Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in Southern Asia
The complex triangular nuclear dynamics in the South Asian sub-continent with three nuclear weapon States—India, China and Pakistan—and the presence of two adversarial dyads (India-China, and India-Pakistan), embody the pursuit of the nuclear weapon capability as being unique to the region. The longstanding territorial and ideological disputes between the three States have forged different approaches to establishing an operational nuclear deterrence capability. Here, China and Pakistan have primarily positioned themselves as allies working to counter India’s influence in the region. In his book, Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in Southern Asia, Ashley J. Tellis analyses the transitions of the declaratory and operative doctrinal capabilities of the nuclear forces in the region. According to Tellis, the regional security competition between the three States is the primary rationale fuelling the development and modernization of nuclear weapons in the region. Pakistan sees nuclear capability as an equalizer against India’s conventional military power. China aims for nuclear superiority over India due to the presence of the US’ advanced technological and ballistic missile defence capabilities, especially in the Indian Ocean Region, and the broader Indo-Pacific. In contrast, India follows a path of strategic conservatism, focusing on a modest nuclear arsenal with a no-first-use policy. Additionally, the author establishes that nuclear weapons also serve as political instruments for all three States, rather than devices for true warfighting. He suggests that strategic stability in the region is more robust than their expanding arsenals would suggest.
