cent said that the local press was fair while 15 per cent stated that the press/media is pro-government.²⁷ Only 16 per cent of the respondents expressed satisfaction at the handling of media by the army; 84 per cent felt there was room for improving the handling of media by army in counter-insurgency/low intensity conflict environment.²⁸

Difficulty in Identifying Militants/Intelligence

All the respondents to the survey said that identification of militants is extremely difficult, and this impacts the psychology of soldiers.²⁹ This is because militants enjoy either willing or forced public support. It is difficult to sift and isolate/segregate militant from innocent people. The army's own intelligence network right down to the sub-unit level to obtain actionable information for successful conduct of operations requires a realistic boost.

Lack of timely actionable intelligence in the initial stages of deployment, is an inherent drawback in low intensity conflict operations. At times double agents feed irrelevant/false information which causes confusion and delay in the launching of operations. Lack of faith in the intelligence impacts on the performance of security forces personnel. Intelligence is no longer only a cloak-and-dagger game as is widely perceived.³⁰ Multiplicity of agencies calls for synthesising the desired intelligence inputs for specific operations.

Quick Reactions

Counter insurgency operations can be very demanding. For success, an outfit has to be in a position to grasp all fleeting opportunities. This can be ensured by maintaining a constant state of alert and readiness and ensuring that the level of motivation is at a pitch, where fatigue and sleeplessness can be subdued. This can have a telling effect on troops and officers alike. Nearly 92 per cent of those surveyed were of the view that equal weightage should be given to counter-insurgency (CI)/low intensity conflict (LIC) operations as well as conventional operations during training. These respondents stressed on the necessity of training for CI/LIC operations by units even during peace tenures, to be able to switch roles with minimum turbulence.³¹ If the junior officers, JCOs and soldiers are trained and confident about

playing their role effectively, their motivation level is bound to be at optimum levels.

Psychological Adaptability of Troops

The operating environment, the various constraints and hostility of the populace bewilder a soldier, and he finds it difficult to adapt. The open hostility of the public can affect any one operating in such an environment and soldiers are no exception. It is indeed humiliating and exasperating to see the very people whom one is out to protect, turn against the forces.³² Seventy-one per cent of those surveyed admitted that they feel stressed in this type of environment.³³ Sixty-four per cent expressed their ignorance about the legalities involved in CI operations.³⁴ Ninety-three per cent respondents admitted that the briefing on terrain, militants, causes of insurgency and local population on induction could be improved. Fifty-seven per cent were of the opinion that action on their feedbacks left much to be desired.³⁵

Command & Control, Initiative and Junior Leadership

A CI operation hinges on the occupation of sensitive areas based on intelligence inputs. Retaining of adequate reserves at the sub-unit/unit levels for quick reaction is vital for success. Mobility and reliable communications are essential. Tactical fighting is mostly at platoon, section and sub-section levels. The junior leaders have to execute assignments independently. Eight-eight per cent respondents felt that JCOs should take more initiative in units.³⁶ Eighty-four per cent respondents were of the view that degree of delegation to junior leaders is unsatisfactory.³⁷ Seventy-seven per cent admitted that more steps need to be taken for creating an environment conducive for creative thinking.³⁸ Sixty-seven per cent troops said that they get pushed beyond endurance by glory seeking superiors.³⁹ The importance of junior leadership, therefore assumes greater significance. This implies that effective command and control mechanisms and junior leadership requirements have to be addressed to create a positive impact on the psychology of troops operating in sub-conventional environment. It is the leadership and decision making at junior levels that would produce desired results.

Minimum Force

The army is organised, designed, equipped and trained for conventional war and to deal with external aggression and protect the sovereignty of the nation. Contrary to this, the use of 'minimum force' in such CI operations restricts the employment and exploitation of its full potential, despite casualties to own troops, at times.

Living Conditions

The living conditions and the transit facilities for troops operating in low intensity conflict and counter insurgency environments are generally of a temporary nature. Indian soldiers are simple rural folk and have negligible comfort requirements when compared to many other armies of the world.⁴⁰ In many places where troops operate, there is an acute lack of basic amenities like accommodation, sanitation and the like, making living difficult. Regions like J&K as well as Northeast with their acute and peculiar weather patterns worsen the conditions further. Eighty-six per cent respondents felt that living conditions needed improvement.⁴¹ A soldier operating in such conditions is bound to get psychologically demoralised, if not handled appropriately.

Pressures from Human Rights Organisations

Seventy-four per cent respondents admitted that fear of human rights violation while discharging their legitimate duty during operations induces stress and affects their performance.⁴² A soldier finds it quite intriguing when if his colleague is shot by a militant, it does not amount to human rights violation, but if a militant is shot by a soldier in certain situation under justifiable circumstances, more often than not, it turns out to be a violation of human rights. The fear of perpetrating a human rights violation and judicial harassment puts restrictions on the actions of men apart from making them vulnerable to militants during operations. Fighting with one hand tied behind his back adds to the pressure on the soldier. A soldier feels handicapped and at times unable to rationalise. Additionally, public glare and media create more pressure in such areas.

Miscellaneous Factors

A large number of miscellaneous issues related to need satisfaction emerged during the interaction with officers, JCOs and other ranks. These included the length of tenure in a CI/LIC environment, standard of clothing and equipment, system for carrying mortal remains, the processing of honours and awards, disposal of disciplinary cases, adequacy of manpower in units, preparations and briefing before launching operations and granting of leave. In addition, issues pertaining to the promotion system, rail travel difficulties, misuse of military uniform by civilian security agencies and financial worries which impact psychology of soldiers were also discussed.

Eighty-two per cent respondents were of the view that duration of tenure in CI/LIC environment should not exceed 18 months.⁴³ Seventy-four per cent all ranks felt that the commanding officer's tenure should be 36 months in such environment.⁴⁴ Eighty-seven per cent thought that the standard of clothing/equipment ex ordnance channels is unsuitable and of poor quality. Sixty-two per cent were in favour of further improvements in the existing system of carrying mortal remains to their respective home towns. Seventy-six per cent of the respondents felt that existing system of processing honours and awards to deserving personnel needs improvement as it is cumbersome and time consuming.⁴⁵

Ninety-four per cent respondents admitted that cases of indiscipline take a long time for disposal due to excessive commitments and shortage of officers in the units.⁴⁶ Eighty-one felt that leave plan gets disturbed due to inadequate manpower in the units as a result of the avoidable excessive holding of PBOR returning from temporary duty/leave at transit camps.⁴⁷

Only 24 per cent troops felt that they were adequately briefed and prepared before operations.⁴⁸ With regards to financial burden, 47 per cent respondents felt that cost of higher education of children is unbearable; 26 per cent were of the view that arranging medical treatment of dependents at home was unmanageable since military/government hospitals are far away from their home town/village; 23 per cent admitted that school education of children imposes a financial burden.⁴⁹ Ninety-five per cent respondents felt that the promotion

system in respect of PBOR be handled by record offices to avoid biases at unit level.

Seventy-four per cent troops expressed their dissatisfaction with regards to rail travel from one duty station to another on posting/temporary duty or to their home town and back on leave. While 62 per cent respondents were dissatisfied with rail travel since the RETURN railway warrant prohibits travel in entitled class during return journey because onward journey was perforce undertaken in a lower class because of non-availability of reservation in entitled class; 35 per cent troops expressed dissatisfaction with rail travel due to long queue for exchange of warrants.⁵⁰ All those surveyed felt that misuse of military uniform by civilian security agencies needs to be stopped as it tends to tarnish soldier's image.

Recommendations for Sustaining Motivation of Troops in Sub-Conventional Operations

The army has been taking steps to maintain the motivation levels of its human resource from time to time. The measures recommended are based on a field trip undertaken by the author to units and formations deployed in counter-insurgency and low intensity conflict operations in J&K. Psychological conditioning is a dynamic process and ways and means have to be found to enhance the motivational levels of troops engaged in these difficult operations. Hence, there is a need to improve the methodology of sustaining motivation over a longer period, so as to withstand the pressures prevailing in such an environment. The recommended measures for sustaining motivation of soldiers operating in sub-conventional warfare environment have also been reconfirmed by 30 officers picked up randomly. The feedback on recommended measures to sustain motivation in sub-conventional operations environment is attached as Annexure III.

Training

Training is closely inter-linked with motivation. A high degree of motivation will demand a correspondingly high level of training. This linkage must be clearly understood, in order to keep the motivational

level high, at all times. Two major aspects related to training, for combating low intensity conflict, merit consideration. Firstly, even a highly trained soldier would require re-orientation training to take on the ever elusive insurgents, in this game of 'no rules and ethics'. Secondly, there is a requirement to have suitable training infrastructure and environment to hone the skills of a soldier to combat low intensity conflict. The army has been concentrating on training needs of our officers and men. However, there is scope for doing much more for minimising the casualties vis-à-vis militants.

Presently, Counter Insurgency Jungle Warfare (CIJW) School is the only Category 'A' establishment which imparts training for counter insurgency operations. This alone does not serve the purpose, as it is basically designed to cater for operations, generally peculiar to the Northeast. As regards J&K, *ad hoc* Corps Counter Insurgency Schools, have been established, but the training facilities and infrastructure is inadequate. Hence, there is a need to shed the attitude of adhocism and evolve a comprehensive and long term approach to address our training requirements.⁵¹ There is a need to have more such schools with a dedicated faculty and infrastructure.

Our established system of training is proven well designed and reasonably well implemented. The army has been able to convert a raw recruit into a fighter, who has performed well. There is, however, a need for a certain amount of structured training at training centres and training academies for counter insurgency and low intensity conflict operations apart from re-orientation training before deployment for such operations. Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) situations are going to remain a reality in the foreseeable future. Hence, the training for LIC environment must remain an ongoing process. Once the unit has been alerted to mobilise for low intensity conflict environment, a well chalked out training capsule should be conducted to hone the skills and to relate the training to specifics of tasks at hand. Once the units are inducted in the sector of operations, situation specific and role related training should be organised. The new inductees to the units should be grouped with the veterans to acquire practical skills.

Allowing Needs of Personnel to Coincide with Needs of Organisation

Nearly all soldiers are driven by the need for job security, promotion, pay increments and appreciations by their peers as well as leaders. They are also influenced by internal factors such as morals and ethics. Leaders must ensure that their soldiers are trained and encouraged and provided opportunities to advance. At the same time leaders must ensure that they set the example by adhering to the same values, moral and ethic principles that they seek in their troops.

Involvement and Participation

Ideally, every man in the unit must know the situation and the task. He must be given the opportunity, the right environment and encouragement to make constructive suggestions. This generates interest, good ideas flow in, tired looks disappear and the men brace up for the big game. The entire plot must be projected in a manner that seeks their involvement. Once he feels involved and associates himself with a plan, the level of motivation and self esteem goes up in larger proportions.⁵² All leaders must allow their subordinates to be part of the planning and problem solving process.

Success and Failure

Nothing breeds like success. Success tends to produce high morale and reinforces motivation. It boosts a soldier's self esteem, his faith in his leaders and self confidence. These very attributes breed further success which leads to yet higher levels of motivation and self esteem as well as pride in the unit. Failure often undermines a soldier's faith in his leaders. It also erodes his self-respect and discipline and tactically it has a tendency to be self-perpetuating. However, failure is not always inimical to motivation. Professional pride, good training, discipline and high moral can insulate soldiers against the worst consequences of defeat. Therefore, operations should be launched only after detailed planning and preparations in order to maximise the chances of success.

Unit Cohesion

Regimental spirit generates primary group bonds and cohesion. Symbols and traditions stress the distinctiveness and pride in the outfit

and promote unit cohesion and individual self esteem. The supportive nature of regimental/unit spirit becomes most evident in an intense counter insurgency environment. Unit spirit is a true indicator of motivation. The unit commanders need to consciously take note of this aspect.⁵³

Making the Tasks Challenging, Exciting and Meaningful

Leaders have to make each soldier feel like an individual in a great team, rather than a cog in a lifeless machine. Soldiers also need meaningful work, even if it is tiring and unpleasant. The troops must be made to understand that the task assigned to them is important and necessary for the survival of the organisation. Stereotype actions need to be discouraged.

Media

Media and press play a very important role in forming opinions/ impressions at national and international levels. It is essential to understand the media and use it as a “force multiplier”. A graduated and regulated system of interaction with the media needs to be developed. The army should be more transparent, ready and receptive to change. There is a need to ensure correct and factual reporting with regard to cases pertaining to either human rights violations or killing of innocent civilians. In effect, the sacking of a colonel and a major on the alleged charges of killing innocent civilians in Jammu & Kashmir is a welcome step taken by the army. It is necessary to evolve an improved media strategy, not only to enhance the image of the army but also to beat the insurgents in their game of using the media. A carefully and aggressively organised media offensive could make the militants defensive in their approach. Rejoinders to false or incorrect/ exaggerated reporting must be given out at the earliest. Army authorities must bring irresponsible/incorrect press items/releases to the notice of the Press Council of India for investigation and for suitable action against the concerned press reporter or the owner of the newspaper.⁵⁴

Junior Leadership

There is a requirement to make the junior commissioned officers and

non-commissioned officers feel more accountable and responsible in the handling of situations. A concerted effort is required in this direction as most actions in such a scenario take place at their levels. Particular attention needs to be paid in the selecting and training of junior commissioned officers as they have not come up to the desired standards as yet. They need to be more competent, responsible and accountable. In counter insurgency operations where the stakes are very high, well-trained and experienced officers and junior commissioned officers/non-commissioned officers give a sense of security to their subordinates by virtue of their military skills. Given the harsh, dangerous and stressful external environment, it is effective leadership, capable of maintaining high motivation levels that will keep the troops in high pitch and ensure success.⁵⁵

Leading by Example

The attitude and personality of the commanding officer plays a very significant role in such an environment. He must be the role model for others to follow. He should be sensitive and alive to their welfare needs and problems, and the senior commanders must assist him in enhancing the capability and effectiveness of his unit.⁵⁶

Delegation⁵⁷

A great deal of 'lip service' paid to delegation. The system has chained itself within the rigidity of hierarchical structure, wherein freedom of action is a rare phenomenon. The 'Zero Error Syndrome' has become the biggest enemy. An attitudinal change is called for in the hierarchy. Only a few are directly involved in the creative and problem solving aspects of the organisation, while others merely carry out what they are told to do. Such a process not only impedes the development and growth of subordinates but also acts as a serious deterrent to the speed of operations. Lack of delegation has resulted in many a lost opportunity in the valley; and insurgents have repeatedly capitalised on the time spent by junior and middle level leaders for obtaining clearance from higher headquarters. Counter insurgency operations are characterised by the fluidity of situations, fleeting opportunities and chaotic conditions in most fire fights. The environmental peculiarities

logically dictate rapid decision making and quick actions by leaders on the spot. Going back to military history, the German army consciously adopted the concept of mission oriented tasks and development of initiative at all levels of leadership down to the non-commissioned officers as demonstrated in World War II. It was the product of an evolutionary process dating back to nineteenth century. There is a need to take a leaf from such historical examples.

Creative Thinking

In a counter insurgency environment, each operation and every situation is different, and as such requires a situation specific solution. The sheer dynamics make set piece and copy book plans virtually non-starters, particularly when pitched against crafty militants, who have to bank on guile for their very survival. The plans, therefore, need to be different, unorthodox and audacious to be successful. Junior leaders must be provided the right type of climate and encouragement to think independently. Creative thinking as an art must be mastered not only by senior officers but also by the leaders down the chain. Creativity does not occur because you want it to happen. It happens because the conditions are right to make it happen. The organisation that desires creativity must provide an environment that nurtures and encourages it. The right combination of elements and people must be in place. A vivid imagination, deep insight and creative approach result in unconventional solutions, which by virtue of being novel and opposed to conventional, result in resounding victories. This would correspondingly keep the motivational level high. Senior officers, therefore, must encourage such actions by units/sub-units.⁵⁸

Tackling Stress Related Issues

Efforts should be made to identify personnel who are under psychological stress and strain so that necessary remedial measures, including keeping an eye on such individuals, can be initiated. Junior commissioned officers and senior non-commissioned officers should truthfully report cases of abnormal behaviour/tendencies in individuals to superior authorities with out any delay to enable initiation of necessary action on a case to case basis.⁵⁹ Such prompt actions elevate the level of motivation of fellow soldiers.

Enforcing Discipline

There have been instances where officers did not have time to investigate culpable offences. This sends wrong signals and shows up the authority in poor light. There should be no compromises in dealing with disciplinary cases, particularly at the level of unit commanders. All cases of indiscipline need to be dealt with fairly and firmly. Exemplary punishments must be awarded to the culprits for offences that are serious, as any laxity is likely to lead to further indiscipline. A leader must let his subordinates know when they are not performing to an acceptable standard and counsel those who behave in a manner that is counter to the unit's goals. By the same token, they must be protected when needed. Senior leaders need to constantly monitor the state of discipline, morale and motivation of the units.⁶⁰

Responsiveness of Civil Administration

Lack of quick response from the government and civil administration in the affected areas hampers operations. These difficulties have been experienced by the troops in the past while operating in counter insurgency areas. It is therefore, imperative to establish good rapport, understanding and a working equation with the civil administration so that security forces efforts are not wasteful. These factors will culminate in bolstering the morale and motivation of the affected population as also own troops.

Improving Service Conditions

The army service has to be made more attractive. Shortage of officers needs to be made up, as the role of sub-unit commanders is more pronounced in these operations. It is equally important to train them as motivated members of the organisation. A soldier must get back his status and pride in uniform. Approximately 50,000 personnel retiring from the army every year could become the ambassadors for attracting better talent, if and only if they take back happy memories of their experiences in the service. Special allowances to cater for the hardship and privations of soldiers must be reviewed afresh. Instead of harping on ranks, give them their status vis-à-vis civilian counterparts with similar service conditions and length of service.

Improving Hygiene Factors

Hygiene factors may not be motivators in the isolated areas of deployment in counter-insurgency operations but their absence could prove to be strong demotivators. Measures therefore, need to be taken to improve the accommodation, transportation facilities both by road and rail, provision of proper clothing and rations, leading to overall improvement in hygiene conditions. Clear note must also be taken of the deterioration in the maintenance of existing assets and special measures initiated to provide decent accommodation to all ranks, at least in peace stations. Similarly, provision of temporary shelters is essential for the rest and refit of troops in these monotonous operations and must be given due importance. It will be worth considering either permitting issue of split railway warrants/concession vouchers or reimbursement of actual rail fare for undertaking entitled travel whether on duty or as part of leave travel concession.

Tenure Duration

Maximum period of deployment in such areas should not exceed two years, including induction/de-induction periods. Units must be turned over smoothly so as to ensure a good combination of 'field - peace' profile and avoid over flogging of troops.⁶¹ Command tenures of commanding officers should continue to be of at least three years duration. Turbulence due to shorter or truncated command tenures needs to be avoided.⁶²

Disposal of Fatal Casualties

In short intense wars, the disposal of bodies is carried out under unit arrangements. However, in the case of casualties in counter insurgency operations, more deliberate measures need to be taken for funerals for all ranks. Service aircraft/transport or civil means are being used to transport mortal remains by fastest possible ways. The nation has accepted it as a moral obligation. However, funds earmarked for this purpose should be readily available at the disposal of the unit commanding officer.⁶³ Civil administration respect and provide realistic support to next of kin of battle casualties.

Recognition and Rewards

To inculcate a sense of achievement amongst troops, exemplary acts must get immediate recognition and rewards. There is a need to explore the possibility of announcing some awards at the level of corps commanders, without going through the existing time consuming processing channels. This would keep the men motivated and provide a sense of achievement.⁶⁴

Intelligence Gathering

Currently, our intelligence is just not good enough. Since hard and concrete information is seldom available, a large number of 'duff' operations are attributed to lack of concrete information. Many a time, troops get the feeling that they are being flogged with no tangible results in sight. Intelligence that leads to successful operations is hence highly appreciated. Troops fed with hard actionable intelligence execute operations with hope, gusto and high motivation. The higher formations have an important role to play in this regard.⁶⁵

Elimination of Fear of Human Rights Organisations

The fact that militants have considerable lethal power to strike soldiers at the time and place of their choosing and then merge with the local population, add to the overall stress factor on our troops. Under such difficult situations, there would be some instances where soldiers may react in good faith. The interests of troops must be looked after and various human rights organisations should be apprised of the facts and situations in which such cases have occurred. Minor issues should not be blown up out of proportion in the overall interest of the state.⁶⁶

Avoidance of Unhealthy Glory Seeking

The spirit of competition and the desire to out do other units of the formation, has led to the tendency of seeking unwarranted or unhealthy glory. Appropriate measures must be initiated to curb such tendencies, as this affects the troops adversely. There have been cases where individuals have pushed themselves and their men beyond a point, to get recognition and awards. These have a negative effect on motivation and must be curbed.⁶⁷

Excessive Commitments

Maintenance of minimum laid down strength at various locations at all times is essential. Special attention must be paid to ensure that the genuine requirements of casual/annual leave do not get hampered. Moderation in the tasks of units may be carried out for equitable distribution of commitments. Troops also realise the constraints, but at no stage should unnecessary local restrictions on leave be imposed. Proper management will obviate any chances of excessive commitments.⁶⁸ Ensuring that PBOR returning from leave/temporary duty are not detained at transit camps, will improve availability of troops in units.

Awareness of Legal Dimensions

There is a requirement to educate the troops regarding legal implications of their actions while operating in such areas to prevent possibility of any default by them. While temporary anger at the loss of a colleague is understandable, this must not be permitted to lead to incidents like rape, burning of villages or harassment of innocent people. This would not only prevent interested parties from getting unnecessary mileage out of small incidents through the media but also ensure the sustenance of soldierly ethos.⁶⁹

Feeling the Pulse

Man management assumes added significance in such environment, particularly at the level of commanding officers and company commanders. The officers and junior commissioned officers must have intimate knowledge of their men and at no stage should the men be allowed to feel neglected. There is a need to take innovative measures to improve and sustain the bond between officers and men. The buddy system being practiced by the army is one such effective measure. Buddies not only watch out for each other's physical safety during operations, but also help each other in unburdening worries, that weigh on the minds of their companion. Men can also provide timely (early) warning of what could be bothering their buddies to their superiors who could then take suitable steps to de-stress affected subordinates. Psychological indoctrination for low intensity conflict and counter

insurgency operations should form an essential and effective ingredient of pre-induction training.⁷⁰ Understanding the pulse of troops is an important command function. Contact with men is essential to obtain feedback or first hand information. Many events can be anticipated, if there is a well laid out system of feedback. The feedback must be addressed to appropriate levels and actions must be initiated, where essential.⁷¹

Rest and Recreation

The routine in counter insurgency operations is tough, exhausting and at times irritating. Searching for a militant, many a times results in seeing him behind every bush and tree. There is therefore, a need for adequate and organised rest to avoid fatigue to the troops. This should not be an eye wash but ensured in right earnest.

Respect for Religion

This is a very sensitive issue and therefore, utmost care must be exercised to ensure that, at no stage, should the religious sentiments of troops get hurt, either advertently or inadvertently. Due care must be taken to deal with any cases where religious feelings/beliefs of the troops are likely to be hurt. Special care has also to be exercised to demonstrate understanding and respect for the religious sentiments of the local population. This should form part of regular briefing of troops before moving out for any operation. Unit commanders should utilise the services of religious teachers in such circumstances. Religious Teachers (RT) are an effective source of inspiration for motivating and instilling “fear of God” in men, if employed gainfully. They should be frequently sent to all areas where the unit is deployed.⁷² The Requisite quality of RT has to be ensured to derive real benefits, lest it may prove to be a wasteful effort.

Opportunities for Growth

Intensity and frequency of operations should not result in denial of opportunities for personal growth. Opportunities for personal enhancement, like appearing in civil examinations, attending a resettlement course and so on should continue to be provided.⁷³ Promotions of PBOR should preferably be handled/processed at

respective Records Offices instead of units to eliminate chances of possible personal biases.

Conclusion

The Indian army has been engaged in low intensity conflict and counter insurgency operations for more than five decades. There has however been an increase in socio-political violence during the last two decades, leading to the ever increasing commitments of the army. Technology and the influx of foreign funds has encouraged and given a new dimension to insurgency/militancy. In addition, the pace of life has become much faster and aspirations have grown. Demands from family have also increased, contributing to greater stress. Sustaining motivation of troops in such environment is a challenging task for military leaders at all levels. The motivation for army personnel has special significance and is different from those in other walks of life. Military leaders have to be sensitive to variations in their subordinates' needs, abilities and attributes.

Motivation of troops in sub-conventional environment involves interplay of numerous factors like group dynamics, leadership, management of conflict, team building, inter-personal relations, training and communication etc. Hygiene factors have become extremely important. A soldier should not be made to feel a sense of comparative deprivation vis-à-vis their counterparts in other spheres of national life. This could be possible by regular updating of conditions of service by the government. The service too could also help, by educating the troops regarding actual benefits. The civil government functionaries should behave with a soldier in a responsible manner and he must be made to feel that his work is important and appreciated. Soldiers should also endeavour to live up to the expectations of society.

Although the importance of motivation has increased considerably over the past few decades, yet there are a significant number of military leaders who tend to view motivation as a "carrot and stick" process. The creation of a stimulating, productive and satisfying work environment will only become possible by ensuring a healthy organisational climate in the army. Men will benefit from such an environment which will ensure better efficiency despite more commitments. Military leaders must realise that they on their own can

not motivate troops. However, they can create the right kind of climate which will lead to significant enhancement in the motivational levels of subordinates.

The results of this study are worrisome and indicate a fall in standards due to internal as well as external factors. External factors/issues include political system, government functionaries, media, adversaries and society and these can not be altered drastically. However, internal issues are more significant as compared to external issues since these can be addressed internally. The internal issues concern professionalism, superior training, combat morale and leadership responsibilities in such operations. There is a need to open more professional schools, preferably one in each division, with exclusive infrastructure and training staff for ensuring CI training of all ranks even during peace tenures. Modernisation of infantry is another important area which needs to be addressed.

In sub-conventional operations environment, a military leader has to get tasks executed through subordinates and junior leaders. This is easier said than done since contradictory requirements in such operations put a lot of pressure on leaders as well as soldiers. Respect for a soldier as a human being needs to be recognized and his good contributions need to be appreciated. Patience displayed by the leaders in distress will help in sustaining motivation. Disconnect between senior and junior leadership, if any, be addressed immediately.

Motivational practice and theory are difficult subjects, and involve several factors. Despite of enormous research, basic as well as applied, the subject of motivation is yet to be understood clearly and realistically applied. To understand motivation, one must understand human nature itself, which is where the real problem lies. Human nature can be very simple, yet very complex. An understanding and appreciation of this is a pre-requisite for effective motivation of junior leaders and troops in the difficult operational areas. Motivated troops will have high morale and troops with high morale will perform better. Both these psychological conditions are dependent on tangible as well as intangible factors. But what needs to be understood is that creature comforts alone will neither motivate troops nor raise their morale. It has to be a correct and balanced mixture of training, creature comforts and leadership. Some of the important practices like trusting soldiers on ground,

providing them with necessary wherewithal, recognising their contribution, showing genuine concern about them by taking care of their physical and emotional needs, treating troops as colleagues, ensuring the presence of a leader in difficult situations who makes sure that the tasks assigned to them are accomplished without recklessly endangering his men, briefing the soldiers thoroughly about impending tasks and training hard with them apart from organising their rest and breaks will help in keeping the troops at desired level of motivation.

Officers, by virtue of their higher educational and training standards, urban orientation and a number of army courses which they have to go through, understand the problem better. Their adaptation to this kind of warfare is also quicker. However, it needs to be borne in mind that Indian soldier coming from a rural background, is hardy, has few requirements and has implicit faith in the army, unit and officers in that order. The other fact in stark contrast to the Dantewada massacre is that Indian army officers lead from the front. An unusually large number of officer casualties, both in conventional as well as sub-conventional warfare testify to this proud Indian army tradition. The weak link is at the level of the junior commissioned officers (JCOs). JCOs develop a safety first mentality as soon as they get promoted from NCOs. This is a paradox. JCOs, therefore, need to be made more accountable. Today in the army, the JCOs' duties and responsibilities are not so well defined. With the result they get away with non-performance.

What also needs to be understood is the sad fact that our civil administrative authorities, whether at the centre or in the states have little understanding of this kind of warfare. Hence their attitude towards improving service conditions of soldiers is somewhat indifferent. The army has been taking measures to keep their human resource at desired level of motivation. However, there is a lot of scope for improving ground realities. A serious collective effort by the society, government, civil administration functionaries and army will only be able to yield desirable outcomes.

Based on the analysis carried out in this chapter, the following points emerge:

- Commanding officer is the key. Hence his tenure needs to be viable.

- Due to operations in high stress environment, tenure of units in counter insurgency operations must not exceed two years.
- Counter Insurgency Operations Training must be imparted as a special capsule in all training establishments.
- Divisional battle schools need to be properly equipped and staffed.
- Officers need to be trained in the art of media-interaction.
- Civil-military liaison needs to be of a high order.
- Actionable intelligence being crucial for success, there is an immediate necessity to devise a more synergised approach.
- Application of minimum force is almost a maxim in sub-conventional operations. Sub-conventional operations put severe restrictions on troops trained to cause maximum attrition. It is for this reason that mental re-orientation of troops and special training is so essential for sustaining motivation in such warfare. Therefore, the army has to get used to the fact that it has to operate in a hostile environment with one hand tied behind its back.

This chapter has highlighted measures, which if adopted in right earnest, will raise the professional satisfaction and confidence level of officers and men operating in sub-conventional warfare environments to optimum levels and eventually enable them to improve their performance, by appropriately addressing their needs and beliefs through application of suitable motivational tools and methodologies.

NOTES

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2. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
3. Frederick J. Maning, "Morale, Cohesion and Espirit de Corps", in Reuven Gal and David A. *Handbook of Military Psychology*, Mangelsdorff, Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons, 1991, p. 445.
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5. K.N. Jagdischandran, "Psychological Factors Affecting Soldiers in War", *Combat Journal*, August, 1989, p. 55.
6. D.S. Goel, "Psychological Aspects of Counter Insurgency Operations", *Combat Journal*, 1998, pp. 43-48.
7. A. Ray, "Psychology of Militancy", Kashmir Diary, Delhi: Manas Publications, 1997.

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10. A. Ray, see note 7.
11. S. Chaudhury, "Psychological Effects of Low Intensity Conflict Operations", *Indian Journal of Psychiatry*, 2006, pp. 223-231.
12. D.S. Goel, see note. 6.
13. Om Shankar Jha, *Combating Left Wing Extremism: Is Police Training Lacking*, IDSA Occasional Paper No. 3, New Delhi: IDSA, June 2009, p. 7.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
15. P. Badrinath, "Psychological Impact of Protracted Service in Low Intensity Conflict Operations on Armed Forces Personnel", *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol. CXXXIII, No. 551, January-March 2003, pp. 41-42.
16. G.B. Reddi, "Some Reflections on Approach to Counter Insurgency", *Combat Journal*, April 1989, p. 23.
17. Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Army), *Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations*, first edition, Shimla, India: HQ Army Training Command, December 2006, p. 15.
18. Based on Interaction with officers and men deployed in counter insurgency environment in J&K.
19. "Motivation & Leadership", Available at <http://www.skagitwatershed.org> accessed on 28 December 2009.
20. Refer response to question at serial number 33 of Annexure I.
21. Refer response to serial number 1 of Annexure I.
22. Refer serial number 28 of Annexure I.
23. Refer serial number 33 of Annexure I.
24. Refer response to question at serial number 5 of Annexure I.
25. Based on a survey by the author, in units deployed in counter insurgency environment during November 2009.
26. More often than not, local press and electronic media tend to ignore the views and efforts of security forces while focusing/highlighting on thinking of extremists/hardliners. This issue emerged clearly during the interaction with officers and men deployed in counter insurgency areas.
27. Refer response to question at serial number 03 of Annexure I.
28. Refer serial number 11 of Annexure I.
29. Refer response to question at serial number 04 of Annexure I.
30. Balakrishnan Gurumurthy, "The Challenges for Junior Leaders in the Next Decade", *Journal of the USI of India*, Vol. CXXXI, No. 544, April-June 2001, p.248.
31. Refer to response to questions at serial numbers 12 and 13 of questionnaire at Annexure I.
32. P. Badrinath, 'Psychological Impact of Protracted Service in Low Intensity Conflict Operations on Armed Forces Personnel', *Journal of the USI of India*, vol. CXXXIII, No. 551, January-March 2003, p.43.
33. Refer to response at serial number 35 of questionnaire at Annexure I.
34. Refer to response at serial number 26 of questionnaire at Annexure I.
35. Refer serial number 27 of questionnaire at Annexure I.
36. Refer to response at serial number 31 of questionnaire at Annexure I.
37. Refer serial number 14 of questionnaire at Annexure I.

38. Refer serial number 15 of questionnaire at Annexure I.
39. Refer to serial number 18 of questionnaire at Annexure I.
40. But, there may be a misinterpretation – the difference between basic comforts and desirable comforts. Life has changed over the years and so has the threshold of basic living conditions. A telephone, vehicle, refrigerator, TV and the power to run these gadgets are no more a measure of comfort. In fact, these can very well be clubbed under basic amenities, both at home as well as place of work.
41. Refer to response at serial number 32 of questionnaire at Annexure I.
42. Refer to serial number 17 of questionnaire at Annexure I.
43. Refer to response at serial number 6 to questionnaire at Annexure I.
44. Refer to response at serial number 7 to questionnaire at Annexure I.
45. Refer to responses at serial numbers 8, 9 and 10 to questionnaire at Annexure I.
46. Refer to responses to questions at serial numbers 19 and 20 of Annexure I.
47. Refer to responses at serial numbers 21, 22, 23 and 24 to questionnaire at Annexure I.
48. Refer serial number 16 of questionnaire at Annexure I.
49. Refer serial number 36 of questionnaire at Annexure I.
50. Refer response to questions at serial numbers 37 and 38 of Annexure I.
51. 92 per cent troops felt that, in view of changing nature of warfare, there is a need to have adequate training provisions for training in counter insurgency operations at training centres during recruits training.
52. 100 per cent troops re-confirmed their commitment to nation.
53. 78 per cent troops felt that they fight for unit's pride.
54. 84 per cent troops were of the opinion that army needs to improve the media management strategy for better results in counter insurgency operations.
55. It came out clearly that junior commissioned officers tend to shy away from taking any initiative. There is a need to make promotion criteria from a non-commissioned officer to junior commissioned officer as also honorary commission more stringent so that quality does not get compromised.
56. 81 per cent troops felt that over commitment of units, shortage of man power due to prolonged stay in transit camps in the garb of non-availability of transport which upsets leave planning, improper transport facility from transit camps to units, non-provision of split warrants for railway travel which leads to travel in lower class due to non-availability of reservation in entitled class for onward journey and non-provision of educational allowance for children for college education after class XII, being an unmanageable burden are some of the reasons which affect their performance and need to be addressed.
57. 84 per cent officers and men felt that delegation exists only in books and conferences and not on ground.
58. 77 per cent officers and men felt that there is a need to improve the environment to develop attitude of creative thinking amongst all ranks.
59. 71 per cent troops felt that counter insurgency environment induces stress because of uncertainty, lack of training and inability to sort out domestic bottlenecks at home due to indifferent attitude of civil administration, civil police and society towards their genuine rights.
60. 94 per cent officers and men felt that acute shortage of officers in the units and excessive administrative commitments leave no time for sorting out indiscipline cases since these tend to eat away a lot of time.
61. 82 per cent troops preferred to limiting tenure in counter insurgency areas to 18 months.

62. 74 per cent troops expressed this concern.
63. 62 per cent troops felt that system of carrying mortal remains needs improvement.
64. 76 per cent troops felt that system of processing cases for honours and awards is cumbersome and time-consuming.
65. 76 per cent troops felt that operations are launched in haste with out proper briefing and information.
66. 74 per cent troops felt that fear of human rights violation in the line of carrying out operations puts a lot of strain and at times restricts their potential.
67. 67 per cent officers and men felt that excessive flogging by higher commanders to show results to further higher reporting officers puts undesirable pressure on them.
68. 81 per cent troops felt that leave plans get hampered due to vested interests of transit camps. They felt that troops returning from leave are made to stay in transit camps basically to carry out cleaning and other administrative tasks and waste 04 to 07 days under the pretext of non-availability of transport.
69. 36 per cent troops expressed their ignorance about legal implications of their actions.
70. It is a matter of concern that only 12 per cent troops accepted that they get motivated by their leaders/commanders.
71. 57 per cent troops felt that actions are not taken on their feedbacks.
72. 84 per cent troops felt that they derive strength and inspiration from God.
73. 95 per cent troops felt that promotions be processed and implemented as per directions of respective Record Offices based on seniority and qualitative requirements as per rules and not left to unit commanding officers as it leads to favouritism and de-motivation.

ANNEXURE I

Analysis of Feedback on Motivation of Troops
Deployed in Sub-Conventional Warfare
Environment

Sample Size: 1085, Officers: 60, PBOR: 1025

	Offr	Offr	PBOR	PBOR	Total	Total
		%		%		%
1. Who is your ideal motivator?						
- Your leader	18	30	113	11	131	12
- Your buddy	08	13	447	44	455	42
- Your family	-	-	412	40	412	38
- Your own pride	34	57	53	5	87	08
2. Do you get adequate cooperation from civil administration/ local population/civil police/ local politicians?						
- Yes	09	15	78	8	87	08
- No	51	85	947	93	998	92
3. How is local press?						
- Justified	10	17	153	15	163	15
- Pro-militants	42	70	760	74	802	74
- Pro-government/forces	08	13	112	11	120	11
4. Is it possible to identify militants?						
- Easy	-	-	-	-	-	00
- Difficult	19	32	79	8	98	09
- Very difficult	41	68	946	93	987	91
5. Why did you join army?						
- To serve mother land	12	20	53	5	65	6
- To lead life of honour	12	20	172	17	184	17
- For better pay & pension	09	15	197	19	206	19
- To earn livelihood	27	45	603	59	630	58

	Offr	Offr	PBOR	PBOR	Total	Total
		%		%		%
6. What is the ideal tenure in CI/LICO?						
- 24 months	12	20	161	16	173	16
- 18 months	48	80	842	82	890	82
- More than 24 months	-	-	22	2	22	02
- Less than 18 months	-	-	-	-	-	00
7. What is the recommended command tenure for a Commanding Officer?						
- 36 months	45	75	758	74	803	74
- 24 months	14	23	235	23	249	23
- more than 36 months	-	-	22	2	22	02
- less than 24 months	01	2	10	1	11	01
8. How is the standard of clothing/ equipment ex Ordnance channels?						
- Good	02	3.5	74	7	76	07
- Very Good/Exemplary	-	-	-	-	-	00
- Bad	04	6.5	61	6	65	06
- Very Bad/Not worth using	54	90	890	87	944	87
9. How is the system of carrying mortal remains to home town?						
- Good	15	25	180	17.5	195	18
- Satisfactory	16	27	201	19.5	217	20
- Needs Improvement	29	48	644	63	673	62
10. How is the system of processing honours and awards?						
- Satisfactory	08	13	90	8.7	98	09
- cumbersome and time consuming	46	77	778	76	824	76
- Motivating	06	10	157	15.3	163	15
11. How is media management by army?						
- Satisfactory	12	20	162	15.8	174	16
- Improvement needed	48	80	863	84.2	911	84

	Offr	Offr	PBOR	PBOR	Total	Total
		%		%		%
12. Are you satisfied with CI training imparted at training centres/ training academies in view of changing nature of warfare?						
- No change required	06	10	81	7.9	87	08
- Equal weightage required for CI/LICO type of warfare at par with conventional operations for satisfactory performance	54	90	944	92.1	998	92
13. Do you recommend training for CI/LICO even in peace tenures to be always ready?						
- Yes	55	92	943	92	998	92
- No	05	8	82	8	87	08
14. Are you satisfied with the degree of delegation to junior leaders?						
- Delegation is adequately given/satisfied	12	20	162	15.8	174	16
- Only in papers/for talking/unsatisfactory	48	80	863	84.2	911	84
15. Do you get encouragement for giving bright ideas for better results in CI operations?						
- Yes	08	13	79	7.7	87	08
- No, improvement is needed for creating conducive environment for creative thinking	45	75	790	77	835	77
- Stereo-type drills are good enough	07	12	156	15.3	163	15
16. Are the operations launched with adequate briefing and rehearsals?						
- Operations launched with adequate briefing and preparations	24	40	236	23	260	24
- Operations launched in haste with inadequate briefing and preparations	36	60	789	77	825	76

	Offr	Offr	PBOR	PBOR	Total	Total
		%		%		%
17. Is fear of human rights violation during operations affecting your performance?						
- No fear of human rights violation	18	30	264	25.7	282	26
- Yes, induces stress & affects performance	42	70	761	74.3	803	74
18. Do you get pushed beyond a point for glory seeking by superiors?						
- Yes	42	70	685	66.8	727	67
- No	18	30	340	33.2	358	33
19. Are disciplinary cases being disposed of promptly?						
- Yes	03	5	62	6	65	06
- No	57	95	963	94	1020	94
20. Why cases of indiscipline take long time for disposal or get neglected?						
- Due to partialism	01	1.6	10	1	11	01
- Due to fear of earning bad chit	03	5	51	5	54	05
- Due to excessive commitments and shortage of officers	56	93.4	964	94	1020	94
21. Do you get leave as per plans?						
- Yes	05	8	202	19.7	207	81
- No	55	92	823	80.3	878	19
22. Why leave plan gets disturbed?						
- Due to casual attitude of superiors in unit	02	3	31	3	33	03
- Due to inadequate manpower in units	48	80	830	81	878	81
- Due to any other reasons like operations	10	17	164	16	174	16
23. Why units have inadequate manpower?						
- Excessive holding of PBOR returning from leave/TD by Transit Camps on flimsy grounds	48	80	830	80.9	878	81

	Offr	Offr	PBOR	PBOR	Total	Total
		%		%		%
- Deficiency in units	01	1.6	10	1	11	01
- Excessive commitments	11	18.4	185	18	196	18
24. How many days are spent in transit camps while returning from leave/TD?						
- Up to 03 days	20	33	142	13.9	162	15
- 04 to 07 days	34	57	845	82.4	879	81
- 08 to 12 days	06	10	38	3.7	44	04
25. Do you get adequate briefing about terrain, militants, causes of insurgency and local population on induction?						
- Yes	25	42	51	05	76	07
- No	35	58	974	95	1009	93
26. Do you know about legal provisions in CI operations?						
- No	32	53.3	662	64.6	694	64
- Yes	28	46.7	363	35.4	391	36
27. Is action taken in units on your feedbacks?						
- Yes	30	50	437	43	467	43
- No	30	50	588	57	618	57
28. Who gives you maximum strength in difficult situations?						
- Your leader	24	40	106	10	130	12
- Your GOD	30	50	881	86	911	84
- Your family	03	5	19	2	22	02
- Your buddy	03	5	19	2	22	02
29. Which type of promotion system do you recommend?						
- Unit based system	18	30	39	3.5	54	05
- Respective Records Office based system	42	70	989	96.5	1031	95
30. Why do you feel that promotion system based on Records Office is better?						
- Since it is based on merit	-				-	-

	Offr	Offr	PBOR	PBOR	Total	Total
		%		%		%
- It tends to avoid favoritism	-				-	-
- It will serve the system better	-				-	-
- All of the above	42	70	989	96.5	1031	95
- Existing system is adequate	18	30	36	3.5	54	05
31. Who should take more initiative in units?						
- Officers	-	-	11	1	11	01
- Junior Commissioned Officers	49	82	927	90.6	976	88
- Senior non-commissioned officers	11	18	65	6	76	07
- All of the above	-	-	22	2.5	22	04
- None of the above	-	-	-	-	-	00
32. How are the living conditions in your lines?						
- Satisfactory	24	40	128	12.5	152	14
- Need improvement	36	60	897	87.5	933	86
33. What makes you to risk your life in operations the most?						
- Unit' pride	39	65	807	78.7	846	78
- Family's pride	02	3	95	9.3	97	09
- Your own pride	07	12	37	3.6	44	04
- Your leader	12	20	86	8.4	98	09
34. Will you agree to compromise own territory in bargain for peace with your hostile neighbours?						
- Yes	-	-	-	-	-	00
- No	60	100	1025	100	1085	100
35. Do you feel stressed in this environment?						
- Yes	36	60	734	72	770	71
- No	24	40	291	28	315	29
36. What causes financial burden on you?						
- School education of children	18	30	231	22.5	249	23
- Higher education of children	22	37	488	47.5	510	47
- Medical treatment of dependants at home, Military Hospital being away	12	20	270	26.5	282	26
- Talking to family members	08	13	36	3.5	44	04

	Offr	Offr	PBOR	PBOR	Total	Total
		%		%		%
37. Are you happy with rail travel arrangements?						
- Yes	24	40	258	25	282	26
- No	36	60	767	75	803	74
38. Why you are not satisfied with rail travel?						
- Return railway warrant prohibits travel in entitled class during return journey since onward reservation was in lower class due to non-availability of reservation in entitled class	36	60	637	62	673	62
- There is long queue for exchange of warrants	20	33	360	35	380	35
- Any other reasons like delays, transit facilities etc	04	7	28	3	32	03

ANNEXURE II

Confirmatory Feedback from Officers on Motivation in Sub-Conventional Warfare Environment

SAMPLE SIZE : 30

	Officers	%
1. Who is your ideal motivator?		
- Your leader	05	17
- Your buddy	05	17
- Your family	02	06
- Your own pride	18	60
2. Do you get adequate cooperation from civil administration/ local population/civil police/local politicians?		
- Yes	05	17
- No	25	83
3. How is local press?		
- Justified	04	13
- Pro-militants	22	74
- Pro-government/forces	04	13
4. Is it possible to identify militants?		
- Easy	-	
- Difficult	10	33
- Very difficult	20	67
5. Why did you join army?		
- To serve mother land	03	10
- To lead life of honour	06	20
- For better pay & pension	03	10
- To earn livelihood	18	60
6. What is the ideal tenure in CI/LICO?		
- 24 months	24	80
- 18 months	06	20
- More than 24 months	-	-
- Less than 18 months	-	-
7. What is the recommended command tenure for a Commanding Officer?		
- 36 months	20	67

	Officers	%
- 24 months	10	33
- more than 36 months	-	-
- less than 24 months	-	-
8. How is the standard of clothing/equipment ex Ordnance channels?		
- Good	02	07
- Very Good/Exemplary	01	03
- Bad	18	60
- Very Bad/Not worth using	09	30
9. How is the system of carrying mortal remains to home town?		
- Good	06	20
- Satisfactory	07	23
- Needs Improvement	17	57
10. How is the system of processing honours and awards?		
- Satisfactory	04	14
- cumbersome and time consuming	23	75
- Motivating	03	11
11. How is media management by army?		
- Satisfactory	06	20
- Improvement needed	24	80
12. Are you satisfied with CI training imparted at training centres/training academies in view of changing nature of warfare?		
- No change required	04	13
- Equal weightage required for CI/LICO type of warfare at par with conventional operations for satisfactory performance	26	87
13. Do you recommend training for CI/LICO even in peace tenures to be always ready?		
- Yes	27	90
- No	03	10
14. Are you satisfied with the degree of delegation to junior leaders?		
- Delegation is adequately given/satisfied	06	20
- Only in papers/for talking/unsatisfactory	24	80
15. Do you get encouragement for giving bright ideas for better results in CI operations?		
- Yes	03	10
- No, improvement is needed for creating conducive environment for creative thinking	24	80
- Stereo-type drills are good enough	03	10

	Officers	%
16. Are the operations launched with adequate briefing and rehearsals?		
- Operations launched with adequate briefing and preparations	09	30
- Operations launched in haste with inadequate briefing and preparations	21	70
17. Is fear of human rights violation during operations affecting your performance?		
- No fear of human rights violation	08	27
- Yes, induces stress & affects performance	22	73
18. Do you get pushed beyond a point for glory seeking by superiors?		
- Yes	22	73
- No	08	27
19. Are disciplinary cases being disposed of promptly?		
- Yes	03	10
- No	27	90
20. Why cases of indiscipline take long time for disposal or get neglected?		
- Due to partialism	01	03
- Due to fear of earning bad chit	02	07
- Due to excessive commitments and shortage of officers	27	90
21. Do you get leave as per plans?		
- Yes	04	13
- No	26	87
22. Why leave plan gets disturbed?		
- Due to casual attitude of superiors in unit	01	03
- Due to inadequate manpower in units	24	80
- Due to any other reasons like operations	05	17
23. Why units have inadequate manpower?		
- Excessive holding of PBOR returning from leave/ TD by Transit Camps on flimsy grounds	23	77
- Deficiency in units	01	03
- Excessive commitments	06	20
24. How many days are spent in transit camps while returning from leave/TD?		
- Up to 03 days	06	20
- 04 to 07 days	19	63
- 08 to 12 days	05	17

	Officers	%
25. Do you get adequate briefing about terrain, militants, causes of insurgency and local population on induction?		
- Yes	12	40
- No	18	60
26. Do you know about legal provisions in CI operations?		
- Yes	17	55
- No	13	45
27. Is action taken in units on your feedbacks?		
- Yes	13	43
- No	17	57
28. Who gives you maximum strength in difficult situations?		
- Your leader	06	20
- Your GOD	18	60
- Your family	05	17
- Your buddy	01	03
29. Which type of promotion system do you recommend?		
- Unit based system	08	27
- Respective Records Office based system	22	73
30. Why do you feel that promotion system based on Records Office is better?		
- Since it is based on merit	-	-
- It tends to avoid favouritism	-	-
- It will serve the system better	-	-
- All of the above	22	73
- Existing system is adequate	08	
31. Who should take more initiative in units?		
- Officers		
- Junior Commissioned Officers	23	78
- Senior non-commissioned officers	04	12
- All of the above	03	10
- None of the above	-	-
32. How are the living conditions in your lines?		
- Satisfactory	09	30
- Need improvement	21	70
33. What makes you to risk your life in operations the most?		
- Unit' pride	21	70
- Family's pride	03	10
- Your own pride	03	10
- Your leader	03	10

	Officers	%
34. Will you agree to compromise own territory in bargain for peace with your neighbouring countries?		
- Yes	-	-
- No	30	100
35. Do you feel stressed in this environment?		
- Yes	19	64
- No	11	36
36. What causes financial burden on you?		
- School education of children	08	27
- Higher education of children	12	40
- Medical treatment of dependants at home, Military Hospital being away	06	20
- Talking to family members	04	13
37. Are you happy with rail travel arrangements?		
- Yes	09	30
- No	21	70
38. Why you are not satisfied with rail travel?		
- Return railway warrant prohibits travel in entitled class during return journey since onward reservation was in lower class due to non-availability of reservation in entitled class	19	63
- There is long queue for exchange of warrants	09	30
- Any other reasons like delays, transit facilities etc	02	07

ANNEXURE III

Summary of Feedback from Officers on Recommendations to Sustain Motivation in Sub-Conventional Warfare

SAMPLE SIZE : 30

Mark the recommendations for sustaining motivation in CI/LICO Environment by awarding marks as under:

Strongly recommended = SR; Recommended = R; Not Recommended = NR

Do you recommend for improving training of officers and men in conduct of CI/LICO in order to minimize casualties to own troops?

SR = 21 R = 09 NR = 00

Do you recommend structured training at training centres/training academies for CI/LICO?

SR = 18 R = 12 NR = 00

Do you recommend equal weightage for conventional as well as CI/LICO training at training centres/training academies since most operations in today's scenario include CI operations, low intensity conflict operations anti-terrorist actions?

SR= 24 R = 06 NR = 00

Do you recommend more counter insurgency training schools with requisite infrastructure?

SR = 12 R = 16 NR = 02

Do you recommend that leaders should have same values, moral and ethic principle that they seek in their troops?

SR = 24 R = 06 NR = 00

Do you recommend that leaders must allow their subordinates to be part of planning and problem solving process?

SR = 04 R = 24 NR = 02

Do you recommend launching of operations only after detailed planning and preparations?

SR = 12 R = 18 NR = 00

Do you recommend regimentation for ensuring primary group bonds and cohesion?

SR = 12 R = 17 NR = 01

Do you recommend making tasks challenging, exciting and meaningful to sustain motivation?

SR = 10 R = 18 NR = 02

Do you recommend need for better handling of media to ensure truthful reporting?	SR = 06	R = 22	NR = 02
Do you recommend making junior officers, JCOs and NCOs more accountable?	SR= 08	R = 21	NR= 01
Is leading by example recommended by commanders?	SR= 14	R = 16	NR = 00
Do you recommend delegation to junior officers, JCOs and NCOs?	SR = 16	R = 14	NR= 00
Do you recommend shift in attitude towards accepting mistakes (zero error syndrome)?	SR= 18	R = 12	NR = 00
Do you recommend creative thinking amongst junior leaders?	SR = 20	R= 10	NR = 00
Stress related issues be addressed on priority?	SR = 22	R = 08	NR = 00
Do you recommend quick disposal of disciplinary cases and counselling of those who behave in a manner that is counter to unit's goals?	SR = 18	R = 12	NR = 00
Do you recommend better understanding and good rapport with civil administration to ensure quick response during operations?	SR = 12	R = 18	NR = 00
Do you recommend improvement in service conditions?	SR = 20	R = 10	NR = 00
Do you recommend that service personnel (officers as well as PBOR) must get back their status and pride in uniform?	SR = 16	R = 14	NR = 00
Do you recommend improvement in hygiene factors like separate warrants for return and onward journey, improvement in living conditions, improvement in clothing and equipments?	SR = 20	R = 10	NR = 00
Do you recommend tenure duration of 02 years in CI/LIC areas?	SR = 24	R = 06	NR = 00
Do you recommend improvement in handling of mortal remains of fatal casualties?	SR = 10	R = 18	NR = 02
Do you recommend improvement in processing honours and awards?	SR = 11	R = 17	NR = 02

Do you recommend improvement in intelligence set up?	SR = 07	R = 20	NR = 03
<hr/>			
Do you recommend improvement in interaction level with NGOs and Human Rights Organisations for making them understand ground realities?	SR = 07	R = 20	NR = 03
<hr/>			
Do you recommend avoidance of attitude of unhealthy glory seeking by leaders at the cost of over-flogging of subordinates?	SR = 06	R = 22	NR = 02
<hr/>			
Do you recommend accountability on the part of transit camps for withholding PBOR on unjustifiable grounds?	SR = 17	R = 13	NR = 00
<hr/>			
Do you recommend education of troops on legal implications in CI environment?	SR = 08	R = 22	NR = 02
<hr/>			
Do you recommend regular contact with subordinates and actions on feedback?	SR = 13	R = 17	NR = 00
<hr/>			
Do you recommend organised rest to avoid fatigue to troops in CI environment?	SR = 09	R = 18	NR = 03
<hr/>			
Do you recommend preservation of religious beliefs of soldiers?	SR = 10	R = 18	NR = 03
<hr/>			
Do you recommend promotion of PBOR based on records held with respective record offices to avoid individual biases?	SR = 07	R = 18	NR = 05
<hr/>			
Do you recommend equal opportunities for growth/personal advancement?	SR = 10	R = 20	NR = 00
<hr/>			

CHAPTER 3

Sub-Conventional Warfare Stress Optimisation

“Everybody knows what stress is, yet no body knows what it is.”¹
—‘Selye’

Introduction

Security forces personnel deployed in low intensity conflict and counter insurgency operations experience a number of stresses events including operation stressors, domestic stressors, physical and situation attributes of operation zone and socio-political stressors.² Troops deployed in such an environment have significantly higher psychiatric morbidity, alcohol use, unfavourable response to task, diminished efficiency, frustration, maladjustment, tension, isolation etc.³ Stress is a part of day to day activities in all walks of life. However, the scope and dimension of physical and psychological stress in the army is relatively higher and peculiar due to the uniqueness of service conditions. Stress has a distinct connotation owing to the constant involvement of security forces personnel in counter-insurgency/counter-terrorist operations, high altitude area environment and long separation from their families. This creates a combination of domestic and operational environment related stresses. On November 6, 2009, at Fort Hood, Texas, the largest United States army base in the world, an army major (service psychiatrist) gunned down 20 people. He was going to be deployed in Iraq.⁴ General

George Patton gained fame during World War II for his brilliant military strategy. He gained infamy for slapping a soldier suffering from shell-shock/battle fatigue/combat stress/post-traumatic disorder.⁵ On an average there have been about a 100 cases of suicide a year in the past four to five years. Mainly it is in insurgency-hit areas, but suicides are also taking place in areas where there is no insurgency. While measures initiated to arrest such trends have yielded some positive results, a holistic approach to arrest this trend is definitely required. In general, the causes of counter insurgency stress are occupational factors like increased workload, lack of adequate sleep and rest and non-grant of timely leave highlighted in the previous chapter; pressure from the family coupled with host of other personal factors. As per reports in the media, officers considered personal causes as the prominent precursors of suicide and fratricide, while personnel below officer rank considered occupational and familial factors as more important than personal ones.⁶

While declassifying the parliamentary report on suicides in armed forces, the ministry of defence stressed on the need for conducting regular studies on the subject. The defence minister stated in parliament on July 13, 2009, that there were 520 cases of suicide and fratricide in the army since 2006, of which 495 were suicides alone.⁷ The parliamentary standing committee on defence, in its 32nd report, had noted that there were 635 cases of suicide and 67 fratricides in the armed forces between 2003 and 2006.⁸ This is a matter of concern despite the fact that the overall psychiatric morbidity is less than the national statistic. Armed forces personnel can not be immune to influences of the environment at their home and the rising aspirations of the community as a whole.⁹

In the light of above, it is essential to understand stress and its effect on the performance of security forces personnel deployed in sub-conventional warfare environment. This chapter highlights the signs, symptoms, causes; effects of stress on performance of troops deployed in sub-conventional warfare environment and finally suggests measures to cope with it. This chapter may be of value to individuals interested in gaining a more detailed understanding of how stressors lead to stress, how stress affects performance and what can be done to mitigate these effects. In particular, army planners and senior officials may find this

helpful in developing new training and support programmes that can help service members deal with and adapt to stress both in barracks and on deployment.

Understanding Stress

“Anguish of mind has driven thousands to suicide; anguish of body, none. This proves that the health of mind is of far more consequence to our happiness, than the health of the body, although both deserve much more attention than either of them receive.”¹⁰ Military life is full of hassles, deadlines, frustrations and demands. For many, stress is so common place that it has become a way of life. Stress is not always bad. In small doses, it can help a person perform under pressure and motivate him to do his best. But when he is constantly in emergency mode, the mind and body pay the price.¹¹ If one is frequently frazzled and overwhelmed, it is time to take action to bring one’s nervous system back into balance. One can protect oneself by learning to recognise the signs and symptoms of stress and taking steps to reduce its harmful effects.¹² Hans Selye, a pioneer of stress research, made a telling point when he stated that ‘stress is a scientific concept which has suffered from the mixed blessing of being too well known and too little understood’. *Webster’s Illustrated Encyclopaedic Dictionary* (1990) defines stress as ‘a mentally or emotionally disruptive or disquieting influence, or alternatively a state of tension or distress caused by such an influence’. Wolfgang Linden defines stress as a process in which stressors (demands) trigger and attempt at adaptation or resolution that results in individual distress if the organism is unsuccessful in satisfying the demands. Stress responding occurs at physiological, behavioural and cognitive levels. Stress is more than just acute subjective or physiological activation and has its potentially most deleterious health effects when it becomes chronic.¹³

Stress is also defined as ‘a fairly predictable arousal of psychological (mind-body) system, which if prolonged, can fatigue or damage the system to the point of malfunction or disease’.¹⁴ A holistic definition of stress could be: ‘Stress consists of any event in which environmental demands, internal demands, or both, tax or exceed the adaptive resources of the individual, social system or tissue system’.¹⁵ A Layman’s definition of stress is ‘feeling bad due to troubles beyond our control’.

Many regard stress as something which forces a person to act and think more quickly or intensely than normal.

Dr Peter Tyrer opines that 'stress is the reaction of mind and body to change'. If we adapt to change, stress is hardly noticed. If we do not adapt to change, the stress becomes distress and if it is permitted to persist, it eventually breaks down mental and physical health. The armed forces are an ideal breeding ground for stress by virtue of initiating maximum changes such as: change of unit location (often from a hot desert to snow bound mountains), change of officers/colleagues/subordinates, change of dwelling places, change of schools for children, change of job content etc. Thus stress is any condition that disturbs normal functioning.¹⁶

Stress Tolerance Level

Stress is a part of life and a certain degree of stress is necessary to make us live an active and productive life. It is only when it exceeds the optimum stress level or the individual stress tolerance threshold level that it affects our psycho-biological system, which, if left unattended, sooner or later manifests in the form of one or more multiple psycho-biological diseases.

The list of events and changes that can trigger stress is exhaustive and unpredictable. Any incident or event can induce stress in an individual depending on his/her mental make up. Service personnel undergo more life events in a year and in total life span as compared to their civilian counterparts.¹⁷ Stressful life events in service personnel in descending order of weightage are given at Annexure I.¹⁸ However, the point to be noted is that given a common situation, the levels of stress experienced by individuals will vary depending on their individual personality traits and stress tolerance levels, which in turn determine their perceptions and responses.

Stress is a non-specific response of the body to a stimulus or event or demand. When an individual experiences an event or stimulus (stressor), it leads to a physiological response, one that can be measured by several indicators, such as, elevated heart rate.¹⁹ Stress is used to refer to this physiological response.²⁰ Stressors may vary in the form and can include; extreme temperatures or lighting, time pressure, lack of sleep and exposure to threat or danger, among others. All stressors,

however, tend to produce similar physiological responses within the body.²¹ We are particularly interested in stressors related to deployment in counter insurgency and other low intensity conflict operations.

Some of the most significant stressors associated with deployment for operations are uncertainty, long work hours, risk of death or disease, boredom and separation from family.²² More over, the risk of death or personal injury and threat of receiving effective hostile fire is much higher in counter insurgency and other low intensity conflict operations.²³

It emerges from the above that stress is an individual phenomena and the status of an individual in relation to his environment determines the perception as well as response to stress. Stress is an inevitable part of life and is necessary in some amount for any performance or achievement. Stress is related to imbalance and discontinuity and if understood, it can be managed and controlled to prevent it from harmfully affecting an individual's life.

As a result of many stressors faced by military personnel deployed in unconventional operations, it makes sense to look more closely at how stressors affect individual functioning and performance.

Signs/Symptoms and Effects of Stress

“It is not so much what happens to you; it is how you react to it that matters”.²⁴ The negative manifestations of stress for the security forces personnel have had serious consequences and the media sensationalises the events even further. The **psychological effects** of stress include increased heart rate, blood pressure, excessive sweating, dilation of pupils, difficulty in breathing, hot and cold spells, anger, anxiety and depression. These may also result in interpersonal conflicts and unsound human relations. **Cognitive effects** of stress include inability to make decisions and concentrate, hypersensitivity to criticism, mental blocks and frequent forgetfulness etc. **Behavioural effects** of stress include under and over eating, sleepiness, heavy smoking, alcoholism, drug abuse, impulsive behaviour etc. which may be manifested by hardiness, absenteeism and turnover. **Health effects** of stress include coronary heart disease, diarrhoea, dizziness, insomnia, asthma, neck/chest/back/body aches/pains, impotency etc.

Relationship between Stress and Performance

According to several authors there is a negative linear relationship between stress and performance, other evidence suggests that the relationship is actually an inverted U-shape. This inverted U-shape hypothesis suggests that individual performance on a given task will be lower at high and low levels of stress and optimal at moderate levels of stress. At moderate levels of stress, performance is likely to be improved by the presence of enough stimuli to keep the individual vigilant and alert, but not enough to divert or absorb his energy and focus. At optimum stress levels feeling of well being gets aroused, confidence level gets enhanced, quick and effective thinking gets augmented, the area of interest making an individual socially acceptable widens and individual continues to remain motivated to bring out his best potential.²⁵ At low levels of stress, in contrast, activation and alertness may be too low to foster effective performance, while at high level of stress, arousal is too high to be conducive to task performance.²⁶ For military planners and policy makers, the fact that performance may be optimal at moderate levels of stress may be important. This also suggests that certain types of operations may benefit from the presence of moderate stressors and highlights the danger of boredom to the completion of tasks.

Easterbrook suggests that when an individual comes under undue stress, his cognitive performance and decision-making may be adversely affected. Under conditions of stress, individuals are likely to screen out peripheral stimuli,²⁷ make decisions based on heuristics (rules of thumb or guidelines),²⁸ suffer from performance rigidity or narrow thinking,²⁹ lose their ability to analyse complicated situations manipulate information,³⁰ and task completion time may be increased while accuracy is reduced.³¹

Stress Effects on Group Functioning

Apart from effects on individuals, stress also has a negative effect on group functioning. When stressed, individuals are likely to yield control to their superiors and allow authority to become more concentrated at the upper levels of hierarchy and communication effectiveness may also be reduced.³² Stress can also lead to 'groupthink', in which members

of the group ignore important cues, force all members to a consensus decision – even an incorrect one – and rationalise poor decisions.³³

Even if some levels of stress may have a positive effect on performance as suggested by the U – hypothesis, extended exposure to stress or a single exposure to an extreme stressor can have severe negative impact on non-task performance dimensions.

Consequences of Prolonged Stress

One potential result of extended exposure to single or multiple stressors is burnout that includes exhaustion, cynicism and detachment, sense of ineffectiveness and lack of accomplishment.³⁴ Lee and Ashforth (1990) support the argument that high and consistent exposure to stress can lead to burnout.³⁵

Long term exposure to high levels of stressors can lead to emotional exhaustion, which has been shown to degrade organisational commitment and enhance turnover intentions.³⁶ Chronic stress can also lead to physical problems, including cardiovascular disease, muscle pain, stomach and intestinal problems, decreased fertility and reduced immunity. Prolonged stress can also lead to feelings of anger, anxiety, fatigue, depression and sleep problems.³⁷ Long term exposure to high levels of stressors or a single exposure to a very demanding event can lead to post-traumatic stress disorder, a psychiatric illness that can interfere with life functioning and lead to nightmares, flashbacks, insomnia and social isolation. However, it is not necessary that all individuals who experience extreme stress will develop post-traumatic stress disorder. Factors that make individuals more or less susceptible to post-traumatic stress disorder include the type stressor experienced, genetics, lack of social support, or existence of other mental or physical diseases.³⁸ Combat experience is a stressor that can bring on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.³⁹ A summary of stressors and their effects on individual and group functioning is given at **Annexure II**. In general, the severity of stress response experienced by an individual appears to be related to the type, duration and magnitude of the stressor experienced. The soldiers who witnessed casualties are more susceptible to severe stress and those who handled human remains tend to display more severe symptoms of stress as compared to those who did not.⁴⁰

Stressors among Army Personnel

Military operations encompass a range of different types of missions, including counter insurgency operations, encountering hostile fire, maintaining law and order in aid to civil authority, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, executing of civic action programs etc, each with its own distinct challenges and stressors. It is difficult to draw a line between what constitutes an unconventional warfare stressor and what constitutes a conventional warfare stressor, because both kinds of operations may include elements and stressors of both, like lack of sleep, difficult living conditions, risk of diseases, long hours and boredom apart from risk of death or injury to oneself and colleagues. The demands of deployments often require tighter deadlines and heavier workloads for maintenance, training and logistics operations. In addition to stressors stemming directly from military operations, there are separation stressors that result from the fact that deployments force individuals to leave their families and friends for long and uncertain periods. This class of stressors affects not only the military personnel who are deployed but also the families left behind and the colleagues who have to deal with their emotions about not being deployed and with the additional work left by those who were. Separation stressors also include the worry associated with being forced to leave one's family alone, financial or safety concerns and the strain placed on a relationship when individuals are separated.

Sub-conventional operations share many stressors with more hostile conventional operations but may have a lower threat of enemy fire, death or personal injury. Certain stressors such as lack of clearly defined responsibilities, boredom, or lack of relevant training may be more problematic in sub-conventional operations including peacekeeping and humanitarian missions than in conventional operations. The most commonly reported stressors are being away from home and family, uncertainty of return date, sanitation, lack of privacy, lack of time off and long work hours, environmental stressors like excessive heat/cold, insects nuisance etc, fear of diseases, lack of sleep, problems with spouse/children, and financial problems at home.⁴¹ The indifferent attitude of the civil administration, civil police and society towards genuine demands of soldiers and their family members in resolving their land/

property disputes and various cases of wilful harassment, causes stress among soldiers.^{42, 43}

In relatively more intense combat operations, the types of stressors that are unique to hostile missions include handling of human remains, dealing with casualties and threat of enemy fire.⁴⁴ Experiences of being ambushed, receiving hostile fire and knowing someone who was killed causes stress among security forces personnel.^{45, 46}

Apart from stressors related to living conditions and work demands, main stressors experienced by security forces personnel are associated with separation from families and friends. While family separation may be a significant source of stress or dissatisfaction, it may not have a large effect on performance.⁴⁷

It might not feel so at the time, but arguments are good for the health.⁴⁸ A new study shows that getting things off your chest and tackling disagreements head-on is better for you. In contrast, avoiding conflict actually leads to greater stress.⁴⁹ Tests showed that people who side stepped arguments instead of confronting them experienced abnormal rises and falls of the stress hormone cortisol as a result. The study suggests we are happier and more relaxed when we tackle issues with our partner, superiors, or children at the time rather than letting resentments fester. Psychologists Dr Kira Birditt, who led the research said, "How we deal with problems affects our daily well-being".⁵⁰ However, it is to be applied with caution among armed forces personnel.

Coping/Moderating Stress

There are variables which either reduce the physiological response to the stressor or reduce the effect of stress on performance. These variables typically reduce the effect of one variable on the other and thus play a balancing role. These variables include personality traits, individual's anticipation of stressor, individual characteristics, individual's self efficacy and perception of control over environment, additional information, uncertainty or lack of control and training. These variables can also affect group performance under stress, particularly within security forces context.

The individual's personality is a significant variable which can affect his response to stress in several ways. Individuals who express higher

levels of reactivity display more pronounced physical responses to stressors.⁵¹ Low anxiety individuals are better able to deal with the physiological effects of external stressors and are more likely to experience a performance improvement from the introduction of certain stressors like threat of an electric shock.⁵²

Individuals with Type 'A'⁵³ personalities exhibit significant stress responses than those with Type 'B'⁵⁴ personalities when confronted with identical stressors. For a given change in workload, individuals with Type 'A' personalities experience an increase in self-reported anxiety than individuals with Type 'B' personalities.⁵⁵ An individual's perceptual outlook may also affect stress response since his experience of stress is based somewhat on his own appraisal of the event. The physiological stress response is the result of individual's interaction with the environment and interpretation of the event, based partly on learning and experience.⁵⁶

The individual's anticipation of the stressor is another significant variable which affects the relationship between the stressor and the stress response. The individual usually experiences the anticipation even before the occurrence of a particular stressor. Anticipation of a stressor increases the individual's physiological response to the stressor and can be responsible for the majority of the stress response. Merely thinking about the impending event is enough to cause a stress response amongst the individuals.⁵⁷

Additional individual characteristics intervene in the stressor-stress response relationship, in lower military ranks and those from poorer socio-economic status. Such intervening variables actually increase the effect of stress on individual functioning and the lower ranks are more likely to develop long-term mental health problems, including post trauma stress disorders.⁵⁸ This has interesting implications for military leaders. While it is not reasonable or practical to select individuals for sub-conventional operations based solely on these characteristics, it may be possible to pay particular attention to stress-related disorders among these populations of soldiers during and after deployment. Such a targeted policy could reduce the number of stress-induced casualties and prevent long-term mental health disorders by focusing on the potentially most vulnerable groups. Based on the physical conditions of personnel, improvement of certain services like bathing facilities in

operational areas, ensuring delivery of mail, improving living conditions and provisioning of good quality hot food and occasional drinks helps soldiers to deal with the stressors associated with operations.⁵⁹

Improving the Stress-Performance Relationship

It is well understood by now that stress is part of life and soldier's life is no exception as also that stress can not be vanquished but it can be moderated to reduced or optimum levels so as to act as a stimulator for improved performance. For example, an individual efficiency and perception of control over environment can reduce the negative performance effects of stress.^{60, 61} Self-efficacy beliefs moderate the negative effects of work overload and long work hours on organisational commitment and psychological strain and thus soldiers with high self-efficacy are able to tackle the work overload and long work hours with ease.⁶²

Additional information can reduce the influence of stress on performance by providing individuals with a better basis for their decisions and improving the accuracy of their expectations about what will be required for effective performance.⁶³ However, the role of additional information as a helpful moderator is sometimes disputed. For example, research by Miller and Mangan suggests that too much information can lead to increased anxiety and performance rigidity.⁶⁴ It could also be the case that information acts as a positive moderator up to a certain point, after which it begins to degrade performance. Military personnel believe that receiving more information would reduce the effect of stress on their morale. However, some authors note that this is particularly true for information relating to the end date of a deployment and information about the strength of the enemy.⁶⁵

Lack of control or uncertainty can be a negative moderator, one that increases the negative effects of stress on performance. Uncertainty can increase the negative effects of stress on performance in several ways. First, the presence of uncertainty implies that the individual spends additional time thinking about the appropriate response and even preparing for a range of possible outcomes. This can lead to a delay in action and even additional physiological response to stress as the body is forced to 'stand-by'. As discussed earlier, uncertainty is a primary stressor for military personnel. Furthermore, uncertainty can lead to

disaster or worst-case scenario thinking that can distract the individual from the task at hand.⁶⁶

Training as a Stress Moderator

One of the most effective variables that can reduce the effects of stress is training. Training is a moderator which can be developed, altered and controlled fairly easily. Training can intervene either before (immediately following the stressor) or after the individual stress response occurs. Training in this context is the training related to stress exposure. In stress exposure training, the individual is repeatedly exposed to a certain stressor and asked to perform a target task under the stressor. The use of stress exposure training- for example, subjecting an individual to extreme heat or lighting – can gradually lesson the individual's physiological response to stimuli by reducing its novelty.⁶⁷ Such training can also build coping strategies that help the individual to moderate the effects of the stressor, even once a stress response has begun⁶⁸ by reducing the physiological response of the individual to the stressor.

Training is also able to intervene in the stress- performance relationship in several ways. First, stress exposure training allows individuals to practice performing complex tasks while being confronted with an external stressor. This can lead to task mastery and can allow individuals to build strategies to maintain performance under stress. In addition, stress exposure training can reduce some of the uncertainty involved in stressful situations by allowing individuals to form more accurate expectations about the effects that stressors and stress will have on their bodies and performance. Through training, individuals may also learn how to manage uncertainty and maintain high levels of performance despite its presence. Annexure III outlines the objectives and structure of recommended stress exposure training.

Both the skill building and the stress combating aspects of training are important stress moderators. However, stress-exposure training should be carried out in a phased manner.^{69,70} It has been suggested that when combined; skill practice and practice under stressors can contribute to improved performance under stress by building problem solving skills, increasing self-efficacy and improving control and coping skills.⁷¹ Furthermore, simulated training that mimics the work

environment is effective in mediating the effect of the stress response on decision making processes.⁷² Kozlowski follows a naturalistic decision making model in which individuals make decisions based on their previous experiences and learning. As a result, by practicing in the actual environment, individuals may acquire heuristics and tools that will prepare them for a future challenging situation. Individuals are able to develop adaptive capability through training, which implies that individuals can gain the ability to apply the knowledge and skills acquired through training or experience to more complex and challenging situations.⁷³ The notion of training adaptive capability has important implications for military trainers and planners, given the frequent uncertain and changing nature of deployment in sub-conventional operations. Security forces/military leaders should constantly try to develop training exercises that emphasise adaptability and learning as well as task completion, to prepare the personnel to deal with unknown circumstances as may be encountered in sub-conventional operations.

Combat support arm and combat service personnel, when under fire, are more susceptible to severe stress reactions as compared to infantry or troops from special forces. One possible explanation is that the additional combat-related training received by full-time infantry soldiers allows them to deal more effectively with the most difficult contingency-related stressors than those personnel who do not receive rigorous combat training. However, it is also possible that individuals in sub-conventional or special operations are inherently less reactive to stress and therefore self-select themselves into more intense operations.

Even during peacekeeping deployments, individuals who undergo peacekeeping training prior to being deployed on a peacekeeping mission have more positive expectations and experiences.⁷⁴

Sleep Discipline Training

Before induction into combat operations, unit leaders must consider the fatigue and sleep loss that occurs during combat. The enforcement of work and rest schedules has to begin early in pre-induction training. Breaks in combat are irregular, infrequent and unscheduled. Extended sleep is unlikely. Sleep logistics must be emphasised such that sleep and rest are allocated or supplied like rations, water, equipment and

ammunition. Sleep discipline training must address the following points:

- A unit-specific work-rest-sleep plan should be developed and practiced.
- The unit leader or commanding officer must be included in the allocation of sleep and rest time, as lack of sleep will impair his judgment and decision-making skills as much as those of his subordinates.
- The plan should allow soldiers at least five hours of uninterrupted sleep, ideally between midnight (2359 hrs) and morning (0600 hrs), every 24 hours. Persons receiving only five hours per 24 hours over a period of several days will accumulate significant sleep debt.
- Sleep priority is assigned to those whose judgment and decision-making are critical to mission accomplishment.
- If frequent, one hour of sleep or even 15-minute naps help, but 'slow mental starting' upon wake up can result.
- Relaxation exercises complement sleep schedules. These exercises are used as an alternative to regular sleep or as an aid to help soldiers rest under difficult circumstances.

Task Allocation and Management

Overloading soldiers with tasks or responsibilities is another major source of stress. Allocating tasks fairly among available soldiers improves unit effectiveness as well as decreases stress. The following should be ensured to achieve proper task allocation:

- The right person is fitted to the right task according to the task requirement and individual's talents, abilities and training.
- Two soldiers are assigned to a critical task requiring mental alertness and complete accuracy.
- Each soldier is trained in a secondary duty position to ensure a competent stepping into the position of another.
- Develop standard operating procedures, checklists or other mental aids to simplify critical tasks during periods of low alertness.

Develop Confidence in Equipments and Supply

If a soldier is adequately confident about his personal and support arms, uninterrupted ammunition supply during operations, serviceability of combat equipments and adequacy of supplies, his stress levels remain at optimum levels. To ensure maintenance of confidence of troops these points must be ensured:

- The unit should provide ample training in equipment maintenance and troubleshooting.
- The unit should field test arms/ammunition/equipments under realistic conditions. For example, the soldiers should fire and maintain their weapons while wearing full combat gear or protective clothing.
- The unit should have sufficient ammunition, food, water and other essential supplies.
- The unit should have contingency plans for procuring and managing critical supplies if normal channels are disrupted.

Improving Group Performance

Group performance under stress can also be moderated. For example, characteristics of the group leadership such as effective communicative and motivational skills can significantly reduce the negative effects of stress on group performance and thus contribute to unit morale and efficiency.⁷⁵ Leadership quality and involvement of the leader with his unit (being present and visible, hanging out with subordinates, concerned with the well-being of subordinates) are together able to significantly reduce stress-related performance decrements.⁷⁶ Military planners should pay particular attention to developing senior and junior leaders who have the qualities needed to foster effective performance under stress and maintain high morale. Leadership development courses and mentoring may be effective ways to ensure that the new generation of military leaders has the skills and strengths needed to lead in the face of uncertain and changing combat situations.

Group level stress can also be effectively moderated by ensuring unit cohesion.^{77, 78} Time spent together is one potential determinant of unit cohesion, but cohesion may not occur spontaneously. Training exercises that encourage group to work together and build mutual trust among

members can also contribute to unit cohesion. In addition group cohesion can be fostered through the creation of shared experiences, the expectation of future interaction and a leadership style that encourages participation of all group members. Successful group performance can increase group cohesion and higher levels of unit cohesion are associated with more effective psychological coping and better performance under stress. It could be because a cohesive group is regarded as an optimal support system in a time of crisis ready to provide emotional support, information, instrumental help and companionship.⁷⁹ Griffith (1989) also supports unit cohesion as a stress moderator and mentions that units under unit replacement system have more cohesion vis-à-vis units under individual replacement systems and there is increased reciprocal learning, higher personal morale and lower levels of overall reported stress. Units with high cohesion rates, good leadership and high morale are less likely to lose personnel for reasons relating to job stressors.

Finally, group performance under stress can be significantly improved by training. The most important aspect of group training is an emphasis on communication and the development of a shared mental model (when the whole group thinks of a problem in similar terms). Teams that have practiced together are better able to maintain performance levels under conditions of external stress.⁸⁰ Team adaptation and coordination training can contribute to team performance, coordination and ability to perform under stress. To moderate the effects of stress on performance of troops, training should include instruction and feedback to help groups and individuals modify their actions as they become more used to various situations.⁸¹ This is important for military planners because training exercises can increase team coordination and reduce stress among troops in a unit by contributing towards cohesion building.

Reducing Effects of Stress through Treatment and Therapy

Effective treatment and therapy can help in reducing the effects of stressors on the individuals and their functioning. Debriefing and counselling can help to prevent symptoms of post trauma stress disorders. Debriefing tends to decrease post trauma stress disorders, decrease anxiety, depression and social dysfunction and leads to

improved family functioning.⁸² Debriefing reduces short-term emotional or physical distress and diminishes the likelihood of long-term stress reactions that could evolve into post trauma stress disorder.⁸³ The debriefing should usually be done immediately following the event to maximise its effectiveness and be led by at least one military person and one trained mental health professional. The debriefing should focus on communicating to the individuals that they are not crazy, encourage them to talk about the facts and emotions of their experience and offer information about the typical stress reactions an individual can expect to have after a stressful event.

Effective and immediate treatment can be extremely important. In-field intervention programmes can reduce the long-term effects of stress on the troops.⁸⁴ Such intervention programmes should emphasise four aspects. Firstly, proximity of treatment, which implies that treatment of stress casualty be ensured as close or as forward as possible in the unit. Secondly, immediacy, which implies that treatment of stress casualty be done as soon as symptoms occur. Thirdly, expectancy by stress casualty, which implies – the affected soldier is made to believe that he will recover and return to his unit. And last but not the least, simplicity which implies that stress casualty be offered required rest, nourishment and assistance. The intervention programme must make use of stress moderators, as discussed above, including group cohesion, expectations and anticipation and self-efficacy. The individuals who go through this type of intervention programme are less likely to display long –term stress disorders.

Leadership Actions and Interventions

It is important for military leaders to know something about the treatment of combat stress reactions. As most cases of initial combat stress symptoms do not require medical treatment, it has been found that military leaders are often quite adept in treating less severe cases of combat stress.⁸⁵ Dr T.R. John, Head of Department (HOD) of Psychiatry at 92 Base Hospital, was of the view that a lot of man-management cases get medicalised due to the reduced threshold of unit commanding officers. This is happening due to shortage of officers in the units to provide required counselling. The following statistics show

the details of cases referred for psychiatric evaluation to Srinagar-based Base Hospital:

Details of Cases Referred for Psychiatric Evaluation

Details	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009 (upto 19 November 2009)
New Cases	196	151	258	314	242
Old Cases	221	354	209	222	213
Alcohol Dependency	44	56	56	83	72
Total	461	561	523	619	527

The details show that less than 1/3rd personnel return to units after management and balance with residual symptoms continue to receive treatment. The HOD brought out that 60 percent affected personnel return for operations, if handled in operational areas instead of being sent to hospital. He suggested that units should apply a time restraint of at least 48 hours before referring a case to psychiatrist to avoid stigma associated with such referral since most persons become normal after rest and counselling at unit-level.⁸⁶

In most cases, debriefing, coupled with rest, food and sleep is sufficient to alleviate the symptoms.⁸⁷ If the operational tempo permits the soldier to remain with his unit and he responds to simple reassurance (e.g. “you just need rest, you will be okay tomorrow”), he is not a casualty (by definition) and may not require further referral for specialised care. Military leaders in combat often make such decisions.⁸⁸ When a soldier requires medical attention to rule out a possible serious physical cause for his symptoms or because his inability to function endangers himself, the unit and the mission, he should be evacuated to nearest medical support facility.

Leadership actions and interventions at the sub-unit/unit level include:⁸⁹

- If a soldier's behaviour endangers the mission, himself or others, the leader should take appropriate measures to control him.
- If a soldier is upset, let him talk about what is upsetting him, then try to reassure him.
- If a soldier's reliability becomes questionable:
 - Unload his weapon.

- Remove the weapon if there is a serious concern.
- Physically restrain the soldier only when safety is a concern or during transport.
- Reassure unit personnel that it is probably a normal combat fatigue reaction and will quickly improve.
- If combat stress reaction signs continue:
 - Get the soldier to a safer place.
 - Do not leave the soldier alone. Keep someone he knows with him.
 - Notify the senior officer.
 - Have the soldier examined by medical person.
- If the tactical situation permits, give the soldier simple tasks to do when not sleeping, eating or resting.
- Assure the soldier that he will return to full duty as soon as possible.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to understand stress, its signs, symptoms, causes; effects of stress on the performance of security forces personnel deployed in a sub-conventional warfare environment and finally the measures that can be taken to cope with stress.

Troops engaged in offensive operations feel more in control of their destinies and hence experience lower levels of psychological stress. Hence troops must not become reactive in sub-conventional warfare environments. But the levels of ambiguity in such environments and the ever-present threat of being accused of human rights violations and getting entangled in legal cases are the major causes of stress among troops. There is a painful dichotomy between the pressure to show results and the ever-present fear of being embroiled in legal cases stemming from death of civilians in crossfire etc. It is noteworthy that the level of actual combat in J&K has gone down significantly since 2005 but the level of combat stress cases has shown an upward trend due to pressure from the human rights groups and a hostile media which tends to paint the troops as criminals. This hurts esteem and morale and deprives the soldier of the support he expects from civil society. It is increasingly proving to be a significant cause of stress in sub-conventional operations.

Stressors will almost certainly have a physiological effect on individual soldiers and will likely have at least some negative effect on their performance. Moderate levels of stress can actually contribute to heightened vigilance and improved performance. Military personnel clearly confront significant stressors while discharging their duties in sub-conventional warfare environments. Military personnel have proven themselves to be highly adaptable to constantly changing and uncertain circumstances, requirements and demands. This adaptability allows them to deal with significant stressors and successfully accomplish their objectives in the face of stress. This adaptability comes not only from personal characteristics and flexibility but also from their military training and experience, including basic and advanced training, operational exercises, pre-induction training and day to day work-related challenges. The application of moderators, including training and provision of additional information, can help individuals to adapt successfully to challenging stressors and maintain high levels of performance.

The importance and potential of training is an important finding of this paper. Training is the chief contributor to military effectiveness and performance. Training can prepare individuals to cope with stressors by:

- Helping soldiers in adapting to the stressor stimuli and reducing their physiological response to the stressor.
- Teaching strategies that allow soldiers to react more effectively to stressors and maintain performance under stress.
- Building task mastery and proficiency that can prevent performance degradations.
- Improving the accuracy of individual expectations.

Training can also improve the performance of a group under stress by:

- Fostering more effective group communication and coordination.
- Alerting individuals about how other members in their group might react to stressful situations.

The importance of teamwork and group cooperation in the army

for successful completion of operations needs no emphasis. Because of this dependence, the army's emphasis on group-based training seems particularly important. It is worth considering since it will help soldiers perform with confidence in a sub-conventional warfare environment. Thus identification of the primary stressors in sub-conventional warfare environment could facilitate the extension of training to address new situations and challenges.

Inculcating sleep discipline brings down the stress levels among ranks and files. Therefore, military leaders must pay due importance to this requirement. Selecting the right person for the right job, duplicating the critical tasks, training the soldiers in secondary tasks and developing performance support systems like standard operating procedures/checklists to simplify critical tasks during periods of low alertness is bound to bring down the stress levels during operations.

The army must ensure that soldiers are confident about their leaders, arms/ammunition and equipment. This will keep the stress levels at the desired levels. The unit should never allow its soldiers to believe that there is ever going to be any break in critical supplies.

Acceptance of mistakes and being receptive to the arguments put forth by the subordinates needs to be encouraged to create a happy environment. This happy environment will act as a catalyst to keep stress at bay and thus improve performance of individuals as also combat outfit as a group.

In combat, any behavioural change is combat fatigue. If managed properly it will help in conserving precious combat manpower. There is, therefore, a need to raise the threshold level of referrals by military leaders. The tendency to medicalise man-management cases needs to be curbed/minimized. Considering the stigma attached to psychiatric treatment in the society, applying restraint of about 48 hours in most cases before referring a case for specialized psychiatrist care, might prove to be beneficial.

Sensitisation of civil administration and civil police towards redress of genuine issues pertaining to welfare of soldiers in their home towns through policy directives to district magistrates and police authorities needs immediate consideration. This will take care of their domestic front more effectively. There is also a need for ensuring respect and

sanctity of uniform worn by the soldiers. Towards this end, the armed forces should also carry out a sincere in-house introspection.

Some of the difficulties faced by the army personnel during operations which cause stress and need to be addressed include:

- Fear of losing contact with their near and dear ones.
- The nature of job demands strict discipline and every activity is monitored. This leaves the soldier with the feeling of losing personal freedom.
- Living away from the family in difficult conditions makes a soldier feel lonely.
- Adjustment problems that develop due to frustration when soldier starts comparing himself with his counterparts or is compared by others.
- Fear of death and getting wounded and the impairment or disability it will lead to keeps building up stress.
- Guilt over the killing of a fellow human being. This happens even when a soldier knows that he has done so for the national cause.

Military leaders should address new situations that are particularly difficult to adapt like living conditions, hostile population, hostile media, living of the land in hardship for prolonged duration, fighting the terrain and weather, working for long hours under tight deadlines. Fixing accountability for stress-related incidents in any outfit be ruthlessly ensured. There may be requirement of training, work allocation or force re-structuring strategies to help personnel in dealing with their increased workload and respond to the demands more effectively.

Stress intervention programmes like proximity-immediacy-expectancy-simplicity are proving useful in the management of short-term psychological problems in troops and hence there is a need to try it for long term benefits. Considering better regimentation and cohesion by implementing unit replacement system instead of individual replacement system in respect of remaining supporting arms/ services will prove to be useful.

This chapter may be of interest to those who want to learn more about the effects of stress on the performance of troops in sub-

conventional warfare environment and wish to undertake further research; as also planners and officials for developing new training and support programmes to help both soldiers and unit commanders in adapting to stress on deployment in sub-conventional warfare environment.

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ANNEXURE I

Quantification of Stressful Life Events in Service Personnel*

ItemNo.	Life Event	Weightage
1	Spouse having illicit relations	82
2	Court martial	80
3	Amputation of body parts	78
4	Divorce from spouse	76
5	Going abroad on duty	73
6	Receiving medal for bravery	71
7	Fighting against enemies in war	68
8	Loss of Identity Card during leave	68
9	Child getting a job	68
10	Getting married	67
11	Hospitalisation – serious illness	65
12	Winning a lottery	63
13	Constructing own house	63
14	Birth of a child	62
15	Posting forthwith	62
16	Fighting against terrorists	60
17	Conflict with family members	59
18	Sex related problems	58
19	Death of a close relative	57
20	Sanctioned leave cancelled	56
21	Demotion	56
22	Red ink entry	54
23	Wife not conceiving since long	54
24	Being released from service	53
25	Child leaving for higher studies	53
26	Child denied school admission	53
27	Spending tenure in High Altitude Area	50
28	Arranging for a huge loan	49
29	Completing a tenure in op area	49
30	Marriage of daughter	49
31	Change of trade	49

* Raju, M.S.V.K., *et al.*, "Quantification of Stressful Life Events in Service Personnel", *Indian Journal of Psychiatry*, 2001, 43(3), p. 215.

ItemNo.	Life Event	Weightage
32	Receiving medal in sports	47
33	Dowry related problem in family	47
34	Not receiving salary due to heavy debit balance	46
35	Completing a field tenure	46
36	Shifting house many times in same station	46
37	Sanction of casual leave	44
38	Not getting government married accommodation	43
39	Wife starting a job	42
40	Pay fine	40
41	Difficulty with seniors	39
42	Annual leave not being sanctioned	39
43	Conflict with friends in unit	38
44	Passing the promotion cadre	38
45	Securing highest marks in firing	38
46	Black ink entry	37
47	Participation in divisional level exercises	37
48	Wife leaving job	37
49	Lack of son/daughter	37
50	Failing in promotion cadre	36
51	Sanction of annual leave	34
52	Having only male/female child	32
53	Going on ERE	28
54	Preparing for annual adm inspection	28
55	Participating in unit level exercise	24
56	Failing in BPET/PPT/Firing	24
57	Going on posting	23
58	Attending roll call	02

ANNEXURE II
Summary : Stressors and their Effects on Functioning

Individual Functioning	Effects Observed	Source
Type of Stress		
General Theory	Perceptual narrowing leading to incomplete decisions	Easterbrook (1959), Janis and Mann (1977), Staw, Sandelands and Dutton (1981)
	Increased time to complete tasks	Idzikowski and Baddeley (1983)
	Oversimplification during problem solving	Friedman and Mann (1993)
Time Pressures	Focusing on fewer cues	Wallsten (1980)
General Stressors	Lower-quality decisions and tendency to ignore alternatives	Keinan (1987)
Loud Noise	Increased heuristic use	Shaham, Singer and Schaeffer (1992)
Sleep Deprivation	Increase in decision errors	Larsen (2001)
Task Overload	Performance decrements	McLeod (1977) ¹
Moderate General Stress	Increases job satisfaction	Zivnuska, Kiewitz, and Hochwarter (2002) ²
	Increase in organisational commitment	Milgram, Orenstein, Zafrii (1989) ³
	Increase in morale and group cooperation	-do-

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High General Stress	Morale and unit loyalty declines	-do-
Long Term Exposure to Stress	Emotional exhaustion, burnout	Lee and Ashforth (1990) Cropanzano, Rapp and Bryne (2003)
	Cardiovascular disease, muscle pain, decreased fertility, stomach or intestinal problems	Seymour and Black (2002)
Group Functioning		
Type of Stress	Effects of Stress	Source
General Stress	Yield control to others or superiors	Driskell, Carson and Moskal (1988)
	Perceptual narrowing	Cannon-Bowers and Salas (1998)
	Groupthink	Janis and Mann (1977)
	Reduction in effective intra-group communication	Cannon-Bowers and Salas (1998)

ANNEXURE III

Objectives and Outcomes of Stress Exposure Training*

	Phase-1: Presentation of Requisite Knowledge	Phase-2: Skill Practice with Feedback	Phase-3: Skill Practice with Stressors
Objectives	Knowledge of typical stressors and reactions to stressors	Develop meta-cognitive skills, positive coping behaviours, relaxation techniques	Use Phase-2 skills while exposed to stressors
Outcomes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increased perceived efficacy in dealing with stressors 2. Knowledge of effective strategies for coping with stress 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Development of cognitive and problem solving skills 2. Reduced negative attitudes towards self and stressors 3. Reduced physiological effects of stress 4. Successful coping skill performance 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reduced anxiety 2. Increased efficacy 3. Improved performance and control under stress 4. Successful application of skills while exposed to stressors

*Johnston, J. and J. Cannon-Bowers, see note. 71.

Note: Even though empirical evidence for the outcomes does not exist, these outcomes are supported by a wide body of research on the effect of training on the stress-performance relationship.

Source: Johnston and Cannon-Bowers (1996), p. 227.

CHAPTER 4

Managing Stress-Related Issues in Army

Introduction

No human being is exempted from stress. Stress causes a number of biological changes and is intended to activate the body's fuel reserves. Soldiers are no exception except that they operate in the ideal stress-breeding environment due to frequent and large numbers of uncertainties/changes vis-à-vis their civilian counterparts with similar service conditions. Stress, raises the pulse rate, blood pressure and breathing rate. This in turn augments the amount of available energy. The heart begins to pump higher volumes of blood with each beat. The bronchial tubes expand to channelise extra air with each breath. The blood vessels supplying the muscles expand as well. The palms of the hands and the soles of the feet begin to sweat. Stress is evidenced to be one of the causative factors for lifestyle disorders such as backaches and sleeplessness, hyperacidity, gas, chronic fatigue syndrome, heart disease, diabetes and even cancer.¹ In addition, hormonal imbalances caused by stress can cause fibroid tumours and endometriosis. Stress is also linked to infertility problems.² Chronic stress responses can lead to aggression or depression in people, depending on the personality traits of individual. While aggressive individuals are prone to fratricide, the individuals with depressive tendencies are prone to t suicide.

There were as many as 635 cases of suicide including attempted suicides and 67 cases of fratricidal killings in the three services from 2003 to 2007. These statistics also indicate that the army was worst

affected in terms of suicides and fratricides during each year of this period.³ The statistics are chilling. According to the ministry of defence, one soldier kills himself every third day – a higher toll than those killed by militants. Between 2007 and May 2010, 208 soldiers lost their lives in action against militants while 368 soldiers killed themselves during this period. In addition, another 15 to 30 soldiers attempt to kill themselves almost every year. The worry is that they might try again.⁴ This alarming trend of suicides and fratricidal killings in the Armed Forces during the recent past is attributable to the enhanced stress environment leading to psychological imbalance in the soldiers. The 31st parliamentary standing committee on defence were informed by the ministry of defence that seven studies on stress related issues have been conducted by the army since 2005 besides an internal study by the Indian air force on suicides reported during the period 2002-07. An in-house study by Indian navy on 'Occupational Stress in Naval Personnel' has also been conducted.⁵ As per these studies, the main causes for stress identified among troops are the changing socio-economic environment in the country and domestic problems. There is apparently no systemic failure as suicides attributable to work-related reasons are few.⁶

Till a year ago, the suicide rate was more than 100 a year. Better psychiatric help and manpower coordination brought the number down to 89 in 2009. Yet, it remains a subject of serious concern since there were 43 suicides in just five months from January to May 2010. The army has been putting up a brave face saying that the suicide rate per thousand is still lower than that of the civil population.⁷ However, Dr. Prasanna Kumar Patasani, a member of the standing committee on defence which recently examined the issue of stress management in the armed forces, did not buy the argument. He said that the suicide rate within the army is shocking and does not stand to logic. Since soldiers are theoretically screened for mental illness frequently and are being medically examined at least once a year, it may not be right to compare the statistics of the general population with armed forces' personnel. Soldiers have access to counselling and health services that millions of ordinary people can not afford.⁸

Most experts attribute the growing stress to deteriorating morale, poor service conditions, denial of leave at the required time, unattractive

pay and promotions, early retirement ages, communication gap with superiors etc.⁹

In this chapter the author discusses the main causes of stress in army including cases of suicides and fratricides, studies on stress-related incidents, actions taken by the organisation/government to address the issue and finally recommends focus areas. The methodology adopted to write this chapter involved study of literature/reports/journals, interaction with officers and men deployed in sub-conventional warfare environment and surveys conducted during field trips.

Main Causes of Stress in Soldiers

The author carried out several field trips to interact with the officers, JCOs and other ranks in formations and units of the northern command in November–December 2009. The interaction was undertaken through a set of two separate questionnaires. After obtaining the responses from the respondents, interactive question and answer sessions were also organised. The survey sample consisted of 100 officers, 100 JCOs and 300 other ranks. The questionnaire along with responses placed at Annexure I aimed at evaluating the operational and domestic environment.¹⁰ The questionnaire along with responses placed at Annexure II assessed stress levels among army personnel.¹¹

Stress can be triggered among soldiers due to a change or an event. It is not necessary that all the factors brought out in this paper cause stress in all individuals. These factors do not cause stress in a mathematical measure. It could be a single factor or it could be a number of factors depending upon the personality traits of an individual that make him react to a stressor. The aim here is to highlight all the factors that may initiate stress reaction in soldiers due to the typical working environment, compulsions and restrictions imposed on soldiers during their service period.

One of the most significant issue that needs to be addressed before analysing stress-related issues in soldiers is the importance of welfare in their lives. It has to be remembered that welfare, motivation and stress-intensity in a soldier's life are closely interlinked and mutually inter-dependent. A soldier whose professional, social, financial and domestic needs are met adequately remains motivated to give his best

to the nation and stress-intensity in such a soldier remains within the optimum limits depending upon his personality traits.

An analysis of factors in the sample survey related to operational as well as domestic environment suggests that the cumulative effect of the professional and domestic pressures induces varying levels of stress in army personnel. The operational environment has been covered with relation to facets of job satisfaction, living conditions including recreational facilities, service conditions including pay and allowances, food, leave, promotion, postings and tenures in operational and high altitude/difficult areas, and aspect of inter-personal communication among peers, colleagues and subordinates. As far as the domestic aspect is concerned, the factors that play a significant role in performance within organisational constraints have been addressed. The domestic factors considered during the interaction, the compounded effect of which impacts on the discharge of duties by army personnel are domestic worries including housing, education of wards, marital discords, medical problems of family members, financial problems and inability to resolve disputes during leave. The organisational climate and service conditions including growth in organisation (promotions) have been considered based on the interaction and feedback. The causes of stress are enumerated in the succeeding paragraphs.

Responsiveness of Civil Administration

As per the director general of the Armed Forces Medical Services, Lt Gen N.K. Parmar, more often it is the problem back at home that makes a soldier feel helpless and drives him/her to suicide than work-related stress. In its report of April 4, 2010, the parliamentary standing committee on defence pointed out that the inability of the soldiers to solve their family problems due to operational requirements and other constraints within which they have to work results in enhanced levels of negative stress which leads to behavioural problems including suicides and fratricides.¹² Suicides and fratricides do not happen suddenly. There are warning signals, such as poor motivation after returning from home, sudden mood changes, high irritability and at times drug addiction or alcohol dependency. Such signs are accompanied by sleep disorders and growing pessimism. These lead to problem with spouse or superiors and then total dysfunction. Depression then worsens into panic, anger

and rage. According to the battalion commanders, the biggest problem is the soldier's helplessness in resolving property disputes back home which makes a soldier feel tense and helpless. There are several instances of neighbours or even brothers taking advantage of the soldier's long absence from home to encroach on his property. The exigencies of service prevent the soldier from being able to pursue the case. This problem had been identified several years ago, but little has been done except for every defence minister writing routine letters to chief ministers requesting the sympathetic disposal of land disputes involving soldiers. It is almost a joke in the ministry that every defence minister's first action after taking charge is to write to chief ministers to help expedite soldiers land disputes. And it ends there.¹³

The standing committee on defence had asked the ministry of defence to institutionalise arrangements in close coordination with state governments/officials and put in place a computerised mechanism to monitor the progress of each complaint received from defence service personnel or their family members.¹⁴ The defence ministry replied that the matter relating to possibility of making statutory provisions in the Services Acts had been examined in consultation with the ministry of home affairs and it had not been found advisable by the ministry of home affairs since public, police, local governance, land and revenue etc happen to be state subjects.¹⁵ This does not resolve the problem. Are states not part of Indian union?

Inter-Personal Relationship

Another major reason for stress in the armed forces relates to conflict in inter-personal relationships. The armed forces have a culture of their own, where sense of belonging and responsibility are cultivated in an individual.¹⁶ Admittedly, the existing mechanism in this regard needs to be strengthened because of current environment of stress and strain. Needless to say that the officers and junior-commissioned officers posted at platoon/company/unit level have to be sensitised towards the needs of soldiers both as individuals and as a group. This assumes greater significance as the soldiers now being inducted in the armed forces have better educational and awareness levels. There is definitely a need to change the mind set of senior officers in the armed forces. The appropriate improvements in the existing system are the need of

hour to ensure better interaction between armed forces personnel at various levels. Soldiers have to be encouraged to share their problems with their seniors and their genuine grievances redressed.

Shortage of Officers

As on March 4, 2010, there was a shortage of approximately 12,000 officers in the army and this shortage adversely affects the functioning at the unit level.¹⁷ As per a ministry of defence press release of July 15, 2009; there was a deficiency of over 14,300 officers in the three services as per details given below:

Army	Navy	Air Force
11387	1512	1400

This shortage of officers is giving rise to greater stress among junior and middle level officers owing to the need to perform multiple functions and inadequate time for intimate administration of personnel under command. This shortage coupled with stressful conditions in inhospitable climate, terrain and environment, particularly in counter-insurgency operational areas, impinge upon performance of both officers and soldiers. Hence, it is high time that initiate concrete and result-oriented steps to reduce stress at unit/sub-unit level are initiated.

Tenure Policy

Tenures of armed forces personnel in counter-insurgency and high altitude areas need to be further streamlined so as to contain stress levels specific to personnel posted in such environments.

Ambition Fulfilment of Officers

During the course of discussions with the middle rank officers, it emerged that performance reporting system does not take into account the real worth of individuals and in the existing system, the pen-picture and figurative assessment given in annual confidential reports hardly match. There is a strange tendency to inflate/overrate reports of officers posted in peace stations. Almost every officer in a peace station is rated above average and many are outstanding. What are the objective conditions that permit such an inflated performance appraisal in a

peacetime environment? What are the practical challenges and difficulties that the officers face here and must measure up against? There is a tendency towards an exaggerated emphasis on peace time spit and polish and event management/hospitality related chores, as the only measurable indices of performance. This can lead to a distortion of basic values and combat ethos.

Beneath the lip of his helmet, an army officer is a common man with family having related problems and career ambitions. In addition, the officer suffers from stress of combat. The only way to stay alive is to keep all their senses at full alert at all times.¹⁸ After partial implementation of the A.V. Singh committee recommendations, the select grade full colonels have lost out miserably. The stress in these officers is tremendous after their respective command tenures. Drop in their satisfaction levels has been noticed during various interactions. They felt that a gap of mere one increment between a time-scale and select grade colonel is not commensurate with the assigned responsibilities. These officers also make a point about their relative status within forces after missing a promotion to the rank of a brigadier. While the majority of para-military officers in BSE, CRPF, ITBP and police make it to the post of one-star official (DIG), all select grade colonels in the army do not become brigadiers. In the Indian navy, all select grade captains (colonel equivalent) become commodores (brigadier equivalent) after putting in five years of service as select grade captain. This is not practiced by the army on the pretext that the commodore rank is for holding non-command appointments. There is definitely a need for an immediate cadre review to ensure grade pay and perks at par with civilian counter-parts with similar service brackets.

Non-Availability of Quicker Appellate Mechanism

Another reason for increased stress in the armed forces relates to the lack of a prompt appellate mechanism to deal with service-related problems and disputes etc.

Keeping in view the fact that a large number of cases relating to service matters of a personnel from armed forces are pending for a long time in various courts of law, there is definitely an urgent need to make earnest efforts for establishing armed forces tribunals at the remaining places.

Psychological Effects of Low Intensity Conflict Operations (LICO)

A number of studies have been carried out on psychological effects of low intensity conflict operations on officers and soldiers. Such operations are characterised by limitations of armaments, tactics and levels of force applied. The troops trained in conventional warfare experience significant stress in LICO environment.¹⁹ In such operations the security forces end up fighting an elusive enemy (in the absence of reliable intelligence) and have to face the active resentment of the local population. Ambiguity of aim, lack of visible success and high casualty rates tend to erode morale among security forces.²⁰

Social Apathy

As per Dr. G.R. Golencha, who has served as a psychiatrist with army for over two decades, social apathy has been identified as a major reason for troop frustration. A soldier believes that he is facing all sorts of difficulties to serve his nation and countrymen. His sense of honour and duty motivate him to face any challenges. But when people do not even bother to give him a seat in the train, he starts questioning his commitment towards his profession and the nation. Some of the cases of suicide are directly linked to this apathy.²¹

Humiliation

Most cases of fragging (killing of superiors) occur because of humiliating taunts by seniors on mundane matters. Due to shortages of officers, the commanding officer is unable to devote the time to his troops for counselling. The commanding officer's inability to spare time for his troops demoralises a soldier and junior leaders tend to over-step their powers. This triggers emotions of revenge in the already aggressive soldier and generally results in fratricidal killings. In case an affected soldier is under depression, he tends to commit a suicide.

The commanding officer is answerable for all incidents of suicide or fratricide in his unit makes and it reflects negatively on his confidential report.²² This causes stress even among commanding officers and other senior officers, looking for promotion.

Poor Leadership

The armed forces need proper leaders instead of psychiatrists and psychologists to treat the soldiers. The call of the hour is quality leadership to motivate the soldiers in thick and thin.²³ Poor leadership leads to the uncontrolled spread of stress among soldiers not only in a counter-insurgency environment but also in peace stations. The poor quality of military officers is due to falling standards of candidates applying to join forces. Joining the armed forces is the last priority of capable youths simply because of poor service conditions and poor/limited promotional/growth avenues. Today's youth is competent enough to observe the deteriorating standards in status and pay packages of defence services officers despite the harsh working environment vis-à-vis their civilian counter-parts with similar service-bracket and service conditions.

Retirement Blues

Soldiers retire at a comparatively much younger age. Most soldiers retire after 18 years of service when they are hardly 36 to 40 years of age. The real burden of looking after their children, spouse and old parents begins at this crucial age. The bulk of the officers retire at an age of 54 years due to early retirement ages strictly linked with higher promotions which are limited in number due to pyramidal hierarchy in organisation. This is the time when they have the maximum domestic responsibilities²⁴ like higher education of children, construction of a house, marriages of children, attending to obligations towards aged parents etc. It is at this age that their income suddenly shrinks and they find themselves on the road despite all their qualifications and experience. Starting a new career at this age is not easy. This leads to high levels of stress among officers and soldiers as it adversely impacts their social standing apart from that of their spouse, children and other dependants like aged and ailing parents, unmarried sisters etc.

Memories of Unintentional Slaying

The combination of combat exposure and ready access to guns can be lethal for anyone mulling suicide. Combat exposure can at times lead to trauma – such as flashbacks of combat, killings or the face of a fallen comrade who might spoken about his wife or children just before

quitting this world. Memories of unintentional slayings can also haunt them for long. "We had laid an ambush for militants in one of the villages in Kupwara", an officer recounted a June 1993 incident with pain in his voice. "After a while, we saw three men in kashmiri pherens (a long dress) moving around. The troops asked them to stop for security check. Instead of stopping for security check, they started running away". Troops shouted at them saying, "Stop, do not run, we will fire if you do not stop." They did not stop and continued to run. The troops fired. On body search all three men were found to be innocent villagers. For almost four years, the officer was haunted by violent flashbacks of that incident. He still would not reveal who pulled the trigger.²⁵

Reluctance in Seeking Psychiatrists Help

The personnel in the armed forces are encouraged to hide their mental problems as being referred to a psychiatrist for treatment is considered a 'stigma' which may adversely affect the career of a serviceman. Since such referrals have been identified as the causative factors of stress,²⁶ their necessity needs to be reviewed. Retaining the conditional option of AFMSF-10 defeats the very purpose and stigma associated with this ailment continues to bother the affected soldiers.

Absence of Mental Health Professionals and Religious Teachers in Units

While the strength of mental health professionals in army hospitals is lower than the required, the units in army have no mental health professionals attached to them. Even priests to whom the soldiers can confide their worries and problems are not posted to all the units. This leaves a void in the system despite increasing instances of stress among soldiers. This difficulty however is not insurmountable.²⁷

Denial of Leave at the Required Time

The existing leave policy is being constantly monitored to ensure that everyone gets his due without compromising operational requirements. Leave under normal circumstances is generally not denied. The ministry of defence mentioned that the operational and functional requirements have to be kept in view while granting leave and this aspect can not

be compromised.²⁸ And therein lies the catch. Under this clause, a soldier at times fails to get leave when he actually needs it. This is a major cause of stress in army.

Denial of leave even in times of extreme need ostensibly on the grounds of exigencies of service, operational requirements and shortage of manpower in field units does not stand the test of logic. It becomes a sensitive issue if the affected soldier is not able to attend social obligations in his home-town/village; and this becomes a cause of stress. In case of an emergency such as war, no soldier would even ask for leave.

Travel Concessions

Under existing rules, service personnel and their family members are entitled to one passage in their mode and class every year. Service personnel and especially officers have now been permitted to avail annual leave in three parts, but travelling by train consumes time. The officers are allowed a 40 per cent concession on rail travel on form-D and PBOR avail 50 per cent on concession voucher. If the entitled concession is to be availed, one has to perforce travel by train only and as a result waste time en route. Today, with cheap air travel, the denial of air travel to officers for the sake of form-D utilisation makes no sense. There is a need to extend the 40 per cent concession on cheapest actual fare paid in case one prefers to travel by air.

Familial Reasons for Stress

Most army personnel are unable to provide quality education to their children due to reasons well known. The families and children mostly stay away from the soldiers. Since most soldiers are cannot provide necessary personal support, their children are unable to cope with the tough competitive requirements for seeking admission in reputed professional educational institutes for higher education. They also find it difficult to support their children financially in case they manage to seek admission. During discussion with a group of soldiers with college-going children, it emerged that any positive impact of the 6th pay commission had been more or less neutralised by the enhanced cost of education, food, vegetables and rising inflation across the board. The Army Welfare Education Society (AWES) runs 126 schools with

strength of 1.7 lac children and 13 professional colleges in popular disciplines exclusively for the wards of armed forces personnel. The list of these professional institutions is placed as Annexure III.²⁹

It may be noted that 126 schools and 13 professional institutions run by AWES for the wards of armed forces personnel are not sufficient to cater to the needs of the entire armed forces personnel.³⁰ Also the cost of school education as well as higher education is not within reach of soldiers. This puts tremendous pressure on soldiers when they find themselves helpless in meeting the legitimate aspirations of their children.

Married Accommodation Shortage in Military Stations/Cantonments

There is still acute shortage of married accommodation for officers and men in most of the cantonments/military stations. The situation is even worse in metro cities and other class X cities like Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Pune, Bangaluru etc. Managing accommodation of near entitled class in peace stations within entitled HRA is a difficult proposition, especially in class X cities. The situation is worse for soldiers posted to military units over and above authorisation of establishment either on compassionate grounds or to perform additional duties in Delhi. Such personnel are not even considered for allotment of government married accommodation by the unit located in Delhi since there is a paucity of married accommodation. This fact was revealed during an interaction with a group of soldiers at the CSD complex in Delhi Cantt. This puts undue pressure on soldiers.

Peace Station Miseries

Though a majority of suicides have been taking place at peace stations, it is surprising that adequate efforts are not being made to control this menace. Whenever officers and soldiers are posted in peace stations after a hard tenure in field/counter-insurgency area away from families, they are required to spend quality time with their families and children. More often than not, they end up finding it a difficult proposition due to peace time station commitments, excessive training exercises, lack of basic amenities etc. The peace time routine is perceived to be even harsher than operational area routine due to difficulties experienced in

balancing the organisational requirements and familial aspirations. This causes stress to both officers and soldiers.

Welfare is a misunderstood term in the armed forces which needs clarification and enforcement at institutional level. Welfare of troops and their families does not mean organising barakhanas and herding families together for so-called family welfare meets.³¹ Welfare today means good pay, proper medical, educational and housing facilities for the troops and ensuring that they get adequate time to spend with their families through timely leave from field areas and reduction in commitments in peace stations.

Peace stations are hard-won interludes between intense counter-terrorist operations and border guarding tenures. These have become 'battlefields' in another form.³² The armed forces in general and army in particular, need strict instructions to be passed with regard to 'activities' which may be permitted in peace stations to enable the troops to relax and not remain in a state of constant alert.

Stress Related Studies

The Defence Institute of Psychological Research (DIPR), a laboratory of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), had conducted two studies. One study conducted during September 2000 – May 2005 in the Northeastern Region dealt with the "Psycho-social aspect of optimising the operational efficiency of Security Forces to combat insurgency". The major results of the study are:³³

- The three main operational stressors, like fear of torture, uncertain environment and domestic stresses are responsible for most psychological problems in various groups of armed forces. Middle rank officers as compared to soldiers and JCOs were found to be more vulnerable and stressed out.
- Mental disorders in the form of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) have been observed in traumatised troops, which form the basis for various somatic symptoms.

Another study, on "Suicide and Fratricide among troops deployed in counter-insurgency areas", was carried out by DIPR in December

2006. This study suggested a number of remedial measures to deal with stress in the army. Some of the suggestions of the study are:³⁴

- Liberalised leave policy.
- Deployment of psychological counsellors in counter-insurgency areas.
- Periodic review of affected personnel by psychiatrists/psychologists.
- Monitoring and analysis of stress-related incidents.
- Organising stress management training programmes and dissemination of reading materials on stress management in appropriate languages etc.

There are as many as nine studies on suicides and matters relating to stress management. Though these studies reportedly identified specific causative factors for stress among various ranks deployed in different areas in the three services, but there is an impression that no effective follow up action has been taken for sensitising officers, improving basic facilities in the field etc.³⁵ The 31st parliamentary standing committee on defence pointed out that one copy each of the only two reports relating to suicide and fratricide and on stress management was made available marked as 'secret'. The committee wondered why these reports are not made public as they do not appear to contain anything sensitive or strategic because such studies can yield desired results only if the reports are made public and there is concerted action by all concerned. The committee further suggested that the veil of secrecy should be removed from such studies and reports placed in public domain. However, the government was of the view that studies are marked 'secret' or 'confidential' since sensationalisation or selective publicity of results of these studies could have an adverse impact on the morale of the armed forces.³⁶ The government also informed the committee that the causative factors identified by these studies are being addressed and remedial measures have been taken.

**Actions taken by the Organisation:
Government's Perspective***Sensitisation of Military Leaders*

The issue of stress and strain is being addressed by commanders in a comprehensive manner. Group discussions, workshops, counselling sessions and stress management courses are being conducted on regular basis to sensitise the military leaders in handling human resource under stressful conditions. Some of the measures initiated by the organisation are:³⁷

- Addressing the grievances of service personnel by more frequent interaction with junior leaders.
- Personnel at high risk of combat stress are identified and counselled by unit commanders, regimental medical officers and junior leaders.
- Religious teachers to preach and counsel vulnerable troops.
- Training of doctors and junior leaders by service psychiatrists has been undertaken.
- Regular and frequent spells of leave, turn over and rotation of personnel deployed in sensitive and stressful situations.
- All personnel returning to unit after leave are interviewed and medically examined by the regimental medical officer, who checks for any signs of stress or any overt signs of psychiatric illness.
- During routine medical care duties, authorised medical attendants are trained to keep look out for symptoms or signs of psychiatric illness or stress disorders among servicemen and promptly attend to them or refer them to appropriate level of specialist care.
- Buddy system is being actively encouraged. Here the persons from same state, ethnic backgrounds etc are made 'buddies'. They are expected to share their problems with each other and take care of each other.
- Seminars and workshops to train the trainers.
- Analysing case studies to draw lessons and take remedial

measures in cases pertaining to leadership, inter-personal relations and man-management need attention.

- Enhancement of traditional group activities such as organised physical training, games, roll-calls, sainik sammelans, sub-unit level training, field firing and recreational activities which act as stress relievers and foster esprit-de-corps.

Creating Pool of Psychological Counsellors

Psychological counsellors from para-medical staff are being trained through courses held at various service hospitals, to combat stress-related problems in armed forces personnel. This will help in providing timely treatment to affected personnel.

In-house training to selected Personnel Below Officers Rank (PBOR) from non-medical units has also been undertaken, to augment the existing trained counsellors. The training in the form of short courses/training capsules is being conducted at departments of psychiatry at seven military hospitals.

A mental health programme for the armed forces has also been prepared and approved. This programme along with action plan for its implementation has been disseminated to all concerned. The army has been constantly taking steps to improve the mental health of the troops.³⁸

Welfare Organisations

There are numerous agencies in the armed forces which are supposed to take care of the legitimate needs of personnel, ex-servicemen and their families. Distressed families of serving personnel are provided requisite help by the C&W Directorate of Adjutant General's Branch in the following manner:³⁹

- Financial assistance based on projected requirement and merit of the case.
- Assistance in solving family problems due to criminal and civil disputes of serving personnel by approaching concerned authorities of civil administration.
- Grant of educational scholarships to deserving children of serving personnel.

- To look after war widows, war disabled soldiers and their dependents. Rehabilitation Welfare Section has been established after OP VIJAY.
- The Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (ESW) is supposed to take care of the welfare activities for ex-servicemen under various schemes through organisations under it like Kendriya Sainik Board, Directorate General of Resettlement (DGR) and Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS).

Improving Rations and Clothing

Based on the feedback from troops and formation commanders at various levels, the following measures have been taken to enhance the specifications and scale of rations for the troops:⁴⁰

- Enhancement of specifications of rice, pulses and tea.
- Introduction of pre-cooked chicken in retort pouches, broilers in place of culled chicken and provision of chicken for all days as against five days in a week.
- Replacement of powder/tinned milk with tetra pack milk.
- Authorisation of in-lieu items like suji, flour, bread, coffee, butter and eggs to PBOR so as to provide variety in rations.
- Provisioning of special rations to all troops deployed above 12,000 feet in areas of northern and eastern commands.
- Enhancing the condiment allowance by 84 per cent and LPG scales by 55 per cent.

Steps have been taken by the government to ensure supply of better quality weather appropriate clothing to service personnel.

Improving State of Government Married Accommodation

Stay with families is permitted in peace areas only. Border areas and high altitude areas are classified as field areas where stay with families is not permitted for operational reasons. No family accommodation exists in these areas as it is not authorised. Local formation commanders at times permit families in border areas for very short duration in existing accommodation under formation arrangements.⁴¹ Government says that it is making efforts to complete the married accommodation

project (MAP). In phase-I, out of 57,875 dwelling units under execution, 40,123 have been completed.

Liberalising Leave Policy

Although liberalised leave policy has been put in place permitting the officers to split their annual leave into three parts with no restriction on splitting of annual leave by PBOR, the ground realities present a different picture.⁴²

As per the government, the existing leave policy is being constantly monitored to ensure that everyone gets his due leave without compromising the operational requirement. Leave under normal circumstances is not denied. However, as already mentioned, the operational and functional requirements have to be kept in mind while granting leave.

Tenures in Counter-insurgency/High Altitude Areas

Tenures in counter-insurgency and high altitude areas for all ranks have been streamlined after necessary validation with respect to operational and medical requirements by the concerned authorities.⁴³ Manpower is being turned over promptly on completion of their prescribed tenure.⁴⁴ This is a positive achievement and needs to be highlighted.

Recommended Focus Areas

After analysing likely causes of stress in the armed forces personnel based on the internal studies and studies carried out by DIPR, it is clear that all is not well. The shortage of officers in armed forces in general and army in particular is a cause of serious concern. A shortage to the tune of 12,000 officers in junior and middle ranks in army alone adversely affects the functioning. This is leading to greater stress among junior and middle level officers owing to the need to perform multiple functions and inadequate time and opportunity for intimate administration of personnel under command. Considering the fact that shortages of officers coupled with stressful conditions in the inhospitable conditions, particularly in counter-insurgency operational areas, impinge upon performance of both officers and the soldiers, it is high time that concrete result-oriented steps are taken to reduce the stress at unit level.

Traditional group activities such as, organised physical training, games, roll calls, sainik sammelans, sub-unit level training, field firing and recreational activities such as barakhanas, religious and social functions, that are supposed to act as stress-busters, have become an eye wash in the absence of desired supervision due to shortage of officers, and sound impressive only when briefing visiting dignitaries.

Mere theoretical knowledge of stress through management courses is going to yield very little in the absence of junior and middle level officers. The JCOs are unable to fill the void despite best efforts. Many old-timers argue that JCOs did very well during British era, but they forget that times have changed.

Stress can actually be addressed effectively only when junior and middle level officers are continuously visible in unit/deployment areas. Mere presence of officers in difficult situations makes a soldier happy. Any one who is happy remains miles away from stress. Motivated junior and middle level officers are needed if the Indian army to tackle stress. However, this will be possible only if adequate measures are taken to ensure the career protection of the officer cadre. To make up for the shortages of officers in army, the service conditions have to be made attractive. There is a need for an immediate cadre review to attract the right type of youth to join army/other defence services. A suggested model which may attract youth to join army as an officer is placed as Annexure IV. This model will take care of satisfaction levels by granting them grade pay and promotions at par with other central government employees in similar service-brackets and service conditions. The model will also be able to take care of the early retirement age in army by assuring them a service up to 60 years of age. Such arrangement will also ensure availability of officers in the rank of captains/majors/Lt colonels in the units and effectively be able to address stress-related issues.

The role of religious teachers and para-medical staff in handling stress-related issues is questionable. Religious teachers will be able to deliver goods only if they are well trained in this respect and they understand the psychology of soldiers. The religious teachers with good educational background and self-motivation can produce results provided they also have a proper relief. It is worth considering recruiting religious teachers with diplomas in psychology who are graduates in

religious science, to the officer cadre. A unit should always have special dedicated staff to assist a religious teacher. Thus a religious team would be in a position to address negative effects of stress. This practice will help soldiers to draw upon their personal religious faith, spiritual strength and values. Counselling by such teams is bound to enable soldiers to work through stress, fear, anxiety, anger and frustration.

Junior leaders are the first ones to spot a potential suicide risk. Such a person has to be provided aid without delay. Suicide awareness information must be made available to all ranks and buddies be tasked to watch out for such signs/signals in their colleagues. Suggested suicide awareness information and prevention keys are given in Annexure V.

Some of the suggested stress reduction techniques for military leaders are given in Annexure VI. These must be practiced religiously. The unit's encouragement and support to colleagues to cope with stress have a decisive effect.

Tendency to deny leave to personnel under the pretext of operational reasons or service exigencies during normal times other than extreme emergency must be curbed. In view of cheap and readily available air travel facility, travel by rail on form-D or concession voucher or free railway warrant need to be reviewed. Re-imburement of similar concession on actual air-fare will be worth considering. This will help in saving on travel-time and thus allow service personnel to spend more time with their family members.

Shortage of PBOR in units is mainly due to excessive attachment of personnel with higher headquarters for additional administrative tasks. This tends to upset the leave and induces stress among affected lot. Such attachments need to be minimised. The tendency of attaching personnel and extending their attachment periods indefinitely needs to be curbed ruthlessly by the higher commanders.

There is a serious need of evolving statutory provisions mandating the district authorities to address the problems and grievances of serving defence personnel within a stipulated time-frame. Mere examination of the issue relating to possibility of making statutory provisions in Services Act, in consultation with Ministry of Home Affairs, and rejecting it on the plea that public, police, local government, land and revenue etc happen to be state subjects is something that needs to be

addressed. The central government can very well direct state governments on this matter of national interest.

As far as rations for the armed forces are concerned, the quality should never be compromised on the pretext of economy. The best way to ensure quality is to have a decentralised system.

The 126 schools run by AWES for the wards of armed forces personnel all over India are grossly inadequate. The members of armed forces are always worried about education of their wards. Therefore, there is a need to increase the number of schools and professional institutions for the wards of armed forces personnel.

The officers, JCOs and PBOR have to remain separated from their families even after their posting to peace stations due to non-availability of appropriate government accommodation of entitled class. There is a need to expedite married accommodation projects under execution as also undertaking more projects to overcome shortages at class X stations like Delhi, Mumbai, Bangaluru, Pune, Kolkata, Chennai etc. It is worth constructing high-rise buildings instead of single/double storey buildings.

The man-management of armed forces personnel through effective leadership is the key to controlling stress. For this the mindset of senior officers has to be re-cast as per the psyche of present/new generation of officers and soldiers. There is a need to adopt newer and simpler society norms. It is the time for simple practices and outsourcing. The leaders have to adapt quickly for creating stress-free environment. Hence improvement in inter-personal relationship is priority. It has to be ensured that self-respect and dignity are not compromised at any cost.

All hygiene and familial stress factors must be addressed realistically. Lip services to these issues can only add to frustration. Improving health services for service personnel, ex-servicemen and their dependants must be given due importance.

Studies on address stress-related issues should be permitted to be done openly if real solutions are to be found. There is nothing secretive about it. In fact troops feel good when they hear that their genuine requirements and needs are being recognised and addressed.

Conclusion

The stress among officers and soldiers cannot be denied. It is more important to tackle the factors that cause stress. There is a need to address the post-retirement worries of defence personnel. This issue has to be handled with all the seriousness that it deserves. Our para military forces are the best organisations where the trained officers and soldiers can find lateral placements. The technical manpower of the armed forces including officers must be absorbed by organisations like DRDO, DGQA, ITI Limited, BEL, MTNL/BSNL etc without any loss of seniority and status. Such arrangements will not only be able to take care of early retirement ages in armed forces but also reduce training costs of those organisations.

Making up of shortages of officers in the junior and middle levels by making the service conditions more attractive and ensuring grade pay and promotions at par with civil services counterparts with similar service conditions and length of service is essential to address stress problems effectively. An immediate need to carry out a cadre review to ensure faster promotions to permanent commissioned officers must be recognised and implemented.

The promotion policy must be transparent and designed to enhance the overall effectiveness of the army. It must:

- Meet army branch/functional area and grade requirements.
- Provide career incentives.
- Be based on a “whole person concept” and potential to serve in the next grade.
- Equally identify and eliminate ineffective officers or those that show any signs of moral turpitude or physical cowardice in the field of battle.

The Indian Officer Evaluation System must identify and nurture talent displayed in combat. Towards that end it could go for accelerated promotion for officers who put up excellent performances on the battlefield. The initial SSB (Services Selection Board) procedure involves clinical, psychological testing and this is a valuable input. This initial report and merit list must be given a basic weightage. Schools of Instruction (Important Career Courses) must carry additional weightage for promotion as this is an objective and universally accepted parameter

of worth. Inflationary reporting in peace stations must be ruthlessly curbed. Joint appointments/experience must be encouraged. Uniformity of procedures must be ensured within the services. It might be worth considering removal of BOX GRADING awards in the ACRs of the officers. This shall definitely remove the biases in judging the performance of officers in various appointments since the inflationary trend of awarding OUTSTANDING grade in the BOX places rates at an advantage which can harm the career of other officers with consistent profiles in the existing quantified promotion-model in army.

Unpredictable factors that contribute to stress can be addressed with open mind through change in mindset, continuous interaction and taking actions to resolve the individual and group grievances in coordination with various agencies including civil administration.

The government should not shy away from enacting laws for the welfare of soldiers and their families where state governments have to play their role. Those requiring psychiatric help must be handled with utmost care and looked after. Monitoring of these cases at all levels generates confidence among ranks and file. This practice will reduce the tendency to avoid seeking psychiatric help.

Military leaders should take preventive actions and address stress symptoms as they appear. Ignoring the early warning signs can increase the severity of stress reactions. Some positive actions that could help in managing stress among soldiers are:

- Recognise that operations duration and intensity increase stress.
- Recognise that individuals and units react differently to the same stress.
- Learn to recognise the signs of stress in yourself and others.
- Recognise that fear is a normal part of combat stress.
- Rest minor stress casualties briefly, keeping them with their unit.
- Be aware of background stress sources prior to combat; e.g., family concerns and/or separation, economic problems.
- Provide an upward, downward and lateral information flow to minimise stress due to lack of communication.
- Practice stress control through cross-training, task allocation, tasks matching and task sharing.

- Look for stress signs and a decreased ability to tolerate stress.
- Practice and master stress coping techniques.
- Face combat stress; it is unhealthy to deny the stresses of combat.

Individual and unit effectiveness is dependent upon initiative, motivation, physical strength, endurance and ability to think clearly, accurately and quickly. The longer a soldier or a military officer goes without rest and sleep, the more his thinking slows down. Continuous work retards speed and accuracy more rapidly than intermittent work. Therefore these parameters have to be monitored periodically by the senior military leaders and timely corrections made where necessary.

A junior/middle level leader is the key to building and maintaining high morale and peak efficiency by knowing his troops and understanding their strength and weaknesses. To maintain the same level of morale and efficiency in combat, a junior/middle level officer must understand how to recognise, prevent and personally contend with reactions to combat stress when it occurs in his outfit. As an organisation, it has to be realised that every soldier and officer has to be treated as a human being with self-respect and dignity. Before expecting the society and civil administration to display care for service personnel, the services themselves have to introspect. The human resource of armed forces should not be allowed to feel neglected or unwanted after retiring. If this aspect is sincerely addressed by the services themselves, a sharp decline in the stress levels of officers as well as PBOR will result.

NOTES

1. Based on inputs from Dr Mukesh Batra as published in his article "Stress Causes a Number of Biological Changes" in Bangalore Times, *The Times of India* dated October 16, 2010, p. 21.
2. Ibid.
3. Fourth report on Action Taken by the Government of India on the Recommendations Contained in the 31st Report of the Standing Committee on Defence (2009-2010) (14th Lok Sabha) on "Stress Management in Armed Forces", pp. 01-39.
4. Syed Nazakat, "The War Within", *TheWeek*, August 1, 2010, p. 01.
5. See note. 3, p.12.
6. Ibid.
7. See note. 4, p. 1.

8. P.K. Vasudeva , “Rising Suicides in Army – Restore Dignity and Improve Pay”, New Delhi, August 3, 2007, available at http://www.sarkaritel.com/news_and_features/infa/august07/03suicide-in-army.htm accessed on July 28, 2010.
9. Ibid.
10. Refer to Annexure I of this paper. The responses were obtained during a field trip to J & K during November 2009.
11. Refer to Annexure II of this paper. The responses were obtained during a field trip to J & K during November 2009.
12. Available at <http://week.manoramaonline.com/cgi-bin/MMOnline.dII/portal/ep/the-war-within>, retrieved on July 28, 2010.
13. Ibid.
14. See note. 3, p. 18.
15. Ibid., p.19.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 21.
18. Ibid.
19. Shailender Singh Arya, “Stress Management in the Armed Forces”, *Journal of the USI of India*, New Delhi, Vol. CXXXIX, No. 576, April-June 2009, p. 191.
20. Ibid., p.191.
21. Available at <http://week.manormaonline.com/cgi-bin/MMOnline.dII/ep/the-war-within>, retrieved on July 28 2010.
22. Ibid.
23. See note. 8.
24. Ibid.
25. See note. 21, and also note. 8.
26. See note.3, p. 25.
27. Ibid., p. 25.
28. Ibid., p. 24.
29. Ibid., p. 8.
30. Ibid., p. 32.
31. See note. 19, p.193.
32. Ibid.
33. “DRDO Conducts Studies on Stresses on Indian Soldiers”, November 21, 2007”, available at <http://www.india.defence.com/reports-3626>, retrieved on July 28, 2010.
34. Ibid.
35. Fourth report on Action Taken by the Government of India on the Recommendations Contained in the 31st Report of the Standing Committee on Defence (2009-2010) (14th Lok Sabha) on “Stress Management in Armed Forces”, pp. 13-16.
36. Ibid, p. 16.
37. Ibid, p. 13.
38. See note. 3, p. 15.
39. Ibid, p. 17.
40. Ibid., p. 10.
41. Ibid., p. 6.
42. Ibid., p. 23.
43. Ibid, p. 22
44. Based on the interaction of the author with officers, JCOs and soldiers of various arms and services deployed in counter-insurgency, high altitude and low intensity conflict operations environment.

ANNEXURE I

Evaluation of Organisation and Domestic Environment

Sample Size: Officers–100, JCOs–100, OR–300

Ser No	Factor/Issue	Officers	JCOs	OR
1.	Marital status – Married (M)/ Unmarried (UM)	M-85 UM-15	M-99 UM-01	M-234 UM-66
2.	Education – 5-8/8-10/10-12/ Graduate (GR)	–	5-8 - 02 8-10 - 37 10-12- 48 GR - 13	5-8 - 18 8-10 - 141 10-12 - 96 GR - 45
3.	Background – Village (V)/City (C)/ Town (T)	V-22 T-20 C-58	V-66 T-30 C-04	V-216 T-48 C-36
4.	Family type- Joint (J)/ Separated (S)	J-36 S-64	J-69 S-31	J-132 S-168
5.	Relations with family members- Happy (H)/Troubled (T)	H-93 T-07	H-84 T-16	H-264 T-36
6.	Fin Problems- Yes (Y)/No (N)	Y-10 N-90	Y-22 N-78	Y-87 N-213
7.	Any birth in family in last two yrs- Y/N	Y-32 N-68	Y-21 N-79	Y-102 N-198
8.	Any death in family in last two yrs- Y/N	Y-28 N-72	Y-08 N-92	Y-69 N-232
9.	Job loss of relative/close friend in last two yrs- Y/N	Y-04 N-96	Y-04 N-96	Y-54 N-216
10.	Theft/loss of property/Natural calamity- Y/N	Y-0 N100	Y-07 N-93	Y-36 N-264
11.	Marital Discord- Y/N	Y-02 N-98	Y-0 N-100	Y-24 N-276
12.	Ill health/handicap in family -Y/N	Y-22 N-78	Y-03 N-97	Y-48 N-252
13.	Are you happy with your posting- Y/N	Y-81 N-19	Y-46 N-54	Y-147 N-153

Ser No	Factor/Issue	Officers	JCOs	OR
14.	Have you get posting of choice- Y/N	Y-42 N-58	Y-37 N-63	Y-57 N-243
15.	Have you been denied/missed out on promotion- Y/N	Y-19 N-81	Y-10 N-90	Y-36 N-264
16.	Have you failed in promotion cadre- Y/N	Y-0 N-100	Y-35 N-65	Y-39 N-261
17.	How many times did you go on leave in 2007 – 1/2/3/>3	1-12 2-40 3-38 >3-10	1-04 2-88 3-05 >3-nil	1-108 2-123 3-60 >3-nil
18.	How many times did you go on leave in 2008 – 1/2/3/>3	1-13 2-38 3-41 >3-08	1-08 2-80 3-09 >3-3	1-66 2-162 3-72 >3-nil
19.	How many times did you go on leave in 2009 – 1/2/3/>3	1-48 2-33 3-19 >3-nil	1-39 2-59 3-02 >3-nil	1-165 2-90 3-45 >3-nil
20.	Did you get leave when required – Y/N	Y-89 N-11	Y-88 N-12	Y-213 N-87
21.	Were you sent on leave when not required – Y/N	Y-12 N-88	Y-45 N-55	Y-96 N-204
22.	Are You satisfied with professional job – Fully satisfied (FS)/ Reasonably satisfied (RS)/ Unsatisfied (US)	FS-50 RS-43 US-07	FS-72 RS-22 US-06	FS-168 RS-108 US-24
23.	Any task other than professional job given – Y/N	Y-74 N-26	Y-22 N-78	Y-72 N-228
24.	Are you happy to do any task other than professional – Y/N	Y-63 N-37	Y-62 N-38	Y-150 N-150
25.	Senior's style of functioning – Easy (E)/ Copeable (C)/ Difficult (D)	E-27 C-62 D-11	E-48 C-48 D-04	E-81 C-177 D-42
26.	Rules and regulations are very tough and maintaining the discipline is very difficult – Never (N)/ Sometimes (S)/ Always (A)	N-21 S-79 A-0	N-40 S-58 A-02	N-54 S-96 A-150
27.	Do you take decisions at wk – N/S/A	N-02 S-50 A-48	N-23 S-55 A-22	N-57 S-177 A-66

Ser No	Factor/Issue	Officers	JCOs	OR
28.	Do you find any difficulty in taking decisions- N/S/A	N-50 S-49 A-01	N-54 S-42 A-04	N-132 S-99 A-69
29.	Do you complete your task in time – N/S/A	N-04 S-42 A-54	N-08 S-29 A-63	N-69 S-75 A-156
30.	Is your working schedule overloaded – N/S/A	N-25 S-64 A-11	N-41 S-39 A-20	N-69 S-123 A-108
31.	How many times have you been delayed in transit camp – N/S/A	N-66 S-33 A-01	N-57 S-36 A-07	N-96 S-51 A-153
32.	Can you plan your leave – N/S/A	N-0 S-59 A-41	N-17 S-64 A-19	N-108 S-102 A-90
33.	How many times have you gone on leave without reservation – N/S/A	N-43 S-57 A-0	N-31 S-59 A-10	N-78 S-99 A-123
34.	Do you get your pay on time – N/S/A	N-0 S-0 A-100	N-0 S-0 A-100	N-0 S-123 A-177
35.	Do you think negative – N/S/A	N-54 S-46 A-0	N-74 S-25 A-01	N-168 S-81 A-51
36.	Do you criticize yourself – N/S/A	N-34 S-64 A-02	N-52 S-48 A-0	N-153 S-75 A-72
37.	Do you over analyse your self – N/S/A	N-37 S-62 A-01	N-19 S-71 A-10	N-150 S-118 A-33
38.	Are your aspirations being met– N/S/A	N-01 S-68 A-33	N-15 S-39 A-46	N-66 S-177 A-57
39.	Do you take things personally – N/S/A	N-34 S-62 A-04	N-40 S-50 A-10	N-138 S-120 A-42

Ser No	Factor/Issue	Officers	JCOs	OR
40.	Do you feel your colleagues make you angry – N/S/A	N-24 S-73 A-04	N-50 S-45 A-05	N-132 S-126 A-42
41.	Do you feel hurt when scolded – N/S/A	N-10 S-83 A-07	N-29 S-66 A-05	N-132 S-96 A-72
42.	Do you feel angry with actions/decisions of your Seniors – N/S/A	N-14 S-79 A-07	N-74 S-23 A-03	N-108 S-111 A-81
43.	Do you feel angry with actions/decisions of your Juniors – N/S/A	N-17 S-79 A-04	N-49 S-48 A-03	N-144 S-111 A-45
44.	Do you feel angry with actions/decisions of your colleagues – N/S/A	N-26 S-67 A-08	N-35 S-43 A-22	N-144 S-108 A-48
45.	Are you satisfied with your food – N/S/A	N-0 S-16 A-84	N-12 S-21 A-67	N-105 S-138 A-57
46.	Are you satisfied with your living conditions – N/S/A	N-0 S-48 A-52	N-31 S-47 A-22	N-108 S-120 A-72
47.	Are you satisfied with recreational activities in your unit-N/S/A	N-0 S-35 A-65	N-26 S-26 A-48	N-84 S-120 A-126
48.	Do you feel comfortable communicating your problem to Seniors (S) – Y/N Colleagues (C) – Y/N	S-Y 100/N C-Y 100/N	S-Y 89/N11 C-Y 88/N12	S-Y 204/N96 C-Y 213/N87
49.	Does your buddy disclose his problems to you – N/S/A	N-0 S-54 A-46	N-16 S-32 A-52	N-87 S-126 A-87
50.	How much duration are you comfortable working in CI Ops – <1/1/2/3 (years)	<1- 0 1-15 2-72 3-13	<1-0 1-19 2-79 3-02	<1-0 1-57 2-132 3-45

Ser No	Factor/Issue	Officers	JCOs	OR
51.	How much duration are you comfortable working in HAA – <2/2/3/>3 (years)	<2-05	<2-06	<2-91
		2-84	2-86	2-186
		3-11	3-08	3-33
		>3-0	>3-0	>3-0
52.	Are you being relieved/posted out in time – N/S/A	N-02	N-08	N-81
		S-36	S-55	S-144
		A-62	A-37	A-75
53.	Do you feel your grievances are being addressed appropriately – N/S/A	N-02	N-05	N-102
		S-48	S-54	S-117
		A-50	A-41	A-81
54.	Previous illness – Y/N	Y- 05	Y-12	Y-96
		N-95	N-88	N-204
55.	Any suicidal attempt – Y/N	Y-0	Y-0	Y-30
		N-100	N-100	N-270
56.	Use of alcohol – Y/N	Y-46	Y-34	Y-123
		N-54	N-66	N-177
57.	Have you increased alcohol/tobacco consumption – Y/N	Y-0	Y-0	Y-30
		N-100	N-100	N-270
58.	Do you use drugs – Y/N	Y-0	Y-0	Y-0
		N-100	N-100	N-300
59.	Do you do daily exercises – Y/N	Y-78	Y-87	Y-214
		N-22	N-13	N-86
60.	Do you have religious habits – Y/N	Y-87	Y-96	Y-271
		N-13	N-04	N-29

ANNEXURE II

Stress Assessment

Sample Size: Officers-100, JCOs-100, OR-300

Ser No	Event	Offrs	JCOs	OR
1.	Do you feel tense, nervous, anxious or upset – Occasionally (O)/ Sometimes (S)/ Most of the times (M)	O-65	O-63	O-63
		S-35	S-27	S-174
		M-0	M-0	M-63
2.	Low in energy, exhausted and tired – O/S/M	O-62	O-73	O-66
		S-38	S-25	S-174
		M-0	M-02	M-60
3.	Feel sad, Depressed – O/S/M	O-66	O-66	O-72
		S-34	S-31	S-171
		M-0	M-03	M-57
4.	Ever felt life is not worth living – O/S/M	O-0	O-01	O-72
		S-11	S-29	S-192
		M-0	M-03	M-36
5.	Preoccupied with personal problems - O/S/M	O-73	O-54	O-81
		S-22	S-32	S-180
		M-0	M-14	M-39
6.	Fell hopeless in unpleasant sits – O/S/M	O-04	O-08	O-51
		S-16	S-32	S-153
		M-0	M-10	M-36
7.	Feel tired in the morning – O/S/M	O-03	O-09	O-09
		S-25	S-37	S-201
		M-0	M-07	M-42
8.	Problems in concentrating – O/S/M	O-09	O-25	O-33
		S-42	S-38	S-114
		M-0	M-10	M-39
9.	No control over events in life – O/S/M	O-05	O-08	O-63
		S-25	S-29	S-153
		M-03	M-03	M-30
10.	Achieve the standards – O/S/M	O-36	O-71	O-36
		S-21	S-25	S-162

Ser No	Event	Offrs	JCOs	OR
		M-43	M-04	M-63
11.	Problems you can't solve- O/S/M	O-81 S-19 M-0	O-49 S-36 M-15	O-27 S-147 M-78
12.	Feel close to/by the people around you- O/S/M	O-20 S-11 M-69	O-51 S-30 M-19	O-54 S-168 M-57

Note: Certain EVENTS have not been responded by few. This means that either they have no such problem/event in their life or they have doubt (confusion) in their mind about themselves.

ANNEXURE III

Details of Professional Colleges for Wards of Army Personnel

Name of Institute	Location	Course Duration (years)	Degree Awarded	Annual Intake	Total Capacity	Availability of Hostel
Army Institute of Technology (AIT)	Pune	4	BE/Four Streams	240	960	Yes
Army Institute of Hotel Management	Banglore	4	BHM	60	240	Yes
Army Institute of Management Kolkata (AIMK)	Kolkata	2	MBA	120	240	Yes
Army Institute of Law (AIL)	Mohali	5	BA, LLB	80	400	Yes
Army Centre of Education (ACE)	Pachmarhi	1	B.Ed	60	60 (girls)	Yes
Army College of Dental Sciences (ACDS)	Secunderabad	5/3	BDS/MDS	40/02	200/06	Yes
Army Institute of Education (AIE)	Delhi Cantt	1	B.Ed	100	100	Yes
Army Institute of Management & Technology (AIMT)	Greater Noida	2	MBA	120	240	Yes
Army Institute of Fashion Design (AIFD)	Banglore	2/3	PG Dip/BSc Fashion Technology	30/60	270	Yes
Army College of Nursing (ACN)	Jalandhar	4	BSc Nursing	50	200 (girls)	Yes
Army Institute of Higher Education (AIHE)	Pathankot	1	B.Ed	100	100	Yes
Army Institute of Nursing (AIN)	Guwahati	4	BSc Nursing	40	160 (girls)	Yes
Army College of Medical Sciences (ACMS)	Delhi Cantt	41/2	MBBS	100	500	Yes
Total				1202	3676	

ANNEXURE IV

Proposed Model for Cadre Review to Make Army an Attractive Career for Officers

Aims

All permanent commissioned officers should retire at an age of 60 years and all to draw grade pay at par with civil services counterparts with similar-service bracket.

Make up shortage of officers in units at junior and middle level.

Methodology

1. Recruit maximum officers as short service officers. Permanent commission should be restricted to the number of select grade full colonels in the army. More number of academies should be planned and opened for this purpose. IMA should also conduct training for short service officers after carrying out necessary organizational changes.
2. Assured lateral placement of willing short service officers at a service bracket of 05, 10 and 14 years into para military (NSG, BSF, CRPF, ITBP, CISF, State Police Forces etc)/other government services (including technical organisations like ITI Ltd, BEL, DRDO, DGQA etc with protection of pay, grade, seniority and growth in new service.
3. Only permanent commissioned officers should be allowed to serve in army for 60 years.
4. Option of lateral placement/deputation into para military services and government's technical organisations should be available to permanent commissioned officers also with effect from the rank of Colonel.
5. Technical arms/services should preferably induct technical graduates (B.Tech) at entry level. NDA should grant B.Tech/BBA/B.A. degrees after completion of course. B. Tech course after commissioning should be done away with to ensure availability of officers in the units of technical arms/services.

6. Officers of same rank in senior positions should be allowed to report on other junior officers of same rank.

Rank Structure

1. Abolish rank of a Lieutenant (Lt). An officer should be commissioned into army as a Captain (Capt).
2. An officer should become a Major (Maj) after putting in three years of service as a Capt.
3. An officer should become a Lt Col after nine years of total service.
4. First Selection Board be held for promotion to the rank of Colonel so that after an officer has put in 14 years service, he gets promoted to command a unit.
5. All select grade colonels should be promoted to the rank of Brigadier after putting in four years service as a select grade colonel. There should be no need of a selection board to the rank of a Brigadier.
6. All Lt Cols who could not become select grade colonels be made Time Scale Colonels after putting in a total of 22 years service.
7. Next Selection Board should be held for promotion to the rank of Major General (Maj Gen) after an officer has put in six years of service as a Brigadier.
8. Next Selection Board should be held for promotion to the rank of Lt Gen after an officer has put in six years of service as Maj Gen.
9. Special Boards should be held for selecting Lt Gens to hold appointments of Corps Commander, Army Commander, VCOAS, PSOs, Director Generals of various arms/services etc.
10. All Brigadiers should become Time Scale Maj Gens after putting in a total service of 36 years.
11. All select grade Maj Gens should become time-scale Lt Gens after putting in a total service of 36 years.
12. This will ensure one upgradation as an incentive to every select rank.

Upgradation of Appointments

1. All company commanders will be of the rank of Lt Col.
2. All unit commanding officers will of the rank of Colonel (select).

3. Brigades and Sub Areas will be commanded by Maj Gens with Brigadier being a deputy commander and all staff officers to be of the rank of colonel.
4. All divisional commanders and Area commanders will be of the rank of Lt Gens (select) with Maj Gens as their deputy commanders and brigadiers and colonels as staff.
5. All Corps Commanders will be of the rank of Lt Gen (after being a GOC of a division and COS at Corps HQ) with Lt Gen as COS and staff in the ranks of Maj Gen, Brigadiers/Colonels).
6. All Army Commanders will be of the rank of Lt Gen (after being a GOC of a Corps) with another junior Lt Gen as COS and staff in the ranks of Lt Gen/Maj Gen/Brigadiers/Colonels).
7. All category 'A' establishments will be commanded by Lt Gens with another Lt Gen as his deputy and faculty commanders/staff/instructors will be of the ranks of Maj Gens/Brigadiers/Colonels.
8. All category 'B' establishments will also be commanded by Lt Gens with Maj Gen as his deputy and faculty commanders/staff/instructors will be of the ranks of Maj Gens/Brigadiers/Colonels.
9. At Army HQ all ADGs will also be of the rank of Lt Gen. All DDGs will be of the rank of Maj Gen. All directors will be of the rank of Brigadier with Colonels as support staff.
10. Lt Cols/Maj/Capts will be posted only with the units with Colonel (select) as Commanding Officer.
11. Organisations like Training Centres, Recruiting, NCC, Resettlement, Embarkation HQ, MC/MF dets etc will be manned by time scale officers (Cols and above).
12. All posts presently held by Maj/Lt Cols at brigade/sub-area/division/area/corps/command/army HQ will be held by Colonels.
13. All staff appointments at brigade/division/corps/command/army HQ and category 'A' and 'B' establishments should be upgraded by one rank with no Lt Cols/Majs/Capts posted there-in.
14. Consider removal of BOX grading from the ACR form of the officers.

Note: The proposals are not exhaustive and need to be studied, analysed and suitably modified by the Competent Authority.

ANNEXURE V

Suicide Awareness Information

Suicide Symptoms

A person contemplating suicide:

- Appears depressed, sad, and tearful and/or may display changes in patterns of sleep and/or appetite.
- Believes he/she is in a hopeless situation.
- May talk about or actually threaten suicide, or may talk about death and dying in a way that strikes the listener as odd.
- May display changes in behaviour, appearance or mood.
- May increase or start drug or alcohol use.
- May injure self or engage in risky behaviour.
- Abandons planning for future.
- May start withdrawing from others, including family and close friends.
- May give away possessions.
- May appear apathetic, unmotivated and/or indifferent.

Prevention Keys

The junior/sub-unit leaders are the first ones to identify the signs of a potential suicide-risk soldier. The following prevention keys will provide aid to persons at anticipated risk:

- Ask: “Are you thinking about hurting yourself?”
- Intervene immediately.
- Do not keep a secret concerning a person at risk.
- Locate help (JCO/NCO/doctor/nursing assistant/MI Room/friend/family/help line).
- Inform your chain of command.
- Find someone to stay with the person. Do not leave the person alone.
- Expedite, get help immediately. A suicidal person needs the immediate attention of helpers.

ANNEXURE VI

Stress-Reduction Techniques for Military Leaders

To reduce stress, the military leader should:

- Lead by inspiration, not by fear or intimidation.
- Initiate and support stress management programmes.
- Provide information to focus stress positively.
- Ensure each person has mastered at least two stress coping (relaxation) techniques, a slow one for deep relaxation and a quick one for on the job.
- Look out for soldiers' welfare.
- Communicate with soldiers personally to learn about stressors and direct signs of stress.
- Understand that stress in response to threatening or uncertain situations is normal.
- Create a spirit to win under stress.
- Act as a role model for self-control of stress reactions.

Realistic training is the primary stress-reduction technique. It assures soldiers' maximum confidence in their skills and belief that their leaders are doing their best for them. Since the basic necessities of life assume even greater importance on the battlefield, leaders should:-

- Ensure personnel are properly trained.
- Ensure training includes understanding of combat stress and how to deal with it.
- Place welfare of subordinates before personal welfare, but keep them capable.
- Ensure personnel get as much rest as possible.
- Ensure best possible shelters are available.
- Keep soldiers well supplied with food, water and other essentials.
- Provide mail, news and information avenues.
- Provide best medical, logistical and other support.
- Maintain high morale, unit identity and esprit-de-corps.
- Ensure that experienced soldiers take care of and teach new inductees.

CHAPTER 5

Developing Human Resource for Sub-Conventional Warfare

Introduction

Total wars of conventional nature are on their way to becoming history. The concentration of existing and future world powers on economic growth vis-à-vis military growth consolidates the practicability, applicability and relevance of limited and sub-conventional warfare concept. While rivalry among nations will continue to exist, the balance will be maintained by the deterrence mechanisms at their disposal. Nations today are more likely to focus on economic growth while keeping their deterrence capability intact for effective and meaningful negotiations on the disputes between them. As per the Indian army doctrine on sub-conventional operations, total war as an instrument of state policy has become less relevant than ever before and resultantly, the probability of full scale conventional war between nations is gradually receding as an option for settling disputes. However, this has given further impetus to sub-conventional operations as the predominant form of warfare.¹

Gone are the days when military supremacy of one nation over the other could mean overall supremacy. Today, economic strength coupled with credible deterrence in terms of technology, possession of weapons of mass destruction, national policies and adequate military power against external aggression and forces with the capability to undertake

sub-conventional operations, in proxy wars, insurgency, terrorism, border skirmishes etc, forms the basis of power in any region.

Most future conflicts, in the form of sub-conventional operations, are largely likely to remain the responsibility of the army. Hence it will be in the fitness of things to prepare army for this type of warfare in a pragmatic and systematic manner. Army personnel trained and equipped for conventional warfare find themselves at a disadvantage when deployed for sub-conventional operations. The advancement in technology, changing warfare concepts, induction of sophisticated weapons and support equipments and need to handle far too many variables require special efforts for ensuring the recruitment of suitable human resources and their training to suit the requirements of conventional as well as sub-conventional warfare. This is essential since possibility of conventional war can not be totally ruled out and at the same time relevance of conventional operations in today's scenario can no longer be ignored.

In this chapter, the author brings out the necessity of human resource development to suit sub-conventional operation requirements, salient aspects of stress in sub-conventional operations and the existing drawbacks and challenges faced by the organisation during such operations. Thereafter, steps required to meet the challenges of future warfare shall be discussed. Finally, the author recommends a human resource development strategy for the Indian army.

Necessity for Human Resource Development

It is essential to have an army which is capable of responding to conventional as well as sub-conventional warfare requirements with minimum turbulence while switching roles from one form of warfare to another. This need can be fulfilled only if there is focus on the basic, advance and refresher training of officers and men at training centres/academies and formation level schools apart from refresher training in respective units. The training centres and training academies will have to shift focus from conventional warfare specific training to conventional cum sub-conventional warfare training. It implies that training of officers and men in conventional as well as sub-conventional warfare tactics need to be balanced. Human resource of army needs to be taught and exercised in sub-conventional warfare techniques at par

with conventional warfare. This shall ensure fully prepared army to respond effectively to conventional as well as sub-conventional operations requirements at all times. Keeping the reality of future wars and conflicts between nations in mind, the human resource of army has to be prepared right from day one. A holistic look has to be given to recruit, prepare/train, utilise and sustain an army, which should be capable of undertaking conventional as well as sub-conventional operations, whenever thrust upon and plays its role to achieve national objectives.

From the army perspective, sub-conventional warfare differs in respect of the application of fire power. Many more restraints are imposed on the sub-conventional battlefield because of political ramifications of its indiscriminate use. This type of warfare demands restraint and judiciousness to ensure that only the minimum amount of force required is applied. The rules of engagement will differ significantly in conventional and sub-conventional operations since the latter is not a declared war between two warring countries but may either be supported from outside or outsiders may be involved in it. Sub-conventional war also encompasses internal unrest within the country, and hence a certain degree of restraint becomes necessary. Indiscriminate violence on the part of military against indigenous population will do little towards winning their hearts and minds. Army personnel have to be trained in this aspect right from day one in a deliberate manner since heavy fire power and large-unit manoeuvres in sub-conventional operations are irrelevant, not cost effective and most of the times counterproductive.

Historically, the fundamental problem confronting the soldier is that he finds himself applying the conventional principles of war, which do not apply in sub-conventional conflicts. Every organisation and profession inculcates a coherent set of constructs and categories which enable them to interpret their professional world,² and army is no different in this respect. Thus, to ensure desired performance of an army in sub-conventional operations at par with performance in conventional operations, it is essential to train the soldiers accordingly. However, it is to be noted that maintaining a balance between the training for conventional as well as sub-conventional wars is not an easy proposition and has to be carefully designed since it might confuse trainees.

Stress in Sub-conventional Operations

The plethora of literature on combat stress substantiates that troops trained in conventional warfare experience significant stress while operating in low intensity/counter insurgency operations. Conventional training makes a soldier think in clear cut terms and this tendency often leads to problems where the concept of enemy can not be applied to his own people. In such an environment, a soldier ends up fighting an elusive enemy, in the absence of reliable intelligence and cooperation of local population. Many researchers tend to believe that ambiguity of aim, lack of visible success, high casualty rates and prolonged exposure to dangerous situations are the main causes of stress among troops operating in counter insurgency environment and operational factors such as fatigue, unpredictability of threat, extended separation from families, absence of recreational avenues and problems related to leave add fuel to fire. However, most of the stress related cases can be managed much before they can drive a soldier to suicide/fratricide. It is essential to understand the underlying cause for the rising cases of suicides/fratricides among trained and disciplined soldiers. Is it due to stressful working environment and extended tenures in insurgency areas as brought out in numerous media reports, or is there something else to it?

With the sharp decline in incidents of terrorist related violence and attack on soldiers in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), prolonged exposure to dangerous situations can not be deemed the root cause of suicides/fratricides in the army. If these were related to exposure to dangerous situations, they should have shown a downward trend, which has actually not been the case. On the contrary, a large number of troops volunteer for field postings in order to retain family accommodation in peace stations so as to ensure requisite schooling for their children since they feel that timely leave and better allowances are available in operational areas. This clearly establishes that the correlation of suicides/fratricides and prolonged exposure to dangerous situations in counter insurgency areas lacks substance.

As per the Yerkes-Dodson Stress Model, a certain degree of stress (optimum stress level) is necessary to help us live an active and productive life. However, the stress level lower than optimum stress level in any individual leads to hypo-stress – implying a lack of interest in

activities. If stress level is greater than optimum stress level, it may lead to accumulation of fatigue- leading to psychobiological diseases. The army has been taking short and long term measures to maintain optimum stress levels among its troops.

During my trip to operational areas in J&K, I interacted with 60 officers, 145 JCOs and 880 other ranks of all arms and services. It came out clearly that suicides/fratricides in operational areas mainly take place due to domestic problems of affected individuals for which they find no solution. These personal/domestic problems include marital discord, hiding facts about his trade/position in organisation while getting married, property disputes, heavy debts, inability to bear children education expenses, previous psychiatric disorder, and inability to meet aspirations of educated spouse at home etc. 98 percent troops felt that suicides/fratricides are triggered by stress purely linked to domestic/personal problems and have no linkage, whatsoever, with operational environment. As per 2008 statistics in operational areas in a corps zone, out of 18 cases, 13 were due to domestic problems, two due to failed love affairs, two due to previous psychiatric disorder history and only one case related to operational stress. It has to be noted here that 13 cases of suicide due to domestic problems were in fact triggered by the operational environment that prevented the affected individual from addressing the issues. With the breakdown of joint family system, soldiers are anxious about their families. Due to easy communication with family members as a result of affordable mobiles even most mundane issues get communicated. The army can grant 90 days leave to an individual in a year. Any requirement beyond his yearly entitlement is taken care of by granting advance of annual leave in exceptional cases, which are adjusted against his next year's entitlement. Most cases of suicides have occurred soon after troops returned to duty from leave. This clearly indicates that soldiers resorting to extreme steps are severely troubled by domestic issues which they are unable to resolve.³

When a soldier is perturbed over his family problem beyond his optimum stress level or returns from leave with helplessness in getting his rightful due after exhausting all possible options and reaches a point of no return, he gets psychologically affected. Such estranged individual either attempts to end his life or turns the weapon towards his

colleagues or superiors, on minor provocation at the spur of moment over any issue. The study of past incidents reveals that the maximum number of suicide/fratricide cases occur within a few days of soldier returning from leave. In most such cases, the individuals had availed their quota of leave as per their requirements.

The army has initiated number of measures to prevent occurrence of such incidents at all levels and the realistic needs of soldiers are being taken care of. Through project – MILAP, interaction with troops has increased substantially and counselling facilities are being ensured up to post level. Officers, Religious teachers and JCOs are being trained in counselling techniques, the buddy system is promoted, leave is being granted liberally, help-lines have been created and are manned round the clock to help distressed soldiers promptly and infrastructure pertaining to living conditions has been improved considerably.

There is definitely a need to sensitize the civil administration more deliberately to address the problems of soldiers and their family members with passion. A large number of soldiers get bogged down by property disputes with close relatives. Limitation of leave period prevents soldiers from adequately presenting their respective cases, otherwise essentially required to seek justice. The increasing lawlessness in rural areas affects their families and further compounds their worries. The recommendations of commanding officers to the district administration about the problems being faced by the soldiers under their command fail to evoke desired response, unlike in the past. In order to limit stress among troops in operational and other areas to optimum levels, this anomaly needs immediate addressing through an institutional directive by the government to district administration to resolve the problems of soldiers on priority.

Notwithstanding the fact that most suicide cases in Army are as a result of helplessness on the part of soldiers in solving their domestic problems, it is a hard fact that helplessness is mainly due their prolonged deployment in counter-insurgency areas/low intensity conflict operations which induces tremendous stress by preventing adequate addressing of personal issues.

Challenges in Sub-conventional Operations

The officers, JCOs and non-commissioned officers of our army face

tough challenges that test their leadership acumen. The volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity of sub-conventional warfare environment impacts on the decision making, and, therefore, underscores the importance of suitable frames of reference and training to enable them to operate effectively in an area, which is largely grey. These challenges are at operational as well as tactical levels. Some of the major challenges encountered by the commanders at operational level in sub-conventional operations include:

- Ensuring the correct orientation of their command for sub-conventional operations.
- Training of heterogeneous components of combat resources.
- Intelligence generation.
- Coping with subversion in various institutions during the initial stages of operations.
- Eliciting accountability of various security agencies in the conflict zone and ensuring effective coordination and synergy in the initial stages of operations.
- Preservation of combat power and maintenance of morale.
- Coping with cases of stress related to operational as well as domestic issues.
- Coping with the time differential in creating counter measures for overcoming the technological capabilities of the terrorists/insurgents.
- Dealing with seditious media reports by subverted sections of local media.

The challenges faced by the commanders at various tactical levels include:

- Intelligence generation at grass roots level.
- Adhering to parameters laid down for engagements.
- Ensuring adherence to prescribed tactical norms during sub-conventional operations.
- Managing operational as well as domestic stress and preventing attrition in own rank and file.

Meeting Operational Challenges

In order to meet above challenges, it is imperative that military leaders at all levels possess necessary conceptual, tactical and technical skills and understand the ways and means for the effective application of combat resources at their disposal.

Training our officer cadre, and specifically junior officers, for effective leadership in sub-conventional operations is of paramount importance. Our military training academies/institutes/schools/colleges responsible for training officer cadres have to gear up to face the reality of future warfare (sub-conventional warfare) and must endeavour to ensure 'what a leader must be', 'what he must know' and 'what he must do' in this new warfare environment. Since principles of conventional warfare do not apply to sub-conventional warfare, training of the officer cadre needs to be reviewed and executed in all schools of instruction right from the National Defence Academy/Indian Military Academy/Officers Training Academy to subsequent progressive military training schools/colleges to produce and sustain a professional role model. The final product should be capable of working selflessly, remaining calm and composed under adverse situations, fit to take pragmatic decisions, motivating his command to deliver with precision by leading by example, switching roles from conventional operations to sub-conventional operations with minimum turbulence, outsmarting terrorists through guile, guts and professional competence and maintaining high a level of combat worthiness of his command for conventional as well as sub-conventional operations by striking a right balance during peace time training.

While interacting with officers, JCOs, NCOs in various units deployed in a counter insurgency environment as also at the training centres of various combat and support arms, certain issues emerged. Most of the young officers were of the view that they are unable to perform up to their full potential and their initiative gets curbed. Majority of these officers went to the extent of saying that training imparted to them in military academies/centres was to fight a conventional war whereas they fight insurgency and are deployed in low intensity conflict operations. Not only young officers but also a large number of middle level officers felt that it might be worth preparing the army for the future instead of repeating history. A

significant number of senior officers felt that quality of younger generation is below the mark and wanted that the selection system be modified suitably taking into account the academic strength, psychological aspects and mental as well as physical capacities of candidates.⁴

It came out clearly that our soldiers are very slow on the uptake and it becomes difficult for them to grasp and understand necessary instructions in the limited available time for execution of tasks/missions and it was advocated that instead of short-listing candidates for selecting recruits on physical tests, short-listing should be done based on a written test that tested basic language skills, general awareness, intelligence and psychological aptitude.⁵ It was felt and it is actually true that physical tests be conducted only for short-listed candidates based on written paper since there is no dearth of candidates who wish to join the services and physical attributes can be easily improved upon during the recruit training at respective regimental centres. In the existing scheme of things, academically and mentally superior candidates get eliminated right at the start of the selection process since short-listing of candidates for the written test is based on performance in physical test(s).⁶ It may be argued that conducting a written test for large numbers may not be feasible. But the navy and air force have already adopted this model which is also the norm in the US and British armies. Well, it is very much feasible, if there is a will.

Personnel below officer rank (PBOR) felt that training centres are unable to fulfil training needs of recruits. A lot of useful time gets wasted in showmanship. The training schedules get frequently disturbed, the instructors get detailed on avoidable non-instructional tasks in order to impress the visitors and, all this they felt, happens at the cost of training. The PBOR strongly felt that the training infrastructure and quality of instructors at training centres needed a boost. They also said that the syllabus continues to be theoretical in nature and far from reality of counter insurgency operations and felt that training is still focused on conventional operations. Some of the PBOR smiled sarcastically when asked about the quality of instructors in training centres. If I put it bluntly, they felt that the officers who have been overlooked or are on a last-leg posting or have a low medical category or have some compassionate grounds are posted to training

centres and hence unable to effectively contribute to the training needs effectively. This should be a matter of concern for planners in various line directorates as also directorate of military training and must be addressed appropriately. In my interaction with training battalion commanders posted at the six regimental centres of different arms as also officers responsible for PBOR training at line directorates, it was revealed that PBOR training is the responsibility of respective line directorates but training centres are controlled by Area/Sub Area headquarters. Since Area/Sub Area headquarters are in no way responsible for PBOR training, the headquarters detail the training personnel for administrative tasks. This imposes an avoidable extra burden on already under-staffed officers and PBOR instructors at regimental training centres due to hard scale holding of officers in a particular arm/service and PBOR in various trades. This is at the cost of training. On interaction with unit commanding officers of various arms/services, it was confirmed that training of recruits at regimental training centres is not up to the mark and professionally more than 30 per cent soldiers reporting to units immediately after the recruit training from training centres are found wanting. This puts undue burden on unit commanding officers. Such ill-trained soldiers posted with units deployed for low intensity conflict operations are bound to suffer from psychological stress due low confidence levels in their professional ability. Such soldiers in difficult situations will only add to confusion and make the tasks of leaders more problematic. I inquired from a group of 30 NCOs from infantry, artillery, engineers, signals, EME and ASC whether they were satisfied with training standards of soldiers reporting to units after recruit training. The majority of them were of the view that most of the soldiers posted from training centres immediately after recruit training lacked professional knowledge and mentioned that the best welfare for a soldier is to make him and prepare him for conventional as well as unconventional operations through a well structured, balanced and ruthless training programme.

The above facts clearly call for a review of the recruitment methodology based on initial short-listing through psychological and mental tests followed by physical tests. There is also an urgent need to revise the syllabus, equipping the regimental training centres with desired infrastructure and ensuring posting of capable and dedicated

instructors at training centres/training academies apart from ensuring an attitudinal shift towards conducting a well structured and balanced training for meeting the training needs of the officer as well as soldier cadre of army for conventional as also sub-conventional operations.

Developing Human Resource for Future Warfare

During its over sixty year journey, the Indian army has left footprints of both success and failure. These years have yielded wide and varied experience in our approach and methodology to combat sub-conventional threats. While refinement of strategic and operational concepts and tactics to operate in such environments have been carried out, holistic view on developing a modern minded human resource for Army to undertake tasks in such an environment while retaining capability of switching roles for conventional operations needs immediate focus.

Recruitment

Future wars will be knowledge wars. Such wars lay emphasis on attracting knowledgeable personnel and training them.⁷ Thus the Indian army also has to induct personnel with higher and better education along with a technical bent of mind. With increase in general level of educational standards, a large number of well qualified candidates can now join the forces. Further, the aim should be to make the soldier multi-skilled in order to meet the objectives of downsizing, achieving flexibility in employment as also improving their career prospects.⁸

The man power must understand that insurgency is not primarily a military problem, and hence has to be addressed to resolve the legitimate grievances of the aggrieved people. Security forces are deployed on an area basis and junior leaders have to be allowed a considerable initiative and tactical flexibility. Restraint has to be exercised and patience is essential since counter-insurgency efforts may consume years rather than months. The soldiers have to afford protection to the population and government's instruments of political control and influence. The soldiers should also be able to perform non-coercive, quasi-military and military activities to mobilize public support.

The process of developing human resource for meeting challenges of sub-conventional warfare including limited wars has to begin right from recruitment stage by selecting the right person for right job. The selected candidate/recruit has to be intelligent enough to understand basic concepts, capable enough to handle modern weapons and equipments/gadgets, educated enough to understand nuances of modern conflicts, quick on uptake, psychologically robust to perform under stress and strain, capable enough to act and react logically in complex situations without looking out for guidance and must be mentally robust and physically tough to withstand future warfare challenges. While physical attributes may be improved through rigorous physical training, it may not be feasible to alter/modify mental robustness of a person significantly. Mentally/psychologically weak candidates are likely to suffer stress related disorders more frequently. Hence there is a requirement to shortlist candidates based on written test conducted before the physical test. Psychological test is also necessary in respect of candidates who get short-listed based on written test followed by physical tests. While selection of officers is being done as per requirements, recruitment of soldiers needs a review. In November, 2008, Dr W. Selvamurthy, then Chief Controller Research and Development, Ministry of Defence had stated that the army will soon introduce an entry-level personality test for aspiring personnel to eliminate candidates with negative traits is a measure aimed at cutting down the number of suicides and fratricides.⁹ However, this is yet to be implemented.

There are high as well as low response areas within the geographical spread of the country from where the manpower for the army gets recruited through open recruitment rallies. Recruitment rallies are planned well in advance, keeping in view the geographical and topographical considerations. At least one such rally is held in each month, combining districts, areas and regions, depending upon the response anticipated, thereby giving every aspirant, irrespective of his place of residence, the minimum of one opportunity in a year to get himself enrolled in the army.¹⁰ Though there may be a low response from certain areas but the intake quality has been found superior. Basic understanding and IQ levels of recruits hailing from low response states like Kerala have been found to be superior. It may be appropriate to

select recruits for technical trades from such areas. Since modern warfare heavily relies on technology, the human resource of the army has to be accordingly mustered and maintained. In order to meet this requirement, objective type question paper with Optical Mark Recognition (OMR) system of evaluation could be considered and minimum cut off for eligibility must be laid down.

The proposed system of selection of soldiers for army, if put into practice, is bound to evoke resistance- initially. But in the long run, it will be able to attract a better manpower.

Training

The training philosophy of Indian army is designed to meet its present and future threats. The sophisticated combat environment of the future battlefield would be replete with the latest technological advancements. Advanced systems, modern techniques and improved training methodologies would facilitate the deployment of battlefield support systems and force multipliers. This necessitates evolution and reorientation of operational concepts, tactics and techniques, in preparing the Indian army to meet the future challenges.¹¹ This in turn, demands changes in force structure, organisation and training philosophy to ensure optimal use of advanced technology for the efficient application of combat power.¹²

The changes envisaged for meeting the future warfare challenges are:

- A well trained, proud, highly disciplined and motivated force for conventional as well as sub-conventional operations, to deter war and when deterrence fails, to conduct swift conventional operations, to obtain decisive victory.
- Graduate transformation to the directive style of leadership.
- Enhanced capability of jointmanship.
- A force trained to fight conventional as well as sub-conventional operations against the backdrop of nuclear threat and insurgencies/asymmetric warfare threats.
- A quality force which emphasises national values and ethos.

The envisaged training objectives for the future army are:

- Progressively implement the Systems Approach to Training, so

as to make training more focused, object-oriented, cost-effective and responsive to the environment.

- Enhance professional military education of all ranks.

No soldier or officer should ever lose his life in combat because he was inadequately trained. This is the essence of the training in the army.¹³

After ensuring recruitment of right person for right job, the training phases have to be carefully planned and executed, duly taking into account the psychological, mental, physical and professional abilities required in modern warfare. A trained soldier when reports to a unit from the regimental training centre lacks experience. Such soldiers have to be groomed in the units for the war readiness through realistic on the job training. The induction of these soldiers into war zone needs to be done in a graduated manner. Mere posting of a soldier from training centre to a unit deployed in low intensity conflict operations to make up for the existing deficiencies may not serve the intended purpose.

Upgrading the Training Infrastructure and Training Syllabus

An important step which should be taken by regimental training centres of all arms and services is to revise their training courses to meet the challenges of modern warfare. A common syllabus needs to be worked out by the Directorate General of Military Training (DGMT) at the service headquarters in consultation with respective line directorates, Army Training Command and Defence Institute for Psychological Research (DIPR) and implemented. While this is done, training infrastructure of regimental training centres has to be upgraded suitably to fulfil the training requirements for modern warfare. There is also an immediate need to simplify the procedure for modernisation of laboratories in the training centres/training academies. There is a need to have more zonal counter-insurgency training schools on the lines of CIJWS Wirangte. The existing number of schools is grossly inadequate. In case, the army has to cater for the CI training needs of para-military forces like CRPF also, as is being talked of in the media post the Dantewada incident, more CI training schools are a necessity. The posting of psychologists for monitoring behaviour of trainees in

the training centres and applying necessary corrections, should also be met.

Preparing the army personnel for near perfect performance in sub-conventional warfare environment, necessitates ruthless execution of training schedules encompassing all elements spelt out in the doctrine for sub-conventional operations i.e. counter-infiltration operations including border sealing through physical presence of troops, use of artificial obstacles and integrated employment of surveillance devices, eliciting support of locals residing in border areas/areas of operations and seamless interface with counter-terrorist operations in the hinterland. Training for such operations has to focus on patrolling techniques, ambushes, raids, cordon and search, search and destroy, establishment of vehicle and personnel check posts, road opening, convoy protection and security of various static installations including operating bases. Similarly officers training academies have to adequately dovetail these aspects in training of cadets/officers.

The Indian army draws its strength from its ethos, traditions and culture that have shaped its thinking over centuries. The qualities self-denial, moderation, tolerance, respect for women and elderly members of society and ability to live in peace and harmony in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious environment must be inculcated as part of training.

The training and administration machinery has to focus on conserving combat power. Friendly losses occur because of terrorist actions, fratricide, stress-related attrition and battle accidents.¹⁴ The training has to address these issues seriously to obviate such losses apart from inculcating the habit of exploiting technology including force multipliers like EW equipments, UAVs etc., detection and neutralisation of IEDs, tie up fool-proof communication and coordination.

Need for Training for Coping Stress

The loss of human resource due to operational stress aggravated by soldier's helplessness in resolving his domestic conflicts can neither be ignored nor accepted. There is definitely a serious need to review recruitment policy apart from dovetailing stress management techniques and their practice in the training of a soldier right from the day he joins army. It is worth mentioning here that a rightly selected/recruited officer as also soldier, rightly trained for conventional as well as sub-

conventional operations at training centres/training academies and rightly refreshed through training in units in peace stations, rightly inducted into counter insurgency environment after requisite pre-induction and motivational training at formation training schools and finally, rightly exposed/turned over from a difficult and stressful environment is bound to deliver most optimally.

Need for Training on Legal Aspects

The soldiers have to be fully aware of legal aspects pertaining to sub-conventional operations. This aspect needs to be built into the training syllabi along with loopholes likely to be exploited by the militants both to evade prosecution as also filing of false cases against security forces personnel. On the job training for honing of basic skills should be a continuous affair in the units.

If the regimental training centres and training academies as also units in peace stations are made to deliver for which they are meant, it will not take long to remain always geared up as a fully prepared Army of all arms and services, ready to face challenges necessitated by sub-conventional warfare.

The Way Ahead – Recommendations

For the human resource of our army to be able to face the challenges of sub-conventional warfare – “the warfare of future”, the following actions must be taken at appropriate levels:

- The recruitment methodology for officers and soldiers needs to be reviewed. Psychological tests have to be designed by the DIPR with a view to select only initiative – takers, mentally robust, dedicated, motivated, physically trainable and persons with logical reasoning abilities.
- The standard of written paper needs to be enhanced to ensure desired intake for coping with technology.
- Psychological and intelligence tests should become part of selection procedure for PBOR also.
- Written-cum-Aptitude Test should precede Physical Tests for selecting PBOR.
- Academies (NDA/IMA/OTA) and Regimental Training Centres

must be geared up for training cadets and trainees respectively in terms of training infrastructure, training methodologies, training syllabi, trainers/instructors and procedures with a deliberate focus on training cadets and recruits for sub-conventional and limited wars.

- Training can dilute the effects of most of the stressors, if properly targeted. Hence training should prepare soldiers and officers to cope with stressors by:
 - Helping trainees (officers and soldiers) adapt to stressor stimuli and reducing their physiological response to the stressor.
 - Teaching strategies that allow trainees to react more effectively to stressors and maintain performance under stress.
 - Building up task-mastery and proficiency that can prevent performance degradations.
 - Improving the accuracy of individual expectation.
- Training should also be able to improve the performance of a group under stress by:
 - Fostering more effective group communication and coordination.
 - Alerting individuals (trainees) to how other members in their group might react to stressful situations.
- Military colleges and schools of instruction of all arms and services must review their training methodologies and equip themselves for meeting the challenges of future warfare realistically.
- Psychologists should become regular part of army organisations at all levels in order to take timely care of stress-related issues in a realistic manner. Putting too much reliance on religious teachers for managing stress may not be appropriate since they have their own limitations and are no substitute for a qualified psychologist.
- Outsourcing of non-military jobs must be ensured on ground for preserving/sustaining self esteem of soldiers.
- Initiative and creative thinking by young officers and junior leaders should be encouraged and tolerance for mistakes while executing tasks should be accepted by senior hierarchy.

- Regimental training centres should be posted with quality trainers and distracting events at training centres, which are major stumbling blocks in training routine, must be curbed ruthlessly. The tendency to post officers, JCOs and NCO instructors, with very little or no inclination/aptitude for instructional assignments, to training centres/schools of instruction/military colleges must be curbed. This will ensure quality training to trainees and in the longer run the desired product fit to sustain future warfare challenges will be available with the units.
- Best training may be feasible under a divisional commander. Training schools with dedicated training and administrative staff and requisite training infrastructure and focused training methodology and vision will be able to achieve desired training goals in respect of officers and men in a division. Here the troops of all arms and services should be imparted holistic refresher training in a meaningful manner duly taking care of sub-conventional warfare techniques/tactics apart from conventional warfare requirements. Every soldier must be able to go through a well structured refreshing training cycle in such training schools away from units even in peace areas.
- Other avoidable miscellaneous events/activities like visit of dignitaries and senior officers to training centres/military colleges/schools of instructions should not be at the cost of training. Corps specific reunions, events pertaining to corps domestic matters and non-professional formation events take a big toll of precious training time and training resources. Such events, if necessary, must be either totally outsourced or based on additional resources for which redundancies must be built into the organisational structure of regimental training centres without disturbing training schedules. For this to be achieved, one may like to visit institutions like IDSA, events and frequent visits of dignitaries are handled on a daily basis without either affecting any schedule or causing confusion.
- Constant review and updating of training syllabi, training methodology, selection and posting of trainers must be carried out periodically and appropriate corrections applied with out

delays, whenever necessary. Regimental training centres should not become the dumping grounds for officers and men at the cost of training of human resource for future wars.

- More short-service officers' academies on the lines of OTA must be created. Deficiencies should be made up through NCC entry scheme.
- Lateral placement of officers and men at all levels to para-military forces should be put into practice with out further delays. This will not only obviate the early retirement worries of service officers and PBORs, but also provide a highly professional human resource to BSF, CRPF, Police and other para-military organisations. However, it has to be ensured that they get absorbed with out any financial/status disadvantage. Short-service officers should be laterally placed with BSF, CRPF, Police and other para-military organisations as an obligation. This action will encourage more and more candidates to join army as short-service officers.
- Professional training vis-à-vis welfare must be balanced in appropriate proportions and efforts must be directed towards achieving professionalism for future wars.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the author has suggested a human resource development strategy pertaining to future warfare—"sub-conventional warfare", with a view to build up capacities. It is for various agencies involved in capacity building process to take appropriate steps in a time bound manner. It may not be true to say that nothing is being done in this direction. However, a lot more needs to be done.

Human Resource, being the main and ultimate component, has to be selected, trained, equipped, refreshed and deployed for meeting the challenges effectively. This requires a change in the mindset and sincerity of purpose among concerned agencies at appropriate levels.

NOTES

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3. K.C. Dixit, "Stress in Sub-conventional Operations", New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 23 December 2009, p. 02.
4. Based on interaction with army officers at regimental training centres of various arms and services.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Vinod Anand, "Approach To Revolution in Military Affairs and Information", *Journal of United Services Institution of India*, October-December 2006, p. 13.
8. Ibid., p.16.
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CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

Clear strategic and tactical directives are essential for the army and other security forces trained and equipped for conventional warfare to operate in an extremely challenging and hostile sub-conventional warfare environment. Commanders and troops must understand that they are operating in a tricky situation and their overall aim must always remain the achievement of a more perfect peace. It simply implies that there is no such thing as a quick military victory. Conduct of counter insurgency campaigns will invariably extend over a number of years. None should attempt to achieve 'quick-end' results, particularly by excessive use of force. Patience, perseverance, warmth and genuineness must be displayed by totally committed, dedicated and motivated leadership at all levels.

Undeniably, a counter insurgency environment demands a very high order of acumen, unimagined ever before in conventional setting. The training of security forces personnel has to strike a right balance between conventional as well as sub-conventional operations since possibility of conventional wars can not be ruled out and at the same time sub-conventional nature of present and future wars can not be ignored.

The security forces personnel end up fighting an elusive enemy, in the absence of any reliable intelligence and lack of cooperation of local population. Ambiguity of aim, lack of visible success and disproportionately high casualty rates tend to erode morale among security forces. It is an important function of command to restore confidence

of troops by keeping them well informed and clearing all foreseeable doubts at the earliest available opportunity, in order to retain/sustain their fighting capacity in the battlefield environment of the present and future.

Sustaining the motivation of officers and soldiers operating in a sub-conventional warfare environment is not an easy proposition. Soldiers operating in such an environment are faced with operational stressors, domestic stressors, intra-unit hassles, physical and the situational attributes of an operation zone and socio-political stressors.

Respect for religion is a very sensitive issue for troops. Therefore, utmost care must be exercised to ensure that, at no stage, the religious sentiments of troops get hurt, either advertently or inadvertently. Due care must be taken to deal with situations where religious feelings/beliefs of the troops are likely to be hurt.

Regimental spirit generates primary group bonds and cohesion. Symbols and traditions stress the distinct identity and pride in the outfit and promote unit cohesion and individual self esteem. The supportive nature of the regimental/unit spirit becomes most evident in an intense counter insurgency environment. Unit spirit is a true indicator of motivation and vice-versa.

Stressors will almost certainly have a psychological effect on individual soldiers and will likely have at least some negative effect on their performance although moderate levels of stress can actually contribute to heightened vigilance and improved performance. Military personnel clearly confront significant stressors while discharging their duties in sub-conventional warfare environment. Military personnel have proven themselves to be highly adaptable to constantly changing and uncertain circumstances, requirements and demands. This adaptability allows them to deal with significant stressors and successfully accomplish their objectives in the face of stress. This adaptability comes not only from personal characteristics and flexibility but also from their military training and experience, including basic and advanced training, operational exercises, pre-induction training and day-to-day work related challenges.

The application of moderators, including training and provision of additional information, can help individuals to adapt successfully to challenging stressors and maintain high levels of performance.

Training is the chief element of military effectiveness and performance as it can prepare individuals to cope with stressors through strategies that allow soldiers to react more effectively to stressors and maintain performance under stress, and by building up task mastery and proficiency that can prevent performance degradation. Training also improves the group performance by fostering more effective group communication and coordination and by alerting individuals to how other members in their group might react to stressful situations.

The importance of teamwork and group cooperation in Army for successful completion of operations needs no emphasis. Because of this dependence, army's use of group-based training seems particularly important. It is worth considering since it would help soldiers perform in sub-conventional warfare environment with more experience and certainty by diluting the effects of most of the stressors. Sensitisation of civil administration and civil police towards redress of genuine issues pertaining to welfare of soldiers in their home towns through policy directives to district magistrates and police authorities needs immediate consideration. This would take care of their domestic front more effectively. There is also a need for ensuring respect and sanctity of uniforms worn by the soldiers.

Human Resource, being the most important and ultimate component, which shall finally conduct operations in limited wars and sub-conventional warfare scenario, has to be selected, trained, equipped, refreshed and deployed for meeting the challenges effectively. This entails change in mindset of planners and executors and sincere addressing of this issue sincerely at appropriate levels.

The soldier of today must have, initiative, be fearless and nimble footed. The soldier should be able to master multi-functionalities such as field craft, weapons, explosives, communications, and intelligence. He must be tough but at the same time be sensitive to human beings and human rights. A soldier can not afford to lose self control in the face of grave provocation.

The training of majors, captains, lieutenants, JCOs and NCOs requires re-orientation. It is leadership and decision making at their level that would produce required results. They have to be encouraged to think and plan for themselves and take on the spot and speedy decisions. There is no room for them to look over their shoulders! It

should be ensured that there will be no witch hunts if and when mistakes are made and things go wrong. They must get on with the task in hand, but at the same time be conscious of human rights and collateral damage. They will have to be good at public relations and respectful of the civil-military relationship.

Sub-conventional warfare is not going to be that much about higher planning and giving set piece orders. Political and cultural suaveness, listening to juniors, intuition and familiarity with local social and religious milieu would be of great help. It shall have to be ensured that people on ground remain calm and do not indulge in human rights violation.

We need first rate small units equipped with light weapons, trained and motivated, somewhat on the lines of 'special forces' teams. Helicopter support shall have to be integral to formations fighting insurgency and terrorism. This is critical for mobility, which will have to be terrain independent and enable outpacing the enemy.

Excellent signal communications will be required within the platoon and section, down to squad and even to the individual soldier level. This will ensure that their actions can be coordinated, latest information is passed on and effectiveness can be maximised with synergy.

Intelligence will play a crucial role in all formations fighting in a sub-conventional warfare environment. While technology will help, cultivating local resources for humanity will lead to better results. There is a need for intelligence fusion centres, so that intelligence from all sources can be evaluated and disseminated with speed.

Information warfare includes effective media handling. This will help in diluting the support given by local population to the terrorists, in obtaining intelligence and getting balanced press coverage to mould public opinion through truthful reporting.

Sound logistic support for soldiers operating in such an environment is an essential pre-requisite and must be ensured at all times. Troops should be capable enough to merge with the locals and live off the land, if situation so demands.

The army will continue to be deployed for fighting sub-conventional operations in the foreseeable future. In addition, the aspirations of the human resource will multiply in geometric progression. Therefore, desired capacities have to be built into our recruitment system, training

philosophy, training methodology, training infrastructure in training academies, regimental training centres, divisional training schools and other military colleges/schools of instruction as also in our military thinking to produce motivated, efficient and stress-adapted officers and soldiers who are fit to face future warfare challenges efficiently. Commanders must realise that they on their own cannot motivate troops. However, they can create the right kind of climate which can lead to a significant enhancement in the motivation level of troops.

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