The Lessons of the 1973 Arab–Israeli War

K. Subrahmanyam
He worked at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses from 2010 to 2011 read more
Volume:48
Issue:3
From the Archives

This article is divided into three parts; an analysis of the war, its lessons and a chronology of events on a day-to-day basis, compiled from information available in public. The qualifi­cations in regard to the assessments presented here may be stated first and they are very important too. While the major events of the war are well established, their causations are not always known. All figures published about the force levels (by the Inter­national Institute for Strategic Studies, London) appeared to be underestimates in the case of at least equipment inventories and possibly in a number of cases of manpower as well. All figures given in the war communiques issued by both sides are to be treated with great reservations, but they, nevertheless, give an idea of what they believed in and what they wanted others to believe in. The total losses of equipment have not been announced by either side. The American estimates, which are often quoted, tend to fluctuate violently. Very often they are formulated with an eye on influencing Congressional opinion, to justify their resupply operations and, of course, for public relations purposes.